Allison, Roy. "Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.2 (2008): 185-202.

Allison, Roy. "Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.2 (2008): 185-202.

• The enthusiasm of the Central Asian republics for the goals of the EEU, CSTO, and SCO are not matched by their implementation of the policies. In fact, at the time of publication [2008] none of these organizations demands significant cooperation from the republics. Rather they reflect the actual goals of membership, providing external supports for internal stability and regime legitimacy (185).
• "This article explores the argument that regional structures in Central Asia have come to offer the role of ‘protective integration’ – a form of collective political solidarity with Russia against international political processes or agendas that are interpreted as challenging politically incumbent regimes and their leaders. This type of political ‘bandwagoning’ on the international stage is accompanied by an emphasis in domestic politics on the statist principle of ‘constitutional order’ and ideologies of national sovereignty" (186).
• The integration of the Central Asian republics to larger macro-regional security structures does not indicate or link to closer ties between the republics themselves, as the security situation within Central Asia remain competitive with each republic distrusting its neighbors and having several ongoing disputes over territory, treatment of minorities, or water rights (186).
• Any attempts of regional integration have been further hindered by the inculcation of divisive nationalism during the nation-building process in the republics. Some scholars argues that this is unavoidable and that nation-building as a process is at odds with regional integration, but the elites of the Central Asian republics also seem to have purposefully divided themselves to retain regime power in each individual republic (186).
• The authoritarian and unitary construction of the political systems of Central Asia is also reflected in their unwillingness to engage in true cooperative behavior at the regional level. The same way that the Presidents of the republics are loath to share political power with other figures or even allow parliamentary oversight, they are unwilling to share even some aspects of decision-making authority with regional or super-national organizations. Fears that regional organizations, esp. those supported by the West like GUUAM or PfP, could be gateways for foreign intervention (186).
• The strongly presidential political systems of Central Asia also make foreign policy more dependent on personality. As a result these systems are perceptive of perceived slights or minor infringements on sovereignty and often reflect personal vendettas. The famous examples being the deeply personal hatred of all the leaders against President Turkmenbashi and the continuation of the Soviet-era rivalry between Karimov and Nazarbayev (187).
• Since the regional projects and organizations that do exist are often the pet projects of powerful local elites, often the President, the lack of real obligations allows them to be jettisoned should they not provide the expected results in domestic politics. This is particularly true of Kazakhstani participation under President Nazarbayev (187).
• Of the Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan is at one extreme w/ self-imposed isolation. Kazakhstan participates the most in regional structures, including regional associations, closely followed by Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. This is partially to offset the dominance of Uzbekistan in regional politics and seek outside support. The minimalist participation of these countries in full cooperation, however, demonstrates the limited engagement of the republics with regional or intergovernmental frameworks (187).
• The ability of the Central Asian republics to participate in grandiose regional projects even if they wanted to do so is doubtful. Most of the republics have difficulties establishing and implementing domestic policies, and they likely do not have the administrative capacity to build strong regional associations (188).
• Membership in the EEU, CSTO, and SCO all have potential benefits for the Central Asian republics. The EEU and SCO focus on increase regional trade and economic cooperation to mutual benefit and the CSTO and SCO generate security assistance in areas where bilateral cooperation is insufficient, such as drug trafficking or trans-border crime. This leaves the question, however, of why these projects are adopted at the continental level, but not the regional level (188).
• One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the presence of Russia or China serves to diffuse tensions between the republics and mediate conflicts through confident-building measures through an unbiased third-party (188).
• "Regional coordination, cast in the grandiose language of regional integration for at least the EAEC and CSTO, creates a basis for political solidarity between state leaders and their protection against or resistance to a perceived interventionist agenda of democracy-promotion by Western states, international organizations and donor agencies" (188).
• Rallying behavior in the region is not solely directed against democratization and Western values, but also against neoliberal economics, anti-corruption activities, or any action which could upset not only presidential power or the power of vested elites in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic (189).
