Kandiyoti, Rafael. "What price access to the open seas? The geopolitics of oil and gas transmission from the Trans-Caspian republics". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.1 (2008): 75-93.

Kandiyoti, Rafael. "What price access to the open seas? The geopolitics of oil and gas transmission from the Trans-Caspian republics". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.1 (2008): 75-93.

• The Soviet Union had the world's largest hydrocarbon production by the 1980s, with most of its reserves landlocked or on the Caspian Sea. This required a complex system of gas and oil infrastructure and pipelines often constructed w/o regard for republican borders. This became an issue after the collapse of the USSR, as states each claimed control of energy infrastructure in their territory, leading to disputes over transit prices and energy flows which detrimentally impacted the function of energy markets in the former Soviet Union (76).
• The rediscovery of massive oil and gas reserves in Russia in mid-2004 has led to the resurgence of Russia on the world stage, as domestic cash flows from fuel reserves have allowed Russia to end its dependence on Western capital, renegotiate unfair contracts made under President Yeltsin, and assert itself internationally (76).
• Russia has never really stopped considering the territories of the former Soviet Union to be part of its sphere of influence, and the contemporary Russian government clearly wants to continue exerting political control over the region. Russia has been leveraging its control of pipelines and other energy infrastructure in the former USSR to increase its influence and maximize Russian profits. To this end, the Russian monopoly as a gas client is exploited to reward friendly relations and when foreign oil competes with Russian products, as Kazakhstan did in the 1990s, the Russians close the pipelines to prevent competition (76).
• The Central Asian republics are not restricted to Russian import markets by geography or necessity during this period, but by a lack of funding and politics. Transmission to India or Pakistan is prevented by the Civil War in Afghanistan. Pipelines to Chinese require huge quantities of yet unavailable funding. Tankers, rather than pipelines, transport hydrocarbons over the undemarcated  Caspian Sea, and exports to Iran threaten further angering the West (76).
• During the Soviet Union the tremendous oil and gas reserves of the RSFS meant that the government did not really explore or fully develop hydrocarbon reserves outside of the RSFS or the TSSR. For this reason, the Caspian reserves generated immense interest in the West during the 1990s with the total being calculated from 200 billion barrels by imperialists to 4 billion by those who wanted the region to remain in the shadow of the Kremlin. Currently extraction is still relatively minor and does not have a major effect on global markets (77).
• Because of historic and contemporary low levels of extractive activities, the total reserves are more important than the productional values. These values are still murky, but may be in the range of 35 to 50 billion barrels for the Caspian Sea region. These values are high enough to attract attention, but nothing compared to the hundreds of billions in the Persian Gulf and Iran (78).
• Contemporary Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all depend on hydrocarbon resources to different degrees. Turkmenistan mainly exports gas and modest amounts of oil. Kazakhstan exports significant amounts of oil and gas. Uzbekistan exports small amounts of gas, although this remains a fraction of total exports. All exports are sent through Russia, as no alternative pipelines exist at this point (78).
• The vast majority of Kazakhstan's oil and gas extraction takes place in one of three large onshore fields on the Caspian coast: Tengiz, Uzen and Karachaganak. Of this Tengiz is the largest, with between 6 and 9 billion barrels of oil that places it among the top 10 in size. The Kashagan off-shore field is still in development and may continue to be so for a while, but it is expected to produce 1 million barrels a day -- more than 3/4 of current daily production -- when it comes online (78).
• When Kazakhstan and Russian signed the first contracts with international oil firms which now control much of production, their governments were insolvent and oil prices were low leading to unfavourable contracts. Post 2004 and the subsequent increase of oil commodity prices, Kazakhstan and Russia have forcibly renegotiated these contracts to assume more favourable terms at the expense of company presence (79).
• Kazakhstan's oil and gas fields are on the Caspian Shore and totally unconnected to industrial centers in the East and South. As a result, oil imports must come from Omsk to the East as oil exports are sent to Samara. The population centres of Astana and Almaty are totally dependent of Uzbekistan for their gas imports (79).
• When oil prices slumped globally the dependence on Russian oil infrastructure created an extremely negative situation for Kazakhstan, as Transneft set a 76,000 barrels per day quota on Kazakhstani imports to reduce competition, far below the amount needed to retain profitability (79).
• Kazakhstan has tried to diversify its export markets by setting up a trade deal with Iran -- despite objections from the USA -- and a new pipeline towards China which has replaced railways and should soon be upgraded to 20 million tons per annum capacity (79).
• The project most responsible for unlocking the potential of Kazakhstani hydrocarbon exports onto global markets was the Caspian Pipeline designed from Tengiz gas field to the Russian port of Yuzhnaya Ozerevka in Krasnodarskii Krai, finished in 2001 with an annual capacity of 28 million tons. This pipeline is managed by Transneft and controlled by Russia (79). 
