Notes on Hindutva and the Bharatiya Janata Party

Diwakar, Rekha. "Change and Continuity in Indian Politics and the Indian Party System: Revisiting the results of the 2014 Indian general election". Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol.2, No.4 (2017): 327-346.

• The 2014 elections were held in the wake of a number of corruption scandals facing the Congress-led coalition government, facing consistent failure in governance, sluggish economic growth, high inflation, and political gridlock caused by divisions with the Indian National Congress (329).
• The main contest in the 2014 election was between the Indian National Congress, led by Rahul Gandhi, and the BJP, led by Narendra Modi, the Governor of Gujarat. Mr. Gandhi is the son of Prime Minister Sonia Gandhi, implicating him in the family's corruption. Mr. Modi is tainted by involvement in anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002, causing the Janata Dal-United party to drop out of the pro-BJP coalition in response to his selection (330).
• The BJP campaign focused on issues of economic underdevelopment, widespread corruption, stagflation, job scarcity, and wealth disparities. The campaign was heavily personalized, with rhetoric focusing more on Mr. Modi's credentials as a leader than the goals of the BJP as a party; his credentials at rapidly increasing economic growth in Gujarat were particularly emphasized (330).
• In previous electoral cycles, the BJP focused heavily on religious issues and rhetoric. Topical religious issues, like the debate about building a temple in Ayodhya, were not, however, covered in the 2014 election. Although religious issues were not made explicit, the backing of Mr. Modi by prominent Hindu nationalist organizations, like the far-right Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS], makes his views clear (330).
• The selection of Mr. Modi as the BJP candidates had a significant effect on the party's victory. Around 30% of active campaigners for the BJP say that they would not have voted for the BJP if the candidate had been someone other than Mr. Modi (334, 342).
• Although the majority of its core base is drawn from upper caste Hindus, in 2014, the BJP managed to expand its support into lower castes, poorer socioeconomic groups, and non-Hindi speakers. This expansion allowed it to secure more seats than in any previous election (334).
• BJP victory occurred in the context of the worse ever year for the Indian National Congress. The failure of Congress to adapt its policies, firm clear stances on many issues, and ineffective campaigning further damaged a party already hindered by corruption, nepotism, uninspiring leadership, and dealing with strong opposition to the Gandhi political dynasty (334).

Manor, James. "Small-Time Political Fixers in India's States: 'Towel over Armpit". Asian Survey, Vol.40, No.5 (2000): 816-835.

• Until 1999, fixers were excluded from politics in Maharashtra by the coalition government of the BJP and Shiv Sena. This government was both corrupt and incompetent, reducing Maharashtra to near insolvency through a combination of unrealistic populist promises and corrupt implementation of projects. Both parties sought to monopolize implementation through their own ranks, with Shiv Sena sometimes using violence to reinforce its hold on the local level (829-830).

Jaffrelot, Christophe. "India's Democracy at 70: Towards a Hindu State?". Journal of Democracy, Vol.28, No.3 (2017): 52-63.

• Since the 1990s Hindu nationalists have successfully mobilized to make Hinduism the dominant faith of the public sphere, hollowing out some of the religious protections enshrined in the 1950 Constitution and the 1976 amendments (52).
• "The Constitution remains unaffected, and only a couple of new laws have been passed, as mentioned above. But in practice minorities have been subjected to fresh forms of domination. The country’s rulers have publicly and repeatedly pledged allegiance to Hinduism at the expense of the official, secular character of the state, and they have stood by while Hindu militias have imposed novel types of brutal cultural policing on Muslims and Christians" (59).
• Hindu nationalism originates with the Hindutva movement of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, founded in 1923, who claimed that only Hindus were the true citizens of India and that other religious groups were essentially foreign. He demanded that to be considered Indian, someone needed to respect Hindu customs or be Hindu (52).
• The main Hindu nationalist organization is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS], founded in 1925. This organization has a number of political offshoots, the most prominent of which is the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]. Collectively, these groups are called 'Sangh Parivar' (53).
• The main paramilitary organization associated with the RSS is Bajrang Dal, founded in Uttar Pradesh in 1984. It has over 2,000 branches across India. It has primarily been involved in threatening artists who challenge Hindu identity (55).
• The 1989 election also marked a turning point due to the success of the BJP. Although the necessity of forming a coalition government prevented the formation of an actively anti-secular state, it allowed the BJP to became a major political force and the government in multiple states (53).
• Further restraints on secularism ended in 1995, when in December of that year, the Supreme Court decided that Hindutva represents a secular concern about the Indian way of life, meaning that Hindutva-based campaigning was not banned as it would be if the Court had considered it a primarily religious platform (54). 
• The 2016 regional election in Assam featured prominent Hindu nationalist themes. The BJP, including Mr. Modi, actively allied with xenophobic regional party and based its campaign on resentment of the significant Bengladeshi immigrant communities in Assam, which local Hindus view as a threat to a Hindu-majority state (58).
• The 2017 election campaign of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh was also based on Hindu nationalism, with Mr. Modi, Amit Shah, and other BJP leaders implying that other parties represented Muslim interests, including inferring connections between these parties and Pakistan-backed terrorists, leading to attacks on Muslims during the campaign. The Chief Minister there, Yogi Adityanath, is also deeply controversial, having founded a paramilitary linked to deadly communal violence in Gorakhpur (58-59). 
• The 2014 election of a BJP-majority government has not resulted in the immediate end of Indian secularism, instead Hindu nationalism has mainly manifested in an uptick in vigilante violence. In control of Haryana and Maharashtra, the BJP has criminalized the sale or possession of beef. In Maharashtra, they have also introduced restricts on converting to Christianity or Islam (54).
• More worrying for religious pluralism are the beliefs and opinions on religion expressed by many leading members of Hindu nationalist groups. In 2016, a Shiv Sena MP said Muslims should be disenfranchised, and the BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh claimed that Saint Maria Teresa was secretly plotting Christian separatist movements (55).
• A number of prominent Christians and Muslims, as well as secular defenders of the Constitution have expressed their concern over what they perceive to be an increasingly unfriendly attitude towards other religions since 2014 (57).
• Hindu nationalist groups have been active in civil society, fomenting public outcry over conventions to Islam or Christianity and organizing armed groups to defend cows from slaughter. The 'cow protection' militias appear across India, most prominently in Maharashtra and Haryana, and use force to investigate places suspected of beef trafficking. The members of these militias are mostly drawn from Hindu nationalist groups, and have been linked to numerous attacks on Muslims (56).
• Narendra Modi publically condemned the abuses of cow protection militias in August 2016, although he faced backlash over this from the RSS (57).
• The author proposes three possible reasons for why Mr. Modi has such passive rhetoric on secularism and religious issues, yet is prepared to pass policy along the extreme Hindu nationalist line of his party: he agrees with the extremists within the BJP but will not publicly admit so; he disagrees with Hindu nationalists, but cannot afford to antagonize the RSS; since 2014, the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism has accelerated so quickly that Mr. Modi has been unable to keep up with it (57-58).

