Hartman, Jeffry W. The May 2005 Andijan Uprising: What We Know. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2016.

Hartman, Jeffry W. The May 2005 Andijan Uprising: What We Know. Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2016.

• Some key points made and substantiated by the author about what the Andijon Uprising was not: it did not involve any foreign terrorists from the IJU, Al Qaeda, or O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati, it was not a popular uprising with widespread approval, and it was not a massacre orchestrated by the Uzbekistani goverment (61-64).
• On this last point, there is no evidence to suggest that the Uzbekistani government ever gave an order to clear Bobur Square and, even if such an order were given, there was no command and control in place at the time to carry it out among all the different government units (62-63).
• Andijon had a reputation as a rebellious city in the modern period, perhaps due to its pride as the birthplace of Bobur. It was always a potential trouble spot for the Qo'qon Khanate and fears of rebellion in Andijon were a big motivation behind the Khan's surrender to Russian suzerainy in the 1860s. The Russians feared revolts from both Andijon and Marg'ilon, building a Russian-only garrison town at Novomargilan, today's Farg'ona Shahri; they still faced two uprisings in Andijon in 1898 and in 1914 (15).
• Andijon always had a reputation as a religious city during the Russian and Soviet periods, but one in which several different schools of Islam peacefully coexisted (15). During the early 1990s, Andijon became the center of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a non-violent Islamist extremist movement. Most of the members of Yimonga Yo'l, including Akrom Yuldashev, used to be members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, as were many who latter joined O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati (16-17).
• Namangan had a much more extreme reputation during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Wahabbism flourished in the city. From 1990 until early 1992, downtown Namangan was under the effective control of Wahabbist extremists who enforced sharia law, led by Tohir Yuldashev and Juma Xo'jayev [AKA: Juma Namangani]. They remained in control of the city until a failed meeting with Islom Karimov in December 1991, during which they tried to convince him to enforce strict sharia, after which point Uzbekistani security forces drove them from the city. They fled first to Tajikistan, where they participated in the civil war, and then to Afghanistan, where they founded O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati (15-16).
• The Muslim group responsible for the 2005 Andijon attacks had around 80 adult male members at its peak during that year, likely had another 80 female members, and a wider number of sympathizers among the Andijon population (10).
• The Muslim group refered to themselves as Birodarlar, roughly equivalent to 'the brothers'. They were generally referred to by the general population as "Yimonchilar" after the pamphlets they had distributed which discribed their religious practices as the "Yimonga Yo'l". The Uzbekistani government referred to the group as "Akromiya" as the imprisoned author of the pamphlets, Akrom Yuldashev; this term was never used by the group themselves (10).
• Yimonga Yo'l was founded by Akrom Yuldashev, a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, who left the group because he believed it was too idealistic in creating a global caliphate and needed to be proceeded by an Islamization of everyday life (16). He was arrested in 1993 for starting the group, then amnestied, arrested again in 1998 on politically-motivated drug trafficking charges, amnestied again, and arrested again in 1999 on religious extremism charges in the aftermath of the 1999 Toshkent bombings, despite having no connection to O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati (11).
• In his pamphlet, Yuldashev adovacated for the creation of a modern Uzbek Islam that penetrated social and economic spheres. He was critical of the Arabic domination of Islam and wanted to build an authentically Uzbek Islam. He deemphasized personal faith obligations, even suggesting that salah isn't that important, compared to obligations to serve one's community. In particular, he stressed the creation of an Islamic economy (18-19).
• Akrom Yuldashev's repeated amnesties is likely evidence that the original charges in 1993 and 1998 were false. Amnestying people who were wrongly arrested was a common practice in Uzbekistan to do justice without the state losing face from losing in court (27).
• In the absence of Akrom Yuldashev's leadership, post-1999, Yimonga Yo'l created a faith community connected to a network of businesses and charities. They continued preaching and spreading the pamphlet written by Akrom Yuldashev, "Yimonga Yo'l" (11).
• By 2005, the members of Yominga Yo'l were concentrated in Andijon, but had a presence in Marg'ilon, Qo'qon, Toshkent, and Jizzax. The largest presence was in southern Andijon, in Bog'i Shamol, where they owed a large tract of land donated in 1993 by an original member, Bahrom Shakirov (18).
• Bo'gi Shamol was home to many of the businesses that formed the core of Yimonga Yo'l, including a bakery, shoe factory, hairdresser, kindergarten, and cafeteria (19).b
• After Yuldashev's arrest in 1999, some of the group's most important members were the Shakirov brothers, the children of Bahrom Shakirov. These included Sharif Shakirov, Hassad Shakirov, and Shokur Shakirov (18).
• The business network around Yimonga Yo'l included over 40 businesses and employed over 2000 people, most of them not actually directly linked to the organization. All of the businesses contributed to a shared 'mutual benefit fund' used to fund a number of charities, including an orphanage, medical services, a daycare, and a fund for covering the costs of weddings, funerals, and social security. Members of Yimonga Yo'l paid one fifth of their wages into this mutual benefit fund (19).
• The Uzbekistani government generally had a good relationship with the Yimonga Yo'l organization, even though they kept arresting Akrom Yuldashev, and President Islom Karimov supported their program of "Islamic socialism" and had praised the group before. Local governments sometimes purchased from the group's businesses and appreciate the jobs and the social services provided by the group (19-20).
• The main friction that existed was the suspicion that Yimonga Yo'l's business subtracted the zakat deductions from payroll from their taxes and, thus, unreported its actual taxable income. The mahalla governments meant to collect taxes — this was the system prior to 2008 — generally overlooked this because of the positive impact of the group. Complaints about the group mainly came from businessmen in competiton with Yimon Yo'l (20-21).
• There were some members of the security services who considered Yimonga Yo'l as a potential extremist group, like Hamas or Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, most recognized that Yimonga Yo'l was not a threat. Moreover, in the security environment of early 2000s Uzbekistan, there were much more serious threats coming from Al Qaeda and its affiliates (21).
• The issues between the provincial government and Yimonga Yo'l began in May 2004 when Governor Kobil Obidov was dismissed from his position, arrested, tried for corruption, and sentenced to house arrest. His replacement, Saydullo Begaliev, almost took action against the Yimonga Yo'l and arrested 23 prominent businessmen who were members of the group's commercial network in June 2004 on charges of forming an illegal group and promoting religious extremism (21).
• The decision to crackdown on Yimonga Yo'l was suggested to Governor Saydullo Begaliev by someone upon his coming to power, but it is unclear who gave this advice. It either came from businessmen within the Ferghana Valley who had disputes with Yimonga Yo'l enterprises or from Toshkent (12). Evidence would indicate that the arrest was a local initiative because national media continued to praise Yimonga Yo'l's charitable work (22).
• There were protests organized, initially by the families of the arrested businessmen but growing in size. By February 2005 and through May 2005, there were hundreds of protests from Yimonga Yo'l, its sympathizers, and human rights organizations. The trial garnered international media attention and by May 2005, the protests grew to over 1000 people, including many angry former employers of Yimonga Yo'l businesses (22).
• During the same time as the protests against the arrest of the 23 Yimonchi businessmen in Andijon gained steam, there was the Tulip Revolution in the neighboring Kyrgyz Republic and a series of attacks launched by the Islamic Jihad Union [IJU], a spliter group of O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati operating from North Waziristan. The recent revolution and the heightened security threat from the IJU placed all the security services on edge in May 2005 (23-24).
• Russian media at the time speculated that the Tulip Revolution had been organized by the USA, potentially from the US base at Manas. This raised concerns in Uzbekistan, which was hosting its own US base at Qarshi-Xanabad (23).
• The rumored end of the trial of the 23 Yimonchi businessmen on 13 May 2005 prompted several key members of Yimonga Yo'l, including Kabul Parpiyev, Sharif Shakirov, and Hassan Shakirov, to action against the local government. In addition to the likely end of the trial, presumably ending in the incarciration of all the businessmen, three Yimonchi were arrested in an unrelated tussle with police over a parking ticket on 11 May, and some Yimonchi may have wrongly believed this was the prelude to a larger crackdown on the group (24-25).
• On 12 May 2005, Paripiyev, Sharif Shakirov and around 50 other Yimonchi armed with AK47s and other small arms attacked the provincial headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the No.34 Barracks of the Ministry of Defense, both at Navoi Prospekt. These attacks killed 4 police and 5 soldiers and wounded another 4 police (27).
• The Yimonchi gained control of the armories at both the facilities and stole over 50 AK47s, 4 sniper rifles, over 2,000 rounds of ammo, a number of fragmentation grenades, and a Zil130 military truck (28).
• Now better armed, the Yimonchi took their cars and the Zil130 truck and travelled south to prison UJa-64/T-1, where they rammed the gate open with the truck at 00:20 of 13 May. The Yimonchi killed 3 prison guards and, allegedly with the cooperation of a sympathetic warden, released 527 of the the 734 inmates. Many prisoners were armed and urged to join the Yimonchi at Bobur Square to protest; of those released, only 93 prisoners voluntarily returned to jail (28).
• After the prisonbreak, there was a dispute over whether to flee to the Kyrgyz Republic through the nearby and poorly guarded border at Paxtabod. Some of the group fled to the Kyrgyz Republic, while a core group around Paripiyev called others to join them and do more in Andijon (29-30).
• The group left the prison and travelled on Navoi Prospekt in the direction of the provincial government building. On the way, they passed and attacked the MXX office at around 01:00. Either they came under fire while passing by the MXX building or, more likely, they deliberately attacked the building to free one of the Yimonchi arrested on 11 May 2005 who was being held there, along with another 6 Yimonchi arrested on separate charges (30).
• The MXX troops defended the building successfully against attack over the course of 2 hours. They requested assistance from Ministry of Internal Affairs police who never arrived. At around 03:00, the Yimonchi called off the attack. Around 15 Yimonchi and 2 MXX officers died in the combat. During the chaos, some prisoners also attacked the nearby Galla Bank and killed the security guard there (30-31).
