Notes on Labor Migration in Europe

 Castles, Stephen. "Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?". The International Migration Review, Vol.40, No.4 (2006): 741-766.

• The guestworker system of Europe developed in the unique conditions in the aftermath of WWII until the 1970s, and was practiced by essentially all Western European states. Labor recruitment, especially from colonies, was pioneered by Belgium, Netherlands, and Britain (742).
• The system of labor recruitment began to break down by the 1960s, with most migration becoming sourced through pre-existing family or social networks instead of official channels. Many family members were employed at the same workplaces, becoming an informal means of family migration (742-743).
• While the oil crisis of 1973 and 1974 was the immediate impetus for the end of European guestworker programs, it was a response to pre-existing political concerns that European businesses were becoming increasingly dependent on cheap migrant labor. As migrant became increasingly permanent, the needs of guestworkers increased, and they participated in strikes and the labor movement of the early 1970s. Since the guestworkers were just as much trouble as regular European workers, they were no longer an economic asset (743).
• Migrant workers became permanent residents because economic prospects were better in Europe than elsewhere, and older migrant workers became increasingly unwilling to move without their families for seasonal work (743).
• Governments allowed temporary migrant workers to become permanent workers because they could not legally expel legal migrants. Trade unions, churches, and other social-liberal civil society groups also increasingly mobilized to support migrant rights (743).
• While some colonial subjects did have citizenship rights, the German model of guestworkers was also common: it prioritized labor migration by restricting migrant rights, minimizing family migration, and limiting the length of work terms (742).
• The pool of labor that states tried to recruit was cheaper than usual and was purposefully denied normal labor rights and distanced from union movements. It was to use labor without paying the costs associated with long-term European workers (742).
• Modern labor practices in Europe continue to replicate these strategies. Recruitment and treatment of EU migrant workers in rich Northern European states is designed to reduce wages, provide substandard conditions, and prevent unionization, only now it is used against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe (751).
• Guestworkers were recruited and housed on an explicitly discriminatory basis: separate and inferior to the regular European population, with lower wages, and worse housing and services. The legacy of this ghetto-ization of migrants is still visible in many European societies (743-744).
• The negative effects of this segregation and its continued effects in European states has prejudiced European politicians about the consequences of migration (744).
• By the 1990s onward, it was believed that new technologies had essentially made low-skilled labor unnecessary in Europe, meaning that immigration of unskilled labor was unnecessary (744).
• This attitude began to change in the early 21st Century, with Germany, the UK, and other states arguing that increased labor migration could be economically beneficial (744-745).
• This change in attitude was caused by a realization that some forms of unskilled work could not be exported, esp. hospitality and construction, that Europe's population was rapidly aging and declining, and that it would stop the negative consequences of illegal immigration (745-746).
• Many Western European states have argued that the entry of Eastern European states into the EU will fulfill these unskilled labor needs, negating the need for other unskilled immigration (750, 753). Turkish membership in the EU has been mentioned in the same context (758).
• This has been the main argument of Western European states for opposing a comprehensive immigration plan including unskilled immigration (758).
• European states are aware of the experiences of the Persian Gulf states and the Asian Tigers in using migrant labor, and view that their tactics of denying migrants legal rights, prohibiting any family migration or settlement, and unrestricted use of deportation were incompatible with the 'democratic future' of Europe (746).
• Actually constructing a working system of migrant labor that both complies with human rights standards and prevents permanent settlement would require active and efficient state intervention in employment. In this light, it seems much more likely that employers would prefer illegal immigrants to guestworkers, since they can easily exploit the former for additional profit (748-749, 755).
• Illegal immigrants work for lower wages and tolerate worse conditions and services than local workers, lowering costs, are generally excluded from unions, and can be deported easily. Tolerating illegal immigration allows Gulf-style exploitation of migrants without officially tolerating these practices (755).
• Many developed countries, including those in Europe, have attempted to give greater benefits to highly skilled persons. There is shit tons of competition for highly-skilled workers and countries are willing to give them lots of benefits, including permanent settlement, to stay (749, 751).
• EU labor policy seeks to encourage the immigration of highly skilled immigrants, but doesn't give any rights or encouragement for unskilled migrants. This means that this labor is supplied by illegal immigrants instead (757-758).
• Policies of the 1940s-1960s were intended to recruit unskilled workers, whereas 21st Century policies are intended to recruit only highly-skilled workers. Unskilled workers are viewed as undesirable/unnecessary for a number of reasons, esp. the ready supply of illegal immigrants (760).
• Author is a smart cookie and questions the artificial 'need' for unskilled labor in Europe. Labor in certain sectors (esp. construction and agriculture) is cheap and with bad conditions because it is allowed to be. If conditions and wages were improved, local workers would take these jobs. These steps would make powerful interests very angry (761).

Desmond, Alan. "The Development of a Common EU Migration Policy and the Rights of Irregular Migrants: A Progress Narrative?". Human Rights Law Review, Vol.16, No.2 (2016): 247-272.

• EU policy on illegal immigration is mainly a security approach designed to prevent illegal border crossings and deport illegal immigrants already resident in the country; human rights are not a primary concern in migration legislation (247-248).
• This approach is represented by the refusal of any EU member states to sign the UN International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers, the only one of the 10 core human rights instruments not signed by any EU member state (248).
• These laws meant to criminalize and curb illegal immigration make it more difficult for illegal immigrants to report being victims of crimes, seek medical attention, or report abuse and underpayment by employers (271).
• The demand for illegal immigration is driven by employers in Europe, with the economic differences between developed and developing regions being another major pull-factor in migration (255). The willingness of employers to hire illegal immigrants is a major reason for illegal immigrants (256).

Favell, Adrian. "The Fourth Freedom: theories of migration and mobilities in ‘neo-liberal’ Europe". European Journal of Social Theory, Vol.17, No.3 (2014): 275-289.

