Notes on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

 

Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ)

(A/RES/52/38/S):

• Recalls inspiration from ¶ 60-64 of (A/RES/S-10/2), [(A/47/27), annex 1], and ¶ 5 & 6 of (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 1)).
• Also recalls (A/52/112), annex, & (A/52/390), annex.
• Welcomes expert consultive meeting in Bishkek on 1998.

(A/RES/53/77/A):

• Celebrates the results of Bishkek meeting; (A/53/183), annex.
• Commends first steps taken towards creation of legal framework.

(A/RES/55/33/W):

• Recalls (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part 1)), and (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/1).
• Welcomes adoption of principles and guidelines by 1999 session of Disarmament Commission; (A/54/42), annex 1.
• Commends progress on creating legal groundwork.

(A/RES/57/69):

• Invites signators to continue consulting w/ nuclear powers at Samarqand meeting.

(A/RES/S-10/2):

• Characteristics of each region should be taken into account in the establishment of NWFZs. They should exist as a result of free negotiation.
• States within the zones should fully comply w/ objectives and arrangements in establishing the zones.
• Nuclear weapon states should: respect NWFZ status, refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against those states.
• These measures are desirable in a NWFZ: adoption of more agreements, cooperation w/ IAEA, & ratification of treaties.

Note:

• Additional sources used include: (A/58/49 (Vol.II)), (A/59/49 (Vol.II)), and (A/60/49 (Vol.II)), with decisions (58/518), (59/513), & (60/516).

(NPT/CONF.1995/32), Part 1:

• Conviction that establishment of int’l recognized NWFZs enhances regional and global peace and security.
• The creation of more NWFZs is a priority, similar to the establishment of areas free of all WMDs.

(A/52/112), Almaty Declaration:

• Signed by “The Presidents of the fraternal states” of KAZ, KGZ, TJK, UZB, and TKM.
• Seeks to counter environmental destruction & raise living standards, mainly concentrates on this & transboundary rivers as cause for meeting.
• Puts Smipalatinsk test site w/ Aral Sea & other environmental concern dealt w/ in treaty.
• Decides to declare NWFZ and work to reduce impact of environmental damage & fissile material leakage.
• Will cooperate w/ UN to create the systems discussed.

(A/52/390), Tashkent Statement:

• Nuclear poliferation is a threat to both humanity & life. Because of this danger, the Nuclear Age must adopt a new idea of peace based on non-intervention and absolute sovereignty.
• Reaffirms belief in the linkage of regional security as the start of global security.
• All parties have signed NPT & Almaty Declaration.
• Affirm need for NWFZ for regional security. Calls for adoption of CTBT, welcomes next NPT review.
• Confirms readiness to cooperate on both disarmament & on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
• Calls upon int’l community to help rehabilitated irradiated areas within the NWFZ.

(A/53/183), Bishkek Communique:

• Meeting between 5 republics and experts from the UN, China, France, Russia, UK, and US.
• Notes that some legal progress has been made, and that consultations w/ nuclear powers are very useful.

(A/54/42):

• NWFZs are good, M’kay?, yeah, M’kay.
• Stressed that the conclusion of a treaty mandates a significant amount of responsibility for non-poliferation & IAEA guidelines.
• By signing and recognizing foreign NWFZs, the nuclear powers are agreeing to respect their status & not engage in nuclear threats.
• NWFZs provide a framework to support cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and proper containment and disposal of irradiated land and radioactive materials.
• The impetus for the creation of NWFZs must come only from within the region on the basis of self-determination.
• Nuclear weapon states, because of their obligations to not threaten the region, must be involved in the creation of the NWFZ.
• All states covered by the NWFZ must be consulted (duh).
• NWFZ must not conflict w/ other int’l law, specifically the Law of the Sea.
• Treaty should prohibit the development, manufacture, control, possession, testing, stationing, or transit of any nuclear fissile device regardless of purpose of national origin.
• To guarantee complience w/ these measures, party states should apply all IAEA safeguards & associated IAEA inspections.
• The treaty should not prevent the development or use of peaceful nuclear technologies.

(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/1):

• IAEA safeguards and regular oversight are an important part of the non-poliferation regime & should be regularly reviewed.
• Applauds new integrated safeguard approaches being used to detect non-state or undeclared nuclear enrichment.
• Establishment of CANWFZ is a priority & welcomes their progress on the issue towards a draft treaty.

(NPT/CONF.2000/28), Part 1:

• Notes with satisfaction the creation of a draft treaty for the creation of a CANWFZ. Encourages more progress.
• Should be created on the basis of free arranged terms defined by the states in question.

“Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ)”:

• Creates this treaty to strengthen non-poliferation, promote, peaceful cooperation, rehabilitate irradiated areas, and enhance int’l and regional security
• Defines CANFWZ as all territory of KAZ, KGZ, UZB, TJK, & TKM, including land, territorial waters, and sovereign airspace.
• All parties must not conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile, possess, or control over any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device.
• They also may not seek nor provide assistance in any of these activities, nor may they assist or encourage others in these activities.
• They also may not permit any of these actions to be performed by a foreign power or non-state group within the territory.
• Complience with the Semipalatinsk Treaty will be enforced by adherence to IAEA conventions (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)) and (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)).
• All of parties must also prohibit the storage of nuclear waste within their territory, regardless of origin.
• All parties must obey the CTBT & prevent their participation in any form in nuclear tests.
• All parties have a responsibility to assist in the rehabilitation of all territory within the NWFZ that has been degraded by radioactivity.
• No party of the Semipalatinsk Treaty will prevent peaceful development of nuclear energy. Although all parties must use nuclear facilities for only these purposes.
• No party state may supply source fissile material, special fissionable materials, or equipment especially designed for enrichment to any non-Nuclear-weapon-state, unless they have special approval from the IAEA.
• All nuclear facilities, materials, and equipment must be physically protected in use, transport, and storage according to the parameters set out in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1987.
• All parties agree to hold a meeting to review the implementation of the Semipalatinsk Treaty annually or at the request of any party. Disputes will be settled through these meetings.
• Any party may withdraw from the Semipalatinsk Treaty given any event it finds mandates invoking supreme national interests. The withdrawal will occur 12 months after notification of the depositary (Kyrgyz Republic).
• A party may propose an ammendment to the Semipalatinsk Treaty provided it be circulated 90 days before any meeting. It shall only be adopted by unanimous cosensus.

“Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”:

• All parties (the 5 nuclear powers) promise not to use nor threaten the use of nuclear weapons against the nations of the CANWFZ.
• All parties must fully comply with the measures of the Semipalatinsk Treaty establishing the CANWFZ.
• So far, all states have signed, but only the UK and France have ratified.

“UK Declaration following ratification of the Protocol to the Semipalatinsk Treaty”

www.disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/canwfz_protocol/unitedkingdomofgreatbritainandnorthernireland/sig/bishkek:

• UK understands its obligations under the protocol, but reserves the right to use nuclear force if any party states (KAZ, KGZ, UZB, TJK, TKM) fail to uphold their responsibilities.
• They also reserve the right to review complience should the development of non-nuclear WMDs poses a present threat to their vital interests.

“French Declaration following ratification of the Protocol to the Semipalatinsk Treaty” https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/R%C3%A9serves-fran%C3%A7aises-CANWFZ-Protocol.pdf:

• The agreement does not prevent France from using any means or tactics in self-defense.
• Should any other states violate the Semipalatinsk Treaty or its protocol, France reserves the right to be exempt from its responsibilities.
• Recognizrs that aircraft or ship carrying nuclear explosive devices in transit or station in the CANWFZ do not constitute a violation of terms.

“Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty (Semipalatinsk Treaty)” www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/central-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-canwfz/:

• Ideas for CANWFZ began in 1992 w/ Mongolian declaration of nuclear weapon free status, which included suggestion for regional expansion.
• Semipalatinsk Treaty demands all party nations comply w/ above mentioned IAEA controls & protection requirements.
• Semipalatinsk Treaty is different because it:
• Requires all members to comply w/ CTBT and NPT
• Has an annual consultive meeting, but not int’l control system monitering for complience.
• Uzbekistan was both the first to introduce and the first backer of the movement. They were also elected to represent the interests of the CANWFZ internationally.
• France, UK, and US have voted against resolutions that showed support for the establishment of CANFWZ.
• These states disagree because of concerns that treaty terms may allow violation due to subordination of the Semipalatinsk Treaty to other treaties (theorhetically including commitments to the CSTO).
• Worried about Semipalatinsk Treaty still allowing storage, deployment, or transfer of Russian nukes.

