Notes on the South China Sea Conflict

Feng, Zhang. “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security”. Political Science Quarterly, Vol.123, No.3 (2017): 435-466.

• ‘Pragamatic’ camp advocates for continued protection of claims by deployment of law enforcement vessels and interdiction in areas already underneath Chinese control. Also calls for expansion of capabilities for continued action in S. China Sea (443-446).
• Further militarization of the S. China Sea and any openly hostile moves, like the declaration of limitations on rights of free air or sea traffic, should be avoided since they will hurt regional stability and risk conflict (446).
• The ‘hard liner’ camp advocates for the same points as the pragmatists, but are more willing to militarize the S. China Sea. They argue that China should be a defensive power, but that it should still increase military capabilities in the region to the degree that it can potentially exert the full degree of power in claims over the region (453-454).
• The ‘moderate’ camp prioritizes the potential collapse of regional security of the S. China Sea and proposes methods to establish multilateral agreements for use, similar to that with ASEAN (460-461).
• Militarization and island building in the S. China Sea are create a tense regional atmosphere that it driving regional countries into the American sphere of influence, increasing the possibility of a dangerous encounter with American naval forces (462).

Wu, Shicun. “让南海问题早点回归本位 [Let the South China Sea Return to its Original Position]”. Huanqui Opinion, 23 November 2016. (Accessed at: http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-11/9717126.html).

• Regional rivals to Chinese claims in S. China Sea are using US Asia-pivot as an excuse to be bolder with their claims because of an expectation of American support.
• The US will try to set the rules for maritime engagement in the region, creating rules to China’s disadvantage.
• The goal of Chinese policy is also the establishment of a common regional order for maritime interactions and use of the S. China Sea, but one led by China and in accordance with Chinese interests.
• The US will take any crisis or conflict as an excuse to become more involved in the S. China Sea, weakening the Chinese position. Therefore, China should focus on ‘fast-tracking’ the development of its own conflict-resolution and maritime control mechanisms, esp. over fisheries resources.
• While these are being developed, China should avoid military escalation by reducing its militarization of reefs and airspace, and respecting the right of all ships to free passage.
• Cooperation on a bilateral basis should be established with all parties contesting borders in the S. China Sea, so that dispute settlement mechanisms already exist within reference to outside powers, preventing US involvement.
• This strategy is the best strategy because it recognizes that the militarization and destabilization of the S. China Sea is a bad outcome for all parties, including China. Any good solution will advance Chinese interests while preventing conflict.

Yan, Xuetong. “Strategic Challenges for China’s Rise”. Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 23 February 2017. (Accessed at: http://carnegietsinghua.org/2017/02/23/strategic-challenges-for-china-s-rise-pub-71208).

• China has three major interests in the S. China Sea: control over valuable resources, sovereignty over islands, and friendly relations with regional neighbors.
• Control over islands is already an established fact that could only be changed with military force. Since this would destroy a friendly environment, China should focus on making strong friendship with ASEAN countries. Getting the majority of ASEAN to back it over the USA is the way to establishing sovereignty and resource control in S. China Sea.

Bindenagel, James. “Pacific Community for Peace and Governance: Towards a Framework for Peace and Security in the Pacific”. In Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, edited by Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu, 509-521. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016.

• The situation of high tensions and strong nationalism in the S. China Sea means that a minor incident could spiral into a crisis with negative repercussions for all countries. It is the responsibility of China, as a major power, to avoid this situation by cooperating w/ the USA (510).
• Chinese policy in the S. China Sea should seek to avoid conflict, create mechanisms for cooperation on issues of joint concern, developing regional bodies for conflict management, and building trust in the region (511-512).
• Force should not be used to solve maritime disputes, as this has contributed to lowered trust and increased US involvement in the area at the request of rival claimants, like Vietnam and Philippines (512-513).
• All parties should seek to avoid war in the S. China Sea, and China should recognize that non-legal or military actions in the arena could trigger this result (517).
• Bilateral negotiations have made S.E. Asian countries nervous and undermined the ability of ASEAN to act as a tool for regional peace and cooperation. China should shift towards multilateral negotiations w/ ASEAN (518).
• Cooperation on issues of common interest, such as multilateral development of natural resources, should be implemented in the S. China Sea to diffuse tensions and build trust among nations (520).

