Keating, Michael. "Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.3, No.4 (1997): 689-717.

Keating, Michael. "Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.3, No.4 (1997): 689-717.

• Since the 1980s, there has been a debate about the impact of globalization on the nation-state, with some arguing that interconnectedness and a growth of international institutions will make nation-states irrelevant, while others say that new nationalism emerging from established nation-states show that the nation-state still has a future (689).
• Two different conceptions of nationalism are commonly used by political scientists, an expansive nationalism created by expanding modern rational modes of authority and destroying smaller identities, and a regressive nationalism formed by a reversion to older ethnic identities and a reject of modernity. Research is frequently confused by a lack of differentiation between these two definitions (690).
• The division between these two identities has been stated in a number of different ways by different scholars, but the core distinction is between civil nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The distinction here is between ethnic nationalism where membership in a community is designated at birth, and civic nationalism where communities are built from common values (690).
• The nation-state is a modern institution, which rose out of early modernity and the overlap of several forms of economic, social, and political organization in the same geographic space. The control of national economies by the nation-state is now being eroded from above by globalization and capital mobility, laterally by international markets, and from below by regionally or locally-based restructuring of the economy (691).
• The absence of state monopoly in economic areas is not new, but it has been greatly exacerbated in the contemporary world. The lack of economic sovereignty has eroded many of the inter-class agreements which underpinned welfare states and allowed citizens to again manifest multiple identities (692, 695, 711).
• There exist a number of reactions to the collapse of single-identity welfare politics. The first has been Neoliberalism and the individualization of economic action. The second is regional identity politics in which the larger nation-state is abandoned and replaced with a smaller usually-ethnic nation. The third proposes a revitalization of civic nationalism despite the constraints imposed by the globalized economic system (962).
• The ethnically-motivated slaughter that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the collapse of Yugoslavia has led many to fear that smaller nation-states are ethnically based as opposed to the larger civic nation-states there are trying to become independent from. There is no reason why this should be true, nor why small nation-states like Scotland cannot be based on a civic nationalism (692-693).
• Globalization weakens some forms of territorial nationalism by allowing international actors direct contact with local and regional actors, thereby eroding the monopoly of the central nation-state, especially in Europe with the reemergence of local languages and cultures (693).
• Globalization has fundamentally changed the way in which states must function, and the forms of nationalism pursued by new nationalisms do not try to assume the roles of previous nation-states, instead seeking a new international role in regulating contact with the forces of globalization within decentralized states (693-694).
• New nationalisms should focus on being culturally based rather than ethnically constructed, as ethnic nationalism only narrows the base of potential adherents. The cultural markers chosen by the nationalism must be strong enough to not collapse under universality, but be open enough to not impose ethnic supremacy (694).
• The author examines the nationalist movements in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia. Dr. Keating claims that these countries best represent new forms of nationalism, as all express a civic identity, espouse free trade and international integration as strategies for approaching economic globalization, and do not aspire to status of classic nation-states (694-695).
• The three nations explored in this article take different approaches to the divide between ethnic and civic nationalism. Scotland has the most robust civic identity, having had to created a common culture to bridge ethnic divides between lowland and highland groups. Since its inception as an ethnic movement in the 1950s, Quebecois nationalism has become more regional, cultural, and willing to assimilate foreign populations. Catalan nationalism is similarly civic (695-696).
• Public opinion in Scotland seems to mimic official policy of civic nationalism, as divides between English and Scots, as well as between Protestants and Catholics, do not express themselves in significant political divides. Most non-Scots populations in the country identify as British rather than English or Welsh, and the Brits still vote for the Scottish National Party [SNP] regularly (696).
• Catalonia has also been forced to express civic identity, due to the foreign composition of the region, with the majority of residents having been born outside of Catalonia. High levels of mixed identity -- Spanish and Catalan -- are shown in all groups (696-697).
• The popular branch of the nationalist movement in Quebec is still very much ethnically constrained. Nationalist sentiment is overwhelmingly concentrated in the Francophone community, with little Quebecois identity among the Anglophone community or recent immigrant groups (697).
• The SNP practices the most orthodox nationalism of the nationalist movements examined, as it generally seeks nation-state status. However, it is more committed to the EU than any other British political party, and will support intergovernmental integration. Significant blocs in the movement prioritize this goal, and prefer home rule to independence (697-698).