Additional Source: www.nti.org/media/pdfs/apmnwfzc_8.pdf?_=1410388105

“Something Old, Something New: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia” by Marco Roscini:

• Controversy over Semipalatinsk Treaty was developed when France, US, & UK raised concerns that provisions in CTS allowing Russian to store nukes in CSTO countries would overide NWFZ provisions, making the Semipalatinsk Treaty useless.
• Authorial analysis indicates that this is a non-issue & Semipalatinsk Treaty still bars nuclear deployment.
• The Semipalatinsk Treaty actually allows more intrusive oversight by IAEA. Under the additional protocol used in the Semipalatinsk Treaty, IAEA can inspect declared sites and undeclared facilities including all parts of nuclear energy from uranium mines upward.
• Obligations existing elsewhere, but not in Semipalatinsk Treaty, include prohibition on attacking foreign nuclear facilities, obligation to destroy manufacturing facilities, and obligation to sign the Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents.
• Unlike some other treaties, Semipalatinsk Treaty has a loophole providing for the development of ballistic missiles that could carry nukes, provided that none exist during tests.
• Semipalatinsk Treaty originally included provisions allowing expansion of CANWFZ, but this was removed at request of France, US, & UK after worries that Iran might joing & then not follow through with commitments.
• CANWFZ does not extent to the Caspian Sea because its territorial waters have not yet been demarcated. When they are demarcated, the Semipalatinsk Treaty will apply there.
• The Semipalatinsk Treaty provides a wide range of acceptable conditions for withdrawal, although withdrawal could theorhetically be contested at the ICJ.
• Unfortunately the protocol to the Semipalatinsk Treaty includes only the 5 nuclear powers, leaving the region legally unprotected from threats by India or Pakistan.
• No part of the Semipalatinsk Treaty specifically provides for the creation of a regional enforcement mechanism nor specific guidelines for dealing w/ non-compliance.

Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)

“1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZPFN) Declaration icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf:

• Signed by INA, MAS, PHI, SIN, & THA.

• Wants to create peace & cooperation amoung SE Asian nations.

• Recognizes that NWFZs are a good idea for reducing conflict.

• Declares a “zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality, in which nations promise to cooperate & no influence from outside powers should exist”.

• Bangkok Treaty covers the complete land, territorial waters, achipeligic waters, airspace, and seabed of BRU, CAM, INA, LAO, MAS, PHI, SIN, THA, & VIE.

• Also includes their contidental shelves & EEZs.

• Defines radioactive materials, dumping, and radioactive waste w/ references to IAEA guidelines & parameters.

• Nothing in the Bangkok Treaty – despite references to EEZs & contidental shelves – should affect the implementation of the Law of the Sea.

• All parties promise not to develop, manufacture, possess, control, station, transport, test, or otherwise use nuclear weapons.

• The signatory states are also forbidden from allowing other states to do these things in their territory, nor to give or seek assistance in any of these tasks.

• All parties promise to prevent the dumping or improper disposal of nuclear waste in their territory regardless of national origin.

• The Bangkok Treaty does not prevent, but rather encourages, the use of peaceful cooperation on nuclear energy.

• All countries using nuclear energy are required to conform to rigourous safety assessment as recommended by the IAEA. They are also required to provide information on assessments to any other state party except where it would violate IP laws or national security.

• All state parties promise to dispose of nuclear waste in line w/ IAEA guidelines and recommendations.

• Signatures may not provide source fissile material, special fissionable materials, or equipment specifically for enrichment to any state expect in accordance with NPT & w/ IAEA approval.

• All state parties must conclude full implementation of IAEA safeguards within 18 months of signing Bangkok Treaty.

• All signature states must aceed to Convention of Early Notificantion of a Nuclear Accident.

• Without being prejudiced by Bangkok Treaty, all states may choose to allow or deny passage to any ship or aircraft in their territory that does violate free transit laws.

• Establishes a Commission for the SEANWFZ. It should be made up of a representative of each signatory nation & it will observe and enforce complience w/ the Bangkok Treaty.

• The Commission will meet at the request of any member. Two-thirds members are required to constitute a quorum. Additionally all decisions will be made by a vote w/ a two-thirds majority needed to take action.

• Establishes a Executive Committee as a subsidary organ of the Commission that wil ensure and verify measure, decide on matters of clarification or fact-finding missions, and conclude negotiations w/ the IAEA on behalf of SEANWFZ.

• Voting rules require two-thirds for a quorum & the same for any action to be taken. It will convene in conjuction w/ the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting.

• The Commission will ensure complience w/ the Control System, which will provide procedures for fact-finding missions, clarification, information exchange, and IAEA safeguards.

• Each party state must submit a report to the Executive Committee on any event on its territory which affects the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty.

• Each party state must request clarification from another state concerning a situation which may create doubts about state complience w/ the treaty.

