Bellamy, Alex. "The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten". Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.29, No.2 (2015): 161-185.

Bellamy, Alex. "The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten". Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.29, No.2 (2015): 161-185.

• Since its official adoption by the UN General Assembly [UNGA] in 2005, the concept of responsibility to protect has become entrenched as an accepted concept of international politics, informing numerous UN Security Council [UNSC] resolutions. During this period, a clear consensus over its usage and limitations has emerged in both the UNGA and UNSC (161).
• Discussions on the responsibility to protect have moved from its merits as a concept to discussions of how to best implement it, as it has become internationally accepted and legitimate. This point was explicitly noted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 2012 (161).
• Even states that had previously opposed the responsibility to protect, including China, now recognize it as a norm of international politics and respect its legitimacy (161-162).
• The responsibility to protect is actually composed of two overlapping norms of state behavior: states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from major human rights abuses, and that some responsibility exists to protect the populations of other countries (162-163).
• The first element of the responsibility to protect -- that states must respect the human rights of their populations -- is broadly accepted by the international community and aligns with many precepts of international law (162-163).
• The second element -- that states have some duty to protect human rights of other populations -- has become broadly accepted as a norm of international conduct during the 21st Century. There is a general consensus on the idea that something must be done to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, what kinds of circumstances demand intervention, and what kinds of mechanisms should be used to facilitate intervention (163).
• Since 2011, even China and Russia have recognized the right of the UNSC to intervene in the internal affairs of countries if mass atrocities are occurring there -- as was the case in Syria in 2011 (168). Only the UNSC is recognized as having the right to intervene in a country without the consent of that government (168-169).
• There is still controversy over whether there is a duty to protect. Some states see the UNSC  as having not only a right, but a duty to prevent mass atrocities on behalf of the international community as a whole, but this interpretation has not confirmed by the UNSC (169-170).
• Prior to 2005, the UNSC only involved itself in preventing mass human rights violations on a case-by-case basis, ignoring many prominent cases of mass atrocities, including the civil war in Angola and genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda. The UNSC only discussed around half of ongoing mass atrocities during the 1990s and 2000s, and took special action in only four cases (163).
• A full list of conflicts involving mass atrocities between 1990 and 2005, and UNSC reactions, is available on page 164.
• UNSC discussions during this time period revolved around the legitimacy of possible interventions, with numerous discussions about whether it was the place of the UN to involve itself in internal conflicts (163, 165).
• The endorsement of the responsibility to protect by the UNGA at the 2005 World Summit was controversial, and many countries were concerned that the concept would be abused to justify meddling in internal affairs and other violations of national sovereignty (165).
• UNSC activity on mass atrocities during the late 2000s was not consistent, with situations like the 2009 massacre of Tamils in Sri Lanka being ignored, and most of the interventions that did receive UNSC approval specifically avoided justifying that intervention on the basis of the responsibility to protect (165).
• General-Secretary Kofi Annan's successful invocation of the responsibility to protect in his mediation of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 seems to have convinced many skeptical countries about the utility of the concept (176).
• A major change in UNSC support for the responsibility to protect appears to have occurred in 2011, when the UNSC approved major interventions in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire in response to mass atrocities committed by the governments there. Since then, the UNSC has tended to respond to all situations involving mass atrocities and these interventions have been based on the responsibility to protect (165-166).
• The genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar has been the only exception to this general trend, as it has not [as of 2015] been discussed as an issue in the UNSC (165).
• The change in attitudes towards the responsibility to protect is demonstrated by the debates around the concept's inclusion in official documents. Whereas reference to the responsibility to protect was scrapped in the 2006 UNSC resolution on Sudan due to intense debate, there were no objections to basing the 2011 intervention in Cote d'Ivoire on the basis of the concept (166).
• A full list of conflicts involving mass atrocities between 2011 and 2015, and UNSC reactions, is available on page 167.