• The acceptability of various reform paths depends on the country in question, for example Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are willing to take part in market reforms, but not in anti-corruption activities which might be acceptable to Uzbekistan. The focus is really on maintaining regime security, and the threats to security depend on the type of regime existent in each republic (189).
• By allying within pan-regional and continental structures with Russia and China, the Central Asian republics can take advantage of additional aid in the fight against 'foreign influence' and 'Western thought', which stresses forms of human rights and democracy which could destabilize the contemporary regimes. Alliance with Russia in particular provides legitimacy to regimes which are illegitimate in Western eyes (189).
• Russia has made clear in past statements that participation in organizations like the EEU and CSTO show a dedication to sovereignty and a strong support for authoritarian leadership in Central Asia. In this sense membership in those organizations also promises an unknown quantity of support for compliant regimes (190).
• The projects to increase the legitimacy of the regimes is part of a Russian project to design its own forms of democratic norms. This is demonstrated by the creation of CIS and SCO monitoring groups which copy the functions of Western and OSCE observers on elections, but proclaim results favorable to the Central Asian governments (190).
• The security arrangements between member states in the SCO and CTSO are loosely defined and allow considerable room for interpretation about what constitutes a threat. This leaves open the possibility of forces designed to combat violent extremism and terrorists being deployed to put down political opposition or other anti-regime forces. This is conceivably another advantage of membership in these security organizations (190).
• Structures with advantages similar to the EEU, SCO, and CSTO have been difficult to build at the regional level b/c rivalries between the states led to situations where no leader is willing to let another gain regional sway through creating or managing such an organization -- specifically this relates the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for regional dominance. Attempts are also hindered by the more limited results of such a regional organization, as none of the republics has as much political cache as Russia or China (190).
• The sole regional political organization which has continued -- the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) -- still faces many issues and demonstrates the impediments to regional integration. Not including Turkmenistan, all Central Asian republics are members, but b/c they are unwilling to divert political power to an international organization dominated by Kazakhstan, the organization's actions have been declaratory and w/o any binding power, leading to consistent non-implementation (191).  
• On the request of President Karimov, who believed that Russia could act "as a guarantor of solving those conflict situations which may arise in our relations" (191), the Russian Federation joined the CACO in 2004, however it became clear that Russia did not care about a group it was not leading and in October 2005 it led a merger w/ the EEU (191).
• Kazakhstan, and specifically President Nazarbayev, has always been the main force behind projects of regional integration in Central Asia, as President Nazarbayev initiated almost all attempts at unification (191). The main force preventing such attempts has always been Uzbekistan, which considers these notions to be restrictive and impinging on sovereignty. President Karimov is also loath to see President Nazarbayev gain political authority in the region, as the two leaders carry a pre-Soviet feud into modern politics, shown by President Nazarbayev's first visit to his souther neighbor being in 2006! (192).
• The author suggests that the movements towards more cooperation between pro-Russian organizations and the expansion and deepening of cooperation within the EEU could signal further integration into an economic-political security bloc shielding Central Asian, Belarusian, and Russian elites from Western criticism. The author specifically suggests that the EEU and CSTO might merge, while also noticing greater cooperation between the EEU and SCO (193).
• Central Asian participation within macro-regional organizations, however, is still virtual and uninspired. The CSTO is a good example, as despite visions of a rapid-reaction forces and joint military command, the first real action was the publication of joint foreign policy goals in March 2007. This was largely due to wariness about Russian imperialism in the region, including Uzbekistan's self-expulsion from the group (193).
• An obvious benefit of participating in the CSTO from its inception was access to cheaper-than-market prices for Russian armaments, although with the entry of NATO into the region in 2001, this benefit became less important (193).