• Russia has been gradually making the pipeline arrangement less comfortable for Kazakhstan, increasing transit fees and stalling plans for expansions, which might compete with Russia's own oil and gas exports to the West (80).
• Oil from the Caspian pipeline has a very limited range of possible export options, with those potential ports of export being determined by Russia. This has resulted in smaller profits and more economic dependence on Russia for maintaining current budgetary practices (82).
• Kazakhstan has tried to diversify its export markets to include Iran, but such attempts have met opposition from Russia and the USA. Russia wants to keep Kazakhstan dependent on existent pipelines and the USA wants to continue isolating Iran (83). 
• Turkmenistan has sizable gas reserves of approximately 2.8 trillion cubic litres at this time connected only to the Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline (CA-C), a route with a combined capacity of 90 billion cubic litres per annum entirely through Russian territory. Turkmenistan would prefer to pay a transit fee for the pipeline and sell to European markets, but instead Gazprom forces the Turkmen government to sell the gas for domestic consumption in Russia, so that Russian gas can be sold at higher prices to Europe (83).
• The officials involved in negotiations about gas sales on both sides were Soviet-era officials and President Niyazov suspected his own party of giving him a bad deal. Turkmen gas garnered very small profits in the 1990s, leading to massive decline in production as sales to Ukraine, Armenia, and other former Soviet republics were abandoned due to lack of profits (83). 
• A utter dearth of options of export -- since Iran, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan are all poor options for the exports of Turkmen gas -- led President Niyazov's administration to reopen negotiations with Gazprom in 1999, leading to a deal where Turkmen gas is purchased by Russia and sold in Europe and Ukraine (85).
• The gas prices resolved at these meetings were minimal and resulted in significant discontent on the Turkmen side. For the first several years the Russians were uncompromising, however when Turkmenistan began withholding gas in 2005 they succeeded to getting the price raised to $58 per 100 cubic metres (85). This was increased to $150 USD per 100 cubic metres in 2008 (88).
• There have been talks about connecting Turkmenistan to Caucasian gas infrastructure through pipelines underneath the Caspian Sea, but the refusal of all parties to delineate the littoral borders have stalled negotiations. Also President Aliyev of Azerbaijan has a particular dislike of President Niyazov (83).
• Turkmenistan has expressed interest in building a pipeline through Iran and connecting to international markets through gas infrastructure in Turkey, however strong US opposition to any project involving Iran has caused both the Turkish and Turkmen government to shy away from this investment during this period (84).
• Turkmenistan has also been interested in connecting to energy infrastructure and markets in Pakistan and India, but such a project would involve stability in Afghanistan, which is utterly lacking during this period of Civil War. Neither the Taliban nor NATO forces could guarantee the project's security (84).
•  Turkmenistan has kept such dreams alive, and continues to be a major force among the states bordering Afghanistan arguing for the construction of transnational energy infrastructure (85).
• Turkmenistan has been in negotiations with a Chinese firm to export gas to China since 2006, despite the fact that their contract with Gazprom accounted for the sale of all gas produced at current rates of extraction until 2025. Gazprom was been repeatedly bullied by Turkmenistan into paying more for gas as Chinese competition increases, with the price jumping to $100 USD per 100 cubic metres in 2007 (86).
• Iran has a number of gas transfer deals with Caspian littoral states and some countries in Central Asia by which Iran receives Caspian oil and gas to its industrial centres and sell its gas and oil from the gas, with the other state receiving a portion of the profit. Despite US pressure, this would make sense as currently all of the Central Asians states are paying exorbitant transfer fees to Russia (87).
• "We have seen how, after some agonizing within the limited room for manoeuvre gained at independence, oil rich Kazakhstan decided there was no real alternative to their close ties with the Russian Federation. Turkmenistan could not be faulted for effort, but has similarly failed – to date – to find major alternative routes for exporting its natural gas. However, after several attempts, both countries have managed to lay limited groundwork for new outlets, for at least a part of their fossil fuel exports" (89).
• Due to its energy self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan has been slow to change its energy policies or strengthen relations with any state in particular. Uzbekistan has pursued ties with Russia, China, and the West, and is exploring energy market opportunities with all these states, but its economy does not depend on gas exports (89).
• Even in the Uzbekistani case, however, the dominance of Russian companies is secure. The West has made little effort to actual entrench itself in the region and China is still a developing power w/o strong connections. The existence of Russian influence and infrastructure mean that Russia will remain to main energy power in Central Asia for a number of years to come (90).
• Russian control is managed through the control of nearly all pipelines heading out of Central Asia and elsewhere in the former USSR. At this time all gas and oil exports out of Central Asia have to go by rail or through pipelines controlled by Transneft, essentially the Russian state (90).
• The potentially of stability in Afghanistan or rapprochement between Iran and the West could led to new avenues of export for the petrochemical-rich states of the Caspian. If these pathways of developed they would potentially prevent Russia from strengthening its position in Central Asia, however both routes would require enormous geopolitical changes (90).