• Left-wing critics of labor migration in Europe increasing draw from a Marxist perspective, that liberalized labour markets exist only to serve the needs of capital in providing more cheap labour. This perspective emphasizes the benefits of liberalized migration for the wealthy contrasted with the depressed wages and continued exploitation of the working class. Instead, they increasingly advocate for tighter restrictions on migration to protect domestic workers from competition and facilitate rising wages and the strengthening of unions (277).
• Those holding these positions should be honest about what a critique of neoliberalism actually entails, specifically a reassertion of nationalist economics which strike a decisive blow against European integration both economically and culturally. Being against neoliberalism means being for nationalism and against European integration (287-288).
• Both liberals and left-wing critics agree that the contemporary migrant labour policy regime in the USA and Europe is deeply flawed, as it combines discriminatory rhetoric and measures against migrant workers while still encouraging and tolerating an exploitative informal economy dependent on cheap illegal immigration (278).
• The contemporary left-wing arguments against liberalization of migration are flawed by a misconception that European economies have been mainly self-contained with little migration, whereas migration is common and important in both contemporary and historical Europe. Cheap migrant labour remains essential to many suppossedly anti-neoliberal economies in the EU (280).

de Haas, Hein. "The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe". Third World Quarterly, Vol.29, No.7 (2008): 1305-1322.

• Popular discourse surrounding migration of sub-Saharan Africans to Europe assumes that the primary causes are extreme poverty and violence back home, prompting what is assumed to be an ever greater number of people to come north. These views have offer generated fear in Europe and North Africa (1305-1306).
• The solutions to immigration, especially illegal immigration, from Africa with this viewpoint are either increases in border defense both in Europe and North Africa, or aid directed towards the development of African states, with the idea that this will reduce the poverty which drives immigration (1306).
• From the 1960s, the vast majority of African immigration to Europe originated from the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Increased immigration controls introduced in the 1970s did not reduce immigration, but rather encouraged a shift from seasonal migration to permanent settlement. Traditional destination countries have been France, Belgium, Netherlands, and the Bonn Republic, although during the late 1980s this shifted to Italy and Spain (1307).
• The modern smuggling networks across the Mediterranean used by sub-Saharan immigrants originated during the early 1990s when Spain and Italy first began to introduce visa requirements for Maghrebi immigrants (1307).
• The reinvigoration of human migration across the Sahara occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, when Saharan and sub-Saharan immigrants began to settle in southern Algeria and Libya to work in construction and the oil sector, with the support of governments attempting to settle their desert regions (1307).
• Libya became the strongest supporter of this policy during the 1990s, when lack of Maghrebi solidarity for Libya following UN embargoes convinced Colonel Gaddafi that Libya should reorient itself as a principally African nation (1307).
• By 2000, however, clashes between sub-Saharan immigrants and native Libyans had created a considerable xenophobic backlash in Libyan society which prompted Colonel Gaddafi to imprison or deport tens of thousands of migrants. Immigrant continued, however, but had now been pushed underground towards human trafficking networks (1307-1308).
• Contrary to popular conceptions, the vast majority of African immigrants crossing the Mediterranean are not poor, instead the high costs of the journey mean that they often represent the middle-class of African countries. Moreover, most travel independently for vast stretches of the journey, only turning to human traffickers during difficult border crossings; most of these smugglers are local nomads, not larger criminal organizations (1308).
• The majority of illegal African immigrants to Europe do not attempt to cross the Mediterranean, instead choosing to enter the country legally and then outstay or otherwise violate their visa terms (1309).
• During the late 2000s, between 65,000 and 120,000 African migrants enter the Magreb annually, over 80% of them crossing into Libya. Although tens of thousands do attempt to cross the Mediterranean afterwards, the majority of migrants remain in North Africa. Most Magrebi countries have considerable sub-Saharan populations, often forced into menial working conditions in construction, agriculture, fishery, or cleaning (1308).
• The primary approach of the EU towards illegal migration from Africa has been increasing the deterrence measures at borders, including constructing fences and deploying quasi-military equipment or tactics to arrest illegal migrants. They have also sought to 'externalize' borders by cooperating with Magrebi countries on border control measures, sea lane patrols, and repatriation agreements in exchange for economic aid and development assistance from Europe (1309).
• The EU has also attempted to deter migrants by providing economic assistance  to African countries, specifically targeted towards rural areas. The EU has specially earmarked development funds for the stated purpose of 'addressing the sources of migration' (1309-1310).
• EU policy towards combating illegal immigration has had a number of unintended consequences, including a diversification of the transit routes used by African migrants. Whereas illegal immigrants used to mainly cross at the Straits of Gibraltar, since the late 1990s, migrants have begun using alternative routes to the Canary Islands from Senegal, and to Italy and Malta from the Libyan coast (1310-1311).
• Increased pressure on migration has also led to a professionalization of smuggling networks during the 1990s, which have become increasingly well financed and organized. Whereas small family groups dominated the trans-Saharan trafficking routes, the trans-Mediterranean routes are controlled by organized crime (1311).
• European attempts to 'export' border control to Magrebi states have succeeded on those terms, but usually involve entrusting border control to forces with a reputation for human rights abuses. Magrebi border police have been accused of abuse, and often deport migrants by simply dropping them off in the desert (1311-1312).
• Magrebi police forces, and to a lesser extent European police forces, often fail to properly enforce humanitarian law regarding asylum seekers during deportation. As a result, significant numbers of vulnerable persons may be being unfairly expelled during police action (1312).
• North African states will often resist the construction of additional security or humanitarian infrastructure in their territory, even if the EU is paying for it, because such facilities are seen as encouraging migrants to come to their country (1313).
• Both supra-Saharan and sub-Saharan African states have been resistant to fully enforce immigration policy through deportations in the past due to international tensions cause by such incidents. The mass expulsion or mistreatment of African citizens can anger neighboring countries, and overall tarnishes the country's human rights record (1313).
• The fact that most African migrants tend to be wealthier than average rather than poorer than average means that European development schemes in Africa are likely to produce more migrants in the short-term, not fewer, as more families have the resources to finance migrants (1314, 1318).
• The primary obstacle to actually enforcing immigration laws between Europe and Africa is that powerful interest groups in both countries have large economic incentives to maintain the status quo. In Europe, businesses, especially in construction, agriculture, and hospitality, have come to depend on cheap labor from illegal immigrants. African governments, on the other hand, benefit from the remittances send by illegal immigrants in Europe. Neither side is strongly motivated to actually stop illegal immigration (1315-1316).
• Because some many powerful interests benefit from illegal immigrants, a fact both European and African governments are well aware of, there are governments genuinely interested in enforcing immigration policy. Instead, most countries appear to only occasionally enforce policy to demonstrate their 'compliancy' to domestic or international audiences (1315-1316).

