Harling, Peter. “Beyond Political Ruptures: Towards a historiography of social continuity in Iraq”. In Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and political challenges, edited by Jordi Tejel, Peter Sluglett, Riccardo Bocco, and Hamit Bozarslan, 61-86. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2012.

Harling, Peter. “Beyond Political Ruptures: Towards a historiography of social continuity in Iraq”. In Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and political challenges, edited by Jordi Tejel, Peter Sluglett, Riccardo Bocco, and Hamit Bozarslan, 61-86. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2012.

• The collapse of the Iraqi state following the 2003 American invasion created a vacuum in Iraqi society that led to the domination of identity politicals and sectarian divides. These divisions, however, had their origin in Iraqi history (61).
• "The fall of the regime gave way to a desolate landscape: state institutions were thoroughly looted, often by employees ransacking their own sources of income, revealing a powerful survival ethos focused on instant gain in the face of uncertainty. Previously powerful tribal leaders appeared bewildered and helpless; exiled Islamist parties returned, and upon discovering that they had no significant social base, turned to US sponsorship, militia activity and sectarianism. Former regime officials were at pains to reorganize themselves into an effective opposition. While the traditional Shi‘i marja‘iya was challenged by an expansive Mahdist movement, the Sunni religious establishment, which had by and large been associated with the regime, was overtaken by a rising, if disorganized, Salafi undercurrent (63).
• The US occupational administration was expected to assume many of the responsibilities of Saddam Hussein's government. Both elites and common citizenry expected the Americans to be the dominant political force (63-64).
• The establishment of a sectarian political system in Iraq was the result of American misconceptions about Iraq and the dominance of sectarian narratives among the powerful exile community that returned to Iraq in 2003 (64). The USA did not want sectarianism nor did it create it, but the occupational regime exacerbated sectarian tensions (65).
• The use of sectarian narratives became even more pronounced within Iraq in the months after the invasion as it became increasingly apparent to exiles that they had no support into Iraq. Using sectarian narratives generated otherwise non-existent support for these figures during the collapse of the state and regime (64).
• Reforms intended to establish a new government and enact transitional justice, like the de-Baathification project, were instead used by new elites to strike against Sunnis and thus reify the ethno-sectarian narrative of Iraqi politics (64-65).
• The US occupational administration was incompetent and did not recognize the harm being done to Iraqi society by the exiles and other new elites. It instead focused almost entirely on Al Qaeda and other resistance groups while uncritically supporting the recommendations of their local allies (65).
• Fearing Iranian influence among populist politicians in the Shia community, the US occupational authority sided against poor and disenfranchised Shia and with conservative elite Shia groups. This inflamed social tensions while failing to stop the proliferation of Iranian influence in formal politics (65).
• There was no common Sunni identity during the Baathist period, as evidenced by the manifold divisions within Sunni Iraqi society. However, the US thought that Sunnis were dominant and implemented policies inspired by sectarian interpretations of Iraqi society that resulted in genuine sectarian divides (71).
• The concentration of power in Saddam Hussein during the 1970s eroded the important and support of Iraqi institutions, including tribal and sectarian identities (66). 
• This also had a definite effect on Iraqi institutions, including the armed forces, as they were poorly organized to prevent them from challenging Saddam Hussein. This was reflected in the poor performance of the Iraqi military in 2003 (66).
• American policymakers during the occupation latched onto the concept of 'tribes' as a basis of Iraqi society, organized around real or fictive kinship structure and shared myths. Leadership was, supposedly, conferred upon individuals through bloodline and personal merit (67-68).
• During the late Ottoman period, many Iraqi tribal leaders reached an agreement with the Ottoman government that they would control their tribal populations and make them available for paid labor, in return they would receive tax exemptions, large land holdings, and the right of arbitrary rule over their subject tribesmen. This change alienated the tribal leaders, shuyukh, from their subject population (68).
• The Republic of Iraq finally ended the domination of shuyukh in rural areas by redistributing land and greatly diminishing the power that tribal administrative structures held over the population (68).
• Saddam Hussein's government gave tribes renewed political salience in the 1980s and 1990s by co-opting them into the security apparatus. Shuyukh received public sector jobs and toleration for their criminal activities if they became clients of the Hussein government; they then offered the patronage from these activities to tribesmen in exchange for political support (68).
• The system of tribal patronage developed during the 1980s and 1990s was fundamentally different from earlier systems of tribal power based on kinship or land tenure. Power within the tribe came from the support of the Hussein government and the most powerful tribes were those most strongly aligned to the government (68-69).
• Tribal groups almost immediately betrayed Saddam Hussein after the American invasion, being important parts of the transition in Falluja or Baiji. The Americans were generally baffled by tribes and had difficulty differentiating real leaders from many fake shuyukh claiming to have supporters. The few experiences in employing tribes were failures due to corruption and the unreliability of tribal forces (69).
• With the state overthrown, tribes were weak and feckless and lost much of their support. The remaining structures of tribes were incorporated into other movements, especially Islamists, as was the case for Shias in Basra and Sunnis in Anbar (69-70).
