Tuesday, October 20, 2020

Notes on Somaliland

 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/africa/05somaliland.html

  • Ms. Edna Adan Ismail is the foreign secretary for Somaliland and will robustly defend the independence of the territory to any groups or person who dares to imply that they are not a fully sovereign state.
    • "We feel slighted, discriminated against, ignored and isolated," she explained later. "We've been doing our own thing for the last 15 years. We have put our act together. Instead of encouraging us, we are being pushed toward Somalia, which continues to fall apart."
  • Somaliland gained independent independence from British colonial rule on 26 July 1960, while Somalia gained independence on 1 July 1960 from Italy. Within days, the two areas decided to unite.
    • Almost immediately, Somalianders felt excluded from governance concentrated in Mogadishu. They rejected a unitary constitution in June 1961 and attempted to assert independence in a coup that year.
    • In 1988, a full scale civil war, developing out of decades of violence, broke out between Mogadishu and Hargeysa. The republic did gain independence in 1991, as the rest of Somalia collapsed into chaos.
  • Many African countries are unwilling to recognize Somaliland for a fear of encouraging their own separatist states, but the state has been essentially self-governing and actively seeks international recognition.
  • Although not officially recognized, passports of Somaliland are accepted by border guards in Djibouti and Ethiopia.
  • Somaliland inherited a difficult legacy, its main cities had been essentially leveled by the Mogadishu government, its countryside was dotted with landmines, and the rule of law had collapsed.
    • Despite this, Somaliland is a relatively functional state, with widely recognized elections, the rule of law, and general political stability.

  • US government said that it would increase development and cooperation with Somaliland and Puntland, seeing them as a useful alternative to instability and bloodshed in the south.
    • The US still refuses to formally recognize the breakaway states, however. It says it waits on the decision of the AU, which recognizes a unitary Somali state.
    • The de factor recognition of Somaliland and its reinforcement of state capacities makes it more difficult to reincorporate into Somalia in the future, effectively cementing independence.
  • The US made this decision largely because southern Somalia is shithole and because the coasts of Puntland and Somaliland are essentially to combatting piracy.

  • International isolation and lack of formal recognition has made it difficult for Somaliland to access development funds and loans from groups like the World Bank and IMF.

  • Actually, 7 out of 47 ongoing World Bank projects have taken place in Somaliland, although all of part of country-wide projects which do not regard Somaliland as its own actor.
    • These projects are also limited to financing private enterprise, and work and are regulated by the Somalian government, not the Somaliland government. This must take a logistical toll, because all projects there are behind schedule.

  • The attorney general of Somaliland pursued the prosecution of journalists despite their acquittal for crimes in an attempt to shut down a newspaper critical of the corruption in the sale of state-owned land.

  • Famines is a reoccurring feature of life in Somaliland, as the government makes insufficient preparation and does not prepare. They lack the infrastructure to save water for times of drought.
    • Somaliland is overly dependent on foreign aid for drought relief, as the state is unable to establish long-term solutions to this problem.

  • The UAE submitted a formal request to establish a defense based in Somaliland, meeting with foreign minister Sa’ad Ali Shire.
    • The UAE has tense relations with Djibouti and Ethiopia, which may resist the construction of the base.
  • The UAE seeks to acquire a port on the Red Sea to help in its fight against the Houthi, Iranian influence in the region, and to control strategic ports near the Bab al-Mandab
  • Apparently these investments and others in Puntland have been successful at destroying Iranian influence (source: https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/)


  • President Ahmed Mohammed Mohamud Silanyo reiterated that the presidential elections will be free and fair.
  • The presidential elections have been rescheduled from 28 March 2017 to a later date because of a serious drought which has affected the country.
    • He hoped that the postponement would not hurt the country’s international reputation and discredit it as a democratic state.

  • Somaliland certainly has flaws, including questionable electoral practices, but they are perceived as legitimate and it has still been able to develop a state and police force that the rest of Somalia has yet to achieve.
  • Sometimes the international community sees the recognition of independence as a road to peace, however, Somaliland is not currently fighting the Mogadishu government and giving it independence would not solve the conflict.
    • A slippery slope argument dominates discussions in the African Union, which refuses to grant recognition. They fear rising tides of secessionism across the continent.
  • The international community has been holding back cooperation with Somaliland to avoiding undermining Somalia. This has given up a number of opportunities to improve and develop institutions in Somaliland.