Joppke, Christian. "Immigration Challenges the Nation State". In Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, by Christian Joppke, 5-47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

• People are far more restricted in their movement than capital in the globalized economy, creating additional incentives to move. The exception is highly-skilled individuals, who travel and migrant according to radically different rules (13).
• The breakdown of the guestworker system during the 1970s was not a sudden failure of policy, but a natural consequence of a policy which had already begun to fail by the 1960s because, contrary to the unrealized expectations of French and Bonn politicians, immigrants did not want to return (14).

Drbohlav, Dušan, and Eva Janska. “Illegal Economic and Transit Migration in the Czech Republic: A Study of Individual Migrants' Behaviour”. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61, No.1 (2009): 141-156.

• Czechia likely receives a high number of illegal immigrants, driven by a high demand for labor and a permissive legislative environment, with perhaps 200,000 migrants intending to illegally reside in the country (142).
• Migrants from the former USSR make up the largest legal and illegal migrant communities in Czechia, author found Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Russians (143-144). These groups were likely to permanently reside in Czechia, whereas Asia and African migrants intended to go elsewhere in Europe (144).
• Most illegal migrants entered Czechia legally on a tourist visa, and simply outstayed their visa terms and engaged in work prohibited by the visa (147).
• Corruption regarding migration is rife, and many illegal migrants provided stories of both border guards and other police officers letting them continue working or illegally passing the border with a bribe, often under $100 equivalent. It is an easy country to enter (151-152). The Czech population also seems to tolerate illegal economic activity and migrant residence, at least from former USSR states (155).

Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Greek Migration Policy in the 2010s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis”. Journal of European Integration, Vol.36, No.4 (2014): 409-425.

• Greek immigration policy in the 1990s was driven primarily by regional instability in the Balkans. When the crisis stabilized, political elites attempt to address the long-term issues of permanent immigrants, mainly supporting immigration as a source of cheap labor for use by businesses and elites (412-413).
• The main effect of the 2001 law was the further restriction of legal migration and the post-facto legalization of illegal migrants so that they could work in low-skill, low-prestige jobs. Any EU regulations were implemented only insofar as they promoted the exploitation of immigrants as a cheap labour force (413).
• Most Greek political parties avoided any discussion of immigration as a political issue during the 2007 elections, limiting criticism to illegal immigrants and underfunding border security programs, all for economic gain (413).

Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?”. European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol.11, No.2 (2009): 159-177.

• In 2001, the PASOK government of Costas Simitis issued Law 2910, which created a regular immigration system, although one that still made admission dependent on employment. It was designed to encourage legal migration and regularize the labour market, it still did not envision long-term integration (165-166).
• During this period, both New Democracy and PASOK saw migrants as a temporary labour force. This agreement made it a non-political issue, since the consensus was that immigrant were economically beneficial, but temporary (166).
• Bipartisan support existed for an immigration system which kept immigrants semi-illegal and insecure so that they could be exploited for cheap temporary labour (176).
• The author implies that Greek businesses were certainly advocating for continued immigration of some variety, since the labour market quickly absorbed immigrants (168).
• As of 2009, Greece had an immigrant population of around 1.2 million, including 200,000 illegal immigrants (174). These immigrants made up around 12% to 14% of the work force, and 15% of the school population (175).

Cholezas, Ioannis, and Panos Tsakloglou. “The Economic Impact of Immigration in Greece: taking stock of the existing evidence”. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.9, No.1 (2009): 77-104.

• Most immigrants in Greece are not entitled to social security, not eligible for unemployment benefits, and face considerably lower wages than Greek workers (80).
• Immigration likely depressed the real wages of low-skilled Greek workers, although others were not affected. Immigrants have not, contrary to popular belief, stolen Greek jobs, but they have depressed wages to the degree that many jobs do not pay enough to attract Greeks (86-87). Others suggest that Greeks were not employed in these sectors in the first place (88).
• In terms of wages and employment, around 37% of the population, focused on poor households, is hurt by immigration, while the middle-class and upper classes benefit from increased immigration. Farmers are also benefitted (89).

 “Spain and Immigration: Bad New Days”. The Economist, 4 February 2010.

• Recession in Spain, not Spanish policy is likely the biggest factor behind a drop in immigration, which began to decline in late 2009.

Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tille. "Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (1999): 703-726.

• By the 1960s, the Netherlands had developed a labour shortage, especially in mining, and 'temporary guest workers' were recruited from Southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa to fill this void. These new immigrants were almost entirely male. This only began to change in the mid-1970s, as guest workers moved their families to the Netherlands (707).

Joppke, Christian. "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe". West European Politics, Vol.30, No.1 (2007): 1-22.

• The policies pursued by the EU are simultaneously protecting the rights to fundamental equality and non-discrimination of immigrants while subjecting them to strict requirements to conform to neoliberal ideals of an atomized, autonomous, and self-sufficient citizenry. These ideals citizens are protected, while all deviations from this model are punished (15-16).
• This trend is being driven by neoliberalism and globalization, creating additional economic pressures on individuals to be able to compete in employment -- regardless of national origin -- and to be financially self-sufficient due to the retreat of the welfare state. Nationalist concerns about culture in general have been subordinated to economic concerns about certain cultural practice as impediments to economic competitiveness (16-18).
• The increased separation of citizenship policy for highly skilled and unskilled migrants is demonstrative of this change in the purpose of integration policies. The actual culture of the immigrant is not a problem, the state is only concerned with the ability of the immigrant to increase the overall competitiveness of the national economy. Thus, unskilled immigrants are increasingly excluded or subjected to measures to increase their economic effectiveness, while highly skilled immigrants are fought over for the economic value they possess (18).

Carmel, Emma, and Regine Paul. "The Struggle for Coherence in EU Migration Governance". Italian Journal of Social Policy, Vol.1 (2010): 209-230.