• Later on, the US occupational authorities hired tribal militias to serve as sahwat. These groups had a more formal relationship with the USA and were motivated to fight because defeat might they would be killed by Al Qaeda (70).
• Since coming to power, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been unwilling to support the sahwat, although he has institutionalized tribes in the south and along the border with Kurdistan through 'isnad councils', bodies that dispense stipends to tribesmen who participate in security and vote for Nouri al Maliki and his allies (70).
• In the post-US environment tribes have either tried to become independent political forces, especially in Ramadi, Tikrit, and Samawa, or to sell their loyalties to various political parties in exchange for patronage (70).
• The presence of tribesmen in the security forces, especially the sahwat in the north, remained common in 2008. Urbanites often complained about the dominance of rural tribespeople in the security forces (70-71).
• Contrary to some claims, the primary social divisions in Iraqi society during the Baathist period were not between rural and urban elites. Major urban areas had rapidly expanded in size since independence, resulting in competition between established urban elites and new rural-immigrant elites (71). Saddam Hussein supported this new urban class against the established urban elites (72).
• Sunni religious movements in Iraq had been weakened by divisions within the Sunni elite and through government control over religion, especially the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s and 1970s (72).
• During the 1990s, the Hussein government allowed more religious expression and promoted religion through the 'National Faith Movement'. Wahhabists were tolerated and became more popular during this period (72).
• More extreme Salafi currents became more prominent during the 2000s, sometimes expressed in arson of liquor stores or cinemas or attacks on Christians (72). The Hussein government sought to suppress Salafism and jihadism, arresting known Salafis. Despite this, Salafism became increasingly popular, even within Iraqi government and security services (73).
• The Sunni insurgency developed in the context of a marginalized Sunni population without a strong basis for mobilization. The insurgency developed from small groups linked by family, professional, tribal, local, or religious ties. Baathists and former security officers were particularly important in uniting these groups due to their organization and resources (73-74).
• From within the disorganized and fragmented insurgency, Salafi groups came to predominate because its ideology allowed all enemies -- Americans, Shias, Sunni exiles -- to be labeled infidels. The international financial resources of Jihadi groups and their innovative use of communication technology led to Salafi ideology dominating the insurgency (74).
• Salafism also held the potential to be utilized by multiple Sunni groups in different ways, as it could be used as a frame of reference to justify anti-establishment violence against tribal or religious leadership (74).
• The insurgency's turn towards Salafism, and particularly its development into an anti-establishment movement, led to a conservative backlash within Sunni communities, who then mobilized themselves as 'Awakening Councils' or 'Sons of Iraq' and allied with the USA against Salafi groups. Some Salafist groups switched sides and joined the Sahwa (75).]
• The present [2012] situation of Sunni Arabs in Iraq is unknown, as they may continue to be denied adequate federal representation. The legitimacy of tribal authorities is also being challenged, as non-Sahwa tribes challenge the authority of tribes who sided with the USA (75).
• Sunnis also remained divided along regional and local lines, with Mosul standing out for its unique connections to Syria and Turkey and history of insurrection against the central government. Local tensions are especially prominent between Samarra and Tikrit and in Diyala (75-76).
• Since 2003, there has been a class struggle within the Shia community between the poor, represented by the Sadrist movement, and a conservative Shia coalition of exiles, allied tribes, and the urban elite (76).
• Support for the Sadrists is strongest among peripheral urban that were founded as shantytowns by rural migrants during the Monarch and First Republic. The urban development projects of the late 1950s and early 1960s did not get rid of strong communities identities in these slum neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were entirely neglected after the 1991 Gulf War and developed a strong criminal culture (76-77).
• The presence of these socially differentiated poor suburbs to major cities sparked fears among the urban elites and upper classes that any disorder would led to mob violence (77-78).
• These slums had always been a site for insurrectionary and revolutionary social movements, especially Communism and Islamism. Sadrism also emerged from these areas, mainly among 20 to 30-year-olds. The defining political experiences of these cadres were the economic hardship caused by the American embargo and the failure of the 1991 uprising  (77-78).
• The Sadrists rejected the claims of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and al Dawa to represent the Shia population. These groups represented the interests of the exiles, the Shia clerical establishment, the middle classes, and certain tribal groups (78-79).
• The movement drew inspiration from Muhammad al Sadr, a cleric who had been promoted to oppose the traditional Shia clergy and was then assassinated when his nationalist, populist, anti-American, and anti-Iranian rhetoric proved too popular (79). 
• There are also local divides among the Iraqi Shia, particularly between Basra and Baghdad, with the latter feeling it has been exploited by the former (79-80).
• During the Iraqi Civil War, which raged in Baghdad during 2006 and 2007, there were numerous atrocities against civilians (80). Mixed neighbors or those of a different religion were subject to attacks to soften them for militia attacks; areas taken by different militia groups were subject to ethnic cleansing (81).
• Sadrist forces were concentrated in the slums of al Thawra, al Fudhayliya, al Shula, and al Washshash; the poor youth of these neighborhoods were the main forces of the Mahdi Army, which tried to expand into mixed and middle-class areas of Baghdad (80-81).
• Sadrist forces specifically tried to attack logistical lines,