Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger. "The Transition to Guerrilla War: 1962-1976". In Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland, by Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger, 113-135. Oxford: James Currey, 2000.

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger. "The Transition to Guerrilla War: 1962-1976". In Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland, by Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger, 113-135. Oxford: James Currey, 2000.

• Nationalism had very different chronologies and histories at the regional and national levels in Zimbabwe. Even before the National Democratic Party and the Zimbabwean African People's Union [ZAPU] were banned in 1964 and 1962 respectively, all party activities were illegal in Matabeleland and activists were frequently arrested (114).
• The organization of armed guerrilla campaigns by ZAPU and the Zimbabwean African National Union [ZANU] from Zambia following 1964 did not reach Matabeleland until 1966, which even then was an outgrowth of local support for violent resistance under ZAPU (114).
• Following 1966, guerrilla activity at both a national and regional level slowed, largely because the Rhodesian state had become much more committed to violence. Local chiefs were empowered to beat or flog nationalists, and torture by Rhodesian security forces became widespread. Violence also became more common among rebels to police their ranks (115).
• Conflict over agriculture remained intense in Matabeleland throughout the Rhodesian War, with the government continuing to push for agricultural modernization despite mounting security threats and locals resisting despite an increasing violence state response (115, 125).
• In early 1963, the Rhodesian army withdrew from operations in the Shangani river valley, its authority being replaced with the Internal Affairs Department, which main the main priority building support for the chiefs and strengthening their authority, including giving them control over the pace of agricultural modernization projects (116).
• The district commissioner of Nkayi, Noel Hunt, was particularly enthusiastic about strengthening the chiefs, whose 'traditional autocracy' he considered the main bulwark of Rhodesian authority. He believed that chiefs should be empowered to act outside of Rhodesian law and inflict whatever punishment they saw fit, operating the tribal areas as independent legal states supported by, but outside of, the Rhodesian state (116-117).
• Although few Rhodesian administrators were willing to abandon direct rule over Africans to the same degree as Commissioner Hunt, the 1960s did see a resurgence of chief authority. Specific areas for administration and courts run by chiefs were demarcated in Matabeleland, resulting in a crackdown on nationalist structures (117-118).
• As chiefs rounded by the leadership of ZAPU, responsibilities for carrying on nationalist activities in Matabeleland fell to women and youth, who continued to organize sabotage campaigns (118-119).
• Chiefs were successfully empowered throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with loyal chiefs being granted more freedom by the Rhodesian government. Some chiefs were given extra-legal authority, including full discretion in using corporal punishment and the ability to detain citizens without a warrant (130).
• Chiefs existed on a continuum of power, with important and powerful chiefs being able to do as they pleased, whereas less powerful chiefs or village headman were still subject to the demands of the Rhodesian government and could be arrested for failure to perform duties, such as modernizing agriculture (130-131).
• The use of 'traditional authority' by the Rhodesian government had been deeply flawed since it first became policy in the late 1940s, however. Many boundaries between chiefdoms were drawn arbitrary and disputes over jurisdiction and associated land tenure continued into the 1970s (129-130).
• The unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith government marked a major turning point for nationalist agitation in Zimbabwe, as it simultaneously ended colonial rule and empowered the white supremacist and traditional authoritarian elements in Rhodesian politics. During the early 1960s, the British government had acted to restrain Rhodesian policies, preventing collective punishment or mass atrocities from being ordered by provincial governors (119).
• The first guerrilla actions in Matabeleland began after this declaration, in April 1966, when six ZAPU members crossed over from Zambia and began training locals. They specifically chose the town of Pupu, which had historical significance to the nationalist movement, and quickly estabished supported among communities in the Shangani valley (120-121).
• The guerrillas sent to Matabeleland were majority Ndebele, but also included two Shona-speaking guerrillas, demonstrating the trans-ethnic base of the nationalist movement (120).
• The Rhodesian police quickly learned of the guerrilla movement into Matabeleland, but locals were noncooperative. After some weeks, the police found the location of the guerrilla camp through a combination of torturing suspected sympathizers and paying locals for information (121).
• Both guerrillas and the government employed violence against the civilian population in the conflict to enforce support. The Rhodesian police kidnapped, tortured, and killed all civilians found to be supply food or shelter to the rebels, while the ZAPU guerrillas killed those who they suspected had collaborated with the government (121-122).
• The immense violence employed by the Rhodesian state against those who supported the guerrillas in the Shangani valley suppressed ZAPU activities in Matabeleland until the 1970s, as the guerrillas had shown themselves incapable of either fighting the Rhodesian state or protected their sympathizers (123).
• The decrease in guerrilla activity during the early 1970s also had national causes, as Rhodesian intelligence services had infiltrated ZANU and ZAPU camps in Zambia and received a stream of information about attempted border crossings and planned attacks (123).
• The creation of the Pearce Commission in 1971, with the mandate to tour South Rhodesia and establish levels of support for the Constitution proposed by the Smith government to determine whether Britain should lift sanctions, marked another liberalization of political activity in Zimbabwe. Under British pressure, the Rhodesian government allowed nationalist political activity and ceased prosecuting citizens for failing to obey chiefly bylaws on farming (126).
• The public reactions recorded by the commissioners were mixed, with different perspectives being taken in public and private meetings. In public gatherings, with chiefs present to enforce order, only ZAPU members openly opposed the constitution, whereas opposition was much more widespread in private meetings (126-127).
• The public rejection of the proposed constitution in northern Matabeleland infuriated the Department of Internal Affairs, which believed that it had failed by focusing on the wrong 'level' of traditional leadership, empowering chiefs rather than the village headmen [imizi], who it now attempted to identify and promote (127-128).
• In the 1970s, there was an attempt by the Rhodesian government to convert the Gwampa Valley, leading into Lake Alice, into a national conservation area to preserve the biodiversity of the surrounding forests. This was strong opposed by all surrounding communities, including both the hundreds to be displaced from the valley, and the land-poor communities around them who did not want to take in displaced persons (133-134).