• If information is still unsatisfactory, a state may request that the Executive Committee send a fact-finding mission to investigate the situation.

• Any party state may request an ammendment to the treaty, which requires an absolute consensus & will enter into force 30 days after consensus has been reached.

• 10 years after ratification, the Commission will meet to review the operation of the Bangkok Treaty.

• Any disputes that arise must be taken to the ICJ for arbitration.

• Withdrawal from the Bangkok Treaty is only allowed in the case of the treaty violation by one of its signatory members.

• Annex is included w/ full procedure for fact-finding missions & all documentation required for request.

• No state has yet signed or ratified the Protocol, but it is supposed to be ratified by the 5 nuclear powers.

• All signator parties promise to respect the Bangkok Treaty & integrity of the SEANWFZ.

• They also may not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against SEANWFZ countries.

• Countries may only leave the protocol under extroidinary circumstances.

• The main objections to the Bangkok Treaty are to its definition of territory, especially contidental shelves and EEZs.

• US and France also object to the unequivocal security assurances towards the SEANWFZ states.

• The verification & complience mechanisms are generally strong & in line w/ IAEA guidelines. Matters and information can be raised by any state & appeal to UN mechanisms is possible in certain situations.

• Unlike other treaties, the Bangkok Treaty covers contidental shelves & EEZs of all countries. It also leaves the issue of nuclear powered or armed ships at the discression of SEANWFZ states, which some violates or potentially violates navigational freedom.

• China has been the most supportive of the nuclear powers, but it still pospones signing, possibly due to maritime border disputes with signator nations.

• Despite the passage of yeats, the SEANWFZ still promotes regional security, especially in preventing WMD materials from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

• The security goals of the Bangkok Treaty have changed, from strengthening the non-aligned movement to combating terrorism.

• The denuclearization of SE Asia was also originally intended to limit the incentives for the US and/or USSR to intervene in the region & internal politics.

• Nuclear powers were not consulted during the drafting process for the Bangkok Treaty or its protocol.

• Just like the ASEAN organization, any state may join the SEANWFZ and ratify the Bangkok Treaty with the full approval of all current members.

“Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ):

“Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”:

“Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)” www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/:

Additional Source: www.indonesia-ottowa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Plan-of-Action-to-Strengthen-the-Implementation-of-The-Treaty-in-the-Southeast-Asia-Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone.pdf:

“A Nuclear Weapon-Free Southeast Asia and its Continuing Strategic Significance” https://muse-jhu-edu.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/journals/contemporary_southeast_asia_a_jounral_of_international_and_strategic_affairs/v027/27.2.abad.pdf:

Mongolia’s Status as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

(A/RES/53/77/D):

• Asserts that NWFZs are supported internationally & that declaring such an area is a method of ensuring national security.
• Appeals to member states, esp. the nuclear powers, to support Mongolian efforts including participation in regional organizations.

(A/C.1/55/PV.6):

• US gives statement on Mongolian NWFZ on behalf of US, UK, FRA, RUS, and CHN. They support its aims & implementation.
• All of the nuclear powers agree to aid Mongolia in its establishment of the zone, and provide security assurances to protect Mongolia from any & all nuclear acts and/or threats.
• Would like to note that Mongolia’s unique geographic situation makes such a system of guarantees useful, but the terms of treaties between Mongolia & the nuclear powers should not be applied to other regions or nations.

(A/55/530):

• All nuclear powers promise to respect the terms of Mongolia’s nuclear weapon-free status. All also make negative security assurances.
• Any issues regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Mongolia immediately become a Security Council issues as per (S/RES/984).

(A/55/166):

• As requested in (A/RES/53/77/D), UN bodies and int’l organizations have helped Mongolia in the development of its NWFZ status.
• The Regional Center for Peace & Disarmament in Asia & the Pacific has included the issue of Mongolia as a NWFZ on the agenda several times to raise int’l & regional awareness.
• Since then it has been discussed at multiple meetings.
• The parties attending the 2000 NPT Review Conference gave their full support towards the concrete establishment of Mongolia’s status as a NWFZ.
• The Regional Center, as mentioned above, has been organizing consultive meetings between Mongola & nuclear powers to discuss negative security assurances.
• To help w/ the non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia’s declaration, the UN Secretariat has hosted meetings w/ Mongolia to receive expert advice from IAEA, UNDP, & UNEP.