• Some elements of EU migration policy, particularly around the period of the Lisbon Treaty, were created for economic reasons. Some supply of foreign workers is considered necessary to promote growth and provide cheap labour. These initiatives have been generally championed by the Commission, and resisted by the Council (223).
• Reflecting considerably disagreement within the EU about the numbers and skills of foreign workers needed for economic growth, the EU controls labour migration through specific requests by countries for workers divided according to skill type (223).
• EU documents recognize that immigrants are more likely to be socially alienated and less likely to secure employment than other groups, but do not conceptualize this as an issue like it does for other marginalized groups. Instead, migrants are encouraged to engage in 'circular migration' through arrangements which secure employment and limit social ties to European countries. This logic allows the continued use of punitive measures against illegal immigrants and their exclusion from schemes for other marginalized persons (224).

Boswell, Christina. "The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy". International Affairs, Vol.79, No.3 (2003): 619-638.

• Part of the rationale behind the developing of external measures to prevent immigration stems from constitutional or legal restrictions on the ability of Western European states to reduce migration within their own countries. Despite consensus during the 1980s that migration should be reduced, Western European governments were prevented from cutting many welfare provisions or increasing deportations by standards of human rights (621).

Vertovec, Steven. "Circular Migration: the way forward in global policy?". Oxford: International Migration Institute, 2007.

• Recognizing the reality that by the 1990s, most migrant workers were engaged in temporary or seasonal work and remitted large portions of their wages, international experts have recommended adjusting national policies in order to make these season or 'circular' migration easier and facilitate greater movement of personals and finances between destination and source countries (3).
• Proponents of circular migration, mainly international or intergovernmental bodies, have claimed that providing greater opportunities for the return of temporary migrant workers increases access to labour in the destination countries, increases remittances available for development in source countries, preventing illegal migration, limiting permanent migration or settlement, and ensuring access to a skilled and trusted pool of labour (5).
• Some have raised concerns about the similarities between circular migration systems and failed immigration policies like the German gastarbeiter program. The author claims that technology and increased cultural sensitivity to foreigners in the West have changes this scenario (7).

Ruhs, Martin. "Labor Immigration Policies in High-income Countries: variations across political regimes and varieties of capitalism". Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming (2017).

• Overall, the most common form of work available for migrants in middle-income or wealthy countries is temporary labour. Skilled migrants face many fewer restrictions to migration than unskilled migrants, and generally are given more rights in host countries than unskilled migrants. Countries more open to immigrants will also impose more restrictions on the rights they enjoy (2, 6).

Paul, Regine. "Strategic Contextualisation: free movement, labour migration policies and the governance of foreign workers in Europe". Policy Studies, Vol.34, No.2 (2013): 122-141.

• Under EU rules there is a distinction between the migration of EU nationals, who have a right to free movement, and nationals of non-EU states, whose migration can be restricted by national policy. EU countries with significant migration, like Germany, France, and the UK, have incorporated this knowledge into national migration policy, tailoring national policy based on assumed immigration from EU member states (122-123).
• Until the entry of former Communist states into the EU beginning in 2004, immigration was largely an issue of non-EU nationals enter the EU rather than movement between member states. These Eastern European immigrants soon formed the vast majority of new immigrants to Western Europe (125). This movement of persons made the pre-existing legal distinctions between EU and non-EU immigrants increasing salient (125, 127).
• Successive British government from the Blair government onward have used the supply of cheap labour created by opening EU internal borders as an argument for restricting low-skilled migration from non-EU countries. This logic resulted in the abolition in 2008 of the Tier 3 visa for low-skilled migrants, as the Cameron government reasoned that these occupations were already being filled by Eastern European migrants (130).
• French immigration policy following full implementation of EU internal movement in 2006 was intended specifically to reduce migration from the former colonies, with the exception of highly skilled labour, and replace it with Eastern European labour. A work visa regime still exists for former colonials, but it is restricted to skilled workers, and even then encourages temporary work instead of settlement (131-132).
• The French work visa regime openly attempts to subvert the current realities of low-skilled work in France, which is dominated by workers from the former colonies, by replacing African migrants with Eastern European migrants, particularly Romanians and Bulgarians (132).
• Increased dependence and acceptance in France of immigrants, especially low-skilled immigrants, from Eastern Europe has occured simultaneously to attempts to reduce immigration from former colonies and expel illegal African immigrants, demonstrated by the creation of migration control frameworks between France and nine different African nations (132-133).
• In 2005, Germany established a new immigration regime with a two-tier permit system for skilled workers and unskilled workers, both, however, needed to demonstrate that they supplied skills not already satisfied by German or EU workers. The introduction of Eastern European members into the EU convinced German officials that they would not have to recruit from outside the EU to fulfill skilled or unskilled labour requirements (133).
• In cases where German officials have noted some shortages in skilled or unskilled labour, the perferred solution was the further expansion of EU freedom of movement into Bulgaria, Romania, and candidate countries rather than increasing migration from outside the EU (133-134).
• What immigration from outside the EU that does exist is carefully selected from a number of EU candidate countries through special arrangements of the Foreign Ministry. For example, elder care workers are only recruited from Croatia, whereas costruction workers can only come from Turkey or former Yugoslavia. This system serves to encourage greater specialization abroad in needed skills, while concentrating these skilled populations in countries expected to join the EU in the future (134).
• While officials in France, Germany, and the UK all discuss the introduction of free movment for Eastern European EU nationals as reducing or eliminating demands for foreign labour, substantial changes have really only been made for immigration regimes for unskilled workers, with skilled workers being prioritized regardless of national origin and without references to skills shortages. This policy choice reinforces a growing divide between global labour markets for skilled and unskilled workers (136).
• The prioritization of Eastern European migrants over former colonials in France and the UK demonstrates an active attempt to reduce ties to the former colonial empire in France, including through reducing human and demographic connections, and the lack of political salience of these ties in the UK (136-137).
• Contemporary to this article, good economic conditions have generally allowed for a dichotomy to develop between non-EU migrants and EU nationals. However, poor economic conditions may increase resentment of all forms of immigration, reconstructing a dichotomy between citizens and all migrants (138).

