Cheeseman, Nic. "Cultures of Resistance: Civil Society and the Limits of Power". In Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform, by Nic Cheeseman, 57-85, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Cheeseman, Nic. "Cultures of Resistance: Civil Society and the Limits of Power". In Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform, by Nic Cheeseman, 57-85, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

• Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the Ghanaian nationalist movement, initially led the United Gold Coast Convention, a moderate nationalist movement. After being imprisoned by the colonial government in 1948, he became convinced that independence was needed immediately and joined the more radical Convention People’s Party upon his release (57).
• Mr. Nkrumah championed political control, demanding home rule as the first step to the empowerment of Ghana. His nationalist message was popular and the People's Party won elections in 1952, making Mr. Nkrumah the Prime Minister of Ghana (57).
• The nationalist belief that control over the state would allow him to undertake complete social and economic transformations undid the Nkrumah administration. After independence in 1957, the government tightened economic controls and confiscated agricultural surplus to pay for industrialization projects. This plan alienated wealthy farmers and entrepreneurs, and development project plunged Ghana into debt (58).
• In an attempt to maintain social order until economic independence had been achieved through industrialization, the Nkrumah government passed a law illegalizing strikes in 1958. He also limited the traditional authority of chiefs in rural areas, and signed the Preventative Detention Act, which allowed the government to arrest anyone for 5 years without trial. This all contributed to public dissatisfaction, and contributed to a coup overthrowing him in 1966 (58).
• His repressive measures to guarantee social stability and worker productivity during the industrialization process alienated large native businesses and labor unions, two of his key constituencies (58).
• "The downfall of one of Africa’s most effective and high-profile founding fathers sent shockwaves throughout the continent. It demonstrated that simply being a nationalist leader and centralizing control under the presidency was not enough. Authoritarian rule threatened to be highly unstable unless regimes could maintain some degree of public support" (58).
• The integration of important civil society groups within the structure of authoritarian regimes insulated them from some forms of democratic criticism, but also exposed regime policy-makers to internal pressure from those groups (58).
• "The fragility of power also encouraged leaders to enter into marriages of convenience with non-governmental organizations such as churches and trade unions in order to secure their compliance. In turn, these delicate alliances conferred on these groups a degree of influence over the areas of government policy of greatest concern to their members. As a result, what is now known as 'civil society' played a role in mediating authoritarian rule, even in some of the continent’s more repressive countries" (59).
• African leaders often sought to employ clientism to anchor their regime in the social fabric of society, by making jobs or economic benefits conditional on political support. Distribution of patronage became a major feature of political power in most countries in post-colonial Africa (58-59).
• In southern Africa, more urbanized populations and stronger trade unions and other voluntary organization meant that patronage was often distributed through formal institutions, like unions or political parties. This happened to a limited extend to some other more institutionalized colonies, like Ghana (59-60).
• Most West and East African countries lacked these entrenched institutions, meaning that patronage was instead distributed through heavily personalized networks based around prominent individuals (60).
• Patronage did sometimes increase the access of particular groups to resources that they previously did not possess, but the sum of wealth distributed through patronage was paltry compared to the gross corruption at higher levels. Overall, system characterized by patronage ended up increasing economic inequality, as well as regional and ethnic inequalities between favored and neglected groups (60).
• The rising economic inequality has reinforced by inadequate investment in healthcare, education, and infrastructure, which limited opportunities for advanced to the wealthiest elites (60-61).
• The perks of public office were so highly valued that few politicians or civil servants saw personal benefit in changing the system of patronage or reducing corruption. Low levels of education and harsh media repression prevented the most disadvantaged from speaking out against the system (61-62).
• Following independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta established a classic model of personalized authoritarian rule, basing his authority on personal networks of patronage outside of institutions. Ignoring the official party structure, he instead adapted the British colonial administrative structure to function around localized patronage networks run by local elites (62-63).
• Mr. Kenyatta built his patronage networks outside of institutions largely because he distrusted his own political party, the Kenya African National Union. He had been imprisoned in relation to the Mau Mau rebellion, and was absent for the formation of the National Union. Mr. Kenyatta did not trust its leadership and supported conservative values at odds with the African socialism promoted by Jaramogi Odinga, a prominent National Union politician (62).
