Beitz, Charles. "Justice and International Relations". Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.4, No.4 (1975): 360-389.

Beitz, Charles. "Justice and International Relations". Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.4, No.4 (1975): 360-389.

• The article criticizes the theory of contractarian justice created by John Rawls on the groups that it can only be applied globally if nation states are assumed to be self-sufficient, that this is still insufficient due to disparities in natural resources of different states, and that a new international system of justice would need to be constructed (361).
• The work of Mr. Rawls implies that in his world nations are mostly self-sufficient, but not entirely self-contained. In this scenario, only the most minimal trade, economic, and human exchanges would occur between countries (363). These nations are held together by basic principles of international law, which work well because all nations have just foundations (364).
• The nations of the Earth have different levels of natural resources, some blessed with abundance and others with scarce resources. The unequal distribution of natural resources on the Earth is similar to the unequal distribution of merit within a society, prompting a similar response in a Rawlsian world of redistribution to the benefit of the least advantaged (367, 371).
• The application of Rawlsian logic on natural talant cannot be easily applied to natural resources, because although someone cannot 'deserve' to be born with talant, that ability also cannot be taken away from them and given to someone else. Natural resources, on the other hand, can be redistributed to others (368-369).
• This fact actually protects an application of Rawlsian logic to natural resources from two common objections to the standard Rawlsian theory, that individuals have a natural right to develop and use their talants as they see fit due to personal ownership (367-369).
• It could be claimed that the self-sufficiency of all nations in the Rawlsian scenario means that redistribution is not a moral necessity, and that national rights to natural resources apply. However, since the redistribution of resources is required for maintaining global parity, there is still a requirement to redistribute resources to avoid random inequalities between nations (369-370).
• If this condition of redistribution of randomly distributed resources on the basis of improving the life conditions of those less advantaged was not met, then nations might wage war to acquire access to resources needed for development. These wars could conceivably be just from a national perspective, making the redistribution of resources essentially for both theoretical consistency and world peace (371).
• Rawlsian theory demands that some standard of conservation must exist, so that future generations are not placed in an unnecessarily bad position (371). The actual level of conservation required probably resembles the Rio Convention on sustainable development.
• The redistribution of food is not explicitly necessary because of the complexity of the issue, as it only involves the amount of arable land to a degree. Redistribution of food supplies is only morally required to the degree than inequality in arable land is a factor in the inequality (372).
• The existance of international trade creates essential problems for the application of Dr. Rawls's theory of justice, as the free international movement of capital creates situations where labor and production can exist at one location while profit flows to another, often resulting in the rich benefiting from the work of the poor. International financial system also traps many countries in debt, further limiting national ability to develop or rectify inequalities (373-374).
• This economic order existing in the present [the 1970s] is certainly not self-sufficient, and applying Rawlsian international principles to it would result in the continuation of a system in which poorer countries continue to be exploited by wealthier countries. This is even more true if only some, not all, nations of the world were reconstituted on Rawlsian principles (375).
• This issue can be solved by extending the 'veil of ignorance' invented by Dr. Rawls to include national citizenship, thus allowing for the design of an international order of just distribution of talants and resources (376). Under current situations of inequality between countries, however, the continued existence of separately self-governing nation-states could not be justified, meaning that a global political order must exist (376-378).
• It may be objected that certain national societies are better organized and more efficient, thus meaning that having more resources ultimately benefits everyone because it increases production. This argument is not contradictory with Rawlsian principles, because an unequal distribution in favour of these countries would still benefit the least advantaged globally (378).
• Where this is not the case, these additional resources are not just because they are acquired by chance, and therefore are subject to the same rules as talants on the individual level (379-380).
• States could claim additional wealth on the grounds of improve the position of those domestically least advantaged before helping those abroad. This is only just if the national least advantaged are also globally so, if not then the past impact of the complex economic and social connections around the globe demand that redistribution be considered with regards to the globally least advantaged (380-382).
• Contemporary claims for development assistance, food aid, and other redistributive demands of the Global South have the moral backing of Rawlsian theory. The degree to which this balances with national duties to assist one's own poor is unclear. Similarly, the current international legal principles of non-intervention do not meet Rawlsian standards in the real world, as a comprehensive theory of justice would demand internvention to remove unjust regimes like Apartheid South Africa (385-387).
• In particular, the author identifies military service as a point of contension between contemporary national responsibilities and Rawlsian principles as most wars cannot be justified and therefore individual service in those wars is unjust by Rawlsian standards (388).