Freeman, Gary. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States". The International Migration Review, Vol.29, No.4 (1995): 881-902.

• Despite the freedom of information which characterizes liberal democracies, most citizens are ignorant on the vast majority of policy issues, including immigration. This is a rational choice from the individual perspective, since the costs of obtaining information about political issues far exceeds the benefits of that knowledge (883).
• This ignorance regarding political issues is particularly true regarding immigration, despite its political salience, because governments fearful of being critiqued on their immigration policies make it intentionally difficult for citizens to obtain information on migration or its effects (883).
• Governments are particularly loath to disseminate certain characteristics of immigration, again in order to appear opposed to immigration, like the fact that small numbers of temporary immigrants will likely blossom into larger permanent populations as families of immigrants move and settle (883).
• Governments eager to adopt pro-immigration policies for economic reasons are also unlikely to fully explore the long-term implications of immigration, or allow that information to be disseminated. They tend to overemphasize the short-term economic benefits, and ignore long-term economic or social issues (883).
• The lack of information about immigration, and the cultural and political norms which police certain anti-immigration viewpoints, mean that public opinion about immigration is likely more favorable in liberal democracies than it would be if information about immigration were better disseminated (884).
• This means that most governing parties in liberal democracies do not have set policy promises regarding immigration, and are therefore bound to interest groups and lobbies rather than the general public. Pro-immigrations lobbies are better able to organize, because the benefits of migrant labor are concentrated while its costs are defuse, meaning that business interests wanting new labor are normally able to set immigration policy (885).
• The groups advocating for increased immigration are usually businesses which benefit from cheap, unskilled labor; businesses dependent on growth, like real estate or construction; and advocacy groups formed by immigrants already in the country (885).
• Some costs of immigration are concentrated, with small segments of the population suffering disproportionately from increased job competition, depressed wages, and less access to limited housing and government services. This segment of the population is both economically and politically marginalized, however, meaning they cannot form affecting lobbying groups (885).
• Immigration policies in liberal democracies are, however, still subject to public approval, with levels of immigration expanding during periods of economic growth and declining during periods of economic depression and high unemployment (886).
• European states with a history of labor immigration during or after WWII, usually through 'guest-worker' programs, are unusually skeptical of increased immigration, especially from non-European countries, informed by social problems stemming from the failed integration of earlier immigrant populations (890).
• Following the WWII, public opinion on immigration was largely shaped by elites with an interest in increased immigration for post-war construction, and it took time for organized opposition to emerge. Opposition to immigration really only organized when it became apparent that the temporary populations of guest-workers were actually permanent and expanding (891).
• Labor needs petered out around the mid-1970s, leading to a halt in immigration. This halt was never actually enforced, leading to increased conflict over immigration and the growth of anti-immigration opposition throughout the 1970s as an economic crisis made immigration more politically salient (892).
• Many European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, have only switched from source to destination countries from immigrants in the 1970s or 1980s. These states are institutionally and political unprepared for immigration, resulting in uncontrolled immigration through formal and informal sectors (893-894).
• Public opinion in southern European countries, with the exception of Spain, is strongly opposed to immigration. Despite this opposition, governments are pressured by labor unions and business interests to sustain high levels of immigration. Government have usually balanced these interests by approving immigration while keeping the issues out of public discussion to minimize engagement with anti-immigration public opinion (895-896).
• The arguments provided by Spanish politicians for the 'need' to import foreign labor through immigration sound very similar to those given by the French or West German governments in the 1950s, prompting concerns that southern European nations will have similar issues as 'guest worker' countries did in the 1970s (896).

Boswell, Christina. "Why do States Liberalise Labour Migration Policies? Germany, Spain and the UK in Comparison". Paper Prepared for OECD, University of Edinburgh, 2013.

• States often have strong demographic and economic reasons to expand their labor pool by allowing and promoting immigration, yet public opinion in many European countries remains strongly against increased immigration. The contrast between economic desire for immigration and an anti-immigration public opinion is called the 'immigration gap', and is usually expressed through the combination of anti-immigration rhetoric and pro-immigration policies (1).
• European countries have particular methods of managing this migration gap, with the most common methods being tolerance of illegal migration -- occasionally regularized through government amnesties -- and the use of seasonal migrant workers on part-time visas to provide for labor needs without becoming a permanent population (1).
• Since the public is generally opposed to liberal immigration policies, the political capital to pursue these policies must either come from organized interested groups pressuring governments or from the beliefs of the political elite. The author predicts that immigration liberalization will occur when there are labor shortages, when the government is left-leaning, when the economy is doing well, and when there is an absence of organized opposition to immigration (3-5).
• Interest groups do not have the standard effect on immigration in the European context, instead their interests are represented in terms of governments' desires to improve economic growth. When labor shortages begin to serious affect the economy, governments will respond (3).
• Under Conservative government from 1979 to 1997, the official immigration policy in the UK had been zero net immigration, although some de facto liberalization occurred after 1994 as visa standards were lowered. Labour took an explicitly pro-immigration stance from 1998 onward, urged by skill shortages hampering economic growth (6).
• When in power, the Blair government lowered the skill requirements needed for a work visa, adopted a new program aided at specifically importing highly skilled professionals, and expanded other programs. They also allowed migrants from all 8 new EU countries to live and work in the UK (7).
• Germany immigration policy during the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by an effective ban on new economic migrants. By the early 1990s, Germany was expanding the opportunities for immigration, especially for seasonal workers and highly skilled workers, but only through administrative policies and parallel to an anti-immigration political consensus (9).
• Partially because of extremely restrictive immigration, Germany suffered from a deficit of skilled industrial workers, which put pressure on economic growth. Immigration reform was proposed specifically in response to this shortage, as well as the need to transition to a globalized, knowledge-based economy, by Chancellor Schroder in 2000 (9).
• An independent commission on immigration affirmed the government's policy on liberalizing immigration, but met with public opposition due to relatively high levels of domestic unemployment and a strong collective memory in the west of failed integration of guestworkers in the 1950s and 1960s (10).
• Prior to 2000, Spain maintained an official policy opposing immigration, instead making up for labor deficits through illegal immigration and subsequent amnesties of illegal immigrants. In 1993, Spain had introduced a quota system which allowed firms to hire outside the country, but this was bureaucratic and many companies preferred to hire illegal migrants already in Spain. Beginning in 2005, the Socialist government rapidly liberalized immigration, which quadrupled in the decade to nearly a million a year, focusing improving control of formal networks over already large migration flows (11).
• The pressure on the Spanish labor market was particularly intense in the 1990s, as the Spanish population aged and left the labor market, leaving the country with high growth potential and low unemployment. Business lobbies, trade unions, and local governments all advocated for liberalized immigration in response to these pressures (12-13).
• Local governments in particular played a key role in shaping the conditions of immigration reform, being made responsible for compiling the lists of occupations experiences major labor shortages (13).
• The primary factor driving the liberalization of immigration policy in Europe has consistently been economic interests in promoting growth during periods of skill or labor shortages. Economically liberal governments in all three countries adopted policies which would benefit the business community through attracting foreign labor (14-15).
• In both Spain and the UK, support for immigration reform was partially driven by public fear of illegal immigration. Governments actively established a dichotomy between legal and illegal immigration, and often proposed increased legal immigration as a solution to rising levels of illegal immigration (15).

