Cohn, Carol. "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals". Signs, Vol.12, No.4 (1987): 687-718.

Cohn, Carol. "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals". Signs, Vol.12, No.4 (1987): 687-718.

• Defense intellectuals justify the position that it is a strategic necessity for the USA to possess nuclear weapons, but that their use would be catastrophic and must be avoided at all times (687-688).
• During her investigation into the logic behind the thinking of defense intellectuals, the author found that her logic and assumptions had also changed, as she became socialized with the defense intellectual community. This demonstrates the inability in social sciences for the researcher to be truly objective or distant from the subject (688, 712-713).
• The author describes the language used by defense intellectuals as 'technostrategic'. The vocabulary of their discussions of nuclear strategy are characterized by euphemism (690), and discussions of the horrific consequences of nuclear attack are minimized (691-692, 705-706), with bland and innocuous language being used to describe horrific scenarios (698).
• The author claims that discussions of missile technology are riddled with sexual innuendo and metaphor [I am skeptical of this claim, as none of the provided examples are explicitly or overtly sexual. To read it that way, you need to be looking for it] and that this way of speaking is so playful as to diminish the serious and depressing nature of nuclear war (693-696).
• Discussions of virginity in nuclear strategy are also semi-sexual, denoting a refusal of the implicitly sinful experience of having nuclear weapons. It is spoken of positively, often in masculine language, when India or the USA 'loses its virginity', but in feminine language when other nations, like New Zealand, try to preserve theirs (696).
• There is a surprising amount of religious language and analogy among the nuclear science community, despite general agnosticism. Many scientists have discussed nuclear weapons as possessing a variety of divine power (702).
• The language used is replete with acronyms, which are often quite fun to say. The use of these acronyms provides abstraction from the actual nature of nuclear policies or systems, allowing the concepts to be discussed in a less emotion and attached way (703-704).
• The author attempted, at one point during a joint course with defense intellectuals, to only speak regular English rather than the technical jargon, or 'technostrategic', language that characterized discussions among defense intellectuals. The author discovered that she was ignored and dismissed when she did not use the technostrategic language, and was instantly accepted when she did use appropriate technical terms (707-708).
• Technostrategic language, however, is limited in the concepts and ideas that can be expressed. The actual reality of holocaust that would result from nuclear exchange is muted by speaking technostrategic and some concepts, like peace, are not adequately captured by equivalent terms in technostrategic (708-709). The biggest omission here is the inability of technostrategic to discuss human concerns or human lives in a way that does not privilege military infrastructure (711-712).
• The use of this language allows defense intellectuals to distance themselves from the horrible realities of the topic that they are discussing, allowing for less charged and more reasoned discussions. However, this is also a negative, as this approach marginalizes moral and philosophic arguments and assumptions within IR theory and security studies (715).
• The possession of nuclear weapons, and the power dynamics between nuclear and non-nuclear nations, were often framed in patronizing and parental terms. While the USA was strong and responsible, other countries were weak, childish, and irresponsible and thus did not deserve nuclear weapons. This framing also justified US threats of overwhelming and disproportionate force while delegitimizing similar moves by other countries (697).
• Nuclear weapons are often described using analogies of male birth or reproduction, reflecting the heavily masculine world of the defense industry. Military officers or scientists will often call themselves the 'mothers' of weapon systems or claim to have played a maternal role in their creations, who are always discussed as 'sons' (699-701).
• US strategic strategists based their nuclear posture strategies on Soviet military capabilities, not their intents. This meant that all plans were created as if the USSR planned to launch a full-out nuclear attack on the United States. While this can be justified for hypothetical strategy, these worst-case scenarios often influenced actual US policy more than those strategies informed by intelligence regarding Soviet intentions or doctrine (707).
• Another major problem was the assumption within the community that the USSR and USA were both rational actors with accurate information on the intents and capabilities of the other side. This assumption underlies concepts like limited nuclear war, but is fundamentally untrue, as states -- especially after nuclear exchanges -- are irrational and poorly or partially informed (709).
• The reference object in discussions of defense intellectual is not human beings, not even the defense intellectuals themselves, but the military capabilities of countries. The lives of people only matter in terms of the ability to produce and operate nuclear weapons systems, and it is the protection of these system that is prioritized in nuclear strategy (711).
• Deconstruction of the imagery, vocabulary, and language used by defense intellectuals undermines claims to rationality and objectivity, as it is just as full of emotive reasoning as the pacifist arguments that are criticized as idealist and unrealistic (717).