Arendt, Hannah. "The Great Tradition: I. Law and Power". Social Research, Vol.74, No.3 (2007): 713-726.

Arendt, Hannah. "The Great Tradition: I. Law and Power". Social Research, Vol.74, No.3 (2007): 713-726.

• Since Plato the Western tradition of philosophy has been concerned with the role of law and power in government. There are two main conceptions of how these concepts play into ideas of what constitutes 'good government': an early idea that good government had laws and bad government was lawless, and Aristotle's idea that bad government was government in the interests of the rulers and good government was government in the interests of the ruled (713).
• Arendt unifies these two ideas, holding that government in the interest of the ruled is really the same as government managed in accordance with just laws (713). 
• Law and power seem to take on contradictory roles in their most common description, with power acting as a force to maintain law, but at the same time having law act as a restraining force on the exercise of power. If we take the first relationship as the essential basis between law and power, then the form of the government cannot matter, only the degree to which the government is restricted by law (714).
• This proposal of a direct link between the degree to which a government follows a law and the goodness of that government is the basis for the ideology of totalitarianism, which takes such an argument to its extreme. Under totalitarianism, the government becomes only a tool for administering a predetermined natural law, meaning all activities are fully lawful -- with that being the only definition between good and bad (721).
• If the second relationship is taken as the essential basis between law and power, then whether the form of government is a monarch, aristocracy, or democracy becomes of tremendous importance. The form of government now determines whose power is restricted, and whether one, few, or many people have the ability to freely and lawfully express themselves (715).
• The beliefs and conceptions of Plato and Aristotle are directly linked to their world and the perception of the 'polis' as an institution within contemporary Greek culture. A common comparison was made between the city walls and the laws of a city, meaning that both were necessary preconditions to the foundation of a community and for its continuation. Without laws, the community of the polis would change with every birth and death; the laws give that community continuity (716-717).
• In this context, the immense fear of tyrants by both philosophers is understandable. By ignoring laws, they raze the metaphorical walls of the city; they destroy some of the necessary preconditions for organized political life (718).
• There is another traditional conceptualization of law dating from this same period, although not expressed in the same terms. The idea of 'universal law' or 'natural law', which does not need to be created and comes from some higher force such as divinity. Important, while the law of the polis covers public life, natural law is all encompassing, even without institutions for the enforcement of that law (718-719).
• The combination of these law-making traditions results in totalitarianism. The idea that positive civil laws should enforce and codify perceived natural laws results in a breakdown of any independent law creation process, as lawful action becomes an extension of perceived natural law (720).
•  The next great step forward in the conceptualization of power within the Western tradition was provided by Montesquieu, who determined that power could be divided between offices. Because power simply represented a potential for human action, and humans had a wide capacity of potential actions, power could be separate between branches of government or between persons (722).
•  Montesquieu also recognized that while laws may provided a framework for a government, the reality of action is the true composition of politics. He then identifies the primary difference between Monarchy, Republic, and Tyranny as the difference in the principles which motivate political actions therein: honor, virtue, and fear, respectively (724).
• Because these forms of government are defined by political action motivated by these principles, when actions are no longer primarily motivated by these principles, that form of government ceases to exist. For example, if people in a tyranny no longer act out of fear, but out of wanting public recognition, then the state has stopped being a tyranny and become a monarchy (724).
• Arendt notes that Montesquieu expression of the republic as being defined by love of equality also demonstrates why that system of government has a great potential to fall under tyranny. Unlike other systems, the virtue of the republic requires that equality be enforced through laws, thus limiting the total potential of any individual and leading to potential political impotence. It is frustration at this impotence that can lead to acceptance of tyranny (724-725).