• At the same time as the battle was going on at the MXX building, a smaller portion of the group had continued travelling to the provincial government and capturing it from the only person there, a single night watchman who they took hostage (31).
• At around 05:00, Paripiyev and his group barricaded themselves into the area around the provincial capitol building and Bobur Square, moving buses and cars to intersection and setting them on fire to create roadblocks (31). In total, the group included 83 armed men and around 80 Yominchi women who tried to rally to crowd to the cause and shouted 'Allahu akbar' (33).
• Around 06:00, provincial government employees started arriving for work and were taken hostage, one by one. Small numbers of confused police also showed up to investigate and were similarly arrested (31-32).
• Paripiyev clearly intended to start a riot or a larger rebellion against the government, but failed to do so. To this end, he set fire to some surrounding buildings, including the Russian Theater and the Bakir Cinema. This did attract crowds, who were mainly very confused by what was going on and disturbed by the crowd of armed men in Bobur Square, and firemen, who were prevented from putting out of the fires and some of whom were taken hostage (32-33).
• All of the news agencies in the city were waiting for approval from higherups, so nothing about the incident was reported on the morning of 13 May 2005 until approval was given from Toshkent around 10:30. As a result, many Andijonlik went to Bobur Square to see for themselves just what was happening (34).
• In total, the Yominchi group ended up taking around 30 hostages, including police, firemen, provincial government employees, the chief of the tax agency, two human rights defenders, and the provincial prosecutor. Some of the hostages were abused, one human rights advocat was shot while trying to escape at around 16:00, and the provincial prosecutor, Ghani Abdurahimov, was beaten to death (33-34).
• The Uzbekistani security forces tried to mobilize to deal with the situation in Andijon during the morning of 13 May, but did so without any coordination. The provincial Ministry of Internal Affairs did a bad job and the Border Guards, MXX, and Ministry of Defense all coordinate separate responses. Nobody seemed to actually know what areas were controlled by Yimonga Yo'l and troops of different security forces kept either missing entirely or accidentally barreling directly into Yimonchi barricades (34-36). This lack of proper planning and identification resulted in at least one incident of friendly fire (45).
• There are numerous pieces of footage to indicate that soldiers were poorly trained and ill disciplined and that officers exercised poor command and control over their forces. In particular, there was a lot of random firing in the direction of Bobur Square, resulting in at least one civilian death (36).
• A factor adding difficult to coordination of forces was that, since the cities of the Ferghana valley had been designated 'strategic' by the USSR, no maps had ever been made of them (45).
• By early afternoon, the Ministry of Defense had finally determined where the Yominchi positions were and established a perimeter manned by soldiers, except for one position in the north manned by Border Guards (36).
• Command of the situation was personally assumed by Minister of Internal Affairs, Zakir Almatov. Later in the day, he was joined by President Karimov, who met with residents to assure them that the government was in the control of the situation (36-37). Karimov, however, returned to Toshkent soon afterwards (41).
• Around 13:00, Zakir Almatov called into the provincial government building and spoke to Paripiyev. This was the first time that anyone actually knew who had taken control of the building. People were surprised that it was Yimonga Yo'l, which was regarded as a benign group (37).
• The assumption was that the attacks had been carried out by the IJU or O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati. This was considered even more likely due to IJU attacks in summer 2004 and an attempt by an schizophrenic man to enter the Israeli embassy in Toshkent with fake bombs earlier on 13 May 2005 (37-38).
• The initial conversation was followed up by two more around 15:00 and around 17:00, during which Parpiyev demanded that Akrom Yuldashev and the 23 Yominchi businessmen be released. Phone recordings indicate that Almatov complied and offered free passage for the whole group to the Kyrgyz border. Parpiyev then refused this offer and announced he had plans to march on Toshkent; it is possible this refusal resulted from the fact that Akrom Yuldashev could not be immediately released because he had been transferred from a prison in Bekobod to one in Toshkent earlier that day (43-44). Another is that none of the Yimonchi trusted the promises of the Uzbekistani government (47).
• By the afternoon of 13 May 2005, the efforts by Hassan and Sharif Shakirov to attract more supporters paid off and a crowd of around 2,000 people had entered the area near Bobur Square. In front of this crowd there were a number of speeches by Yominchi and freed prisoners, including Sharif Shakirov and Akrom Yuldashev's wife, Yodgory. The speeches were rambling and many did not actually focus on the Yominga Yo'l or their points (39-41).
• As part of their plans to start a popular uprising, the Shakirov brothers had contacted a German journalist, Marcus Bensmann, and an Uzbekistani Internet journalist, Galima Buxarbayeva (42-43).
• Around 15:00, the Yominchi forced several hostages, including the provincial tax assessor and the prosecutor to speak before the crowd. After this, the prosecutor was seized by members of the crowd and murdered (40).
• Many of the members of the crowd were not interested in the speeches or Yominga Yo'l (61-62). At least some of them had shown up because of a rumor that President Karimov was going to address the crowd, although it actuallity he had returned to Tashkent (41).
• By late afternoon, especially after rejecting Almatov's offer again at 17:00, Parpiyev and other Yimonchi discussed the idea of breaking out of the government cordons, potentially using the hostages as human shields to secure their escape. Their rebellion had clearly failed to become Uzbekistan's 'Tulip Revolution', so they decided to flee. At around 17:20, Parpiyev led a group of 24 Yimonchi and 30 hostages out of the north exit of the provincial government building onto Cholpon Street, where they were joined by a crowd of around 300 onlookers and supporters (47-49).
• The group was haltered around 1km north on Cholpon Street at a portion of the cordon manned by Border Guards between School No.15 and Cholpon Cinema. One of the hostages, a captain in the MXX, stepped forward and negotiated the safe passage of the group, to which the Border Guards responded that they needed to phone their superior officers (49-50).
• The crowd stayed on Cholpon Street until around 18:00 waiting for the Border Guards to get confirmation and let them pass. At this point they got tired of waiting and someone started shooting. The MXX captain tried to calm the crowd, but was shot by a Yimonchi. The Border Guards openned fire on the crowd with a machine gun, killing hostages, Yimonchi, and supporters alike. Those were survived fled back south or hid in the surrounding streets (50-51).
• As soon as gunfire started to be heard from the Border Guard checkpoint in the north, everyone back at Bobur Square started firing: Yimonchi and security forces alike, despite the presence of a crowd of some 2,000 people in the area. Shooting in this area continued until around 20:00 (51).
• There was a thunderstorm in Andijon between 21:00 and 22:00 that night, during which time many who had survived fled the square and Cholpon street (51).
• Parpiyev and a large group of around 600 other surviving Yimonchi and their families took advantage of the thunderstorm to flee north toward the Kyrgyz border. The group got into a firefight with Border Guards around 06:00 on 14 May, during which another 8 Yimonchi were killed, but eventually managed to cross at a different point (52).
• Another group of Yimonchi escaped from the area and went to Qorasuv on the border with the Kyrgyz Republic. There, they happened to be in the same place as a separate uprising against the government beginning on 14 May and continuing until the government forces recaptured the town on 20 May. There is no evidence they participated in this second incident at Qorasuv (52-53).
• Uzbekistani security forces remained at the scene all night, but did not actually enter Bobur Square or the provincial administration building until the morning of 14 May, just before 05:00 (52, 63).
• Parpiyev managed to escape to the Kyrgyz Republic and remained on the run, giving a series of interviews as he went during which he mocked the Uzbekistani government and refuted MXX claims of foreign involvement. He remained in the Kyrgyz Republic until at least June 2005 and then was in Kazakhstan by August 2005. Parpiyev was finally captured in Shymkent, Kazakhstan, in late November 2005 by a joint operation of the MXX and its Kazakhstani equivalent (53). As of 2016, he is still in jail in Uzbekistan (59).
• Of the 600 or so Yimonchi, sympathizers, and their families who crossed into the Kyrgyz Republic, 439 were registered as refugees and resettled in Romania and the USA. 15 of this group, including Hassan Shakirov were arrested by the Kyrgyz government and deported back to Uzbekistan to face trial in June 2005 (54).
• The total number of those killed in the Andijon Incident was probably close to the figure of 211 given by the Uzbekistani government. This includes 29 active members of security forces, 14 hostages from the security forces, 12 other hostages, 40 Yimonchi, and 116 civilians. Additionally, there were around 250 civilians wounded in the shooting who required hospitalization; an unknown number of security forces were also wounded (55-56, 58).
• Accurate accounting for the number of dead is very difficult due to confusion at the time, the difficulty of distinguishing those who died in the chaos of the uprising from those dying of other violent causes in Andijon, and the fact that many families likely retrieved the bodies of their loved ones and buried them before they could be catalogued by the government (56).
• The official number also remained subbornly still despite new investigations conducted later on because of fear that new numbers would embarrass those who had presented the old numbers and because the Karimov government wanted to stick with one number, despite knowing it was incorrect, to face down international pressure. For these terrible reasons, the official death toll remained 189 for a long time despite being accompanied with a list of 211 names (57-58).
• This number is wildly different from the account of between 500 and 1,500 killed given by Western and Russian media sources and human rights groups (55). These groups also spread rumors of mass graves in the southern hills of Andijon, actually in the vecinity of Bo'gi Shamol. This likely was a mass grave, but one created by the families of the Yimonchi (56-57).
• The reason that the number was so much lower than this was probably due to the dispersion of the crowd and the ability of many to escape down narrow alleyways once they left the main square. Many of the leading Yimonchi managed to escape, as did journalists interviewing them. It is also, therefore, likely that most members of the crowd were able to similarly escape the area (58-59).
• Although the Yimonga Yo'l movement still exists online to some extent, its actually infrastructure and organization was destroyed by the events in Andijon in May 2005 and their aftermath (59-60).