King, Russell. “The Social and Economic Geography of Labour Migration: From Guestworkers to Immigrants”. In Western Europe: Challenges and Change, edited by David Pinder, 162-178. London: Belhaven Press, 1990.

• The main demographic change since the end of the Second World War has been the movement of primarily young men from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and French Africa to Switzerland, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and the Bonn Republic from the 1950s until the early 1970s (162).
• This group was steadily joined by spouses and children, who gradual grew as a proportion of migration to exceed the number of guestworkers by 1975. Family reunification made this form of migration predominate throughout the 1970s (162).
• This immigration was been primarily labor migration mainly conditioned by economic factors, with migrants coming from poor countries with limited career prospects to rich countries (163).
• France, Belgium, and Netherlands drew guestworkers primarily from Spain, Portugal, and its North African colonies. Switzerland has primarily imported guestworkers from southern Italy. Austria and the Bonn Republic received most of their guestworkers from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Britain instead sourced most of its labor from Ireland and its wider colonial holdings (166-167).
• Italy was a major source of guestworkers from 1945 to the late 1950s, at which point southern Italy labor started being demanded by northern Italy industry and emigration tapered off (167).
• The growing economies of northwestern Europe sought to attract migrants from southern Europe and the colonial periphery. The labor-shortage in these countries was driven by decline in fertility, a rapidly growing economy, and the increasing education and upward mobility of the native population, making them less likely to engage in low-paid or undesirable work (163, 171).
• Immigrants with limited prospects at home could perform menial, unpleasant, unsafe, and poorly-paid jobs. They were also prevented from participating in other aspects of the economy by restrictive short-term contracts of residence – most brutal enforced in Switzerland and the Bonn Republic (163).
• By the 1970s, the pool of migrant labor was smaller, leading European states to compete for fiercely for it. This led a liberalization of rotation policies, allowing for longer terms of settlement and family migration (163).
• The end of European growth with the 1973-1974 OPEC oil crisis changed the economic dynamics of Europe and ended the guestworkers program. Young Europeans found employment increasingly difficult in the post-crash economies, leading to more pressure for previously undesirable jobs. In response to these pressures, guestworkers were less desirable and northwestern European countries stopped actively recruiting foreign labor (163).
• Many guestworkers left after the termination of recruitment programs and the non-renewal of labor contracts, the latter being most pronounced in strict countries like the Bonn Republic (163).
• This period also saw the increased outsourcing of manufacturing to the Third World, where labor costs were even cheaper than guestworker labor in Europe. This trend only increased in the 1980s. This decreased the desire for migrant labor, with the exceptions of construction and domestic service (171).
• Migrant laborers did not actually move out of manufacturing, where they are still very present, the number of available manufacturing jobs simply declined. Employers still lust after that tasty cheap foreign labor (171-172).
• Some of the major differences between low-skill labor migration in 1990s Europe versus the earlier guestworkers decades are the higher proportion of women among labor migrants, the larger number of source countries, and the even greater extend of their economic and social marginalization (164).
• During periods of economic expansion – as during the period between the 1950s and 1973 – Western European capitalists can use the massive and vulnerable labor pools in the Mediterranean region to increase the supply of cheap labor and subvert unionization, increasing profits which would have otherwise been translated into wage increases for unionized native workers (164-165).
• During periods of recession, as in the Bonn Republic during 1966 and 1967, unemployed foreign workers can be deported back to their home countries, allowing capital to keep wages permanently low without paying for the social support of its foreign workers (165).
• Many migrants stayed after the 1970s because either inflation has meant that their savings are insufficient for support a family in their home country or because employment opportunities in their home country are bleak. Their willingness to do undesirable work for low-wages or in dangerous conditions has guaranteed them permanent positions (175).

Cohen, Robin. “The New Helots: Migrants in the International Divison of Labour”. Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower Publishing House, 1987.