Morton, Katherine. “China's ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible?”. International Affairs, Vol.92, No.4 (2016): 909-940.

• Chinese military assertiveness in the S. China Sea has generated more involvement of the USA in the region, not lessened its role. It is unlikely the USA will respond to increased Chinese maritime capabilities by retreating, if anything this may provoke a mutually destructive conflict (940).

Rapp-Hooper, Mira, et al. “Counterbalance: Red Teaming the Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific”. Center for a New American Security, November 2016.

• China should hinder the US navy’s capability to deploy air and sea forces in the S. China Sea by building up A2/AD and other military capabilities in the region, and using economic or diplomatic coercion to force regional states to cancel new base and hosting agreements with the USA (20-21).
• This should be coupled with two approaches towards regional states: decreasing directly threatening military activities, thus reducing the perceived need for US involvement; and demonstration of new capabilities to impress the fact that US involvement cannot successfully provide security (20).
• China should oppose US attempts to construct an anti-Chinese security community in S. E. Asia. This can be done by constructing its own alternative system of security assistance, training, and funding to replace the US. China can also tie participation in its program to economic incentives, using these offers to reward those who opt into its scheme and punish those who remain US security partners (28-30).

Zhou, Fangyin. “Between Assertiveness and Self-restraint: Understanding China's South China Sea Policy”. International Affairs, Vol.92, No.4 (2016): 869-890.

• A moderate approach to disputes in the S. China Sea would result in other countries being more aggressive in pressing their claims, leading to Chinese strategic losses and upsetting domestic nationalists (873).
• An aggressive approach to the region would erode regional and international trust in China, harming its overall influence in Asia. It might also prompt serious military responses from other powers, including the USA (873).

Storey, Ian, and Lin Zhengyi. The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

• Building artificial islands and expanding both civilian and military infrastructure on disputed islands in the S. China Sea has allowed China to deploy more PLA-N and Coast Guard forces, which greatly increases Chinese capability to effectively enforce its claims in the area, police boats of rival claimants, and defend its national vessels (294).
• The process of increasing these capabilities, especially constructing artificial islands, has greatly increased tensions w/ USA and ASEAN. It has provoked strong diplomatic responses from all countries and prompted the USA to become more vigorously assertive of rights of freedom of navigation in the region (295).

Shang Hao, “南海又成热点 中国如何应对 [South China Sea Becomes a Hotspot Again, How Should China Respond?]”. Huaxia Shibao [China Times], 6 June 2011. (Accessed at: http://www.chinatimes.cc/article/23401.html).

• Liu Jiangyong, Deputy Dean of the Institute of Contemporary International Relations at Tsinghua University, argues that Chinese policy should focus on keeping a low profile in the region, focusing on cooperation, and peaceful resolution of disputes.
• Shang Hao argues that the rising of Chinese naval and economic power has made the US China relationship fundamentally and necessarily competitive.
• The current situations of bilateral aggression, however, benefits the US position in the region at the cost of China. The end goal should be the creation of a Chinese led order in the S. China Sea. This should be achieved by establishing a peaceful order in the periphery, a necessary precondition to eventual strategic competition with the USA.
• Xu Guangyu, former vice-president of the PLA Academy, argues that passivity and absolute commitment to compromise in the S. China Sea will result in a degradation of Chinese interests there. Instead, the PLAN should not take any aggressive actions, but enforce its preexisting claims with military force.
• The ability to complete this mission should be supplemented by an increase of military capabilities in the S. China Sea so that China could prevail in any conflict.