Segal, Joshua E. "The American mission to Tashkent. An examination of the mission of Roger Culver Tredwell, American Consul at Tashkent May 1918–April 1919". Central Asian Survey, Vol.11, No.1 (1992): 51-110.

Segal, Joshua E. "The American mission to Tashkent. An examination of the mission of Roger Culver Tredwell, American Consul at Tashkent May 1918–April 1919". Central Asian Survey, Vol.11, No.1 (1992): 51-110.

• In May 1918, as the Central Powers advanced into western Russia and turmoil shook Turkestan, the USA established its first consulate in Central Asia at Tashkent with Roger Culver Tredwell serving as Consul (51).
• The impetus to dispatch an US consul to Central Asia came after American banker and agent of the Goods Exchange Ernest Harris visited Tashkent in April 1918 to report on the cotton situation. His report said that the country was in a condition of anarchy and mass starvation; he also reported rumors that Bolshevik atroicities against the native Muslim population made the region receptive to German plots for rebellion (54-55).
• The decision to dispatch Tredwell was made following the the 1918 Spring Offensive launched by the Germans in France and after the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which risked the possibility of the Germans or Ottomans crossing into Central Asia. The mission was meant to survey wartime conditions and assess threats to the Allied war effort (52-53, 71).
• The Soviets insisted that the purpose of the American mission to Tashkent was to undermine the Bolsheviks and that Tredwell organized and financed the Basmachi rebels in the region (51-52).
• There is no evidence to support this claim. On the contrary, Tredwell operated under the general restrictions imposed by Consul General DeWitt Poole and President Woodrow Wilson to not intervene in Russia's internal affairs, to respect whatever form of government it choose, and to support any Russian government against the Central Powers (52, 100).
• The USA identified three possible threats to the Entente cause coming from Turkestan: the 190k German and Austro-Hungarian POWs held in Turkestan and recently released following Brest-Litovsk, the potential for Russian cotton to be used in the explosive charge for ammunition, and the potential for German propoganda to start a jihad among Turkestani Muslims and, potentially, spread this to British India (53).
• The Bolsheviks had agreed to release the 190k Central Powers POWs held in Turkestan, but by summer 1918, only 38k remained alive, the rest killed by typhus, scurvy, and other epidemics. When released they were made to fend for themselves, as the system originally proposed for Sweden and Denmark to look after the POWs had broken down due to difficulties in transportation. They took jobs as farm laborers and in cities around Turkestan and many joined the Red Army; in parts of southern Turkestan, entire Red Army units were composed of former POWs (59, 80-81).
• The biggest threat came from German POWs under Lt. Zimmerman, who prohibited his POWs from joining the Red Army and kept them in military discipline within Tashkent. There were fears they would attack India or cross the Caspian back to the Western front (59-60).
• The Germans and Austro-Hungarians were in active discussion with the Bolsheviks about the return of their POWs from Central Asia and sent delegations to secure this, either themselves or through Sweden and Denmark. The USA worried that these POW negotiators were actually German agents there to start trouble (60).
• Turkestani cotton production was second only the USA in output and essential to the production of munitions (60). In 1917, Germany looked toward Turkestan as a possible source of cotton, as the region had a lot of cotton just sitting there and unable to be exported due to transportation disruptions related to the Russian Civil War (62-63).
• Britain declared cotton to be contraband in August 1915 and embargoed exports to Germany, although it was less successful preventing supplies reaching Germany through neutral countries. As a result, the Central Powers experienced a massive cotton shortage and both Germany and Austria-Hungary were forced to impose severe rationing on cotton. This shortage was also not devestating because Germany had a significant stockpile prior to the war (60-62).
• By the beginning of 1918, the Goods Exchange and Entente consular agents reported that there was a significant trade going on between Russia and Germany, either directly via the Bolsheviks or indirectly using Finland and Sweden as intermediaries. By March 1918, one of the main focuses of the Entente was preventing any kind of good from falling into German hands and Turkestani cotton was part of this concern; this included fears that the Bolsheviks would sell Turkestani cotton to Germany (65-67).
• In late March and April 1918, the USA made plans to try and purchase cotton surplus from Turkestan in the hopes that it could be owed and guarded by the Goods Exchange and thus kept out of Bolshevik or German hands or sold directly to Russian factories and thus kept out of German wartime production (67-68). This plan would have had the positive side effect of bartering cotton for scarce manufactured goods, improving the opinion of the Entente in Turkestan (70-71).
• Concern for the status of Turkestani cotton and the need for accurate information was the immediate impetus for the establishment of a US Consulate in Tashkent in May 1918 (69).
• Turkestani Muslims, who constituted 95% of the 7 million inhabitants, were extremely pissed off at the atrocities of the Tashkent Soviet and at Tsarist colonialism and were thus vulnerable to German pro-Muslim propaganda. The fear was that Turkestani Muslims could rise up and start a jihad that would threaten the northwest portion of British India (58).
• The Entente had a difficult challenge in wanting to get materials to Russia to keep it in the war without letting these supplies fall into German hands. To this end, the Entente created the Michelson Commission in February 1917 in coordination with the Ministry of War of the Russian provisional government, but this was dissolved after the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. The idea was ressurrected as the Goods Exchange, a firm that purchased or barter for supplies and then transfered them to the Russians and, in January 1918, was put in the hands of Entente businessmen: the French Pierre Darcy, the British Arthur Marshall, and the American Robie Rich Stevens (63-65).
• The Russian Revolution is Central Asia saw the same divisions in the rest of Russia: there was an 'executive committee of the provisional government' set up in Tashkent by the city duma; a Tashkent Soviet founded by railway workers and joined by the city's garrison and a number of Russian farmers; and a Congress of Turkestani Muslims which called for autonomy for the region and greater rights for Muslims (55-56).
• Any support which either the Soviet or the Provisional Government had among the Muslim population disappeared due to repression and the fact that most Russians in Turkestan supported these policies (56).
• The Tashkent Soviet overthrew the Provisional Government and seized sole power in Tashkent in October following the Bolshevik coup in St Petersburg. They voted in November 1917 exclude all native Turkestanis from the Soviet government, making it a Russian-dominated organization in opposition to the majority, and prompting the Muslims to proclaim their own autonomy, beginning with the proclamation of the Kokand Provisional Government in December 1917 under Mustafa  Chokaev (56).
• Both the Tashkent Soviet and the Kokand Provisional Government claimed strong revolutionary credentials and both groups wrote to Stalin to receive the support of the Bolshevik government in Moscow. Both seemed to receive some kind of support and recognition (56-57).
• During this same time, many other Muslims rose in revolt against the existing government. These groups were not aligned with any Russians, but preferred to join with the Ottomans in some grand Muslim confederation (57).
• In February 1918, the Tashkent Soviet declared war on the Kokand Government. The Bolshevik government in Orenburg picked sides and sent men and arms to aid the Tashkent Soviet in this fight. The Soviet forces won after a three day siege, destroying the city, killing 14k people, and burning or looting many ancient sites. These atrocities were confirmed by an observor sent by Vladimir Lenin, Georgiy Safarov (57-58).
• The destruction of Kokand was so shocking to the Muslim population of Turkestan that it led a serious of spontaneous uprisings across the country, collectively known as the Basmachi (58). By spring 1918, the Basmachi controlled the majority of the countryside (74). They were directed largely by Ottomans and by Indian revolutionaries (101).
• After defeating the Kokand government, the Tashkent Soviet's forces moved south to Buxoro. Fyodor Kolesov, the head of the Tashkent Soviet, demanded that Emir Ali Khan surrender and allow the takeover of the Young Bukharan Party. The Emir refused the demand and the city's population was so incensed that they massacred every Russian inhabitant of the city. Kolesov was then forced to admit defeat and leave Buxoro alone for the time being (58).
• In the summer of 1918, Tashkent experienced a crimespree and a general breakdown of public order. There were a number of murders and mugging was common. The security forces responded with arbitrary searches and arrests, sometimes beating, torturing, or murdering suspects. Red Guards had poor discipline and constantly stole from the population (80).
• This coincided with a typhus epidemic across the region, which was particularly concentrated among the Kyrgyz. In the cities and countryside, there were epidemics and typhus and cholera. Many others died of a combination of starvation and heat stroke (80).
• In late June 1918, there was chaos in Ashgabat, which had been under the control of local Bolsheviks. In response to the Ottoman seizure of Tbilisi and rumors of that the Central Power's next move was crossing the Caspian Sea, the Bolsheviks had tried to impose conscription. Protests against conscription turned violent and armed workers attacked the Red Guards and seized control of the city government and the city's arsenal. The Bolsheviks dispatched an army from the Caspian shore to retake the city, but they were repulsed (82).