  • An interview with Ambassador Brook Hailu Beshah, the Ethiopian ambassador to the United States, is the source for this information.
  • The ambassador claims that the Somalilanders and Somalis are different clans of the same ethnic group. The difference comes from colonial rule, during which British administration gave more political freedom and encouraged Somaliland to use political discourse as opposed to violence.
    • The original Somali state in 1960 had allowed different political parties and different viewpoints. The Somalilanders only began to resist southern domination following the assassination of the 1st president.
  • Hints dropped that Ethiopia does not recognize them because in the 1990s there was some talk between governments that Somaliland would have a political association with Ethiopia.
    • Several states have set up ‘de facto’ recognition of the country, including Ethiopia. They had consulates in Hargeisa.
    • Ethiopia has been investing in infrastructure in the country, esp. for export. They have built a nice road from Jijiga, in the Somali region, to Berbera through Hargeisa, and develop port facilities.
  • The Ambassador considers that Somaliland will soon become recognized by the international community.

  • Levels of violence and piracy are still troublingly high in neighboring Puntland.

  • The rubric of the failed state, as applied to Somalia has had the negative effect of warping perceptions about Somaliland, limiting the degree to which foreign aid and development networks interact with Somaliland (373).
  • The latest civil war in Somaliland began in 1982 when the Somali National Movement, overwhelmingly supported by the Issaq group populating Somaliland, moved its headquarters from London to Ethiopia (377).
    • The National Movement joined forces with other prominent opposition groups, prompting harsh crackdowns and mobilization of other loyalist ethnic groups by Siyaad Barre. This culminated in the wanton destruction of Hargeisa and Burao in 1988, and the regime had lost control of the northwest by 1990 (377).
    • In 1990, the Dhublbahante, one of the groups which had fought with the government, called for a ceasefire and meetings in Ogadeen, Ethiopia. Talks continued and culminated in a northern peace conference in February 1991 in Berbera (377-378).
      • Negotiations with the pro-government Gadabuursi did not immediately yield an end to fighting, but by January 1991 the group enter negotiations with the National Movement militia surrounding their main city of Borama and agreed to attend the Berbera conference (378).
    • The Somali National Movement had the explicit goal of creating a new nation in the North after the ceasefires were secured in the Berbera conference. They next planned a summit of all northern tribes in Burao – the central city, despite being destroy by war – to create a new nation (379).
      • The National Movement had never intended to create a state, but the elders decided to anyway, a proposition with strong popular support (379). Support was common amongst all tribes (380).
    • The chair of the National Movement, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, became the first President of Somaliland for two years (380).
  • With 18 month of unification, Somaliland officers attempted a coup. They had joined out of a dream of a single Somali homeland, but the failure to incorporate Dijbouti, eastern Ethiopia, and northeastern Kenya into the country led to pessimism (379-380).
  • Somaliland was imperiled soon after its independence by fighting between National Movement militias, who lacked any other enemies. An initial firefight in February 1992 in Burao was dispelled, but conflict became intense between the government and the local warlord controlling Berbera, who refused to turn over port revenue. They lost this battle (381).
  • The Somaliland government agreed following fighting in Berbera that the best way forward would be a clean peace-building process, in which restitution for crimes and property would be forgotten and no blame attributed. The nation would be like a newborn (382).
  • President Ali stepped down in 1993, giving power to a civilian committee composed of elders from the major tribes. They created a constitutional framework which allowed for civilian government, with Haji Ibrahim Egal as president (384).
    • The government remained very fractitious, with seats in parliament being distributed according to the size and strength of ethnically-aligned militias backing political parties (384).
    • There was a fear among the non-Issaq tribes that President Ali would be too strong a leader, and they pushed for a parliamentary system. They did not succeed, although he was not reelected (385).

  • Ethiopian troops crossed into Buhudle, Somaliland on 21 May 2010.
  • Generally Ethiopia provides security to Somaliland, which in return allows Ethiopia trade access to the port of Berbera.

  • The World Bank was attempted to provide the Somaliland government with accurate GDP and poverty estimates for the country to aid in their national development program.
    • Poverty is around 29% in cities and 38% in rural areas. These are similar figures to Ethiopia, and inequality is as high as neighboring Kenya.
  • Somaliland has very low levels of investment, with almost all outside aid coming in the form of remittances from the diaspora, or NGO aid groups.
  • The Somaliland government has had difficulting taxes businesses in its territory, with many large companies paying very low rates of tax. This hurts the national budget and ability to develop public services.