Thachil, Tariq. "Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in India". World Politics, Vol.63, No.3 (2011): 434-469.

• The Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] had a lot of trouble attracting supports from lower caste and poor voters, since its social outlook reinforced an oppressive and hierarchical caste structure and its economic policies are directly opposed to the interests of India's poor. As a result, most of the BJP's base is upper caste and middle class or above (438).
• Despite this political profile, in 2004 the BJP managed to get the votes of 30% of dalit and adivasi/tribal voters, two of the most socially and economically marginalized groups in India (438).
• These strategies have all proved difficult for the BJP to implement. It has been unwilling to implement programmatic changes, instead pushing the liberal economic policies which benefit its middle and upper class base. The fact that system of patronage in India have stratified along caste lines makes this strategy unfeasible as long as the BJP continues to be dominated by high caste politicians. The use of Hindu nationalism to appeal to poor Indians has also been largely unsuccessful as a political tactic (439-441).
• The main BJP-affiliated charity in Chhattisgarh is the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram [Association for the Welfare of Tribals], which focuses on tribal areas, while the Seva Bharati [Service to India] also has a presence in other parts of the state. The Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram was founded in 1952 to counter Christian missionary activity and convert advasi to Hindusm (444-445).
• The activists and volunteers in Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram and other Hindu nationalist organizations report a deliberate strategy of providing health and education to gain support in communities, in the hopes that these communities will then become sympathetic to Hinduism because of this charity (449).
• They also have explicitly political tasks which they perform during election time, such as recording the caste affiliation of families in their village to the BJP or spreading malicious rumors about opponents. This and any campaigning activity is not seen as aggressive or partisan by the villagers, since the vast majority of their other work is not political (451-453).
• The presence of Hindu nationalist service provider charities and organizations in districts is significantly and positively correlated to the electoral success of the BJP in those regions, despite otherwise similar demographics (455, 464). Analysis of individual voting patterns shows that participating in these organizations strongly correlates with voting for the BJP, while actual political opinions on Hindu nationalism is not at all a significant factor for lower caste voters (458-459, 464).

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond". World Politics, Vol.53, No.3 (2001): 362-398.

• Radical Muslim parties and Hindu nationalist parties, like the BJP, would benefit politically from increased ethnic tensions. (383).

Yadav, Yogendra. "Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India's Third Electoral System, 1989-99". Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.34, No.35 (1999): 2393-2399.

• Despite early political isolation for its extreme position on the Ayodhya temple, the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] has managed to forage alliances with other parties during the 1990s and expand outside of its previous geographic base of the northern Hindi Belt and demographic base of urban Brahmins. At the end of the 1990s, it is the primary opposition to Congress (2395).
• There are issues with Indian democracy, especially the similarity of Congress and the BJP on many important policy issues. The similarity of the BJP and Congress policies, combined with the effective exclusion of many small political parties from agenda-setting means that the ability of voters to select policies important to them is still limited (2399).

Hasan, Zoya. "Gender, Religion, and Democratic Politics in India". Third World Quarterly, Vol.31, No.6 (2010): 939-954.

