al-Anani, Khalil. "The Brotherhood's Organization, Structure, and Ideology". In Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics, by Khalil al-Anani, 99-117. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

al-Anani, Khalil. "The Brotherhood's Organization, Structure, and Ideology". In Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics, by Khalil al-Anani, 99-117. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

• The Brotherhood has firm ideological goals, an expressive objective of improving the world through Islam and instrumentalist objectives centered around liberating Muslim countries and transforming society and state institutions on an Islamic basis (103).
• The Brotherhood maintains a rigid and hierarchical system of organization that subordinates lower-ranking members to the will of a small group of senior leadership. Leaders are only elected on the local level. There are strict bylaws about the responsibilities of each section, the relationship between sections, and the credentials required to advance in the organization (103-104).
• The Brotherhood is divided into six levels of administration:
• Usra is the basic level of the Brotherhood, consisting of between five and seven Brothers who gather to discuss religion and politics. Each usra must elected a naqib, usually the eldest member of the usra, to act as leader. While the original role of ursa was to evangelize and indoctrinate new members, it now has a more active political role as the focal point for organizing protest activities and poor relief (105-106).
• Shuba include five or six usra, around 30 or 40 Brothers, and coordinates social work, recruitment and financial and administrative affairs for a region. Its leaders are elected for set terms by the membership. Only initiated Brothers are allowed to participate in this level of administration (106).
• Mantiqa includes three or four shuba and supervises lower levels of administration, while also giving feedback to higher levels of the organization. Usually, there are three or four mantiqa in each of Egypt's governates. Leaders of mantiqa have to have been Brothers for at least 2 years and are elected by regional membership (106).
• Maktab idari, or 'administrative office', is the executive authority of the Brotherhood in a governate. It has the authority to command all Brothers within a governate. The members of the maktab idadi are chosen by the Majlis al-shura for set terms (106-107).
• Majlis al-shura is the legislative body for the entire Brotherhood and is responsible for debating its stances and projects, making decisions by simple majority. It also has the power to appoint the maktab al-irshad and elect the al-murshid al-am. It meets a minimum of twice a year, but can be called more often. Its members are selected by shura councils in each of the governates, with the maktab al-irshad also exercise some authority. Members of the Majlis al-shura must be members of their governate's shura council, at least 30 years old, and have been a Brother for at least 5 years (107-108).
• Under the Mubarak government, repression has been extreme and prevented the majlis al-shura from regularly meeting. This meant that, for the past few decades, most actual authority has been weilded by the maktab al-irshad and al-murshid al-am (110).
• Maktab al-Irshad, or 'guidence bureau', is the chief executive body of the Brotherhood, meeting in Cairo around twice weekly to discuss all aspects of Brotherhood activity. Its members are determined by majority vote by the majlis al-shura, which can also dismiss them. Members of the maktab al-irshad are elected to four-year terms, and must be members of the majlis al-shura, have been Brothers for at least 10 years, and be at least 30 years old (108-109).
• The majlis al-shura can choose to extend the term of any member of the maktab al-irshad if they wish. This was done frequently during the Mubarak government because government surveillance made any elections a potential security risk. This practice has also created claims of un-democratic abuse (108).
• Al-murshid al-am, or the 'general guide', is the head of the Brotherhood and all plans by any part of the organization have to be approved by him. He is elected by the majlis al-shura by simple majority for a six-year term. The al-murshid al-am then appoints a deputy who governs in his stead. The al-murshid al-am has to be at least 50 years old, have been a Brother for at least 15 years, and not have any other political or financial interests outside of the Brotherhood. The majlis al-shura has the power to remove the al-murshid al-am, but this has never happened (109-110).
• The role of the al-murshid al-am has changed significantly since the influence of the al-murshid al-am depends on the charisma and initiative of the office-holder. Under the first three al-murshid al-ams -- Hasan al-Banna, Hasan al-Hudaybi, and Omar al-Tilmisani -- the office wielded massive power over the entire organization. The current al-murshid al-am, Mohamed Hamed Abu al-Nasr, is uncharismatic and serves mostly as an arbitrator among factions in the majlis al-shura and maktab al-irshad (115).
• Decision-making is reserved for the very top levels of the Brotherhood administration, whereas actual work is done by the lowest levels. So the decision to contest an election would be made by the al-murshid al-am, maktab al-irshad, and majlis al-shura, while the work would be done by the rest of the organization (110).
• The actual coordination of events and political and social activities of the Brotherhood are planned at the local level, however, giving regional and local branches a lot of authority over these particulars. This means that even low-level members have some experience and skills in political organization, allowing them to step forward when high-ranking members of the Brotherhood are imprisoned or killed (111).
• The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is basic and general, captured by the slogan 'Islam is the solution'. While all members share the same core ideological tenants, the vagueness of these beliefs allows the Brotherhood considerable flexibility regarding its policies and political behavior (112).
• For the Muslim Brotherhood, having a rigid organizational system is a part of their Islamic mission. Having such an organization prevents dissent within the umma and organizes Muslims into a solid intellectual, religious, and political bloc (112).
• The Brotherhood's rigorous organization has been a major political boon. It turns the entire membership in a powerful tool for its various projects and helps it create an outsized influence. Organizational strategies were also important to its penetration of urban and suburban areas in the 1930s and 1940s (113).
• The actual balance of power in the Brotherhood is different than the ideal administrative system. This is particularly true for the relationship between the majlis al-shura and the maktab al-irshad. Whereas the majlis al-shura is supposedly equal, the maktab al-irshad exercises a lot of power over core issues of politics and the budget, whereas the majlis al-shura is often sidelined. This inequality is further by allegations of corruption and nepotism on the maktab al-irshad (114).
• Some of the major splits within the Brotherhood are between the younger members and the old guard, and between reformists and conservatives. These disputes are the fiercest in elections for the maktab al-irshad (114).
• Promotion up the ranks of the Brotherhood is not meritocratic, but instead based on perceived loyalty to the organization and the inclinations of its leadership. This creates a culture of bureaucratic obedience and an unwillingness to step out of line or innovate (115). This is reinforced by a generally undemocratic character that limits debate on core issues to the highest ranks of the organization (116).
• Women are almost entirely excluded from the Muslim Brotherhood, as their equivalent organization, the Muslim Sisters, only has representation up to the mantiqa level. All Sisters in the region are managed by a single male official in the maktab idari for that region. They are consistently marginalized in both the administration and in the actual work of the Brotherhood (116).
• The Brotherhood has been largely unwilling to open up or become more transparent because of the threat posed to it by the Mubarak government in Egypt. The rigidity of its organization has made it more difficult to destroy and its limited democracy has allowed decision-making even during intense repression. Moreover, the insular nature of the organization limits its penetration of police-spies (117).