Zhuang Liwei, “南中国海对策应服从战略大局 [South China Sea Policy Should Defer to the Overall Strategic Situation]”, Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], 18 March 2009. (Accessed at: https://news.jnu.edu.cn/xzsj/2013/07/05/1149025130.html)

• The US maintains a large naval presence in the area of the S. China Sea and could potentially intervene at any time. Conflict with the US would also endanger strategic goals in economic development, general diplomacy, and the status quo in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.
• Conflict with the Philippines is the most strategically dangerous in this regard, since they have the closest ties with the USA. Any conflict in the Sea may escalate due to American involvement.
• Author suggests that a protracted conflict in the S. China Sea would not constitute a major threat to the USA, which has experience with multiple low intensity conflicts, but it would create a lot of pressure on Chinese resources, ultimately constraining and weakening China as a rival. Even speculates that America knows this and is deliberately trying to goad China into conflict.
• Any conflict would be deeply harmful to China’s overall goals. Military deterrents and capabilities should be improved, but the primary focus should be on maintaining the moral high ground and cultivating diplomatic support.

Yan, Xuetong. “从南海问题说到中国外交调整” [From the South China Sea issue to the adjustment of Chinese diplomacy]. Shijie Zhishi [World affairs] 1572: 1, 2012. (Accessed at: http://www.zhongdaonet.com/Newsinfo.aspx?id=3984)

• China cannot meet its strategic goals in the S. China Sea by continuing to focus primarily on maintaining a good reputation, avoiding tensions, and economic development. This strategy wrongly prioritizes economic interests over security interests in the Sea.
• The US redeployment to Asia and interest in the S. China Sea is a calculated decision to restrain China through a network of military alliances in the region.
• China must counter America in this field by appealing to the specific area in which we are outclassed: regional ties. The Chinese policy of nonalignment has harmed national interests in the region, and China must in the future attempt to establish military alliances with S.E. Asian states, as this will weaken the US position in the region. The success of the SCO should be used as a model.

Li, Xiangyang, “中国崛起过程中解决边海问题的出路 [The solution to sea border issues during China’s rise]”. Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations] 274: 8, 2012.

• The involvement of the USA in maritime disputes has created the conditions for smaller states to take advantage of China and seize territory they could not have otherwise gained.
• The USA is intervening in maritime issues in E. Asia because it feels that China poses a threat to its power and seeks to prevent China from creating its own order in E. Asia. The USA is doing this under the pretense of protecting global rules of maritime freedom, framing the conflict as Chinese disobedience from legal rules.
• The maritime of Chinese territory is a core interest of China and it should use force to defend its legitimate sovereign territory. However, regional countries are unlike to employ force against China to settle disputes because of economic cost. This means there is not a contradiction between strong positions in the S. China Sea and a stable regional order.
• China must use military force to defend its claims in the S. China Sea against regional claimants if necessary. This is not an option that can be discarded.
• This situation regarding regional powers does not, however, mean that China can do what ever it wants. The core issue in the S. China Sea is great power competition.

Wei Chen. “搁置争议,共同开发解在决南海问题中的困境及展望 [Predicaments and prospects of handling the South China Sea issue by shelving disputes and seeking common development]”. Jinying Guanli Zhe [Managers] 234: 13, 2010.

• China has shelved actual disputes over the S. China Sea and focused on mutual and protective management of common resources. This has solved economic problems, but not strategic conflicts.
• This strategy cannot actually solve the underlying issues of sovereignty and military security in the S. China Sea since it falsely reduces the issue to economic concerns.
• Moreover, Chinese advancement of this strategy does not guarantee that other claimants will respect these rules. Rather, both Vietnam and Philippines have demonstrated refusal to cooperate on joint development and are aggressive in occupying disputed territory. This one-sided cooperation has been self-defeating.
• To rebalance power against China, the S.E. Asian countries have invited the USA to intervene in the conflict.

Zeng, Yong. “从’黄岩岛模式’看中国南海政策走向 [China’s South China Sea policy evolution from the perspective of the ‘Scarborough Shoal model’]”. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], No. 5 (2014): 127–144. (Accessed at: https://www.wendangwang.com/doc/85a1320744e25e8ca8dc1f28)