  • In the mid-2000s, many African nations made warm signs towards Somaliland, including Senegal, Djibouti, and Ethiopia all hosting the then Somalilander president, Dahir Riyale Kahin (78).
  • Ethiopia and several EU and UN agencies have opened chapters in Somaliland, conducting some form of communication with the government there (79).
    • Almost all reconstruction efforts, including the rebuilding and demining of the capital, Hargeisa, were funded by the Somalilander diaspora, without assistance from the World Bank or IMF (80).
  • Relations with Djibouti have been cool since the establishment of the transitional government authority in Mogadishu. This government was strongly supported and organized – to the detriment of Somalian input – by the President of Djibouti. He is largely seen as against the interests of the Somalilanders (80).

  • The formative period of Somaliland’s history, between 1991 and 2001, there was essentially no foreign support or contact. Its international isolation prevent any significant government or non-government interference or aid (629).
    • Somaliland was not very harshly striken by famine in the 1980s, unlike the rest of the country. What aid groups that were there fled in 1988 when Gen. Barre began a campaign to wipe out the Somali National Movement (633).
  • Private citizens of Somaliland, or foreigners investing in Somaliland, are unable to access most types of loans or insurance. They are also unprotected by international investment law (629).
  • The entirety of this article suggests that Somaliland’s isolation during early independence and the civil war forced regional elites to work together instead of fighting over resources, and thus isolation was partially positive.

  • Somaliland joined Somalia in 1960 out of the ideology of pan-Somalianism, which had developed under colonial rule and hoped for a single Somali nation including Somalia, Somiland, Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia, and northeastern Kenya (72).
    • The war was devastating, and reunification with the South is now many Somalilanders’ greatest fear (73).
  • The Somalian army attacked Hargeisa in response to a siege of the city by the Somali National Movement in 1988. They carpet bombed the city, and killed all civilians they could find (74).
  • More than half of the nation’s GDP comes from remittances (76).
  • Health services are still poor to abysmal in much of the country, largely due to a shortage of doctors. In specialist fields like mental health, there is literally no care (84).

  • A number of countries, including many African countries, are unwilling to recognize Somaliland’s independence because of the implications it would have for other break away regions. For example, Russia has expressed concern about its meaning for Chechen independence (811).

  • Policy document of the government of Somaliland issued to justify their declaration of independence.
  • They directly claim to be the international successor to the independent state of Somaliland, voluntarily disbanded in 1960. This original state was recognized by 35 states upon independence, including Egypt, Ghana, and Libya (1).
    • Because they had previously been independent, Somaliland claims to exercise an internationally legal to self-determination in accordance with the AU’s policy on colonial borders (2).
    • Somaliland claims it had never really joined Somalia because the act of union had not been official approved by the Somalian parliament. Instead they approved a different law, which was not signed by Somaliland (4-5).
  • The Somalilander government only agreed to unity because it believed that the colonial territories containing Somalis would be under one government; hence the 5-pointed star on the flag: one for Somaliland, trustee Somalia, Ogaden, northeast Kenya, and Djibouti (2-3).
  • The Somaliland government considers it a torment and constant affront that they are forced to remain part of a country they despise (6).
  • Somaliland at least partially blames President Ismail Omar Guelle of Djibouti for the newest derailment of recognition, because it led talks for the newest Somalian government (10-11).
  • Somaliland claims that the UN and AU will not offer it recognition because doing so would admit that they have failed in Somalia to the world. UN document try to cover up Somaliland’s achievements for this reason (35).
    • Although talked about in a conspiratorial tone, the UN did not work with Somaliland and often created administration divisions which hindered its ability to work with the Somaliland government (37).
    • The entire document places the UN mission in Somalia as in cahoots with an imperialistic government in Mogadishu, attempting to erode Somaliland’s independence (40-41).
  • Somaliland has been unable to access or communicate with institutions like the IMF and World Bank, at least until 2003. Probably afterwards, too (44).

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González-Ruibal, Alfredo. "Fascist Colonialism: The Archaeology of Italian Outposts in Western Ethiopia (1936-41)". International Journal of Historical Archaeology, Vol.14, No.4 (2010): 547-574.

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