Allison, G. (2012) ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91 (4), July/August, 11-16.

Allison, G. (2012) ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91 (4), July/August, 11-16.

• When given a choice between accepting nuclear warheads in Cuba and attacking a nuclear state, President Kennedy rejected both options and gave Khrushchev a deal including a public status quo and a private redeployment of nukes from Turkey to elsewhere (12).
• The author believes that the policy-making of the Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis can be applied to normative analysis of American foreign policy towards the armament of Iran.
• This situation, however, is significantly more complex as the goal is not the movement of physical missiles, but the termination of a missile program. The knowledge of bomb-construction cannot simply be unlearned (12).
• Israel also makes the situation more complex, as it is an empowered and jingoistic player liable to make much rasher and more hawkish decisions than the other two powers. This situation is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis if the jingoistic Cuban government had not been denied a seat at the table (13).
• The author argues that Kennedy brought the nation so close to war by purposefully escalating to DEFCON 2 to demonstrate resolve to the Soviets and decrease the chance of war in the long run. The logic goes that by standing up over Cuba, the USA prevented Khrushchev from using force to resolve tensions over West Berlin (14).
• Dr. Alison recommends the same policy be used to finally intimidate N. Korea into submission, a statement which clearly belies a lack of understanding of the N. Korean state and its capacities.
• The lesson to be learned is that sometimes you have to bring everyone closer to the brink in order to prevent an adversary from crossing a line again, by making the consequences truly unbearable (15).
• "Unless the commander in chief has sufficient time and privacy to understand a situation, examine the evidence, explore various options, and reflect before choosing among them, poor decisions are likely" (16).