• The Chinese response to the disputes over the Scarborough Shoal should be a model for all future disputes in the S. China Sea. This incident occurred between China and Philippines on 8 April 2012, when Filipino patrol boats interdicted Chinese fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal.
• By 11 April, China had responded by condemning the attack through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy. They entered negotiations, but these talks stalled and both Filipino and Chinese craft remained in the area. This response was appropriately firm on the issue of sovereignty and the quick military mobilization has admirable.
• Although the Philippines involved the USA in the dispute through diplomatic channels on 30 April, China did not change its position on the bilateral dispute or force posture due to diplomatic pressure.
• On 3 May, Philippines intensified its pressure, filing a law suit over the islands and calling on patriotic fishermen to occupy the shoal. China responded on 11 May by issuing a warning against travel to Philippines and halting importation of Filipino agricultural goods.
• On 13 May, US ships entered the Scarborough Shoal. China did not respond in any way, continuing to fish in the region. It also declared the bilateral nature of the dispute. The Filipino government soon restarted peace talks without further attempts to seize control of the Shoal on 29 May.
• On 10 June, USA and Philippines both called for China to respect freedom of navigation through the Shoal. This was followed, on 12 June, by a pledge by the USA to strengthen the military patrol capacity of the Philippines. Philippines withdrew its navy on 16 June, but China did not, reaffirming the Chinese possession on territorial possession.
• The overall strategy pursued by China during the period of 2012 tensions over the Scarborough Shoal should be copied elsewhere, since it maintained regional security and stability, avoided military escalation, and established Chinese control over the dispute territory. This strategy focused on deployment of overwhelming force to deter conflict combined with economic and diplomatic pressure to accept a peaceful change of control.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “杨洁篪就南海仲裁案仲裁庭作出所谓裁决接受中央媒体采访（全文) [Yang Jiechi accepts a so-called ruling from the Arbitration Tribunal of the Nanhai Arbitration Tribunal to be interviewed by the Central Media (full text)]”. 16 July 2016. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zt/zhongguonanhai/t1382058.htm)

• China unconditionally rejects the UNCLOS ruling on the S. China Sea and refutes its legitimacy. It was inconsistent with the principles of the UN and a political farce by USA and Philippines to undermine Chinese sovereignty.
• Chinese claims to the S. China Sea are in accordance with international law and UNCLOS, and should not conflict with these documents. China still seeks to uphold international law, including UNCLOS.
• China must uphold its historical and legitimate territorial claims to the S. China Sea, balancing this need with the general goals of peace, stability, good relations in S.E. Asia, and the ‘peaceful rise’.
• Government stance, backed by popular nationalist opinion, is against any form of compromise in the S. China Sea.
• The process of dispute resolution in the S. China Sea must be between regional countries, not outside powers. China will, however, respect their legitimate international rights under UNCLOS.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “中华人民共和国政府关于在南海的领土主权和海洋权益的声明[Statement of the People's Republic of China Government on the Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights in the South China Sea]”. 12 July 2016. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zt/zhongguonanhai/t1379724.htm)

• China seeks to maintain its position in the S. China Sea in accordance with international law, with all islands in the S. China Sea recognized as historically owned by China and generating EEZs and continental shelf claims. China recognizes all rights of freedom of passage under the UNCLOS regime.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “崔天凯:如何弥合南海问题上的分歧 [Cui Tiankai: How to bridge differences on the South China Sea issue]”. 2 June 2016. (Accessed at http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxx/cuids/dshd/t1368669.htm)

• Cui Tiankai, Ambassador to the USA, says that China seeks to avoid militarization of the S. China Sea. (This may just be bluster, though, since he doesn’t necessarily represent core Chinese interests).
• “There may be some major differences between the two sides, but they also have important common interests. Both sides advocate maintaining peace and stability in the region, support freedom of navigation and overflight under international law, and support the resolution of disputes through peaceful negotiations and diplomatic dialogues.”

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “南海不应成为地缘政治博弈场--驻美国使馆发言人就南海问题致函《纽约时报 [South China Sea should not become a geopolitical game field - Spokesman of the Embassy in the U.S. sends a letter to the "New York Times" on the issue of the South China Sea]”. 25 May 2016. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/sgzhichuang/t1368342.htm)

• Chinese aims in the S. China Sea are the peaceful resolution of disputes that respect its historical territorial claims in the region. As such, it will respect international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight, from the perspective of ownership.
• US behavior in the region, including use of spy planes, is unfriendly and has increased tensions. China has responded to these provocations in accordance with international law, respecting rights, but tailing the aircraft.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “美国不应成为南海的“危险礁石”——驻美国使馆发言人就南海问题致函《华盛顿邮报》 [The United States should not become a "dangerous rock" in the South China Sea - Spokesman of the Embassy in the U.S. sends a letter to the Washington Post on the issue of the South China Sea]”. 16 May 2016. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/sgzhichuang/t1363535.htm)