• By August 1918, the entirety of Transcaspia, modern day Turkmenistan, was in revolt against the Bolsheviks. Seeing that this anti-Bolshevik government could have potentially joined the Germans, who controlled the Black Sea coast and had made peace with newly-independent Georgia, British General Wilfrid Malleson sent in British soldiers to defend the Transcaspian government from the Tashkent Soviet (82-83).
• By August 1918, Turkestan was becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the world: the Chinese closed the border at Kashgar, combat between the Whites and Reds at Orenburg and Semirechye blocked any communication north, as did fighting between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolshevik forces, supported by the British, in Transcaspia (85-86).
• By September 1918, the situation of the Tashkent Soviet was desperate. The government was deeply unpopular, food prices were high as the peasantry hid the year's crop from markets, there was a severe shortage of ammunition, and trains were limited to strictly military usage due to an oil shortage (87).
• Between 19 January and 21 January 1919, Tashkent was briefly captured by anti-Bolshevik forces. This revolt started when the War Commisar of the Tashkent Soviet, K. Osipov, told the other commisars that there was trouble at the barracks that needed to be investigated and, when they arrived, he shot them all and declared that Bolshevik rule was over. Fighting then raged between anti-Bolshevik forces, mainly Left SR and railway workers, and the large number of Austro-Hungarian POWs who had joined the Red Army (94).
• On 21 January 1919, the Red Army managed to defeat Osipov's forces and carried out a purge of the city. The Bolsheviks armed criminals to conduct house-to-house searches, who arrested hundreds and killed around 4k people in the aftermath. It was originally assumed that Tredwell had been murdered during this red terror (94).
• Turkestan experienced a total economic collapse with the onset of the Russian Civil War. The disruption of railway lines to European Russia meant that cotton could not exported and foodstuffs and manufactured goods could not be imported. Since no cotton was exported, banks and merchants gave out no loans for next year's crop and the peasantry switched back to growing basic food crops, if they could, many instead succumbing to starvation (63).
• According to Roger Tredwell's observations in June 1918, around 60% of all industry in Turkestan was not operational. Those that remained open runned at less than half capacity. The economic collapse was a consequence of the Tashkent Soviet's policies of confiscation, which encouraged peasants to only grow basic food crops and prompted workers and administrators alike to steal everything possible and not work at all (83-84).
• An account of Roger Tredwell's travels from Orenburg to Tashkent is provided from page 71 to page 73.
• Upon becoming established in Tashkent, Roger Tredwell hired a Cossack to translate for him, including Russian press accounts, and decided to investigate the situation in the major towns along the railways (73-74).
• Tredwell's mission was complicated by the communications available to him. When the telegraph lines to Moscow were open, which they sometimes weren't, the transmission stations were controlled by the Bolsheviks, who refused to let him transmit encoded messages. This meant that any sensitive information could be conveyed to Moscow only through radio or through couriers — fighting stopped many couriers, as it did between May and June 1918 (74).
• The Tashkent Soviet also kept a generally sharp eye on Consul Tredwell, making sure that he was watch as he visited cities along the railway (76).
• Tredwell had difficulty discovering information about the cotton crop, as many cultivators hid or misreported their crops to prevent confiscation by the Tashkent Soviet. What information he discovered was that only wealthy landowners could afford to plant cotton, meaning the crop would be maybe 10% to 20% of a normal year. Most of what cotton was produced did not leave Turkestan, being stored and hidden, and much of the cotton that did leave Turkestan was either destroyed in combat or seized by soldiers to make fortifications (74-75).
• Although the Bolshevik government in Moscow changed its policies regarding the economy and cotton, the Tashkent Soviet was particularly insistent on nationalization through a policy of confiscation without compensation. the Moscow government wanted to purchase cotton directly from producers, while the Tashkent Soviet insisted that all purchases go through them, a position likely inspired by the fact that the Tashkent Soviet was broke (76-77).
• Tredwell believed that it was unlikely that the Germans would obtain any Turkestani cotton unless they managed to occupied a region where cotton was being stored (77, 85). A big reason behind this was that the Tashkent Soviet wouldn't allow anyone to sell (85). Despite this, Tredwell did create a list of suspected German agents and transmitted it to the Entente (79-80).
• The initial plan to barter Turkestani cotton for manufactured goods quickly fell apart as it was discovered that transportion between Turkestan and European Russia was prohibitively expensive and dangerous (75). It also fell apart when Tredwell realized that the Tashkent Soviet was wholeheartedly behind a scheme of nationalization (79).
• Tredwell's reports of meeting with Austro-Hungarian POWs indicate that many of these soldiers had no desire to fight and signed up with the Red Army to avoid starvation. They were recognized as useless in combat and send to guard border posts (81).
• His general observations on Bolshevik rule were that the Red Army was greatly resented by the peasantry and the workers. The workers felt overworked and everyone believed that most officials were petty thieves. Everyone resented the immense repression that met any dissent. Peasants refused to plant any more crops that the bare necessity because the currency for which they could be sold was worthless. The only substantial economy between urban and rural regions took place as bartering food for manufactured goods (97).
• The relationship between the USA and the Bolsheviks deteriorated during the summer of 1918 from a fairly high level of hope for cooperation, at least on the American side, at the beginning of the year. The break in the relations was US support for the Czechoslovakia Legion during its revolt in May 1918. The Bolsheviks blamed the Entente for a number of revolts across Russia and various intriuges and adopted a hostile policy against what Entente diplomats and agents remained in the country (84-85).
• On 29 July 1918, Lenin announced that a state of war existed between the Entente and the USSR. The Bolsheviks terminated all ties with the USA and by 1 September 1918, all US diplomats had left European Russia (86). During this period, the US State Department lost contact with Consul Tredwell (87).
• Officials of the Tashkent Soviet arrested Consul Tredwell and a British official, Frederick Bailey, on 15 October 1918. They were both placed under house arrest until a few hours later when different Soviet officials released them. They were both placed under constant surveillance after this point. Tredwell was arrested again on 26 October 1918 and returned to house arrest, while Bailey went into hiding as an Austro-Hungarian POW, fearing he might be killed due to anti-British sentiment among the Bolsheviks (89-91).
• Tredwell then became the subject of hostage negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Entente, as the Bolsheviks refused to release Tredwell until the British released a Bolshevik delegation to Mashhad that had been taken as hostages to ensure Bailey's safety (92-93). Then, on 2 January 1919, Tredwell was informed by a Comrade Fomenko that the orders from Moscow to arrest him had been withdrawn and he was free to leave (93-94).
• Instead, the Osipov Revolt disrupted this plan and he was instead taken out of his hotel and placed into solitary confinement at a prison on 4 February 1919 along with other foreigners. He was released later that same day by the Foreign Commisar and the Police Chief and reassured of his right to leave without reference to the Bolshevik delegation imprisoned by the British at Mashhad (95).
• Tredwell finally made arrangements to leave through the German, Danish, and Swedish diplomatic missions and departed for Orenburg on 27 March 1919 (96). An account of Tredwell's return from Tashkent is given on pages 96 and 97. He was then further arrested for a single day upon arrival in Moscow and again upon arrival in Petrograd (98), finally crossing into Finland on 27 April 1919 (99).
• In February 1919, a delegation of anti-British Muslim revolutionaries arrived in Tashkent. It was headed by Mohamed Barakatullah Bhopali, an Indian revolutionary who had been given German citizenship and conducted anti-British activities from Berlin during WWI, and a Turk named Yusup Zia Bey. They were apparently on their way to meet with Lenin, Chicherin, and other prominent Bolshevik leaders to discuss Soviet support for a mission to cross the Pamirs and start a revolution in India (95-96).

Akiner, Shirin. Kyrgyzstan 2010: Conflict and Context. Washington D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2016.

 

Akiner, Shirin. Kyrgyzstan 2010: Conflict and Context. Washington D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2016.

The report is a good explanation of not only the 2010 Revolution, but also a survey of Kyrgyz politics from independence to 2016 (when the report was published). Its explanation of the violence in 2010, however, is partial and does not reflect any original research into responsibility for the conflicts in either North or South, i.e., we still don't know who organized the violence. This is probably not the author's fault and just reflects the difficulty and danger of investigating this topic in the Kyrgyz Republic. The core point of the report is that, while politics following the 2010 Revolution have been more consistent and seen a peaceful transition of power, the fundamental problems that caused the Tulip Revolution and the 2010 Revolution remain the same and are still unresolved; if anything, the divides between Uzbek-Kyrgyz and North-South divides are getting worst. The most significant policy changes have been a stronger alignment toward Russia and the reduction of presidential power, although the proper balance of power between parliament and the president was not conclusively decided after the 2010 Revolution, explaining why the presidential system was so readily readopted under President Sadyr Japarov in 2021.

