Cohen, Stephen. "India and the Region". In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, edited by David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, 341-355. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Cohen, Stephen. "India and the Region". In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, edited by David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, 341-355. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

• The term 'South Asia' only came into usage in the 1960s, replacing terms like the Indian subcontinent or the Raj. It is the least contested of the many terms used to describe the region. It is a deeply heterogeneous region, however, and has fuzzy borders at Afghanistan, China, and Myanmar (341).
• Traditional representations of South Asia view its borders as firmly placed at the Indian Ocean, the Himalayas, the Arakan Mountains, and the Hindu Kush. These boundaries, especially the Indian Ocean, are all porous and do not make natural borders. Historically the region was never united until British colonial rule and historical polities crossed the borders of South Asia into other regions (342).
• Under the British Raj, Indian foreign relations were handled by the Indian Political Service, which managed relations between the British Raj and the independent princely states as well as with the imperial powers of Russia, Iran, and China. These external relations involved the heavy involvement of the army (343).
• Much of this foreign affairs capacity was destroyed following Partition with the disbandment of the Indian Political Service and the division of its staff between India, Pakistan, and Britain. The military capacity of India was also guttered by Partition as the Punjabi base of the armed forces mainly joined Pakistan (343).
• Indian diplomats and policymakers inherited the same assumption as British policymakers that India needed to maintain a series of friendly states on its borders (344).
• The British had been reticent to endorse partition and actively lobbied for India to remain as united as possible, seeing a united India as an important bulwark against Communism and radical Islamism (344).
• Jawaharlal Nehru and other early Indian leaders had also resisted partition and viewed the division of the subcontinent between India and Pakistan as unnatural. Prime Minister Nehru assumed that Pakistan and India would eventually reunify, even if it was after a war (344).
• Indian plans for an early hegemony in South Asia, and eventually all of Asia, proved fruitless as India was unable to resolve its dispute with Pakistan and has been consistently and repeatedly outclassed by China. Neither of these regional issues has been successfully resolved in the decades since (344-345).
• South Asia is the least integrated of global regions, and has actually become less connected since independence. South Asian states, particularly India, have failed to invest in infrastructure, leaving the region with crumbling and dysfunctional railroads, roads, airports, and some of the world's least efficient ports (345).
• Many of the impediments to trade in South Asia stem from 1947, when railways and roads were closed off following Partition and never reopened. Under the Nehru government, further isolation was imposed through tariffs and restrictions (345).
• In the presence of such large formal restrictions on trade and commerce between South Asian countries, trade has been facilitated by massive smuggling networks. Migration has also continued, usually through human trafficking groups (345).
• Organizations designed to integrate South Asia, like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] have failed to achieve meaningful progress towards integration or cooperation (348). This is partially because India has been totally unwilling to make the concessions necessary for the organization to function (352).
• The Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs are poorly thought-out and seem to be gradually moving towards a nuclear arms race due to the absence of other clear objectives about the purpose of the nuclear weapons program. Indian goals of matching Chinese prestige through acquiring nuclear weapons have failed and led to its diplomatic isolation. All that the Indian nuclear program has done is increase the danger posed by conflict with its neighbors (346).
• "South Asia is characterized by different theories about organizing socially complex states and peoples. The Nehruvian view plays the long game: a benevolent, secular India will, sooner or later, dominate the region peacefully, and its minorities would be protected by the state. The Hindutva view, [...], stresses that Hinduism’s inherent tolerance ensures that loyal minorities will be protected" (346).
• Indian thinking about the involvement of foreign powers in South Asia is shaped by a narrative of colonialism being the result of superior military technology and the internal division of India. Accordingly, India is constantly suspicious of foreign influence and sees transfer of military technology as an important symbol of loyalty (347-348). 
• The peripheral South Asian states have consistently sought to involve foreign countries to balance against Indian power in the region. Much to Indian chagrin, this has allowed all the other South Asian states to resist Indian power with foreign assistance (348).
• India seeks to position itself as a regional rival to China, but the Chinese did not consider it an equal power and refuse to give concessions to India on border disputes or other issues. India has fixated on the idea that if it becomes a stronger nuclear power, then China will respect it, but China has made it very clear that it doesn't care about India's nukes and that earning Chinese respect would require a much wider economic, political, and strategic transformation (348).
• China believes that India inherited Britain's imperial agenda and seeks to establish hegemony over South Asia. India's instance on the McMahon borderline, its annexation of Sikkim, and its interference in Nepal and Bangladesh also confirm Chinese fears. China does not consider India a potent rival, but does actively try to limit its influence (349).
• China backed Pakistan out of its desire to counter both Indian and Soviet influence in South Asia. This relationship has been great since Pakistan has been totally dependent on China, whose assistance has transformed Pakistan into a nuclear power capable of challenging China (349).
• India leaned towards the USSR during the Cold War, as the Soviet Union was its largest weapons supplier and a major trading partner. The collapse of the USSR has been especially harmful because many Indian politicians and diplomats have failed to adjust to the new reality and have maintained outdated attitudes on foreign affairs (349).
• America has backed India to a degree since the 1962 war against China, but it was always considered a peripheral territory to American Cold War interests. Interest only heated up in the 1990s, first antagonistic over Indian nuclear tests and then strengthening following 2001 as India was recognized as a partner against Islamic extremism (350).
• India has hoped to use a better relationship with America to damage the position of Pakistan, but has been unsuccessful with this. America refuses to link its relationships with India and Pakistan, and has not paid attention to Indian concerns in Afghanistan or elsewhere (350).
• India has been consistently outclassed and outmaneuvered by China, Russia, and the USA in Asia. Most of its regional initiatives have ended in failure. It was pushed out of Central Asia by Russia and China, and out of Southeast Asia by China and the USA (350-351).
• Indian foreign policy failures have been consistent due to a number of factors: weak civilian control over the military, the fact that the Indian foreign service is understaffed and undertrained, and an absence of strategic vision from the central government. In the absence of directives from the central government, state governments and the military have become the main forces shaping foreign policy, usually coordinating with neither each other nor the central government (351-352).
• The Indian strategic position is very fragile as it does not have a strong relationship with any of the world powers, faces the constant prospect of both nuclear or conventional war with Pakistan, and its economy is dependent on China: its greatest rival (351).
• Indian efforts to build a large military force have been only partially successful at a technical level and have not been associated with any strategic objectives. Spending has not been connected to any concrete plans for securing India from threats (352).
• Most of the massive military budget goes towards personnel costs for the huge and poorly equipped Indian Army, whose capabilities are limited by lack of advanced military technology. This asset itself in devalued by Chinese and Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons (352).
• Despite nearly 70 years of research and development, India still cannot manufacture quality equipment for itself and has become the world's largest importer of military equipment because it cannot build this equipment domestically (352).
• Most of its military budget not spent on maintaining its land forces goes towards the nuclear weapons. Better nuclear capabilities have had little to no impact on Indian security, but consume large amounts of a budget that could be spent on military technologies in fields in which India is deficient. The navy and airforce are relatively neglected, leaving India outclassed in its naval and air capacity by most other powers (352).
• The author considers it extremely unclear that, "India can restore the regional power exercised by the Mughals and the British, let alone earlier empires. If nothing else, the existence of nuclear weapons makes the breakup of Pakistan too dangerous, and India has no answer to the military and economic expansion of China, except to bemoan it" (353).