• The election of a Bharatiya Janata Party-led government in 1998 represented a massive change in Indian politics, where previous decades had seen the BJP politically isolated. This was the turning point in the political changes that had begun in 1989 with economic liberalization and the rapid rise of Hindutva political organizations, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar (939).
• One of the justifications provided for the Indian government's secular policies is that they promoted gender equality, which was enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Under the Nehru government, Hindu customary and religious laws were overruled by progressive laws on women, but Muslims, Sikhs, and others were largely excepted from these laws (941-942).
• The BJP and RSS actually play a large role in promoting the expansion of women's rights for Muslims. Although this is done as a political gimmick to incite anger at the Muslim community, it still serves to promote issues of Muslim women's rights (948). Today the BJP is the strongest advocate a uniform civil code (949).
• This current secular establishment has faced attacks from the Hindu right in recent decades on the grounds of claims that the implementation of secular policies actually benefits religious minorities at the cost of Hindus (941).
• The secular political order in India began to break down as the electoral dominance of Congress weakened. This prompted Congress to respond to political threats, like that of the Akali Dal in Punjab, by appealing to sectarian Hindu interests or claiming to protect minority religious groups from Hindu majoritarianism (943).
• The turn of Hindu nationalists against Congress really began in 1989 when conservative Hindus switched from Congress to the BJP in response to Rajiv Gandhi's decision to woo Muslim voters by overruling the Supreme Court decision on the Shah Bano case, making Muslims no longer subject to civil law on divorce (943-944).
• Secularism in politics further degraded during the dispute over the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, which Hindu nationalists claimed was build on the birthplace of Ram and should be demolished to make room for a Hindu temple. The BJP had been mobilizing over the issue since the mid-1980s, but during the 1991 election campaign Congress decided to support the Hindu nationalist side in an attempt to win back Hindu voters. The plan failed, with the increased visibility of the dispute over the Ayodhya temple benefiting the BJP rather than Congress (944).
• Hindu nationalism has been around for decades, but emerged as a major political force in the 1980s. Hindu nationalism is centered around the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS], which organizes groups like the BJP, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and Bajrang Dal. These groups are attempting to create a Hindu state including all members of the faith (944).
• The main obstacles to the Hindu nationalist groups of the RSS and its affiliates is the internal diversity and division of Hindus. The solution of the RSS has been to unite Hindus around hatred and resentment of religious minorities, especially Muslims, who they blame for India's problems, thus uniting Hindus around a common enemy (945).
• Politically, the BJP also managed to benefit from public anger in northern and western India over the implementation of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. During this period of high inter-caste tensions, the BJP presented itself as a symbol of Hindu unity by focusing on the Ayodhya temple issue. When the Janata Dal government attempted to oppose BJP mobilization, they appeared partisan and collapsed, while the BJP looked like a symbol of stability during the crisis (945-946).
• The BJP made an active attempt during the 1990s to recruit more women into their political activism surrounding the Ayodhya temple, an effort which was successful in expanding the RSS to include more women and more people of middle class backgrounds. Women played major roles in the campaigns around the Ayodhya temple and during associated riots, such as the 2002 Gujarat riots (946-947).
• The Sangh Parivar offers women many opportunities in politics and activism, including in communal violence. At the same time, however, its women's organizations teach doctrines of conservative social values, instructing members that their first responsibilities are as homemakers, wives, and mothers, and encouraging their return to these roles after brief periods of activism (947-948).
• The BJP and other organizations used women to gain support from more demographics and have argued in favor of women's rights in minority religious communities, but these actions are not because the organizations of feminist, instead it is a shrewd political tactic to serve a deeply conservative and patriarchal organization (952).

Jaffrelot, Christophe. "The Rise of the Other Backward Classes in the Hindi Belt". The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.59, No.1 (2000): 86-108.

• The politicization of caste divides during the 1990s prompted many upper castes and non-OBC lower castes, like the Jat, to migrate to the BJP because it expressed initial opposition to the reservation system and Hindutva had traditionally been a conservative and upper caste movement (104).
• Electoral defeats in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 1993 due primarily to losing the OBC and Dalit vote, however, prompted the BJP to promote lower caste interests and promote many OBC and Dalit politicians within the party. The BJP reluctantly accepted the Mandal Commission expansion of reservations, paving the way to several successful alliances with OBC and Dalit parties in the 1998 election (104-105).
• The BJP has essentially recruited more politicians from the OBCs and Dalits without changed its fundamentally social outlook. Multiple politicians report than OBC and Dalit members of the BJP have been habituated to the upper caste attitudes of the core of BJP politicians. Defections of OBC and Dalit politicians to the BJP may change this in the future, however, as these politicians tend to have a very different social outlook (105).
• Caste politics is currently polarized between the wealthier OBCs, particularly the Yadav, and the other, more disadvantaged, OBCs. These other OBCs are open to different political opportunities, including alliance with the BJP, despite the fact that this party does not represent their interests. This situation is likely to endure unless OBCs can take over the BJP, a move which would likely cause the Sangh Parivar and RSS to fracture, or the most disadvantaged members of the OBCs manage to unite politically rather than remaining divided along jati lines (106).

Saideman, Stephen. "At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism and Kashmir". In The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, edited by T. Paul, 202-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

• Muslims in Kashmir were scared when Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh entered a coalition with the BJP in the 1980s, a mutual distrust which caused his government to take a harder stance on Kashmir. He adopted a mainly military response, increasing public resentment of India in the region (216).
• The BJP successfully politicized the issue of Kashmir during the 1990s, calling for the government to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution, drafting Hindu militias to fight Kashmiri insurgents, and appealing to the Hindu minority in the state (216).

Adeney, Katharine (2015), ‘A move to majoritarian nationalism? Challenges of Representation in South Asia’, Representation.

• The BJP depended on the RSS to mobilize its voter base, particularly in the Hindi Belt. This organization also engaged in Hindi nationalist rhetoric during its campaigning efforts (10).
• Modi has supported policies that privilege Hindi, refusing to speak in English on some occasions and generally disparaging minority languages. This attitude is also reflected in his Hindi-speaking Cabinet (12).
• Reserved seats for Muslims were abolished upon independence, and Muslims have been underrepresented since then (13).
• The Modi government includes four ministers of minority religions [out of 37 ministers]: one Muslim, one Zoroastrian, and two Sikhs (13).

