Hurrell, Andrew. "Global Inequality and International Institutions". Metaphilosophy, Vol.32, No.1 (2001): 34-57.

Hurrell, Andrew. "Global Inequality and International Institutions". Metaphilosophy, Vol.32, No.1 (2001): 34-57.

• The advent of globalization has undoubtedly increased the density and depth of economic, social, and ecological connections across the Earth. The change has rendered the previous classification of the world into distinct domestic and international spheres indefensible, prompting a change in global justice philosophy (35-36).
• Despite these changes, there is still a difference between increased economic globalization and the formation of a common global community. Increased trade relations have not generally engendered a common global identity or sense of responsibility to other humans in the same way as exists within nations (36).
• This globalization has also resulted in the creation of an international civil society, independent of national governments and economic interests. They play an important role in the construction of international norms, as well as encourage cooperation between professionals. These international NGOs may currently be benevolent, but their influence is still questionable, as they remain independent of democratic controls (37).
• The author chooses to focus on the economic aspects of globalization as representative of the emerging international order. The international markets which have emerged are deeply political creations and their widespread affects should be considered the results of political agreements (38).
• Many of the philosophers denying the application of the principles of redistributive justice on the international sphere make these assertions on the basis of assumptions about national autarky which are no longer true in a globalized world. Whether international institutions as they currently exist trigger international responsibility is debated among philosophers (39).
• The international system emerging after WWII has created and institutionalized a shared system of norms in political and economic spheres, constructed a moral sentiment and arguments to defend these norms in a way accepted by the vast majority of states. These norms are broadly recognized as legitimate (41).
• International institutions have been an important step in create a unified community of nations, creating norms which domestic populations hold their leadership accountable, dominating conversations of the legitimacy of state action, and created opportunities for individuals to be held accountable outside of national law, such as through the International Criminal Court (42-43).
• The system of international law which nations generally recognize as legitimate, as well as a trend of increasing legitimacy and power of international institutions means that a global moral order exists and is in the process of strengthening (43).
• It could be argued that the fact that the global moral order was created by a select group of powerful countries means that its values are not universal, this would belie that fact that most states still accept these values are legitimate regardless of their origin (46).
• The contemporary system of international institutions is weak and imperfect, as the global political and moral order coexists with a state-dominated political and economic system. This means that international institutions are still unequal, granting access selective to the most powerful states. Powerful countries are able to dictate terms to weaker countries, as well as flout laws which weaker countries could not (43).
• The primary issue with the global economic and political system is that its unequal access to power and authority is necessary for its functionality. No international organizations function without state support, meaning that it is the unequal power of certain states which makes any effective cooperation possible. This means that the solutions to global injustice must focus on changing the goals of current international institutions, rather than refashioning a new system with a different basis of power (44).
• The author recognizes that there is difference in the methods used to achieved procedural justice as opposed to redistributive justice. While the contemporary unequal global order is obviously unjust on procedural grounds, it can be argued that it remains just on redistributive grounds (44-45). 
• This unequal distribution of political and economic power in the international system means that attempts to reform the system must come from powerful actors and that these attempts must be informed by the beliefs of the weaker states so that they are not entirely excluded from the process of reform (46-47).
• "Poverty reduction and the relief of individual suffering are not enough and cannot displace the need for economic growth and development" (47).
• Some scholars like John Rawls and John Miller claim that the sources of inequality and underdevelopment are domestic and not related to the international system, meaning that no duty to help these societies exists. This view ignores the importance of foreign powers and international actors in determining national economic policy, both through effects on a shared global economy or through deliberate interventions designed to control national economic policies (48-49).
• The structure of the contemporary global economic order contradicts this claim, as powerful states impose policies and decisions on weaker states. This imposition may result in negative economic effects, it is unclear, but certain curtails democracy and the development of national institutions by exporting important decisions to unaccountable foreign or international bodies (49-50).
• Despite the talk of global redistributive justice in philosophical circles, it has not been seriously considered by any existing international body since the Global South movement of the 1960s and 1970s, whose proposals were universally rejected by all other states. No agreement or negotiation after the Uruguay Round and the creation of the Washington Consensus has even mentioned redistribution of wealth across partner countries (50-52).
• The author believes that strong moral arguments in favour of economic redistribution are necessary because it is not clearly in the interests of wealthy states to redistribute. Absent any strong moral pressure of their populations, the power dynamic between rich and poor states is likely too large for pressure from the poor states to bring about a change in the global economic order (54).