• As 'color revolutions' began to be seen as a threat to regional regime security from 2004 onwards, involvement in the CSTO became more important, as non-judgemental Russia was seen as a protector of regime security in the region. Russia certainly took advantage of this situation to assert itself militarily with new realms of Russian-dominated security cooperation and the deployment of Russian forces in the Kyrgyz Republic (194).
• The 'rapid reaction force' created after the Andjion Incident in 2005 agreed to the deployment of CSTO troops in any country upon request to shore up political stability. Uzbekistan even signed this agreement, leading to a distinct possibility that Russia might use force in the event of serious threat to an allied government. Despite this, Uzbekistan in particular are distanced itself from associations afterwards, showing that Russian involvement is still begrudged by some Central Asian governments (194).
• The contemporary CTSO Secretary, General Nikolai Bordyuja, has tried to dispel such beliefs, arguing that the CSTO was never created for involvement in internal affairs and will not intervene in a domestic conflict. However, the organization's members are bound to defend against foreign enemies, which could lead to open interpretations of domestic opposition as foreign-backed (194).  
• It is unlikely that any of the Central Asian republics would allow Russian military intervention as anything except a last resort, as they know that Russian troops have a tendency to interfere in domestic politics and to not leave at scheduled times. Ending up with a situation similar to Moldova or Georgia would be a nightmare for Central Asia (195).
• "This role of the CSTO does not mean that the organization’s military security functions are completely bogus. First, the various counter-terrorist exercises between CSTO member states offer some practical experience of joint operations against possible transnational terrorist acts. [...] Second, the CSTO’s function of collective security against external military incursions has gained some more credibility as the Taliban’s reach in Afghanistan has extended since 2006. [...] Practical tasks related to Afghanistan, including counter-narcotics, are likely to continue to coexist with the more political functions of the CSTO analyzed above" (195).
• The SCO, as compared to the CTSO, offers more opportunities for the Central Asian republics to organize themselves within the organization as independent entities as China acts as a counter-balance to Russian influence. Despite this, the Central Asian republics are still sometimes voiceless in the organization's direction between Russian geopolitical concerns and Chinese geo-economic concerns (195).
• Cooperation in the security sector between SCO members has been inconsistent and limited in the fields of cooperation. The organization has successfully implemented border security measures, but as far as training and assistance capacity building, the PfP initiative has been more helpful to Central Asia than the SCO. The SCO has shown potential as a means of dialogue between member states, but it is extremely unlikely that the Chinese would ever allow intervention in a domestic issue on behalf of a specific regime (196).
• "For Central Asian rulers this leaves a significant political role for the SCO. Its political function in Central Asia, like the CSTO, is that of protective integration – the solidarity it offers provides symbolic political legitimacy and equality to Central Asian regimes that struggle to assert this on the broader international stage. This political objective reflects the defensive mood in Central Asia that has followed the CIS ‘coloured revolutions’. Central Asian leaders who preside over illiberal states have accepted the development of SCO principles which are effectively norms that are different to those currently promoted globally by the US and likeminded powers" (196).
• "since the leaders of the SCO states link the defence of their political systems with national sovereignty there is little chance that the SCO will be used to lower the threshold of sovereignty in Central Asia, to develop aspects of shared regional sovereignty" (197).
• Regional cooperation in Central Asia is unlike to increase in the foreseeable future, as the anti-regional process of nation-building continues and conflicts and competition between the republics make them loath to engage regional cooperation in any substantive way. The prioritization of state sovereignty within the Central Asian political systems also leaves them less likely to participate in any organization -- regional or otherwise -- which wants to usurp executive powers (198).
• The regional organizations which Central Asian states do participate in are run by powers external to the region -- such as China or Russia -- are imperil either sovereignty nor the power balance within Central Asia. The benefits these organizations provide are unclear and reflect a desire to have political backing against Western norms of governance and democracy rather than any explicit material benefit gained through membership. This may explain why participation in these organizations is still limited and shallow, with little real integration with Russia or China (198).