• Mr. Kenyatta still distrusted the National Union even after political opposition was illegalized in 1964, which only caused divisions within the National Union to become more intense. By the mid-1960s, a formal breach had occurred between the radical socialists led by Mr. Odinga and the conservatives led by Mr. Kenyatta (62-63).
• To encourage local participation in his government, based on right-wing economic principles, Mr. Kenyatta declared that members of parliament would be responsible for organizing development in their local constituencies, encouraging rapid development and preventing Parliament from challenging him on national issues (63-64).
• Although the Kenyatta government promised that all completed public works, such as schools or hospitals, would be maintained by the government after construction, in reality this funding was distributed selectively based on loyalty to Mr. Kenyatta (64).
• Those parliamentary representatives who could best fulfill local development needs had ample supplies of personal wealth to begin funding projects. This meant that Kenyans increasingly elected businessmen of dubious reputation as representatives, rather than teachers or local notables (64).
• The patronage system created by the Kenyatta administration actively discouraged national vision, prompted politicians to treat each other as competitors, and generally retarded the development of ideas such as equality of citizens, separation of public and private funds, and national unity, needed for successful democracy (64-65).
• This system of patronage only worsened during the presidency of Daniel arap Moi. At this point, politicians stole vast amounts of public funds, and often parliamentary representatives could only cover development costs by borrowing cash from Mr. Moi or his cronies, increasing their dependency. All development was now essentially funded through borrowing funds stolen by high officials (65).
• Although the corruption and poverty associated with patronage system was not often challenged directly, other forms of resistance developed among poor communities, including participation in 'witchcraft' thought to imbue power on otherwise powerless groups. Like comedy, witchcraft accusations allowed for the public identification of people most associated with corruption in a non-political setting (65-66).
• These accusations of witchcraft are rarely targeted at high officials, but instead of persons known to the accuser and associated with economic exploitation. This is esp. notable in Cameroon in the 1990s, when a rash of witchcraft accusations targeted the nouveaux riche, accusing them of turning workers into zombies (66-67).
• The focus of witchcraft accusations on local notables or wealthy family members means that these accusations are not a systemic critique of the patronage system, but rather a social method of shaming family members or notables who fail to keep their patronage obligations (67).
• Witchcraft accusations are almost never used as a tool of social justice or retribution, but as a means of legitimating violence against those thought to have wronged the community. Punishments for witchcraft usually involve beatings or murder, and are overwhelming targeted at women (67).
• Witchcraft has been politicized in a number of West African countries, most notably Benin, as an public relations tactic to scare political opposition. By threatening curses and making alliances with supposed witchdoctors, politicians have used these traditional beliefs to attack political enemies and frighten opposition voters (82-83).
• The standard technique to increase democracy by strengthening civil society is based on the belief that civil society organizations function independent from the state, an assumption frequently untrue in the African context, as many authoritarian regimes have co-opted civil society groups into the state structure (68-69).
• The ability of civil society groups to effectively challenge the power of ruling autocratic parties varies by country. Typically, religious groups have the greatest power, considering the influence of established religious leaders. In southern Africa, powerful unions can also exert independent influence (69).
• The relationship between civil society groups and authoritarian government changed over time. Before the 1970s, when African countries were generally flush with cash, relationships were stable, but during the economic crises of the late 1970s, civil society groups became increasingly bold as governments were unable to pay them off (70).
• Unions had the greatest political significance in Zambia, where copper mines employed over 270,000 workers by 1953 and where the Northern Rhodesian Zambian Mineworker’s Union exerted a political force independent of the tribal representation set up by British colonial rule to divide the population (71).
• The support of the mineworkers' union and other labor organizations propelled the United National Independence Party to success in the late colonial period, despite colonial prohibitions on the participation of unions in politics. The Independence Party successfully utilized labor connections to secure urban votes (71).
• The newly independent government of Kenneth Kaunda attempted to co-opt the labor unions into the Independence Party by establishing a government congress of labor unions. The strong financial base of the unions prevented them from becoming dependent on handouts from the Kaunda government, and they continued to engage in strikes and labor action against the government (71).
• The Kaunda administration tried repeatedly to restrict the power of labor unions through measures like the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, but to no avail as workers continued to strike regardless of official legality (71).