• The US presence in the S. China Sea is dangerous because its presence may be used by regional countries as a ‘blank check’ for their own aggressive and illegal behaviors. Therefore, the US presence heightens tensions by increasing the risk of conflict between neighbors.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “中方加强在南海的能力建设有助于维护南海的安全、稳定和航行自由 [China’s strengthening of capacity building in the South China Sea helps maintain the security, stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea]”. 17 April 2015. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/sgzhichuang/sguandongtai/t1255462.htm)

• Construction on islands in the S. China Sea is entirely within China’s rights as sovereign. The improvements on these islands either help China provide services in the area, maintaining freedom of navigation, or are defensive military installations to deter rival claimants.
• (My own note: The USA doesn’t appear to have the ability or will to distinguish between offensive and defensive installations.)

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “崔天凯大使就南海局势接受《华尔街日报》专访 [Ambassador Cui Tiankai accepts an exclusive interview with ‘The Wall Street Journal’ on the situation in the South China Sea]”. 31 May 2015. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/zxxx/t1268808.htm)

• China perceives the US reactions as disproportionate and unreasonable. US believes it is totally justified, so there is obviously room for misunderstanding. Believes that US is provoking militarization, an outcome that should be avoided by all (but the US might not understand the full scope of potentially negative effects).
• China seeks the peaceful resolution of the dispute in this area, for economic reasons as well, because freedom of navigation cannot be restricted or it would damage the Chinese economy.
• Vague statement that China might fire on US craft that enter its 12 mile territorial seas in the S. China Sea. (This happened on 17 January 2018, and China issued a statement but did not fire on the USS Hopper).

Yao, Ling. “2017年，中国南海岛礁大变样 [In 2017, the South China Sea reef changed]”. China South China Sea Network, 22 December 2017. (Accessed at: http://m.haiwainet.cn/middle/3541351/2017/1222/content_31214476_1.html)

• Chinese expansion of islands in the S. China Sea is meant to serve the needs of islanders and fishermen in the area, and also enhance military capabilities to defend Chinese sovereignty in the S. China Sea.
• These facilities, particularly those in Sansha City, help China meet its international obligations to conduct search and rescue, police maritime law in its EEZ and territorial seas, and keep sea lanes clear.

Lu, Kang. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Remarks”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 20 January 2018. (Accessed at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1527341.shtml)

• On 17 January 2018, the USS Hopper passed into the 12 mile territorial sea of China outside Scarborough Shoal. China told the destroyer to leave, but did not fire. Lu Kang gave a scathing remark about how this would not be tolerated, but no further action was taken.

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. “外交部边海司司长欧阳玉靖就南海问题接受中外媒体采访实录 [Ouyang Yujing, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China's Coastal Waters, accepts interviews with Chinese and foreign media on the South China Sea issue]”. 11 May 2016. (Accessed at: http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zt/zhongguonanhai/t1362191.htm)

• Chinese expansion of islands in the S. China Sea is meant to serve the needs of islanders and fishermen in the area, part of fulfilling its international responsibilities within its EEZ and territorial waters.
• China has never ruled out retaking the disputed territories by force, and thus forcing rival claims since the 1970s from areas which they have militarily occupied. The preferred solution, however, is negotiating a settlement.

The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Military Strategy”. Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015.

• Essential purpose of security forces is to create the internal and external conditions for China to become a strong and prosperous state, maintain social stability, and keep the Communist Party in power.
• The main strategic tasks of the Chinese armed forces are safeguarding the sovereignty and security of all Chinese territory: land, sea, and air. Providing security is followed by promoting regional and global peace. Lastly is assisting in civilian law enforcement and disaster relief activities.
• Active defense is a core element of Chinese military strategy in this paper. In accordance with the principle of “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked”, presumably China will not use force to recapture disputed territory, although it will defend territory.
• All military operations should be performed keeping in mind overall strategic goals, stretching beyond the tactical and regional level.