 

— Eunice Noh, March 2022

The background to the conflict is that, in 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic emerged as the 'Switzerland of Central Asia', seemingly stable and dedicated to democratic reforms. However, the reforms of this period were flawed and exacerbated societal divisions, particularly between North and South and between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. A new constitution was promulgated in 1993, but immediately found to be flawed and rival factions argued over the constitutional order as politics reached gridlock and corruption proliferated. There were hopes that this would all go away in March 2005, when mass protests forced President Aksar Akayev to leave the country and Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president, but his regime was also corrupt and plagued by elite infighting. By 2009, the Bakiev government was in serious trouble: the global financial crisis had trashed the economy, particularly by reducing the global price of gold; everyone was angry about price hikes initiated in 2010; and Bakiev's corruption around airbases had alienated both the USA and Russia. Bakiev was overthrown later that year, in events covered by the rest of the report  (5-7).

Part I: Context

Socio economic factors:

President Askar Akayev was a true glasnost figure who did care about rapidly transitioning from a Soviet dictatorship to a multiparty democracy. These reforms, however, were sloppy: there was a new constitution in 1993, but it was found faulty in 1994, so the whole parliament was dissolved and Akayev ruled by degree until it could be replaced with a bicameral parliament in 1995. The Kyrgyz Republic then began constantly changing the constitution, all without actually solving the problems of the country, and many politicians just focused on being corrupt. Politics often focused on being able to gather a coalition based on corrupt dealings, bribes, and personal networks.

Economic reforms to become a market economy also faltered. The Kyrgyz Republic left the ruble zone to adopt its own national currency in 1993 and asceded to the WTO in 1998. The immediate effects of these moves was that trade with ruble-zone countries collapsed, cost of living soared, and cheap imports wiped out the domestic manufacturing base, causing a deep economic recession. The privatization or breaking up of collectivized farms, particularly livestock farms, denied most Kyrgyz farmers and herders access to basic agricultural inputs or services, prompting a mass killing of unsustainable livestock and the movement of impoverished rural populations to the cities. Any social services, including access to good education, that had existed under the USSR was gutted. The country lacked the infrastructure to be internationally competitive and the government did not invest in building up road, rail, and communications networks. The economic collapse just continued as the Kyrgyz Republic became import dependent, poor, and extremely indebted.

The economic crisis and growing corruption of society in the late 1980s onward fed into disaffection among the youth and a rise in crime, particularly as youth fell into poverty without social institutions. The Kyrgyz prison system was brutal and prisoners joined gangs as a way to survive. Most criminal gangs focused on drug trafficking from Afghanistan, which was already a problem in 1992 but exploded after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001. Gangs became more serious and heroin addiction began a problem in the country. Many gang bosses and their rackets were protected by politicians. Corruption exploded during this time, assisted by the linkage between public position and private wealth created during privatization. There was a general perception that all of society was corrupt and no one in power could be trusted.

Islamic revival began in the country under glasnost and the government at first welcomed religious freedom, but began to become concerned about extremism and imposed controls on religious activities through the Muftiate in 1993. Many considered extreme salafi groups, like Hizb ut Tahrir, to be linked to jihadist organizations like the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati, which had a presence in the country. Kyrgyz policy on religion was a delicate balance between concerns about radical Islamist and pressure from Western states to preserve religious freedom.

The favorativism shown to the nominal ethnicity, the Kyrgyz, increased following independence. Although ethnic Russians were comforted by Russian being retained as an official language, ethnic Uzbeks were given no similar concession. While the upper house of parliament, created in 1995, was meant to address this issue, it failed and Uzbek issues were ignored. This was particularly bad under President Bakiev, who was a Kyrgyz chauvanist. A pivotal moment was in 2006, when Uzbek representative Kadyrjan Batyrov was prevented from speaking, after which he decided to try to provide Uzbek services outside of the state. The marginalization of Uzbeks was combined with a bad economic situation in the South, with the collapse of agricultural economies causing mainly Kyrgyz ruralites to become squatters in mainly Uzbek cities, creating a widespread jealousy of Uzbek wealth among rural Kyrgyz migrants.

The Kyrgyz Republic always had a north south divide, as the country is physically divided by the Tian Shan mountains. This got worst after independence because the only major highway going north-south, the Bishkek-Osh Highway, fell into disrepair and got so bad most people only used air travel to cross the mountains. The divide was cultural, in that the North was more Kyrgyz with Russian cities and more international connections, whereas the South was an agrarian backwater with large ethnic minorities, particularly Uzbeks.

In March 2005, in the 'Tulip Revolution', crowds angry at alleged vote rigging in parliamentary elections flooded the streets and demanded that President Akayev resign, which he did. The hope was that the troika of revolutionary leaders, Kurmanbek Bakiev, Roza Otunbayeva, and Felix Kulov, would clean house and end corruption. Kurmanbek Bakiev quickly sidelined the other leaders, became president, and then alienated everyone by being extremely corrupt and persecuting his political enemies.

A conflicted society:

Violence erupted in Osh, specifically in that city and the nearby towns of Uzgen and Kara Suu, in the spring and summer of 1990. The underlying factor was that, during the collapse of the agricultural economy, many Kyrgyz had come to these cities seeking work only to be frustrated that Uzbeks owned the good farmland and dominated commerce. This rage at the economic position of the Uzbeks combined with nationalism under the Kyrgyz nationalist group 'Osh Aimagi'. Uzbeks, for their part, were underrepresented in government and felt the sting of Kyrgyz nationalism as Uzbek language education and publications were reduced. Many left for the Uzbek SSR, the Uzbek nationalist group 'Adolat' wanted the area to join the Uzbek SSR, and the Uzbek community elders of Osh submitted a petition on 2 March 1990 to be granted autonomous status within the Kyrgyz SSR. Conflict began in June after a decision by the Kyrgyz-dominated local government to give a plot of prime land to landless Kyrgyz and following the expulsion of Kyrgyz tenants by Uzbek landlords. Brutal riots broke out on 4 June 1990. The riots were only repressed by the Soviet army and Interior Ministry soldiers, with deaths in the hundreds and millions of rubles in damage.

In late August 1999, several hundred armed men, allegedly militants of the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakat, appeared in Batken province, Kyrgyz Republic, likely having been ejected from Tajikistan. It is unclear who exactly they were or what they wanted, but they had been able to cross the border because Russian border guards had withdrawn in 1999. There was another crossing in August 2000, which was driven out of Uzbekistan in September and from the Kyrgyz Republic in October 2000. These incidents, for which Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine offered aid through the CIS, convinced the Kyrgyz Republic to enhance its cooperation with CIS nations on counter-terrorist activities.

Large public protests occured in March 2002 in response to parliament agreeing to ratify a 1999 treaty with China that deliminated the border, giving around 30% of the disputed territory to the Chinese. This anger Kyrgyz nationalists, particularly in the more intensely nationalist South, and highlighted the general corruption of government. Protests started in Aksy, in the Jalalabad region, demanding the release of local politician Azimbek Beknazarov, who had campaigned against the border treaty and been arrested in January 2002. On 17 March, police fired into the crowd, killing 6 and injuring 62. Beknazarov was released, but protests continued and spread across the country, especially the South. This led opposition parties to band together as the 'Movement for the Resignation of President Akayev' in August 2002, which led a march on the capitol in September 2002. The march was stopped when the government gave assurances it would punish those responsible for the murder of civilians in Aksy. It didn't punish anyone and continued to prosecute opposition figures, including former vice president and head of the opposition party Ar Namys, Felix Kulov.

In 2005, the bicameral parliament was again replaced with a unicameral parliament, the elections to which were messed up pretty badly. Protests occured after these elections, especially in the South. The protests turned into riots directed at government buildings in Jalalabad in March 2005 and spread to Bishkek. There was widespread rioting and looting, but no major ethnic conflicts during the 2005 Tulip Revolution, which was possibly inspired by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. President Askar Akayev fled the country 'temporarily', and order was partially restored when former prime minister and opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiev was declared provisional president until elections were held and Felix Kulov was released from prison and put in charge of the security services. It looked like there might be more drama in April 2005, because Kulov, a Northern, announced his intention to run for president against Bakiev, a Southerner, but this was resolved when Kulov withdrew his candidacy in exchange for the promise of being appointed prime minister. Bakiev was elected president in a 90% landslide on 10 July 2005 and did appointed Kulov prime minister, but there were now tensions between the two figures, two parliamentarians were murdered in the fall of 2005 under suspicious circumstances, Bakiev quickly became subject to allegations of corruption, and there were major protests in Bishkek both for and against Kulov; in the fall of 2005, things already did not look good.

Geopolitical trends 1992-2010:

During the 1990s and 2000s, the Kyrgyz Republic was involved with regional initiatives backed by Russia, China, NATO, Turkey, and Iran. It also was subject to influence from its neighbors. All of this fed into conspiracy theories.