• There is a division in treatment between native workers and foreign or illegal foreign workers. They often lack legal rights or union protections, and cannot be politically active. Even in France and Netherlands, where they have some rights, discrimination puts them at a disadvantaged position [in late 1980s] in the labor market (113).
• A Swiss academic saw the use of foreign labor in Swiss manufacturing as a dystopia in which, “the Swiss could become a race of supervisors having at their service a labour force without political rights, dedicated to the least agreeable tasks, and victims of a more or less total segregation, which would be equivalent to a colonial state, with the difference being that the autochthonous people would be the masters and the immigrants the servants” (116).
• Gender divisions in guestworkers began to shift by at least the late 1960s, by which point women constituted 40% of all migrants, and likely one-quarter of labor migrants (115).
• The essential conundrum of capital in post-War Europe was that the small working population in positive economic conditions meant that, without intervention, unionized labor could force capital to pay higher wages, diminishing the right of capital accumulation (116-117).
• European capital developed four potential solutions to this ‘problem’: employing new groups within the population, like women or impoverished regions, in industry; lengthening the work day or otherwise increasing output; investing in labor-saving technologies; exporting manufacturing to countries with weak labor unions (117).
• The first solution would have obviously targeted women as an available labor source, but political paranoia about the declining birthrate precluded this option from widespread use (118-119). Some countries had pockets of cheap labor, like southern Italy or refugees in the Bonn Republic, but most did not (118).
• The organization and political power of labor during the 1950s strongly resisted moves to extend work hours or otherwise extract more value from workers (120).
• Automation during the period was still in its early stages, limiting the ability of new technologies to significantly reduce the number of boring and unpleasant jobs. Instead, new technologies tended to replace skilled work with unskilled work, increasing the need for low-wage unskilled labor (121).
• While some elements of manufacturing can be moved to other countries, many other sectors requiring domestic production, like domestic services, agriculture, construction, and energy production. Anti-colonial struggles during the period also made Third World countries less desirable for manufacturing and investment (122-123).
• Hiring migrant labor was a good solution to capital’s ‘problem’ in the post-War period: Paranoia in European governments about declining birth rates provided political support for importing foreigners (124-125), neither the companies nor the state had to pay taxes for the upkeep of laborers since they didn’t have rights (126), the presence of foreigners divided the labor unions on racial issues (129), and the migrants were a cheap and unorganized labor population who could be deported at will and were willing to tolerate lower wages and worse living conditions (127-128).
• An enormous number of academics, economists, and officials have concluded that the economic benefits of guestworker labor have been so great that it must become a permanent feature of the European economies (130-131, 135). In this narrative, the post-War economic boom was largely enabled by the available of cheap migrant labor which kept wages down and minimized inflation [because lower wages mean that more money is invested than placed into the market, lower relative inflation; also, migrants often remit wages, taking money out of domestic circulation] (131).
• The West European economies really were dependent on migrant labor because access to this cheap and exploitable labor supply enabled European manufacturing to artificially deflate prices and thus remain competitive on global markets. Not having access to this cheap labor would increase costs, which would increase prices, which would make industry uncompetitive and led to an economic decline (132).
• This problem is furthered by the lack of investment by European capital in new cost-saving technologies, since the ready supply of cheap migrant labor has made capitalists see this investment as unnecessary. This means that European industry is even less competitive than otherwise without cheap labor (133).
• This constitutes a major change to the politics of migrant labor; it originally existed to facilitate higher than normal economic growth during a period of rapid economic expansion by depressing wages, but now access to this labor made European industry artificially competitive to the degree that the end of guestworkers would not slow growth but cause a recession (135).
• The end of illegal migration to northern European in 1973 certainly had its catalyst in the OPEC oil crisis, but it cannot be explained by economic factors, which would have necessitated more migrant labor to lower wages to make industry more competitive for reduced markets (138). Instead, guestworker programs are terminated because migrant labor had begun to organize -- and national publics decided to protect migrants from exploitation -- and become more expensive, reducing its appeal to European employers (141-143).
• The political and technological conditions which had prevented manufacturing from moving to the Third World in the 1950s no longer existed, as stable post-colonial political orders had been settled in most areas and technological advancements had cheapened transportation and allowed for more types of work to be outsourced. In other words, outsourcing became a viable option at the same time that the costs of guestworkers increased (140).
• The claims that guestworker labor was a ‘structural necessity’ for the continued competitiveness of European manufacturing was proven false by the end of these programmes in 1973. Instead, when manufacturing in Europe became uncompetitive, European capitalists simple moved production somewhere cheaper (144). [Not discussed in this is the fact that only the stability of the Third World during the 1970s allowed this changed. Had European capital been unable to move manufacturing elsewhere, a depression would have occurred due to a sudden decrease in competitiveness]

Salt, John “International Labour Migration: The Geographic Pattern of Demand”. In Migration in Post-War Europe: Geographical Essays, edited by John Salt and Hugh Clout, 80-125. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

• Following 1945, European states sought to attract labor from poor areas of the world, and set up offices to actively attract this labor. Migrants were mainly attracted by relatively high wages (80).
• Most workers coming into Europe do not intend to settle, with rates of actual settlement differing between countries. The except is the UK, as most immigrants from the Commonwealth intend to permanently immigrate (81).
• The primary factor in motivating the use of migrant labor has been the fact that rates of economic growth in Europe exist alongside an essentially stagnant population level. While demobilization in 1945 accounted for some labor, European employers soon looked elsewhere for labor (83). The initial use of this migrant labor created a structural division between skilled native labor and unskilled migrant labor, furthering a demand for the latter to support continued growth (84).
• The recruitment of guestworkers in the Bonn Republic did not begin until the mid-1950s, as the population of 9 million refugees fleeing the Red Army provided a massive surplus labor force during the early years of occupation and self-rule (88).
• The beginning of German labor recruitment in the mid-1950s was responsible, along with the growth of northern Italian industry, for depleting Italian labor surpluses, compelling other European states to source guestworkers from different countries (88-89).
• The author believes that the presence of migrant workers has certainly allowed Europe to achieve an enormous economic expansion by depressing wages during a time of economic growth and low population growth (123).
• The job in which labor migrants have employed have changed since the beginning of the guestworker period. In the 1950s, most migrants worked in mining, agriculture, construction, and domestic services. This then shifted to manufacturing in the 1960s. By the 1970s, employment started to shift towards services (84-85). [different jobs were done in the past compared to now, reflected different industries]
• Politics also affected migration of guestworkers, as Greek emigration increased greatly in the late 1960s in response to the military coup and subsequent repression in 1967 (104).
• Importation of foreign labor and unemployment of the domestic workforce coexisted throughout the period of guestworker programs – the author blames it on an unwillingness of Europeans to accept certain kinds of work. It was common for hundreds of thousands of workers to be imported when unemployment remained around 5% among native workers (83).