Stuart Corbridge, John Harriss And Craig Jeffrey. “Has the Rise of Hindu Nationalism Halted?”. In India Today: Economics, Politics and Society. Cambridge: Polity. 2013

• Hindu nationalism started as a movement among the Hindu middle and upper classes who sought to modernize and rationalism their faith through organization so that it could be presented as respectable and challenging in British colonial society (179).
• Vinayak Savarkar enters the stage in 1923 when he coins Hindutva, an idea of a Hindu culture and civilization defining a ‘Hindu’ ethnic group. In enabled religious minorities to be ‘otherized’ and removed as part of the polity, but was not explicitly religious (179-180). [Similar to Mussolini’s ideas of Italy as a Catholic nation but against the Pope, or White supremacist ideas of Judeo-Christian civilization].
• The RSS runs over 70,000 thousands schools throughout India, most of them teaching intensely Hindu nationalist material (181).
• The BJP has a mixed relationship with more rapidly Hindu nationalist and violent groups, like the Shiv Sena. Sometimes their violence embarrasses the BJP, which is more moderate, but they still actively partner and form coalitions together (181).
• The BJP had subtly supported the elements which led to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodha in 1992 (182).
• When the BJP won elections in 1998, it was on the assumptions that they were the party of the Indian future, full of hope and modernity, and less corrupt than Congress. Hindutva helped entrench this belief, as they promised to be authentically Indian and project Indian/Hindu power (182).
• The BJP was also forced to moderate its stance on key issues like the Ayodha Temple, Article 370, and the Unified Civil Code between the failed 1996 elections and its success in the 1998 elections to attract necessary coalition support (182).
• The RSS frequently criticised Prime Minister Vajpayee starting in 1998, pressuring his government to take more hardline stances on Hindu nationalist issues, including putting greater pressure on Muslims and Christians to ‘Indianize themselves’ (183).
• The Sangh Parivar as a whole, and its trade union branch: Bharatiya Mazdur Sangh, called for a more closed economy and an end to liberalization. These requests were ignored by the BJP (183).
• Criticism has been particularly intense from the VHP, which took the hardest line on the Ayodha Temple dispute. This likely reflect different perspectives in different Sangh Parivar branches (184).
• Major members of the BJP government in 1998, including Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani, were largely unresponsive to a wave of attacks on churches in Gujarat in 1999, instead deflecting blame from Sangh Parivar organizations and calling for debate on religious conversion (183).
• While in government, the BJP has tried to introduce Hindu elements into the education system, attempting to use the University Grants Commission to introduce courses on Vedic studies, astrology, palmistry, and Hindu rituals (184).
• Narendra Modi’s victory for a third term as Chief Minister of Gujarat came immediately after the 2002 riots during which his government did little to stop violence or hold perpetrators responsible. He won his largest victories in the most violent districts of the state (185-186).
• After its defeat in the 2004 elections, several members of the RSS, especially the VHP, argued that the BJP should be disbanded and replaced with a new Hindu nationalist party. The RSS leadership rejected this suggestions, but still demand that the party reform itself (186).
• The core tension in the BJP is that it must simultaneously appeal to two masters: the public, which likes secular nationalism and demands material policies; and the RSS, which demands a dedication towards Hindutva and dislikes political compromises (187, 196).

Jaffrelot, C. ‘Hindu Nationalists and Power’ in Gopal Jayal, N and Mehta, Pranap Bhanu, eds (2010), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press), 205-218.

• In 1951, some members of the RSS managed to convince/pressure Golwalkar to create a political party, the Jana Sangh. It was politically isolated, as the RSS had previously been banned and the Nehru consensus considered it an Indian strain of fascism (208).
• The goal of the party, placed under the leadership of Deendayal Upadhyaya, was not electoral successful, but the transformation of society. The political party’s role was thus using political platforms to educate the public about Hindutva (209).
• It was not at all successful during the 1950s and 1960s, as many of its issues – like traditional medicine, cow protection, and Hindi language promotion – were already advocated by local Congress officials. It was also suppressed by the Nehru and Indira Gandhi governments. It managed to averaged between 5% and 10% of the vote (209).
• The Jana Sangh toned down its Hindutva rhetoric in the late 1960s, combining with other anti-Congress parties into the Janata Party. It achieved much more political success in this, adopting more conservative and less radical views (209).
• As part of the coalition, Hindu nationalists still continued to push for Hindutva legislation. They attempted to get a constitutional amendment banning cow slaughter, to control conversions to other religions, and to rewrite textbooks to remove left-wing bias and demonize Muslim conquerors (209-210).
• Since it did not feel that the Janata Party was advancing Hindu nationalist interests, they left the bloc in 1980, becoming the BJP. It continued to moderate its positions to achieve electoral viability (210).
• L.K. Advani said that the BJP fundamentally changed tactics in 1996, when it failed to secure a stable government. In now switched from being an ideological party to being an alliance-based party. Thus, to appease its allies, the BJP dropped the issue of Article 370, the uniform civil code, and the Ayodha temple in 1998 (213).
• RSS leadership accepted this decision of Vajpayee because his government did so much to raise the profile and prestige of the Sangh Parivar. It also allowed the RSS to have its members imbedded at all levels of central government (213).
• It appears that the RSS is willing to tolerate dilution of Hindutva by the BJP while it remains in power, but when it fails then this because unacceptable. Even, there is still pressure from RSS on certain issues, esp. economic liberalization and Ayodha temple (214-215).
• The BJP, under Advani, was quick to say that it was not a servant of the RSS. They appreciate their input, but note that they are ultimately accountable to the people, not the RSS. They are now an independent organization, only affiliated with the RSS (215).
• After avoiding the issue in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the BJP largely campaigned on the Ayodha temple issue in 1989 (210-211). The repression of its agitation in Ayodha, resulting in the death of dozens of protesters, further enflamed tensions, leading to a greater victory in 1991 (211).
• By the 1980s, Hindus had developed an inferiority complex, believing that the Congress government – through actions like overruling the Shah Bano case – was favouring religious minorities over Hindus (211-212).
• Whereas the Jana Sangh of the 1950s had struggled politically because religious leaders did not generally support its views, the strength of the VHP in the 1980s and 1990s gave religious legitimacy to the BJP’s policies and was able to marginalize dissenting voices within the Hindu religious community (212).