The Kyrgyz Republic's relationship with Uzbekistan was the most difficult because the two shared a massive border, transport infrastructure, and water resources. There were a number of disputes between the now independent republics over border regulations and organized crime, energy supplies, and, most importantly water. The Kyrgyz wanted to constructed larger hydroelectric dams for power, but this would deprive water from Uzbekistani farmers and be bad for the environment. The situation got worst after the Batken incident in 1999, as Uzbekistan considered the Kyrgyz Republic to be unstable and instituted a tougher border regime. Uzbekistan was also involved in the internal matters of Russian and US bases in the Kyrgyz Republic, as Uzbekistan wanted to keep NATO and the USA in the region, fearing Russian domination and believing that a US presence was necessary for peace in Afghanistan.

The Kyrgyz establishment was heavily pro-USA and wanted an American presence in the region. So, when the USA invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Kyrgyz happily offered the use of Manas Airbase near Bishkek as a logistics hub. By 2005, public opinion had turned against the USA largely because of the fact that President Akayev had accepted an insanely low rent for the base, which he only eventually got revised; there was huge corruption surrounding the supply of the base; and it was very noisy. There were rumors that the USA was also going to use the base to station AWACS to spy on others an people hoped that the SCO or Russia would help them get the USA out. In February 2009, the parliament voted for the Manas base to be closed and for the USA to leave the country, shortly after the government had concluded a very lucrative investment deal with Russia. However, Bakiev used this as pressure on the USA for more money and assistance and extended the lease, at a much higher rent, for a year in June 2009.

In the 1990s, Russia was in too much disarray to have a coherent policy towards Central Asia, but this changed when Vladimir Putin was elected in 2000. Putin actively reached out to the Kyrgyz Republic, including opening an airbase at Kant under the framework of the CSTO. The Russia presence was broadly favorable, as people liked the Russians and, unlikely the US base at Manas, the Kant base was seen as contributing to the local economy. There were issues with the base, and other Russian facilities, in August 2009, as Uzbekistan objected to the Russian presence and warned that it increased the militarization of the region. Some of the recent expansions were also abruptly cancelled by Bakiev as he received more lucrative US counterproposals.

Chinese relations with the Kyrgyz Republic was mainly informal and commercial, as the Kyrgyz Republic became a distributor of Chinese goods throughout Central Asia, and distrust for China was high in the 1990s and early 2000s. These relations expanded after 2002 within the context of the SCO and anti-terror exercises. This was followed by promises of Chinese military assistance and Chinese investment. There were also tensions in the late 2000s over Chinese treatment of Uyghurs, as there were some 5k Uyghurs living in the Kyrgyz Republic, many of them with family in China.

Part II: Conflict

Coming into his second term following reelection in July 2009, Bakiev was tarnished with corruption scandals but was still a powerful figure and had managed to reduce the poverty level, particularly in the South. Bakiev began his second term by introducing radical reforms, which he claimed were to reduce corruption and get shit down, but were also viewed as a power grab. In October 2009, Bakiev reduced the number of ministries and brought state agency under direct federal control, prompting Prime Minister Igor Chudinov to resign, followed by the rest of the Kyrgyz government. The pro-government Ak Jol party still held the majority in parliament, so they nominated Bakiev's Chief of Staff, Daniar Usenov as PM and Bakiev continued his reforms. The most contraversial reform was massive price hikes in public utilities — heating by 400%, electricity by 170%, hot water by 300% — to be implemented in January and July 2010.

Large protests against President Bakiev were organized when the price hikes were introduced in January 2010. They increased in size when prices increased further in April 2010 when Russia increased tarriffs on fuel exports to the Kyrgyz Republic. The revolutionary violence began on 6 April 2010, when, the day after an opposition politicians had been detained in Talas, looting and arson broke out in Bishkek and Talas. Protests got larger on 7 April, several people were killed and government buildings were torched or ransacked; crowds were dispersed with live fire from police, killing dozens. President Bakiev fled from Bishkek to the South and an interim government was set up in Bishkek, headed by Roza Otunbayeva on 8 April 2010. The new interim government imposed curfews in Bishkek, Talas, and Naryn. President Bakiev officially resigned on 16 April and left first for Kazakhstan and then Belarus. Several officials linked to Bakiev were arrested, including his brother Janybek, who was accused of ordering police to fire on the crowd. Members of the muftiate were attacked and Mufi Jumanov was kidnapped for several days.

Bakiev still retained some support in the South and, on 13 May, his supporters attacked government buildings in Jalalabad and expelled the governor. The following day, armed Uzbeks clashed with these majority-Kyrgyz crowds and restored the governor before marching to Bakiev's ancestral village and burning down the houses of his extended family. The Uzbek community, including the influential Kadyrjan Batyrov had decided to support the interim government against Bakiev. In response to the Uzbeks picking sides, pro-Bakiev forces attacked the Uzbek language Peoples Friendship University that Batyrov had founded in 1999, a prominent Uzbek cultural institution, and burned it down, preventing firefighters from reaching the site. Later, hearing that someone had issued a warrant for his arrest, Batyrov fled the country. Clashes between pro- and anti-Bakiev forces continued in the South throughout May.

In the region around Osh, Bazarkorgon, and Aravan experienced open ethnic violence beginning in June 2010 with a brawl between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths at a casino in Osh on 9 June, likely in connection to the murder of Bakiev-linked drugrunner and mob boss Oybek "Qora" Mirsidikov on 7 June. This fight instantly exploded in massive race riots, involving murder, torture, rape, and arson; property and districts were marked 'Uzbek' or 'Kyrgyz' to identify targets in the riots. Kyrgyz police failed to stop and sometimes participated in attacks on Uzbeks. Reports indicate that the main perpetrators appear to have been organized and given masks and armbands. The violence displaced around 400k people, mainly women, children, and the elderly, around 100k of whom fled to Uzbekistan. On 12 June 2010, the interim government issued an emergency degree deploying the army to the area and permitting the use of deadly force. Large scale riots were dispersed by 14 June, but emergency law remained in effect until the end of the month and attacks on Uzbeks and police abuse continued in the following months.

External responses

The response to the violence in the Kyrgyz Republic was rapid, particularly that organized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. With the exception of one Pakistani student at Osh State University, there were no attacks on foreigners. None of the regional organizations in which the Kyrgyz Republic was a member responded to the crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic: the CSTO refused to participate, as Belarus and Uzbekistan vetoed any intervention; the SCO did not receive a request for intervention; the OSCE assisted for Bakiev's safe and peaceful departure from the country, but did not deploy its own forces even when requested by Otunbayeva because of the objections of Osh's mayor.

Despite both countries have military bases in the country, neither the USA nor Russia intervened in the internal crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic; both were scared of instability, wanted a return to order, and had no desire to get involved in the mess. China was even less inclined to get involved. Uzbekistan behaved responsibly and cautiously to prevent the spread of ethnic violence, closing its border in early April 2010 and keeping it closed until mid-June 2010, after the ethnic violence had passed, briefly opening borders to accomodate refugees. Uzbekistan requested and received international assistance in caring for these refugees and repatriating nearly all of them on and after 27 June 2010, in cooperation with international organizations and the Kyrgyz interim government. Uzbekistan's position was extremely important in preventing angry Uzbeks from launching raids across the border against Kyrgyz communities. Kazakhstan also closed its borders with the Kyrgyz Republic in April 2010, caused an economic crisis due to the country's important position as a trade hub for Kyrgyz merchants selling Chinese goods to Russian buyers. In retaliation, the Kyrgyz interim government blocked several cross-border irrigation canals during an important part in the Kazakhstani growing season, convincing the Kazakhstani government to reopen the border, although restrictions remained in place until late July 2010 and there were a number of shooting incidents.

Overall, the violence in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010 resulted in 100k refugees and 300k internally displaced persons, an estimated 1,900 casualties, and between 470 (the official number) and around 2,000 deaths. Around 2,800 buildings were completed destroyed and 200 were severely damaged. There was $71 million in commercial damage, but the destruction of trees for use in barricades and knock-off effects of economic distruption meant that reconstruction would cost around $450 to $500 million. Commercial businesses were disrupted, causing shortfalls in government revenue; foreigners, including students and the foreign business community, were scared away; and relations between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the Kyrgyz Republic were damaged.

Part III: Analysis

The first phase of the conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic was intra-Kyrgyz and focused in Bishkek and the North. It included both a political element of anti-government protest and a criminal element of looting and violent attacks on specific targets. These two elements combined, with criminal elements hiding themselves within the political protests. The second phase of the conflict was in the South and between the Uzbek community of the Kyrgyz Republic, which generally supported the interim government, and Southern Kyrgyz, who generally supported President Bakiev, who was a Southern and whose family and cronies held many important positions across the South. In the South, this political conflict assumed an overtly ethnic character. The interim government responded to the ethnic violence in the South by positioning themselves on the side of the ethnic Kyrgyz against the Uzbeks, despite the political support they received from the ethnic Uzbek community of the South, by issuing a warrant for the arrest of Batyrov on 19 May 2010. The last stage of conflict, around Osh, was purely ethnic, without political overtones, involved planning for violence by both sides, and saw Kyrgyz state authorities siding with pogromists against the Uzbek community. In all stages of the conflict, criminal attacks were mixed with the political or ethnic conflict.