• There is a split in the Quebecois nationalist movement between the independence-seeking Parti Quebecois and the Quebec Liberal Party, which seeks greater autonomy. Even the Parti Quebecois, however, demands free movement of goods and peoples with Canada, essentially retaining all the benefits of statehood (698).
• The Catalan nationalist movement specifically seeks greater autonomy for Catalonia, especially considering its socialist leanings, with the Convergencia i Unio Party [CiU] openly for autonomy, as opposed to the much less popular independence movement Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [ERdC] (698).
• All three nationalist movements assume continued security arrangements and protections, and do not develop any defense policy of their own. In fact, the Quebecois nationalist movement in particular assumes the continuation of beneficial Canadian institutions alongside new federally devolved powers (698).
• Levels of support for autonomy are significantly higher than those for independence. Even in Scotland, with majority support for independence, a sovereign Scotland without integration in the EU garners minimal support (699).
• Since the 1960s, the status of the Francophone community has risen from emphasizing survival in Anglophone Canada, to advancing French businesses and restricting access to English-language schools in the province. The Francophone domination of education, with the exception of an Anglophone minority with certain rights, has allowed the expansion of Quebecois nationalism beyond ethnic lines (701).
• The security of the Francophone community in Quebec is now much more secure than in the 1960s, with the Quebec Liberal Party decided in no longer needed to enforce many restricts which promoted French at the cost of English knowledge, and therefore harmed business interests. (701-702).
• Catalonian language policy has encourage bilingualism or multilingualism instead of exacerbating linguistic or ethnic divides. Schools are taught in Catalan, but also require children to speak Spanish and a foreign language to graduate, thereby maintaining the local linguistic tradition and promoting the study of competitive languages needed for business (702).
• Large numbers of people born outside Catalonia still do not speak Catalan, but this divide is narrow among the younger generation. The large communities of non-speakers are a remanent of the Franco era, and will disappear in the coming decades as bilingual youth replace them (702-703).
• In Scotland, Quebec, and Catalonia, civil society organizations and voluntary associations are notably distinct from national organizations -- in Scotland this is especially pronounced in sports teams (703). The rise of these associations has been paralleled with the expansion of regional government in each of the countries studied (704).
• Trade unions are usually organized on the same federal model. Despite having local branches in each of these region, Scottish, Quebecois, and Catalan trade unions do not function significantly different from their British, Canadian, and French counterparts (703-704).
• Many elements within nationalist movements argue in favor of increased free trade compared to the policies of their current nations, although this could potentially raise issues with the idea of independence considering the minimal bargaining power of new states, as well as the difficulty of state-building in a globalized economic market (706).
• In Quebec there has been a concerted effort since the 1960s to increase the number of businesses, especially large firms, run by French-speakers. This movement has allowed Quebecois business to do well internationally, although some criticize that independence would spoil its currently advantageous position (706).
• Business in Scotland is not explicitly connected to nationalist identity, and Scottish ownership has actually been declining as businesses nationalized after WWII were sold to the highest bidder, usually non-Scots, during the Thatcher administration (707).
• Catalan nationalism in the Republican era centered on business interests rallying against the protectionist and archaic Spanish state, although the contemporary nationalism does not appear to be as explicitly centered on business. Instead, Catalonia depends more on international capital than other parts of Spain, resulting in a perception among the business community that Spain does not contribute very much to Catalan success (707).
• Quebec has undertaken a massive international role to promote investment in the region, strengthen cultural ties, and legitimate the nationalist movement. At one point, the Quebecois government had its own foreign ministry, which lobbied Wall Street groups for investment and promoted connections with the Francophone world. This project was derailed in 1996, however, after severe budget cuts (708).
• Catalonia has promoted the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions', but has not taken any concrete steps to create this reality. It maintains its own representation in Brussels, but does not have a wider international network (709).
• Scotland maintains its own international offices to promote investment and tourism, but does not actively advance its interests internationally nor maintain a strong office in Brussels (709).
• New forms of nationalism have emerged which are not contradictory with the modernizing state, nor explicitly call for independence. Although drawing on historic roots, new kinds of nationalism propose novel organizations of responsibility between their regions and the central government (710).
• "The civic conception of the nation continues to compete with the ethnic, but the former has been gaining ground. It is dominant in Scotland, largely dominant in Catalonia and stronger in Quebec, though here there continues to exist a sharp ethnic distinction based on language. This modernized nationalism represents, not a lapse into tribalism or identity politics, but a search for collective identity and a capacity for collective action in a complex world" (711).