Bose, S. (1999), ‘Hindu Nationalism and the Crisis of the Indian State’ in Bose, S and Jayal, A., eds., Nationalism, Democracy and Development. State and Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press)

• The BJP is a semi-loyal political actor that depends upon and supports the democratic norms and procedures of the Indian state, but also supports and affiliates with groups who aim to undermine it; e.g., VHP or Bajrang Dal (110-111).
• Traditionally, the BJP/Jana Sangh drew electorally from the urban middle class, especially small shop owners, overwhelmingly concentrated in the Hindi Belt. This is the same demographic composition as the RSS, showing the link between the groups (118).
• Much of the electoral success which the BJP experience during the 1980s and 1990s was not a result of moderating Hindutva policies, but the result of a massive expansion in the popularity of Hindutva and unitary nationalism in light of the failures of Rajiv Gandhi to prevent the collapse of state authority in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam during this period (130-131).
• Support also increased in response to the empowerment of lower caste smallholders and commercial farmers following the green revolution. Upper castes felt threatened by the new demands and wealth of the OBCs, and supported the BJP because it ignored caste issues as unimportant within Hindutva identity and because the RSS had always opposed reservations (135, 137-139).
• Only a specific demographic group supported the BJP during this period, however, with support massive increasing among upper castes, esp. in the Hindi Belt. During the 1990s, it had very few OBC, tribal, or Dalit supporters and essentially no Muslims (140).
• The new members of the BJP during the 1990s came overwhelmingly from the most reactionary elements of Congress, attracting support where other regional parties did not have strong holds (163).
• The BJP was terrified that the Mandal Commission would split the Hindu voter base, exactly the opposite of their goal. To avoid alienating either lower or upper caste voters, they instead focused entirely on the Ayodhya temple, a symbol of Hindu unity (142-143).
• This won them an electoral victory in 1991 in UP, because upper castes all voted for the BJP, while other votes were split between pro-Mandal Janata Dal splinter-parties and ambiguous Congress (143).

Ogden, C. ‘A Lasting Legacy. The BJP led National Democratic Alliance and India’s Politics’. Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 42, No.1 (2012): 22-38.

• By leading the NDA coalition, the BJP has had a transformative effect on Indian politics by making Hindutva more mainstream and eroding the secular norms of Indian politics (22).
• The willingness of the BJP to back down on Article 370, the Ayodhya temple issue, and the uniform civil code made it seem much more respectable in national politics (24-25).
• The BJP dominated the NDA coalition, monopolizing most important positions. The BJP used this opportunity to promote members of the Sangh Parivar in government and put them in positions to advocate Hindutva (25-26).
• The BJP government in Gujarat had been stacked with members of the RSS and VHP since 1995, culminating with RSS member Narendra Modi. These officials did little to stop the worse communal violence since partition in 2002, originally claiming attackers were Pakistani (27).
• Since many orchestrators of the violence were Sangh Parivar member, their friends in the state government had no incentive to prosecute them or fully investigate the violence (28).

Hansen, Thomas (1999), The Saffron Wave: democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

• In the early 1980s, the previous division of labour between different branches of the Sangh Parivar turned into a split between two separate organizations with different strategies. The BJP sought to moderate and secularize to appeal to more voters like it had during the Janata Party, while the RSS and VHP became more radical in response to Congress playing towards Hindu nationalism (157).
• The BJP attempted to display a new tolerance by inviting Muslims to its events and endorsing Muslim candidates. It essentially adopted a moderate Hindu nationalism and strong opposition to Congress policy between 1980 and 1986 (158).
• All of this really pissed off the RSS, and many members endorsed Congress in 1984 over the issue! (158).
• After losing really really badly in 1984, Vajpayee, the BJP head, decided to abandon centrist policies and go back to Hindu nationalism. They kept more strongly populist programs, especially among the poor, but otherwise returned to the RSS line and put a lot of pressure on Congress (159).
• Vajpayee managed to link economic issues to Indian nationalism. He portrayed the illegal immigration of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to India as ‘Muslim invasion’ needing to be stopped (159-160).
• The BJP managed to appeal to both moderates and extremists in the 1989 election by having top leaders make moderate statements while nominating VHP and Bajrang Dal leaders as candidates, ensuring that candidates in contested areas would be extreme. This intentionally allowed the BJP to appear respectable, while endorsing violence at the local level (163).
• The BJP victory in the 1989 elections was because they had managed to retain control of their traditional areas while also breaking into new areas with high communal tensions whose populations had been splintered between Congress and regional parties (163).
• The BJP largely stopped supporting the V.P. Singh government in 1990 under pressure from the RSS and VHP, who opposed it because the Mandal Commission had proposed including Muslims in the OBC reservation system (164). The tensions of Ayodhya temple only provided a pretext for the withdrawal (165).
• Again in the 1991 elections, the BJP nominated huge numbers of VHP members, blending political and religious authority (166).
• Its hardline policies on Kashmir and support for the nuclear program also made the BJP the main party of veterans after the 1991 election (167).
• Originally, the BJP supported liberalization, but the RSS opposed it because of economic nationalism and ‘swadeshi’ campaigns. There was tension between the party’s popular supporters and its RSS leadership (171-172).
• After a BJP victory in UP in 1991, there was tension within the party over the Ayodhya issue. Moderates like Vajpayee and Advani sought to demonstrate good governance credentials to promote further victories, whereas hardliners like the RSS, VHP, and Murli Manohar Joshi wanted to go full steam ahead of the building of Ram Mandir. While the BJP vacillated, the VHP and RSS organized an attack on Babri Masjid on its own without BJP help or approval (182-183).
• In the end, the BJP did nothing to stop the destruction of Babri Masjid. Some spoke against it, but took no action (184).
• In response to the destruction and following rioting, the Congress government arrested Advani, Joshi, Ashok Singhal, and VHP leaders, banned the RSS, VHP, and Bajrang Dal until 1995, and dismissing BJP governments in MP, HP, and Rajasthan (184).