Despite attempts to present the 2010 Revolution as a national struggle to oust a corrupt dictator, examination of the events of 2010 clearly shows that it was a spontaneous eruption of anger and frustration. While the first stage of the conflict, concentrated in the North, was politically, it was uncoordinated and no opposition figure seemed to be in control of events. The crowds had no common political platform and were only united by anger and opposition to President Bakiev. The new interim government was not composed of prominent opposition figures or anyone who had organized protests, but politicians who established some form of order during the chaos and were grudgingly accepted.

The problems that resulted in the overthrow of the Bakiev government were essentially the same as those that resulted in the ousting of Akayev in 2005: corruption and incompetence. It became clear that people were becoming less tolerant and forgiving of these faults. It took until the early 2000s for people to start getting really mad about Akayev's corruption, it took less than a year for people to start complaining about Bakiev, and accusations began being levelled against the interim government by May 2010. The reputation of the interim government was also hurt by the defection of some senior members, who complained that the new government had many of the same problems as Bakiev's government.

There were two main conspiracy theories popular among Kyrgyz as explanations for the 2010 violence: Russia-US rivalry and a shadowy 'third force'. The US-Russia narrative said that Bakiev was being punished by Russia for his pro-US stance. This 'Russia overthrew Bakiev' conspiracy theory was supported by the USA's blind eye toward President Bakiev's blatant corruption and misuse of Western aid and funds, seemingly showing that the USA propped up Bakiev. The USA was also blamed for a series of attacks on Russian journalists in the Kyrgyz Republic who were writing stories about the US funding 'color revolutions'. Moreover, Russian price hikes were responsible for higher fuel prices in the Kyrgyz Republic, fueling protests. This conspiracy fails to stand up to scrutiny, as, although Russia was certainly pissed off at Bakiev and allowed Russian media to openly criticize his corruption after March 2010, nobody seemed to consider Bakiev to be a reliable US ally or at risk of becoming one. Moreover, many of the politicians who replaced Bakiev, including Roza Otunbayeva, Ismail Isakov, and Omurbek Tekebayev, were pro-US. The Russian tariffs introduced in April 2010 are also better explained by the Kyrgyz decision to remain outside the customs union established by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2010. This was also a period of low tensions between the USA and Russia, characterized by 'New START', and neither country seems to have believed the other was responsible for or benefited from the coup in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The 'third force' conspiracy theories, which have become much more popular than 'Russia did it' as time goes on, say that the violence must have been orchestrated by someone. Candidates for that someone include: Bakiev loyalists, radical Islamists, and criminal gangs. Of these, Islamists are the least likely and criminal gangs were definitely involved, although there is no evidence that they were organized. Ethnic tensions were also blamed, but there is no clear narrative here, as the Uzbek community had no history of opposition to Bakiev, was initially supportive of the interim government, and actual began to be sympathetic to Bakiev again after Batyrov was forced into exile. Overall, the 'third force' conspiracy theory ignores the fact that almost all the violence was commited by local youths. Whether local youth were paid to commit violence is less relevant than the fact that thousands of people, especially in the South, were eager to commit violence.

The violence in the Southern Krygyz Republic revealed the shallowness of civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic, despite it having the most NGOs in Central Asia, nearly 4k in the late 1990s. Most of the large NGOs were either state-funded and used to give patronage to regime allies and family members or were funded and staffed by foreigners without local roots. Truly local NGOs existed, but were usually small, poorly funded, and badly run. None of these NGOs was in a position to organize against ethnic violence in the South. The press also remained subject to certain constraints on its activities, preventing active reporting, and generally had a pro-Kyrgyz slant. The most important element of civil society in the South turned out to be mahalla authorities and oqsaqals, as neighbors helped each other survive violence and oqsaqals of both communities tried to talk to young gangs of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and convince them to stop the violence.

Responsibility for maintaining public order lay with the army and the police forces of the Ministry of the Interior. The army is dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz and its lower ranks are conscripts doing a year's service. Both the army and police force were corrupt, poorly paid, poorly trained, and ineffective. The security forces were incapable of maintaining order in either the North or the South, but in the South there was the additional problem of police participating in violent attacks on Uzbeks. The security vacuum was filled by militias of civilians; these started as neighborhood defense groups, but expanded to provide broader public security and, by May 2010, the Meken ('Patriot') militia was guarding the area around Parliament. The interim government recognize these militias and gave them official legal status on 12 June 2010.

Several official reports about the violence in 2010 were published in 2011, particularly focusing on the ethnic violence in the South. The major one, created at the request of Otunbayeva and chaired by the OSCE, was the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. Its report released an important amount of information into the public sphere, although it admitted that any criminal investigation was entirely the responsibility of the state authorities. Although it tried to be clear of any political or ethnic bias, the report truthfully noted that Uzbeks were subject to unfair treatement by Kyrgyz state authorities; for this reason, it was criticized by the Kyrgyz parliament for being biased in favor of the Uzbek community. On 26 May 2011, the parliament rejected the report and declared its OSCE chair a persona non grata in the country. Further discussion of this violence in the Kyrgyz Republic is liable to result in prosecution for journalists and deportation of foreigners. Reactions to the report were so strong because Kyrgyz public opinion refused to acknowledge any discrimination against the Uzbeks and often held them responsible for the violence.

Part IV: Post-conflict trends

Politics in the Kyrgyz Republic started back up almost immediately, with the interim government holding a referendum on 27 June 2010 on changes to the constitutions reducing the power of the presidency. The following referendum passed and was broadly fair, although many Uzbeks did not participate due to fear in the community following the ethnic violence, and most voters interviewed did not seem to actually understand the substance of the referendum.

New elections were on 10 October 2010, which were broadly fair, but featured only 55% turnout and resulted in the election of 5 parties that were very difficult to distinguish and which lacked clear political platforms. It was clear that support for Bakiev was no longer a major political issue, as the largest party, Ata Jurt, a Kyrgyz nationalist party from the South, included many former Bakiev officials and did not seem to matter because the substance of politics was dividing up the spoils. In late December 2010, a coalition government was formed between the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, Ata Jurt, and Respublika. New presidential elections were held in October 2011 — point of interest here: the original 83 candidates included people of every background, including working people and the unemployed, really showing that any social strata felt qualified to run for president — and were won by former Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democrats, Almazbek Atambayev. Interim President Otunbayev stepped down, making the country's first peaceful transition of power.

The new Kyrgyz government of Atambayev immediately ran into problems, as the parliamentary government disagreed with reforms proposed by President Atambayev and resigned two days after his inauguration. A new coalition government formed in parliament a few weeks later, but also eventually fell apart. This internal disunity in parliament meant that nothing really got done. This lack of political cohesion was reflected in the huge number of political parties in the country, around 203 by 2015, most of which resulted from minor splits, were the vehicles of personal interests, and lacked any coherent platform. Corruption is a core part of the political system and, for larger parties, positions on the lists in the proportional representative electoral system are determined by bribes. There were hopes that corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic had stemmed from the concentration of power in the presidency and that the weaken of that position would result in good governance, but the corruption remained and more power held by parliament simply led to additional gridlock and a lack of any coherent policy.

Turnout remained low in the 2015 elections, corruption was rife, electoral fraud common, and the results were a parliament split between 7 parties, the largest being Ata Jurt, Respublika, and the Social Democrats. The election of parliament was followed by a series of resignations due to corruption allegations and criminal prosecutions, including of the prime minister. There was new concern after the resignation of the original prime minister and speaker of parliament led to the appointment of two Social Democrats to those positions, Sooronbai Jeenbekov as Prime Minister, and Chynybay Tursunbekov as Speaker. This led to concerns that the Social Democrats now held too much power and would ignore other parties.

The lack of any coherent policies meant that existing social tensions were not healed and only got worst, including North versus South and Kyrgyz versus ethnic minorities. In particular, Uzbeks were a more marginalized group following 2010, as Batyrov was in exile and other political leaders were in jail. Uzbek cultural and educational institutions were closed and the community lacked political representation, often under implicit threat of violence from the ethnic Kyrgyz community should they act uppity. This marginalization was criticized by the international community, although not by Uzbekistan, but the Kyrgyz government resisted this pressure and international pressure may have only exacerbated ethnic tensions.

Islam continues to increase the role in plays in public life in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly among the young and Southerners. Compared to the early 2000s, the Kyrgyz Republic is more devoutly religious and more extremist Islamist groups are present in the country. This trend has not been seen as mainly positive among population, who warn of Islamization. The Muftiate, which has been frequent turnover due to corruption and changes of political fortune in parliament, has been placed in a difficult situation as it struggles to retain public credibility while also satisfying government demands to keep Islam under control. There were continued fears about radical Islamist groups organizing in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly after 350 Kyrgyz joined ISIS in 2015 and may return to the country to carry out attacks.