• When the UNSC has failed to appropriately intervene to stop mass atrocities, as it has in Syria, there has been significant criticism from the international community, including the UNGA, indicating the degree to which there is an expectation that the UNSC has a responsibility to protect (170-171).
• Some critics claim that the responsibility to protect has not really been accepted and that interventions continue to be selectively used to support the interests of the great powers. They use the lack of intervention in Syria and Sudan as evidence of an inconsistent response, and argue that responsibility to protect has not actually resulted in a change in state behavior (171-172).
• This few is flawed because the 2011 intervention in Libya really did break new ground, since it was the first time that the UNSC had intervened without the consent of the internationally-recognized government. Previous interventions had either occurred at the request of the affected state, as in Somalia in 1992, or had received consent from the internationally recognized government -- even if they did not control the country -- as in Rhodesia, Haiti, and Rwanda (172).
• The lack of UNSC response to cases like Syria and Sudan is an exception rather than a demonstration of any essential self-interest in UNSC reactions. Moreover, it belies the other forms of active involvement and intense debates that have occurred around Syria, which did not occur for other mass atrocities prior to 2005 (172-173).
• The UNSC discussions on the 2011 intervention in Libya reflected a major change in norms, as all permanent UNSC members explicitly referred to the responsibility to protect in their debates on Libya. The responsibility clearly entered into the decision-making process of all five permanent members, especially since Russia, China, and the USA had previously objected to French and British bellicosity on the issue (173-175).
• The formal adoption of the responsibility to protect by the UNGA in 2005 was preceded by the increased and gradual adoption of similar ideas about the protection of civilians in wartime, respect for human rights, and holding individuals accountable for international crimes. The responsibility to protect formalized many of these other duties, but, like them, was still contested at the time of its adoption (175-176).
• The creation of the Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect helped permanently institutionalize the concept, as the presence of the relevant official meant that the concept could not be ignored (177).
• Concerns that the responsibility to protect would be used to undermine national sovereignty were mollified in the years between 2005 and 2011, as attempts by states to use the responsibility to protect as cover for interventions were unsuccessful. French and Russian attempts to justify intervention in Myanmar in 2005 and Georgia in 2008, respectively, were unsuccessful and met with scorn from the rest of the UNSC (176).
• Through incidents like these, a general consensus has formed about the circumstances when the responsibility to protect can be applied. It is based on the protection of civilians and can only be invoked in cases of genocide or other mass atrocities. Importantly, it cannot be used to justify intervention beyond these circumstances (177-178).
• The responsibility to protect is a recognized international norm, but states can still choose to act in violation of it. Doing so comes at the cost of criticism and perhaps exclusion, but there are no huge consequences to not responding to the responsibility to protect (178-179).
• While the vast majority of states agree on the legitimacy of the responsibility to protect and the scope of its usage, they still disagree on how to apply the concept in practice and under what circumstances it should be applied (179).
• The overthrow of Mohammar Qaddafi following intervention in Libya in 2011 has generated substantial criticism of NATO conduct under its UNSC mandate and influenced debates about the danger of intervention. Many countries, such as Russia, are cautious about using military force to uphold the responsibility to protect because of the dangers of abuse (179-180).
• The limited UNSC response to the Syrian Civil War has generated opposite criticism, that the UNSC has been too cautious about invoking the responsibility to protect and that it should intervene more. This was also led to French suggestions that the permanent UNSC members create a code of conduct to facilitated consistent intervention in situations of genocide or other mass atrocities (180).
• Most states are unwilling to dedicate significant resources to upholding the responsibility to protect, and even less to associated human rights initiatives. This results in disputes over the level of commitment demanded by the responsibility (180-181).
• Interventionist states and advocates of the responsibility to protect have damaged their own position by making unrealistic claims about the effectiveness of the concept. The adoption of the norm will not end all mass atrocities, and claiming that it will only undermines the limited successes of the concept (181).