• The Zambian government depended on peaceful labor relations, as the copper produced by the mineworkers' union accounted for the vast majority of the country's exports. Despite a necessity to tax copper exports for the development of other economic sectors, the Kaunda government found itself unable to resist union pressure on key financial issues (71-72).
• The continued resistance of the mineworkers' union, even in a political environment of increasing authoritarianism and one-party rule, prevented the Kaunda administration from cementing authoritarian control in urban areas and ultimately provided the political space to denounce and challenge one-party rule in the 1980s (72-73). 
• Churches often became the only forms of civil society under extremely repressive authoritarian rule. In the case of Zaire, their importance was exacerbated because they ended up providing many of the educational and healthcare services that the Mobutu administration neglected (73).
• Joseph-Desire Mobutu was well aware of the independence of the Catholic Church and its occasional criticisms of his government, but was unable to effectively repress the organization due to the massive number of devout Catholics residing in Zaire (73).
• The Catholic Church has a long history of partnership with government in the Congo basin, beginning during Belgian colonization, when the Church agreed to ignore the abuses of Belgian colonialism in return for being granted a monopoly on conversion and proselytism within the territory (74).
• The Catholic Church frequently refused to speak out against government abuses in Zaire, afraid of being forced out of the country after independence. There were many elements of the Church that wanted to take a strong stance against government violence, but the Catholic establishment was largely unwilling to stand up to the Mobutu government (74).
• "Lower-ranking officials who were more exposed to the everyday brutality of the government advocated radical strategies of resistance, but were overruled by senior clergy who feared that a more confrontational approach would inspire a crackdown on Church activities" (74).
• The Mobutu government actively encouraged rival religious movements in an attempt to weaken the Catholic Church's control over Zaire, encouraging Protestant and Pentecostal groups which had sided with the government. These attacks always kept the Catholic Church on its toes and kept it quiet (74).
• The uneasy agreement between the Mobutu government and the Catholic Church began to break down in the 1980s, as increasingly brutal government repression prompted more condemnation by clergy. This movement was largely inspired by calls to political action by Pope John Paul II in the late 1980s, and came to a head in January 1992, when the Catholic Church led a 'March for Hope' to Kinshasa before being fired up by government troops (74-75).
• The Catholic Church in Zaire, and other religious denominations in other countries, provided important services for other civil society groups by providing churches and religious services as meeting places for the opposition (75).
• Pentecostalism, alone among Christian groups, sometimes provided express support for dictatorial and authoritarian rule during its growth in the 1980s. Its stress on personal connection with Jesus and the acquisition of wealth provided support for authoritarian rule, and provided a counterpoint to more critical Catholic and Protestant denominations (75-76).
• Islam played an important role in limited the power of the state in some cases, depending upon their organization. In Senegal, where most Muslims were organized into hierarchical Sufi orders, the Sufi Brotherhood provided important civil society obstacles to authoritarian rule (76).
• The ruling party of Senegal, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, led by Leopold Senghor, realized the importance of Sufi orders to attracting rural votes and so endorsed their control over rural communities and the profitable peanut harvest in return for political support (76-78).
• The Sufi brotherhoods demonstrated their political capacity during the 1960s, when Prime Minister Mamadou Dia attempted to expand on government taxation of the peanut harvest by imposing more centralization over rural governance. This would have challenged the power of Sufi orders in the countryside, and their campaigning led to his political downfall (78).
• The Senghor government did not descent into autocracy, despite decreased political freedom in 1966 following the establishment of a one-party state, but retained civil society institutions and even liberalized in the early 1970s following criticism of the one-party system (77-78).
• The refusal of Sufi orders to back the faltering Parti Socialiste du Sénégal in 2000 contributed to the downfall of that government and a peaceful change of power, as the orders represented the last major stronghold of rural support for a party increasingly unpopular in poor, urban areas (78-79).
• The reintroduction of multiparty democracy in many African countries in the 1990s did little to make the divide between civil society and the government more transparent, if anything it increased competition for government positions and caused officials to double-down on securing loyalty through patronage (82).
• The economic collapse of the early 1990s, which forced many African governments to accept the conditional bailout offers of the World Bank and IMF, limited the ability of governments to directly buy civil society groups through patronage, but it also decimated the strength of many unions and voluntary professional associations (83).