Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy". Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.6 (1997): 22-43.

Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy". Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.6 (1997): 22-43.

• "American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, [...] 'Suppose the election was declared free and fair,' he said, and those elected are 'racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the dilemma.' (22).
• Whereas the rise of democracy in the West has coincided with the rise of liberalism, resulting in the condition of liberal democracy, the same is not true in other parts of the world. Liberalism and democracy are fundamentally different traits, and liberalism is rare in new democracies (22-23).
• These countries which have flawed election cycles and restrictions on civil society are not less democratic than other states, but they are significantly less liberal. These new illiberal democracies lack civil liberties, but still manage to reflect the popular will in their politics (23).
• "If a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic. When public participation in politics is increased, for example through the enfranchisement of women, it is seen as more democratic. Of course elections must be open and fair, and this requires some protections for freedom of speech and assembly. But to [...] label a country democratic only if it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of social, political, economic, and religious rights turns the word democracy into a badge of honor rather than a descriptive category" (25).
• Although almost all Western states since 1945 have been liberal democracies, the two characteristics can exist separately as either illiberal democracies or liberal autocracies. Illiberal democracies are found throughout the developing world, where individual rights are severely restricted, but competitive and multiparty elections still take place. Liberal autocracies historically dominated Western Europe prior to the 20th Century, where individual rights were protected, but suffrage was severely restricted or non-existent (26-27).
• The path of Western states towards democracy appears to be historically unique, representing a gradual extension of liberal rights with increased suffrage, until liberal autocracies transformed into constitutional and then democratic systems. These transformations do not necessarily occur in other countries, as democratic Latin American countries have not liberalized and liberal East Asian countries have not democratized (27-28).
• The most powerful historical predictor of liberal democracies appears to be some form of constitutionalism, as existed in the British and American systems during their periods of liberal autocracy. The clear liberal framework of basic rights in constitutional systems appears to lend itself well to preserving liberalism during democratization (29).
• There is an essential tension between liberalism and democracy, because the core element of liberalism is the restriction of government power, while democracy is about the use of government power for the benefit of the majority. Democracy will try to remove the restrictions on power created through undemocratic liberalism (30).
• This process often occurs through vertical usurpation, where government figures, either the parliament or the executive, claiming direct representation of the popular will, supposedly allowing them to act legitimately without constitutional restraint because of their democratic mandate (30).
• Horizontal usurpation occurs where government institutions erode the autonomy of sub-national structures, claiming to represent a more pure and legitimate form of democratic mandate than those institutions. This is the most common form, with many countries restricting the freedom of universities or local government (30-31).
• Strong governments capable of enforcing order, though often demanded by both domestic and foreign audiences in the developing world, are not good predecessors to liberal democracy. In fact, liberal democracies tend to emerge from deeply pluralist and divided societies, such as the United States or India (32-33).
• Many prominent liberal institutions, like the IMF or World Bank, promote liberalizing reforms regardless of government structure, empowering illiberal governments to restrict civil liberties to ensure successful privatization. This restriction of civil liberties, although used to advance liberal goals, ultimately results in illiberalism. Actual liberalism needs to be promoted through consistent application of the rule of law and respect for personal and property rights (33-34).
• Western politicians often make the mistaken assumption that democracy will led to peace and ethnic harmony; neither of these traits is actually related to harmony. Democracy can actually intensify ethnic divides and spark conflict, as it did in many parts of the former Eastern Bloc. Substantial historical evidence also demonstrates that democracies may be conflict prone, again because democratization makes issues like war and ethnicity politically salient in ways autocracies may not (35-36).
• The author contests that even democratic peace theory does not actually make any claims that democratization will result in peace. The 'democracy' that Emmanuel Kant describes is actually republicanism, which he defines as a liberal system, not a democratic one. Therefore, it might be plausible that all liberal states should be peaceful, but certainly not illiberal democracies (36-38).
• The American political system is impressive not for its democracy, but a distinct lack of democratic framework for a liberal democracy, reflecting its origins as a liberal autocracy. The many liberal and anti-democratic elements of the American system, like an unelected Senate and Supreme Court, and severe restrictions on presidential power, made it a successful system than other illiberal countries should consider adopting (39).
• The author argues that democracy is not the most important quality in government, which is instead liberalism and the preservation of its associated rule of law and personal rights. American foreign policy should focus much less on promoting democracy and much more on promoting liberalism, which ultimately guarantees better conditions for life (40-41).
• Actually non-democratic states are increasingly uncommon, as almost all countries adopt some form of democracy. The issues for progressing human society come increasingly from illiberal democracies, making the problem one of global illiberalism, not global democracy (42).
• This trend towards illiberal democracy poses two dangers. The first is that democratic governments will not be adequately sanctioned for committing human rights abuses. The second is that abuses in illiberal democracies may undermine global belief in democratic norms, creating a growing population willing to reject democracy (42-43).