Bale, Tim, et al. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe". Political Studies, Vol.58, No.3 (2010): 410-426.

Bale, Tim, et al. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe". Political Studies, Vol.58, No.3 (2010): 410-426.

• The populist radical right in its contemporary form emerged in European politics during the 1970s, but has begun in the late 1990s to became a serious force in politics (410-411).
• The authors hypothesize that their growth has primarily been at the expense of social democratic parties, because both disproportionately target the poor and uneducated. The authors examine Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, and Austria for evidence of this trend (410-411).
• Populist radical right parties pose a threat to social democratic parties in three distinct ways: first, they campaign on issues of immigration that the political Left has been historically unable or unwilling to counter; second, they disproportionately draw from the lower classes, from which social democrats draw much of their support; third, they are likely to join coalition government with other right-wing parties to keep the left-wing out of power (412).
• Social democratic parties can respond to increased competition from the populist radical right by a combination of three strategies. They can refuse to compromise and present counter-argument on the relevant issues, they can attempt to change the agenda by refusing to discuss issues salient to the populist radical right, or they can adopt some positions of the radical populist right in their platform (412).
• The first strategy of uncomprimisingly holding the traditional position would be extremely difficult for social democratic parties in contemporary Europe. It would require an open defense of multiculturalism and migration to a public and media which is generally and openly hostile towards migration (412-413).
• The second strategy of removing populist radical right issues, primarily immigration, from the political agenda would require cooperation with other political parties to all avoid discussing the issue. This is difficult due to both the intense interest of voters in immigration and the inclusion of immigration is most platforms of the mainstream right-wing (413).
• By adopting the position of their competitors, the populist radical right, on immigration the social democrats can win back traditional voters. This solution, however, risks depriving the social democrats of legitimacy because they will be viewed as opportunistic. It also risks alienating voters who supported the original position on immigration (413-414).
• During the 1970s, left and right-wing parties in Denmark were able to establish distinct controls over emerging issues: environmental politics were dominated by the left-wing, whereas immigration became the topic of the right-wing. In 1973, the Progress Party emerged to dominated the anti-immigration platform, but remained an isolated force. Some mainstream right-wing parties supported these more restrictive immigration policies, but remained focused on liberalizing the economy until the mid-1990s, a task dependent on the support of the pro-immigration Radikale Venstre party (414).
• The issue of immigration became increasingly politicized during the 1990s, resulting in the increased success of the far-right Dansk Folkepartie and the adoption of anti-immigrant policies by right-wing parties, including the Venstre party. The increased salience of immigration contributed to electoral losses for the Social Democrats in 2001 (415).
• Having failed to successful keep immigration off the political agenda due to the rightward movement of the Venstre party, the Social Democrats attempted to adopt more restrictive positions on immigration. This policy shift was difficult for the party, which faced opposition both from its coalition parties in Radikale Venstre and key party figures who had fought against the anti-immigrant turn among party cadres in Copenhagen since the 1980s (415).
• The decision to adopt more restrictive immigration policies has been popular in its own right, but has failed to actually make the Social Democrats more competitive since their 2001 defeat. Their commitment to anti-immigration is doubted because of strategic alliances with the pro-immigration Radikale Venstre, and anti-immigrant votes still associate right-wing parties with these policies more than the Social Democrats (415).
• The Netherlands Labour Party was already moving towards for restrictive immigration policies during the 1990s as part of a shift towards a 'third way' position, eventually leading to coalition government with the centre-right People's Party of Freedom and Democracy [VVD] (416).
• Unfortunately for the Labour Party, their focus on the failure to complete the economic integration of immigrants did not resonate with voters to the same degree as the focus by the VVD and other right-wing parties on failed social and cultural integration. This result in a split within the Labour party during the 1990s between a nativist wing and elements concerned about losing the Labour Party's traditional control over minority votes (416).
• By the turn of the 21st Century, the Labour Party's strategy had entirely failed. The adoption of anti-immigration policies had alienated pro-immigration supporters, who moved to the Green Left Party, while its internal division resulted in a simultaneous exposure to attacks by the nativist right and continual defections from the Labour Party to Pim Fortuyn's coalition, the Socialist Party, or other anti-immigrant spliter groups. Its policy change also led to a rapid loss of public legitimacy relative to other left-wing parties (416-417).
• Since its 2001 electoral loss, the Labour Party has attempted to avoid discussing immigration, focusing on other issues in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats. This strategy has been largely unsuccessful, however, considering the continued salience of immigration and the continued presence of devoutly anti-immigrant parties in Netherlandish politics (417).
• The Norweigian Labour Party was very successful in preventing the domination of immigration by the populist right-wing, being the first party to announce anti-immigration policies in 1975, before even the Conservatives, and cooperating with the Conservatives to avoid discussion of the status quo and marginalize the populist radical Progress Party (417).
• The inter-party dynamics were unique in the Norweigian case, since mainstream parties preempted a public turn against immigration. The Progress Party influenced a rightward move by the Conservatives during the 1990s, but did not have any influence on the anti-immigration turn before that (417-418).
• The Conservative and Labour parties essentially succeeded in robbing the Progress Party of its command over the issue of immigration, by adopting similarly strict policies, forcing the Progress Party to stress its liberal fiscal policies in an attempt to remain competitive (418).
• The Labour Party had been able to adopt these more restrictive opinions on immigration due to intense party unity, reflecting the fact that the Labour Party was itself a rump party following splits from the Socialist Left party over membership in NATO and the EEC. This rump party was more unified than social democratic parties elsewhere (418).
• Austrian post-war politics was dominated by the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People's Party, and these parties continued to conspire to keep the populist Austrian Freedom Party from participation in government, extending this cooperation to a refuse to discuss immigration as the issue became increasingly salient during the 1990s (419).
• This opposition to the Freedom Party's policies began to decay during the mid-1990s, as increased crime rates moved public sentiment against both immigration and EU integration. The pressure on the Social Democrats was particularly strong from Austrian labor unions, concerned about competition from migrant workers. In 1997, the Social Democrats capitulated and passed significantly more restrictive immigration and naturalization laws (419).
• Following major losses to the Freedom Party in 1999, the People's Party also abandoned traditional exclusionary tactics and embraced a coalition government with the Freedom Party, hoping to co-opt and moderate the latter's positions. In reaction to this, the Social Democrats largely embraced the new deeply anti-immigration political order, providing slightly less nativist perspectives on key elements, but broadly supporting restrictive policies (419-420).
• Although social democratic and centre-left parties have generally abandoned their initially support for liberal immigration policies and multiculturalism, this change has not always been reflected in adoption of anti-immigration policies; additionally, the nature and timing of these transitions varies by country (421).
• One of the most significant factors for determining the response of social democratic parties was the reaction of mainstream right-wing parties to their populist radical challengers. In countries, like Norway, were centre-right parties attempted to marginalize the populist radical right, social democratic parties were not faced with pressure to adapt. In countries were mainstream right-wing parties adopted nativist positions, however, such as Austria, the social democrats were placed under much greater pressure to change their policies on immigration (421).
• The behavior of other left-wing parties has also had a significant affect on the response of social democratic parties to populist radical right parties. In places where strong left-wing opponents existed, social democratic parties were severely weakened as faced both pro-immigration voters leaving for other left-wing parties and anti-immigration voters leaving for more right-wing parties (422).