Jaffrelot, C. (1999). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s (New Delhi: Penguin Books).

• There were conflicts between the BJP and Sangh Parivar from its creation in 1980, out of scepticism by many RSS members that it kept the secularist or socialist elements of the Janata Party; these were the traits that led the Sangh Parivar to originally pressure the BJP to leave the coalition (319).
• The head of the RSS, Madhukar Deoras, actively sought to have the VHP expand its influence in the 1980s so that they could mobilize a ‘Hindu vote bank’ to support their interests, not necessarily through voting (326).
• At this time, the RSS doubted the capacity of the BJP to advance Hindutva goals and interests. They were particularly distanced by its attempts to attract Muslim voters and play down Hindu nationalism (327).
• Because the RSS did not actively tell its membership to mobilize in favour of the BJP in 1980 and 1983, many supporters switched to backing Congress against the Communists. This demonstrated the danger to the BJP of losing RSS electoral support (328-329).
• Following 1985, the BJP readopted its old Hindu nationalist align, integrating its ranks more closely with the RSS and placing issues of cow slaughter, Article 370, and a uniform civil code at the top of its agenda (376).
• At the same time, however, the BJP focused its policies during this time on popular socio-economic issues because it feared that Hindu nationalism would distance it from the Janata Party and get it kicked out of the coalition. It was only when this happened anyway in 1988 that they fully endorse the RSS Hindu nationalist electoral platform (379).
• The BJP’s political agitation around the Ayodhya temple in the late 1980s was planned and coordinated with the RSS and VHP leadership as part of a unified plan to increase the public standing of Hindutva and build the Ram Mandir, benefiting all three branches of the Sangh Parivar (380).
• The BJP has traditionally been unsuccessful in the south because it is heavily associated by the upper caste, Hindu, Sanskrit culture of northern India. Since the 1980s, however, Hindu unease with growing conversions to Islam – esp. mass conversion by Dalits – and the wealth of Gulf Arabs has made the Hindu nationalism of the BJP more appealing (439).
• The BJP support in West Bengal and Assam is centred on similar communal tensions. Rather than campaigning on the Ram Mandir in 1991, the BJP campaigned against illegal Bangladeshi immigrants as ‘Muslim infiltrators’, appealing to communal tensions with Muslim immigrants (441).
• BJP victories over Congress in northern India in 1991 where largely due to the split of the OBC and Dalit vote following Mandal Commission. As the main party of the upper castes, the BJP managed to win against lower caste majorities split between Congress and the splinters of the Janata Party (443).
• Once in power in UP in 1991, the BJP sought to distance itself from the violence and explicit religiousness of the RSS. It also sought to limit violence around Ayodhya, something that the RSS and VHP wanted to create (449).
• Support for extremist Hindu nationalism and destruction of the Babri Masjid was strongest among the middle and upper classes, esp. in urban areas. Lower classes, esp. those in mixed rural areas, did not support this and feared the violence it would create (476).
• After the demolition of Babri Masjid, the BJP leadership said that it had been regrettable, but refused to outright condemn the destruction. Instead, the BJP concentrated most of its efforts in late 1991 trying to get other Sangh Parivar branches unbanned (474-475).
• By early 1992, the BJP totally turned face and started openly praising the destruction of the Babri Masjid and celebrating the mob that destroyed it as national heroes (476).
• Also, historical note that President’s Rule was enforced in UP, MP, HP, and Rajasthan after the destruction of the temple until the 1993 elections (482).
• In the early 1990s, the BJP decided to focus mainly on economic issues, primarily an opposition to globalization and the ratification of GATT since it would hurt economic autonomy and mainly benefit foreign businesses. This was deftly tied to Hindu nationalism by envoking Mahatma Gandhi’s swadeshi campaigns (536-538).
• The ban on the RSS and VHP was not strictly enforced, with the organizations often just operating under different names and many major leaders being allowed to post bail (547).
• Examples of BJP behaviour in the early 1960s, early 1970s, and early 1980s all show that the party will try to moderate its behaviour and focus on issues other than Hindu nationalism to gain electoral support. When it fails without RSS support, then it comes back to the RSS line and does its part to cooperate with the RSS and VHP (548-549).

Varsheny, A. ‘Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety’, Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 3 (1993): 227-261.

• Mainstream Hindu nationalists, like most of the BJP, do not actually advocate the removal of all Muslims from India, only that Indian Muslims recognize Hinduism as the essence of the Indian national, revere Hindu gods as national heroes, condemn India’s Muslim rulers as redeemably bad, and never claim special rights. Muslim BJP candidates have generally done all these things (231).
• Importantly, there remains a tension in the early 1990s between radicals and moderates within the BJP and it is unclear which faction will become dominant (255).

Pinto, A. “Saffronisation of Affirmative Action”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 52 (1999): pp. 3642-3645.