The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea”. Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2016. (Specifically Section V)

• China seeks to uphold international law and safeguard its sovereign territory, while seeking to resolve disputes through peaceful cooperation as to maintain regional security and peace.
• Disputes should be settled through negotiation, as dictated under international law, not through military action. The peaceful resolution of Chinese land border provides an example. This is done because maintaining peace and stability in the region is so important.
• China will respect all international law, especially UNCLOS, in the S. China Sea, in particular respecting the rights of freedom of navigation in the area.
• UNCLOS does not have jurisdiction over disputes about islands in the S. China Sea because that deals with solely maritime claims, whereas the dispute is essentially over control of land.

United States Embassy and Consulate in China. “确保在南中国海航行自由是美国海军的首要使命 [Ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is the primary mission of the US Navy]”. 4 May 2016. (Accessed at: https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/zh/south-china-sea-20160504-zh/?_ga=2.106238848.2076104953.1520097442-1440071187.1520097442)

• USA seeks to maintain freedom of navigation, in accordance with UNCLOS, in the S. China Sea because of the importance of the Sea to global trade. It seeks to cooperate with China in this endeavor.
• US Navy is concerned with the potential for miscalculation in the region, which will likely result in military conflict. Therefore, the US tries to signal its intentions and promote dialogue with Chinese counterparts. US will not, however, use military force unless challenged.
• USA is building the capacities of S.E. Asian countries to defend their (illegal) EEZs from China. It is not, however, carrying out these missions for allied nations itself.

The White House. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017”. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017.

• USA believes that Chinese actions in the S. China Sea constitute bullying of American allies, and pose a threat to the freedom of navigation in the area (46).
• American allies are calling for US involvement in the area to help them uphold their sovereignty and the US should become involved on this basis.
• To uphold freedom of navigation in the S. China Sea and protect the interests of S.E. Asian nations, the USA will become more militarily involved in the S. China Sea. It will also actively seek to intensify cooperation with Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and and Indonesia (47).

Department of Defense of the United States of America. “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment”. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense of the United States of America, 2015.

• US plans to place more ships into the S. China Sea, increase its cooperation with regional partners, and conduct more frequent freedom of navigation exercises to ensure continued access to what it considers international waters and EEZs.
• Claims to maritime and airspace that US considers illegal are seen as a threat to US operation capacity and freedom of the seas. Challenging these claims with military force through peaceful exploratory operations is the main purpose of US Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force deployments.
• US is actively working with all S.E. Asian countries, particularly the Philippines, to improve their capacities to conduct maritime operations. This cooperation is mainly focused on establishing common norms so that misunderstandings can be avoid in the future.
• However, US has also been training personnel in Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. They also contributed equipment and even boats to many of these countries to increase capacity.
• USA will conduct operations in accordance with its views on the status of disputed waters, not those of China or its allies. This mainly means treating most contested territories as if they were EEZs or international waters/airspace.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china

• UNCLOS court rules in favor of Philippines. Xi Jinping confirms that this will not affect how China approaches these maritime disputes.
• Chinese officials have been quoting saying that they would be willing to defend Chinese maritime claims with military force, including from Japan and the USA.

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/world/asia/chinese-aircraft-flies-within-50-feet-of-us-surveillance-plane.html

• China flew within 50 ft. of a US surveillance aircraft in the S. China Sea. This may constitute a violation of previous codes of safe use of airspace between the countries.

https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-will-china-react-to-the-gavel-coming-down-in-the-south-china-sea/

• In response to Chinese aborted declaration of an air identification zone in the S. China Sea, the Obama government announced that further militarization of land features would result in escalation.
• To demonstrate resolve, a number of EA18 Growler electronic attack units and A10 Warthogs were deployed in the region.
• China has promised not to militarize the Nansha islands, although it has made no similar pledges about the Xisha islands.
• ASEAN is fracturing over the disputes in the S. China Sea, as different countries are willing to stand up to China to different degrees.
• President Roderigo Duterte has said that he would be open to negotiations with China over the Zhongsha islands dispute. This would be in return for investment and economic assistance from China.

https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/china-signals-resolve-with-bomber-flights-over-the-south-china-sea/

• China are started regular overflights over land features in the S. China Sea with H6K long-range bombers beginning in July 2016. This follows deployment of artillery and missile systems in the Xisha islands in May 2015.
• China also conducts aerial patrols in the area with J10, J11, JH7, and SU27 aircraft.
• This is mainly a propaganda tactic designed to elicit public support in China.
• China has considered declaring an ADIZ in the S. China Sea, and these aircraft could be used to enforce that claim.

https://news.usni.org/2017/08/10/uss-john-s-mccain-conducts-south-china-sea-freedom-navigation-operation-past-mischief-reef-3rd-south-china-sea-fonop-year.

• USS John McCain sailed within 12 miles of Mischief Reef in Nansha islands on 10 August 2018. It finally left after 90 minutes and repeated warnings to leave the area.
• This is part of a pattern of intensified freedom of navigation exercises by the US government initiated in late 2015.

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/world/596827/us-says-will-prevent-china-taking-over-territory-in-international-waters/story/?utm_source=GMANews&utm_medium=Facebook&utm_campaign=news.

• During his confirmation in the US Senate, Rex Tillerson said that the US would use military force to prevent China from accessing its islands in the S. China Sea for further militarization.
• China responded that this would start a war and that China would be willing to defend its rights to access this territory militarily.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/the-south-china-sea-fell-off-trumps-radar-this-year-he-may-have-to-pay-attention-in-2018/2018/01/01/b7c9a27a-eb1e-11e7-956e-baea358f9725_story.html?utm_term=.f23e9520f3ff

• Trump has been ignoring issues in the S. China Sea in 2017, not developing new policy towards the region. He is just continuing the Obama policy of conducting regular freedom of navigation operations.
• Trump seems to like President Xi on a personal level, and has not had a rival relationship with China during his presidency.

Panda, Ankit, “The US Navy's First Trump-Era South China Sea FONOP Just Happened: First Takeaways and Analysis”, The Diplomat, 25 May 2017 [online]. Accessed at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-trump-administrations-first-south-china-sea-fonop-is-here-first-takeaways-and-analysis/

• There was a 216 day break between freedom of navigation operations after the election of Donald Trump, with them only restarting with regularity in May 2017.
• US freedom of navigation operations do not specifically target China, but are rather a general tool by the US government to enforce its own claims to international waters as legal precedent. It does not support the position of UNCLOS or others, but its only unilateral conceptions of international waters.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/08/asia-pacific/apparent-first-chinese-air-force-deploys-advanced-fighter-jets-south-china-sea/#.WqV8O5PFLeR

• China deploys SU35 fighter aircraft to S. China Sea. Says that it is in response to US activities in the region to provide a deterrent through combat capable aircraft.

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-carrier-group-heading-to-south-china-sea/4277631.html

• US Navy carrier group led by USS Carl Vinson will pass through S. China Sea in late March. Its stated mission is to enforce freedom of navigation, indicating that it will likely sail within dispute areas claimed by China as territorial seas.
• The carrier group visits Philippines and Vietnam during its tour of the region.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

UNCLOS, Part II, Section 3, Subsection A, Article 25

    1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to

        prevent passage which is not innocent.

    2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port

        facility outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the

        necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission

        of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject.

    3. The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact

        among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial

        sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for

        the protection of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension

        shall take effect only after having been duly published.

UNCLOS, Part II, Section 3, Subsection C, Article 30

        If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the

        coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any

        request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may

        require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

China is bound to seek peaceful resolution of any disputes with the USA over illegal activities in its territorial seas that violate protections under innocent passage. This obligation stems from a general obligation under the UN Charter, reaffirmed in UNCLOS, Part XV, Section 1, Article 279. The applicability of this obligation to China is outlined in UNCLOS, Part XV, Section 3, Article 297, Paragraph 1b, as the dispute clearly falls underneath US breaches of UNCLOS with operating in Chinese coastal waters.

Although USA is not a party to UNCLOS, China is and should behave as though these rules apply, especially since all countries are party excepting USA and Iran, and both these countries have stated that they will respect UNCLOS on a provisional basis.