Salt, John, and Hugh Clout. “International Labour Migration: The Sources of Supply”. In Migration in Post-War Europe: Geographical Essays, edited by John Salt and Hugh Clout, 126-167. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

• Emigration, as for previous generations of Mediterranean immigrants, is primarily driven by the economic factors of poverty and unemployment in home countries or regions. These under-employed populations, especially in rural areas, are attracted to the relatively high wages and plentiful work in Western Europe (126-127).
• Migration affords a social transformation as much as an economic transformation for immigrants, as new-found wealth from employment in Western Europe enables migrants and their families to achieve a higher social standing their home countries (133).
• Continued migration on a seasonal or temporary basis creates psychological and social connections to the host country, leading more and more migrants to settle permanently in the host country, with perhaps only remittances remaining a connection to their homelands (133-134).
• The initial sites of emigration in source countries are likely to be urban areas which are better developed, with more rural populations become involved later as knowledge of work opportunities abroad spread through the country (162); most rural migrants go directly to international migration or do so after a very short time of urban residence, rather than first migrating to domestic urban areas and then going abroad (162-163).

Kindleberger, Charles. “Europe’s Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply”. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967.

• The thesis of the book, as stated in introduction, is that the immense economic growth in Europe since the 1950s was due to the available of cheap labor due to colonial immigration in the Netherlands, large refugee populations in the Bonn Republic, and the importation of cheap migrant labor in France, Germany, and Switzerland. Britain, Belgium, and Scandavia were relatively deprived of labor, leading to a slower growth during this period (3).
• By this argument, the slowdown of the Swiss economy in the 1960s is due largely to the nationalism of that country in enacting strict limitations on new immigration (4).
• Explanations of German economic growth and low wage-growth rates during the period of economic expansion from the 1950s onward which concentrate on the weakness of unions need to acknowledge the reason behind this weakness: large labor supply (34).
• In 1964, the Swiss restricted recruitment of guestworkers, reflecting a deep concern in Swiss society about the domination of foreign workers in low-wage sectors of the economy, who made up 1/3 of the labor force at its height during the early 1960s (42-43).
• This move was supported by a Swiss body politic which believed that guestworkers depressed wages and prices (44). They also feared a religiously and culturally different Italian immigrant population (46).
• The reason that guestworkers are considered a better option than domestic workers by European employers is that they are cheaper to maintain because they accept lower wages and worse conditions than native workers. The jobs they do can be filled, but Swiss would demand higher wages and better working conditions (45).

Wilpert, Czarina. "Migration and Informal Work in the New Berlin: New Forms of Work or New Sources of Labour?". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.24, No.2 (1998): 269-294.

• Illegal immigrants are mainly concentrated in construction and associated industries; skilled trades like carpentry, hairdressing, and mechanical repairs; the food industry; and cleaning in public and private settings (286). The construction business in particular is infamous for hiring illegal immigrants, often hiring or importing underpaid migrant laborers despite unemployed populations in the same areas (286-287); perhaps 10% of all construction workers in Berlin in the 1990s were illegal, with another 27% being legal -- but often exploited and underpaid -- migrant workers (288).
• Following the cessation of guestworkers programs after 1973, the Bonn Republic mainly laid off migrant workers when factories closed or diminished production. Most of these workers were on tenuous contracts and were deported during the late 1970s and 1980s (289).
• The Bonn economy began to be deregulated during the mid-1980s, when a business lobby convinced the government that an inflexible labor market was undermining the competitiveness of Bonn exports and contributing to high levels of unemployment during the 1980s. In 1985, the Bonn Republic made it easier to fire workers and allowed new temporary contracts which could be used to employ people without paying certain social security benefits (289).
• This deregulation affected those in low-wage job positions the most, shifting their work entirely into a temporary and part-time status. These workers, disproportionately women, could now be denied social security payments and some forms of insurance (290).
• The creation of a large number of unprotected and temporary job positions since the 1980s has conditioned employers to expect these jobs to be done cheaply without paying for many forms of social support or insurance. These positions are easy to fill with illegal immigrants because the government doesn't regulate the conditions of work well because few rights are legally guaranteed in these kinds of work contracts (290).
• Because migrant workers, especially former guestworkers, have been disproportionately hit by layoffs and economic recession, they are much more likely to be unemployed than other Germans because they were largely employed in heavy industries which have outsourced and because they are discriminated against. This means that they are much more likely to enter into precarious, temporary, or illegal work; the same people who were exploited as guestworkers are disproportionately represented among exploited and/or illegal workers (291-292).

Sole, Carlota, et. al. "Irregular Employment amongst Migrants in Spanish Cities". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.24, No,2 (1998): 333-346.

• Immigrant workers are concentrated in construction, agriculture, domestic service, the food industry, and small-scale retail. These jobs are known for being insecure and having lower wages and worse conditions than other sectors (334). They usually do not have access to legal recourse for violations of labor law, and reports of underpayment, illegal firing, no social security benefits, and long hours or unsafe conditions are common; construction employees have already illegally low wages docked for invented infractions or to pay for work-provided housing or food (335).
• "The labour organisation Commissiones Obreras describes the situation of immigrant strawberry pickers in the 1994 season as follows: 'cases of foreign workers being exploited in this sector are constant. The employers use immigrants as cheap labour, taking advantage of their vulnerability and their illegal status. They have no contracts, no insurance and they live in snacks with neither electricity nor running water" (335).
• The jobs for which employers typically choose illegal immigrants are unskilled, feature highly competitive markets, and have flexible increases or decreases in demand. These employers pay a lot of attention to cutting costs, usually through hiring and exploiting the cheapest possible labor and tax avoidance. Profits are usually not enough to invest in new labor-saving technologies. The sporadic demand structure means that rapid hiring and firing are preferred (338).
• Despite several legalization processes of illegal immigrants in Spain since the 1980s, most of these now-legal workers continue to occupy the same positions and accept the same illegally insecure and low-paid positions as offered prior to legalization. Other employers simply fired these legalized workers and hired new illegal immigrants without legal protections (341).
• "Discrimination against immigrants from the 'poor' countries is widespread. [...] In other words, there are cases in which employers prefer illegal immigrants to local workers because they are cheaper, more vulnerable (they are not in a position to officially complain about their situation) and more docile (they do not protest if their working conditions deteriorate or if they are over-exploited). This 'positive' discrimination at the time of hiring goes hand in hand with negative discrimination in the job itself, particularly in terms of wages and working hours" (341).