• In the 1999 election, the BJP managed to win half of the Dalit and tribal vote in reserved districts, mainly by promising to expand the reservation system by widening the definition of OBCs (3644).
• Dalit voters are mostly won by promising to extend social programs and endorse pro-Dalit policy. This is empty talk, as the BJP are only scared of Dalits leaving the Hindutva fold (3645).
• This victories are constrained to populations in metropolitan India, not the Northeast. The BJP still has essentially no pull among the tribal peoples of the Northeast (3644).

Spodek, Howard. “In the Hindutva Laboratory: Pogroms and Riots in Gujarat, 2002". Modern Asian Studies, Vol.44, No.2 (2010): 349-399.

• Narendra Modi responded to the anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat by blaming Pakistani and a Muslim fifth column for the initial attack on Hindus that prompted to the riots (350).
• Later investigations showed that the train fire in Godhra was an internal failure not set by anyone. The BJP said that this was a sectarian lie by Congress, sticking to the ‘Muslims did it’ narrative (351).
• In the three days after the train fire, the VHP called for a strike and organized rioting and violence during that period. The Gujarat government ordered the police to not intervene or stop the pogroms, esp. those orchestrated by the VHP or Bajrang Dal (352, 357).
• The BJP cynically calculated that its electoral success would increase by stoking Muslim-Hindu tensions through rioting and pogroms. This is why the Sangh Parivar sought to provoke violence (359).
• On the same note, the reason that policy were finally sent in to stop the last of riots in September – 7 months after the incident – is that the BJP wanted to project some sense of law and order before the December 2002 elections (360).
• The entire decision of the BJP to run Modi as its candidate for Gujarat in 2001 was based on a belief that he would endorse and incite violence – as he had as an RSS leader – to the electoral advantage of the BJP (363).
• The divide within the BJP in Gujarat over whether to suppress or promote violence is reflective of larger divides in the party and the Sangh Parivar (360).
• Prime Minister Vajpayee originally thought the Gujarat pogroms were horrible, but ended up adopting the party line that it was a lesson for Muslims to not make waves (364).
• The VHP and Bajrang Dal have embedded themselves in Dalit communities since the mid-1980s, seeking to increase electoral performance among these groups. In tense situations, like the reservation riots in the 1990s, these Sangh Parivar officers have successfully managed to turn these caste riots into anti-Muslim riots (375).
• These program are largely organized to provide basic social services and salaries to Dalit or Tribal communities. Because they are paid salaries, many Dalits and Tribals will then participate in violence against Muslims and Christians (376).
• There is a tension between the BJP and the RSS and VHP, were the latter think that the BJP is selling out its values for electoral gains, while the former cannot remain competitive and endorse the radicalism and violence of the RSS (390).
• Modi in particular has come under attack by the VHP for emphasizing economic issues over religious ones. This resulted in a withdrawal of support for him in 2004 and losses for the BJP in state elections that year (394).
• In the 2007 Gujarat state elections, however, Modi won handily without the support of the VHP. He now has an independent power base based around his personality (399).
• The continued power of the RSS and VHP to exercise control over the BJP’s policies stems from the growing influence of Hindu nationalism across the political spectrum. This means that in Gujarat, if the BJP is too moderate, the RSS can threaten to shift its support to Congress – led in 2002 by a veteran of the RSS (397).

Chhibber, Pradeep. "Dynastic Parties: Organization, finance, and impact". Party Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (2013): 277-295.

• In 1980, the BJP strayed too far from the RSS line and as a result was not supported by the RSS, resulting in major electoral losses. Similar control is still exercised over the BJP (286).

Palshikar, Suhas. “The BJP and Hindu Nationalism: Centrist Politics and Majoritarian Impulses”. South Asian Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol.38, No.4 (2015): 719-735.

• Tensions between the BJP and its fellow Hindutva organizations, like the RSS, exist because electoral constraints prevent the BJP from being as radical and polarizing as the RSS is, leading to tension about distance of positions (721).
• In the past, the RSS clearly played a major role in running the BJP, the influx of non-RSS voters and candidates and the personal strength of Modi have changed that, however (721).
• Narendra Modi in particular has complex ties with the RSS, having essentially ejected its influence from Gujarat despite having once been a major cadre. Current relationship more like old Labour Party and trade union (721).
• While the BJP still benefits from its traditional base among urban, middle-class RSS members in the Hindi Belt, it now also has a significant following among aspirant OBCs, devout Hindus and former Congress voters (723-724).
• Even after their massive electoral victory in 2014, Modi continued to focus mainly on non-religious issues, like the economy (724-725).
• References to Hindutva during the 2014 campaign were tactical, with it being mentioned it states where it was politically salient – e.g., Assam – but other issues covered in states where it was not (726).
• While Narendra Modi has continued to focus on non-religious issues since his election, BJP state governments have done other things. Gujarat has introduced pro-Hindutva textbooks, and Maharashtra and Haryana both strengthened their laws against cow slaughter (727).
• Many other BJP MPs and ministers have also defended the conversion of Christians and Muslims to Hinduism using controversial Hindu nationalist terms, and advocated for prohibitions on conversion from Hinduism (728).
• Attacks on Christians and Muslims have also become more frequent in states where the BJP governs. Importantly, attackers – often linked to the VDH –are almost never arrested or punished (729).
• The Sangh Parivar tries to integrate itself into Dalit and Tribal communities under the Samajik Samarasta Manch and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, respectively (730).
• Hindutva ideas are gaining ground in India, with these positions becoming more mainstream since the 1980s. These represents a broad change in Indian political perspectives (731).
• This implies that the BJP can safely adopt some Hindu nationalist positions without risky electoral success. This make it more likely to take hardline positions in the future (733).