(A/54/323):

• Mongolia believes that all states should contribute to regional & int’l security. To this end, Mongolia supports the construction of NWFZs and general disarmament.
• Due to the vecinity of Mongolia to nuclear weapon tests & storage, it makes sense to declare the country a NWFZ.
• Inspired by int’l support, specifically of the nuclear powers & the non-aligned movement, Mongolia is working to draft national legislation that will define its nuclear weapon-free status.

(A/55/56):

• This is the copt of the “Law of Mongolia on its Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Status” as passed by the Mongolia legislature.
• Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status applies to all its territory, airspacem territorial waters, and sub-soil.
• In case of conflict between this law & another int’l treaty, the provisions of that treaty overide the conflicting terms of this law.
• Any individual, group, organization, or foreign state shall be prohibited from developing, manufacturing, possessing, controlling, stationing, transporting, testing, or using nuclear weapons within Mongolian territory.
• Dumping or disposing of nuclear waste and/or enriched fissile materials is also prohibited.
• The transport of nuclear weapons, any components therein, and weapons-grade enriched materials is forbidden in Mongolia.
• Nuclear energy & technologies is only permitted by the appropriate state authority, and only for use in peaceful purposes, such as healthcare, research, mining, & energy production.
• To guarantee that no above aspects of the law are violated, Mongolia promises to fully cooperate w/ the IAEA.
• The National Security Council of Mongolia is empowered to implement state policy concerning prohibited activities under this law. Internationally institutionalize Mongolia’s nuculear weapon free status, & fully cooperate w/ int’l bodies (e.g., IAEA) & national bodies.
• All Mongolian security & law enforcement services have the right to stop, detain, and search any vehicle, train, aircraft, individual, boat, or group suspected of violating this law.
• The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be responsible for monitering complience w/ this law & any other int’l agreements associated w/ Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status.
• NGOs and empowered individuals may also observe complience & submit reports to the relevant state agencies.
• Mongolia’s status as a NWFZ will be internationally verified by cooperation w/ relevant int’l organizations, esp. the IAEA.
• An individual or group that violates this law shall be held liable in accordance w/ the Criminal Code of Mongolia.
• The guilty party will be required to pay compensation for the damage caused to the interests of Mongolia by the action.
• The facilities, equipment, means of transport, & materials involved of the law will be seized by the state.
• In case that a foreign nation violates this treaty, the matter shall be dealt w/ peacefully, with assistances from int’l bodies such as the IAEA or arbitration at the int’l level being possibilities.
• If Mongolia feels its vital interests are affected, this law may be terminated.

(A/RES/55/33/S):

• Believing that the establishment of a NWFZ is a method of preserving national security in line w/ UN committements to protecting small nations.
• Welcomes all int’l & domestic efforts towards the establishment of Mongolia as a NWFZ.
• Request that the UN & states in the Asia & Pacific region continue to provide support for Mongolia’s efforts.

“Mongolia’s Nuclear Weapon-Free Status” www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-weapon-free-status-mongolia/:

• A comprehensive study done in 1976, in accordance w/ (A/RES/32/61/E), provided the possibility of single-state NWFZs as a method of increasing int’l security.
• The nuclear powers certainly recognize the legitimacy of Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status, but question the use of single-state NWFZs elsewhere.

(A/RES/57/67):

• Believes that Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status promotes security & strengthens the sovereignty, environmental protection, and self-determination of Mongolia.
• Welcomes regional & int’l support for Mongolia’s development & help in developing Mongolia’s NWFZ.
• Appeals to member states to support for Mongolia’s integration w/ regional economic and security organizations.

(A/RES/59/73):

• Updates report to include support for Mongolian NWFZ by non-aligned movement summit in Kathmandu.
• Besides that, it is a word for word copy of (A/RES/57/67).

(A/RES/61/87):

• This document is a word for word copt of (A/RES/59/73).

(A/RES/63/56):

• Updates report to include support for Mongolian NWFZ by other NWFZ treaty organizations.
• Besides that, this is a word for word copy of (A/RES/61/87).

“Mongolia: A Model for an innovative approach to Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700500209122:

• Although in many ways the Mongolian case was unique, the vagaries of geological location leave it as a good model for the creation of other single-state NWFZs.
• Although all 5 nuclear powers supported the establishment of a Mongolian NWFZ, they worried that it set a negative precedent, which might disincentivize some states from joining more stable regional NWFZs.
• The nuclear powers agree, but w/ emphasis in all resolutions on Mongolia’s unique status.
• Reciprocity of security agreements are even more necessary for single-state NWFZs, as they are only protected by the influence & credibility of the nuclear powers.

Additional Source: http://jstor.org/stable/3021136: