Caney, Simon. "Distributive Justice". In Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, by Simon Caney, 102-141. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Caney, Simon. "Distributive Justice". In Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, by Simon Caney, 102-141. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

• Generally discussions in philosophy about the morality or implementation of redistributive justice took place at the state level, not considering the application of distributive justice on a global scale (102).
  
  
• Distributive justice contains several questions about an individual system: 1) what are the subjects of redistribution, individuals, ethnic groups, states? 2) which groups in the system deserve goods, which are expected to contribute goods? 3) what goods are being redistributed? 4) what constitutes a fair distribution? what is the redistributive goal? (103).
  When applied to the international scale, the scope of distributive justice can generate multiple possible definitions. A cosmopolitan position that redistribution should occur globally between individuals, a global position that redistribution should occur between states, or a statist position of redistribution limited to national communities (103).
  
  
• Cosmopolitan theories of redistributive justice focus on the individal as the unit of observation, with the individual being the receipiant or distributor of goods. The duty to participate in redistributive could be a negative or positive duty, with philosophers having argued both sides. The proposed methods of engaging in this redistribution and the definition of equitable distribution are varied (105-107).
  All three basic varieties of cosmopolitan theory: contractual, generalist, and rights-based, provide compelling reasons for implementing redistribution on a global rather than national scale and for targetting individuals rather than nation-states or communities (121).
  
  
• Charles Beitz proposes the adoption of John Rawls's theory of justice to the global scale, necessitating a distribution of resources which would guarantee the best possible position for the worst-off in a given society. Dr. Beitz argued that this theories requires global distribution of natural resources, whose placement is arbitrary, and that the current unequal global economic system necessitates this transfer morally (107-109).
  The arguments of Dr. Beitz have been subject to two main criticisms: the first that international trade is not sufficiently encompasing to create any obligations between nations for redistributions, and the second that economic connections between people does not create any obligations for redistribution (109-111).
  This first critique is not valid because, even if international trade does not link countries sufficiently to activate a moral duty for redistribution for Dr. Rawls's theory, Dr. Beitz does not use Rawlsian theory and instead sets out his own conditions which are fulfilled by contemporary international trade (110).
  
  
  The second critique holds that wealth disparity between people in different countries does not necessitate redistribution morally just because economic connections exist. This argument dooms people to poverty based solely on the arbitrary place of birth, a deeply unjust outcome. Additionally, our contemporary economic system was constructed on direct harm and exploitation, resulting in reparational obligations to poor countries (111-114)
  
  
  The arguments for global redistribution provided by Dr. Beitz are subject to theoretical criticism because they make enjoyment of rights to redistribution contingent on economic or social contact. Theoretically, this means that people in an isolated poor country do not deserve the same life as those in an isolated wealthier country. These critics view this as violating the basic idea of universal rights and making rights subject to place of birth (115).
  Dr. Beitz actually did respond to this critique, and adjusted his theory, making redistribution moral regardless of institutional connections on the grounds that place of birth should be included within the categories of the veil of ignorance (115).
  
  
• Other cosmopolitan theories of redistribution do not require a contractual position, like that created in Rawlsian systems through the veil of ignorance. John Singer theorizes that global redistribution is required because poverty is bad and failing to help prevent bad things through a relatively easy sacrifice of money is immoral (116).
  Some critiques have argued that the redistributive moral requirements created by Dr. Singer are too arduous. This is does not really demonstrate that he is wrong, only that morality is difficult (117).
  
  
  Some philosophers have followed Dr. Singer's general argument, but have not adopted his extreme position that anything other than radical charity is immoral. These partial arguments are not theoretical sound, as they do not account morally for the fact that they will led to more suffering that the original theory. Even positions which emphasis threashholds of living rather than total equality still fail to provide justification for not engaging in radical charity (117-118).
  
  
• Another group of cosmopolitan theories for redistribution argue in terms of rights and fulfillment of human rights. Henry Shue claims that rights are important and that certain rights -- like safety and food -- are necessary for the function of other rights. This argument and similar ones are based on conceptions of human life and the desires of humans being fundamentally important (119-120)
  Certain aspects of Dr. Shue's argument are unconvincing, particularly the emphasis on the absolute necessity of basic living standards for the exercise of other rights. While dead people obviously cannot exercise rights, there is little basis that ill people without medical care or the malnourished cannot exercise most rights (120).
  
  
  A major issue encountered for rights-based accounts of redistributive justice is assigning duties: the existence of human rights do not automatically inform us about how is responsible for their fulfillment. Most rights-based philosophers have provided good responses to this problem, however (120-121).
  
  
• Based on a synthesis of other theories for cosmopolitan redistribution, the author puts forward four principles that overlie cosmopolitan redistribution: everyone has a right to subsistence; nobody should be disadvantaged due to their nationality; everyone has the right to equal rewards for equal work; there is a moral obligation to help those who are very poor (122-123).
  One's nationality and place of birth are arbitrary and do not reflect decisions, meaning that one should not be punished through poverty because of nationality. This should apply to both initial circumstances and one's working life (123).
  
  
  These principles are not as demanding as Dr. Singer's suggestion of radical charity, and address the fundamentally injustice of having place of birth determine life circumstances. Additionally, all cosmopolitan groups agree on these principles, and they apply both domestically and internationally (124).
  
  
• John Rawls makes three claims regarding international distributive justice: 1) cosmopolitan claims are inappropriate because they impose egalitarian and liberal ideas on illiberal socieities; 2) all persons have basic economic rights, like those of subsistence; 3) orderly societies have a responsibility to assist disordered societies in becoming orderly and decent (125-126).
  A number of objections to Dr. Rawls's theory have been made, namely that contemporary societies frequently oppress minorities and cannot be considered just actors deserving of protection for interference, and no justification is provided for protection some human rights but not others, such as civil and political rights (126-127).
  
  
  Dr. Rawls's theory also does not adequately explain why the domestic veil of ignorance, which precludes individuals from faring worst because of ethnicity, does not apply internationally to prevent individuals from being disadvantaged due to place of birth (128).
  
  
• David Miller has proposed an interesting counter-example to cosmopolitan redistribution plans, positing a case where two democratic states diverge in wealth because one institutes smart industrialization and population-control policies, and the other independently decides not to do so. He argues that in this case, countries must be responsible for their own actions and redistribution of resources is not morally required (129-130).
  This theory fails to account for the imperfection of democracies. To be responsible for one's own poverty, the individual needs to have taken part in that decision. Unless the entire country was united in this decision, than some dissenting or apathetic individuals are not responsible and deserve assistance (130).
  
  
  Dr. Miller's theory is also not consistent with the ideas of basic economic rights. Either it is okay for people to starve due to their own poor decisions, or others have a moral responsibility to prevent this. In his example, this means that if human rights exist, there must also be a redistributive responsibility (130-131).
  
  
• Some nationalist scholars claim that in order for principles of justice to be implemented, people must be motivated to comply with them. Since national connections are usually salient, redistribution within nations is practical whereas international redistribution is not. Additionally, forcing individuals to comply would be immoral (131).
  This theory has a fundamental issue in that essential to its claim is that individuals are only bound by duties if they want to perform those duties. If taken as true, this essentially frees people from all moral responsibilities and also degrades national models because not all individuals believe in national redistribution (132).
  
  
  This theory also incorrectly assumes that national connections are strong or the best basis for redistribution. In many cases nationalism is weak and redistribution on the basis of ethnic group, religious identity, or region would make more sense in terms of locating strong common identities (132-133).
  
  
• Another argument against cosmopolitan redistribution is it forces us to adopt a soulless utilitarian view and ignore the connections to family, friends, or nation which should define special and prioritized agents of redistribution. This view holds that preference for certain individuals over others should be incorporated into redistributive schemes (133-134).
  The specific application of this principle to nations is perculiar because there is no universal logic for why nations should constitute a group of special moral significance to the same degree as families (134).
  
  
  The application of this principle to families or other directly salient groups also lacks justification. The basic argument is that human intuition should be accounted for, but this is not further justified with some moral argument which would contradict a cosmopolitan redistributive principle (134).
  
  
  A variation of this nationalist argument exists, claiming that redistribution should take place along national lines because they constitute pre-existing spheres of cooperation creating mutual obligations. In the globalized economy, this is not the case, as economic connections and obligations extend across borders. Furthermore, this argument would seem to preclude invalids or others without economic connections from the redistributive scheme (135).
  
  
• Some scholars claim that cosmopolitan redistribution is utopian and inpractical, thus meaning it should be abandoned in favour of more practical nation-state models. These realist arguments object that no only do no international mechanisms allowing for redistribution exist, but they cannot exist due to the self-help constraints of the international system (136-137).
  This argument is fundamentally dependent on endorsement of the conception of international relations favoured by the Realist school, requiring a belief that the self-help nature of international politics can never be overcome. Moreover, even in this system, not all states need to adopt cosmopolitan principles, they can come about through limited action by wealthy and powerful states (137-138).
  
  

The author goes through a really long account of cosmopolitan theories of redistribution, those requiring individual-level transfers on a global scale, and a lot of different objections to these views, which are then disproved. The core conclusions of the chapter are the claims that people have minimum rights, extreme poverty is very bad, and place of birth or nationality should not affect life prospects.