Gatade, Subhash. “The Saffron Condition: Politics of Repression and Exclusion in Neoliberal India”. Gurgaon, Haryana: Three Essays Collective, 2011.

• During a BJP campaign to demonstrate support for Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, Vinay Katiyar [Bajrang Dal leader and BJP MP] and Sahib Singh Verma [Delhi Governor and BJP MP], were arrested by police for offering cash re wards to civilians who killed militants (21-22).
• They must have had some sort of higher party approval to do this, so that the BJP could gauge public reaction. Local incidents help shape what the BJP thinks is acceptable to say at other levels of government (22).
• In 2006, in a speech in Hyderabad, L.K. Advani said that the country’s three top security concerns were Naxalites, terrorists, and Bangladeshi immigrants (27).
• There is evidence that the local BJP party leader in Goa and another BJP candidate were involved in organizing communal violence against Muslims in 2006 in Savordem and Curchorem (91).

Hansen, T.B. and Jaffrelot, C. (eds.) The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

• The campaign platform of the BJP in the 1996 elections was still intensely Hindu nationalist, even more than 1991. Issues emphasized were a uniform civil code, disbanding the Minorities Commission, fortifying the border with Bangladesh, and abolishing Article 370 (3).
• The 1995 Supreme Court decision that Hindutva was a legitimate and non-religious campaign platform marked a huge cultural and normative victory for Hindutva by legitimating an ethnic definition of ‘Hindu’ (5).
• Conflicts have taken place between the BJP and RSS and SJM over economic policy. The RSS, and esp. SJM, promote economic autarky, whereas more of the BJP’s regional partners [e.g., Shiv Sena] are liberal. In response, the BJP took a mixed stance during the mid-1990s (20, 313).
• Most BJP members seem to support liberalization, they are simply restrain themselves out of respect/fear for the RSS (291).
• Support for liberalization is the strongest among the urban upper and middle classes (296-297).
• As these were the groups that traditionally voted for the BJP, leaders were scared that opposition to liberalization would cause this voter bloc to switch to pro-liberalization Congress (300-301).
• The appeal of Hindutva remains minimal among most lower castes, meaning that they will only support the BJP if they are not otherwise mobilized. In the South [and Northeast], there are other regional and Dravidian parties mobilizing these groups (202).
• Muslims overwhelmingly benefitted from the post-1970s boom in employment in the Gulf. This created anger among many southern Hindus (222).
• This is reflected in rapid growth of the RSS and other Sangh Parirvar groups during the 1980s and 1990s. RSS members made up a large amount of total BJP voters compared to other states (225).
• The BJP has failed to become electorally successful in Kerala because it is not comfortable sacrificing its electoral principles of Hindu nationalism. While it sacrificed on points when part of the Janata Party or NDA, it refuses to do so with secular and pluralist parties in Kerala [large number of RSS members probably is also a factor] (227).

Adeney, K. and Saez, L. (2006), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism, (Abingdon).

• Vajpayee allegedly stated that the BJP needed to jettison Modi – tainted because of the 2002 pogroms in Gujarat – to remain competitive. After the 2004 defeat, this was ignored (260).
• The decision of the BJP to make Vajpayee its head in the early 1990s was because they were aware that their national reputation had been damaged by the destruction of the Babri Masjid and thought that Vajpayee was a good sober and moderate face to appeal to voters (261).
• During its government between 1998 and 2004, the BJP sought to actively alleviate the worries of Muslim voters by focusing on economic policies that would appeal to all Indians (80-81, 153).
• The BJP government in UP made it illegal to erect religious buildings without permission from local authorities, specifically directed against the creation of new mosques, which they rumoured were being infiltrated by Pakistani spies (86).
• The NDA coalition government removed certain textbooks from national curriculum for being critical of Hinduism and Indian history. This was part of the Hindu nationalist policy agenda (153).
• Its initial campaign platform in 1998, however, did not mention any explicitly Hindu nationalist objectives. They were likely abandoned as part of the BJP joining the NDA coalition (160).
• In reality, the NDA has not done any of its stated agenda – even the support for charitable education parts – and instead has mainly focused on making more RSS cadres responsible for designing curriculum, particular resulting in charges to textbooks to praise Hinduism, demonize and ‘otherize’ Muslim invaders, and support certain historical claims made by the RSS (160-163).

Ogden, C. (2013), Hindu nationalism and the Evolution of Contemporary Indian Security (Delhi: Oxford University Press).

• After the BJP’s defeat in 2009, the party experienced a major shake-up, with the head of the RSS demanding the expulsion of Jaswant Singh for writing a book favourable to Pakistan. The result of this reorganization will likely be a strengthening of militant Hindu nationalists and RSS cadres in the BJP (194).
• The BJP’s promotion of Indian nationalism takes place within a context of Hindu nationalism. Hindutva sees India as strong and respected, so the BJP seeks to make India internationally respected and economically and militarily strong as part of this goal (195).
• The BJP has maintained some limited opposition to economic liberalization throughout the 2004 and 2009 elections, continuing to oppose international companies and capital in 2011 [the change must only be in the 2014 elections] (196).
• While in NDA coalition governments, however, the BJP has continued to endorse the liberalization plans supported by Congress. Its swadeshi has been abandoned in office (90-91).
• Hate crimes and violence against Christians increased greatly since the BJP-led coalition took power in 2004. This is likely due to a culture of impunity and because BJP officials in government refused to stop violence (86-87).