Following the 2010 Revolution, the Kyrgyz Republic's international relations were generally more stable and positive, largely because Atambayev was a firmer and more reliable negotiating partner than Bakiev. Atambayev's stance was that the Manas airbase lease would be extended but had to close by July 2014, as its presence made the Kyrgyz Republic a target for Islamists, but that cooperation would continue with the US in other areas, although criticism about human rights was not well received.

Atambayev stressed the importance of the relationship with Russia, which improved as Russia's base leases were extended and Russia cancelled $500 million in Kyrgyz debt, and Russia expanded military cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic and Gazprom acquired parts of the country's gas infrastructure. Although plans for a permanent Russian base in Osh were dropped, such a proposal was not opposed by Uzbekistan by 2015 and remains a possibility, as relations between Russia and Uzbekistan improved during this period. The Russian military presence in the Kyrgyz Republic has expanded, largely as a result of increased worries about radical Islamists infiltrating the country from Afghanistan. Conservative cultural attitudes also favored a pro-Russian stance, as the US was associated with gay rights, color revolutions, and other perceived threats to Kyrgyz society and government. Economic relations with Russia have strengthened since the Kyrgyz Republic's entry into the EEU in August 2015.

Relations with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan were generally positive, while the relationship with Uzbekistan remained tense, as old problems related to disputed borders and the difficulty of regular border crossings into Uzbekistan's exclaves, reinforced by conspiracy theories peddled in the Kyrgyz Republic that Uzbekistan wanted to annex the southern Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic also developed stronger ties with countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, particularly China. China became a major force in the Kyrgyz Republic in the 2010s, pushing for economic integration through the One Belt One Road program and political cooperation through the SCO's committment to fight the 'three evils' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. One of the main Chinese projects, a railway from Kashgar to Andijan, passing through the southern Kyrgyz Republic, was controversial because it would only benefit the economy of the South and integrate its economy more with Uzbekistan, potentially exacerbating already high North-South tensions. India also expanded its role in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in the miltiary sphere through acquisition of former Soviet naval testing grounds and equipment at Issyk Kul; this military relationship with the Kyrgyz Republic also counterbalanced against Pakistan's military cooperation with Tajikistan. Japan had been one of the most important countries in the Kyrgyz Republic in the 1990s, but withdrew many of its programs and investments following the kidnapping of several Japanese geologists in Batken in 1999 and did not reextend these programs due to persistent instability until the 2010 Revolution, at which Japan restored its strong political relationship and investment. Korea significantly boosted its investment in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2011 in response to a Chinese decision to reduce exports of rare earths and sudden need to develop new supplies; other business relations also expanded significantly in the 2010s. Stronger ties were also forged with Middle Eastern countries, in particular Iran after the removal of the US base at Manas in 2015. Other prominent Middle Eastern countries were Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

There is a very nice timeline of the 2010 Revolution on page 126 to page 135.

There are biographic sketches of major political figures on pages 136 to 141. These are worth copying in full:

• Askar Akayev: Born November10,1944, Chui Province, northern Kyrgyzstan. Aged 17 years old, began work in local factory; subsequently studied at the Leningrad Institute of Precision Mechanics and Optics, graduated with an honors degree in 1967; re-mained at the Institute until his return to Kyrgyzstan in 1977, where he continued his scientific career at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute. In 1989, became President of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences. On October27,1990,elected by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet to serve as the country’s first president. Re-elected by popular vote twice (1995, 2000), but was increasingly unpopular. On March 24, 2005, in the wake of fierce protests and demonstrations throughout the country, he fled to Kazakhstan. Subsequently granted asylum in Russia; formally resigned on April4,2005.Thereafter resumed his academic career in Moscow.

• Azimjon Askarov: Born 1951, Jalal-Abad province; Uzbek Kyrgyzstani. Studied arts and crafts in Tashkent, worked as a painter-decorator. Post-independence became a civil rights activist. In 2002 founded the group Vozdukh (“Air”) to monitor conditions in Kyr-gyz prisons, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan; publicized instances of police brutality. During the 2010 conflict,Askarov recorded killings and arson attacks, distributed videos to international media outlets. Arrested by the Kyrgyz author-ities on June15,2010; claims that he was beaten and tortured while in police cus-tody were denied by the authorities.He was later tried and handed down a life sentence. In prison, his health rapidly deteriorated. Numerous international or-ganizations took up his case, includingHuman Rights Watch,Reporters Without Borders,People In Need, theCommittee to Protect Journalists, and Amnesty International. In 2015, the United States conferred the 2014 Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov. In response, the Kyrgyz government terminated the 1993 agreement on cooperation with the United States.

• Kurmanbek Bakiev: Born August 1, 1949, Jalal-Abad province. Graduated from electrical engineering faculty, Kuibyshev Polytechnic Institute, 1972;military service in Soviet army 1974-76. Thereafter returned to engineering; working mostly in southern Kyrgyz-stan. Began political career in CommunistParty in 1990, active in local politics in southern Kyrgyzstan 1995-97. Held senior administrative post in northern prov-ince of Chui 1997-2000; December 2000 to May 2002 served as Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, became chairman of the “People’s Movement of Kyrgyz-stan.”In July 2005, after ousting of Askar Akayev, Bakiev was elected President, gaining 89% of the vote. In 2007, he founded the party Ak Jol (“White Path”). Dur-ing his presidential tenure, family members held prominent positions in the gov-ernment and allegedly profited from lucrative commercial contracts. Forced from office in April 2010, granted asylum in Belarus, where he later acquired citizen-ship. In February 2013, Kyrgyz military court sentenced him in absentia to 24 years in prison, with confiscation of all his property. Some of his relations and close associates also received long sentences. The Kyrgyz government repeatedly called for the extradition of Bakiev and other individuals wanted on criminal charges, but as of mid-2016, the Belarusian leadership showed no sign of acceding to these requests.

• Kadyrjon Batyrov: Born March 9, 1956, Jalal-Abad city; Uzbek-Kyrgyzstani. After military service in the Soviet army (1974-76), he worked in various enterprises in Kyrgyzstan, then entered the Andijan (Uzbekistan) Institute of National Economy. After graduat-ing in 1990, he developed extensive business interests in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Played a prominent role in the cultural affairs of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-stani community in southern Kyrgyzstan and was reported to have invested some $6 million in educational initiatives in the region. The Kyrgyz authorities accused him of inciting violence in Jalal-Abad in May 2010; he denied the charges and fled abroad, first to Ukraine, then to Sweden, where he was granted asylum. He was tried in absentia in Kyrgyzstan; the court handed down a life sentence.

• Azimbek Beknazarov: Born 1956, Jalal-Abad Province, Aksy region. Served in Soviet armed forces, grad-uated from Tashkent Law Technical College in 1984, and worked in legal depart-ments in various places (1991-99). In 2002, criticized President Akayev for giving up land to the Chinese (Sino-Kyrgyz Treaty); called for impeachment of Presi-dent. Arrested in January 2002 on charges of abuse of office; freed a few months later after public demonstrations in his defense.Member of Parliamentary Com-mittee on Legal Affairs in 2000-05. In September 2005 (under Bakiev), appointed Procurator General of Kyrgyzstan; April 2008, chairman of Asaba(“National Re-birth”) party; January 2008, launched anti-Bakiev “Revolutionary Movement of Kyrgyzstan”; December 2008,joined “United People’s Movement of Kyrgyz-stan”; 2010, became member of Interim Government.

• Baktybek Beshimov: Born September 13, 1954, Osh region. Graduate of the Kyrgyz State University. President of the Osh State University 1992-98. Held senior positions in UNDP programs and Aga Khan Foundation regional initiatives.Briefly worked in the administration of Askar Akayev (1991-92), then became disenchanted and joined the opposition. Served as Kyrgyz ambassador in the Indian sub-continent in 2000-05. Supported the “Tulip Revolution”(2005), but soon became critical of Bakiev. Vice-President of the American University of Central Asia (2005-07). Leading member of the parliamentary opposition group of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (2007-09). In 2009, fearing for his safety, he left Kyrgyzstan to take up visiting posts in the United States.

• Sooronbay Jeenbekov: Born November16,1958, in Kara-Kuldja district, Osh province. Graduated from the Kyrgyz Agricultural Institute in 1983. Thereafter employed in teaching and administrative positions, also in Communist Party work. Parliamentary deputy, with special responsibility for agrarian issues, in 1996-2000. Deputy parliamen-tary speaker 2000-2005. Appointed Minister for Agriculture, Water and Pro-cessing Industries in 2007 under Bakiev. Joined the Social Democratic Party. Appointed governor of Osh province in 2010, under the Interim Government. Elected Prime Minister of Kyrygzstan April 2016.Jeenbekov’s younger brother Asylbek (b. 1963), also a prominent politician, and parliamentary speaker since 2015, resigned when Sooronbai became prime minister, since family members were barred fromholding government posts simultaneously.

• Murataly Ajy Jumanov: Born May1,1973, Osh province. In 1990-92 saw military service in armed forces of Kyrgyzstan, then entered Hazrat Usman madrassah in Osh province. In 1996-99, deputy qazy (Muslim cleric) in Osh province; in 1997-98, studied at Islamic Institute in Ufa (Russian Federation). In 2002, unanimously elected Mufti of Kyrgyzstan by the Council of Ulama; in 2003 graduated from Law Faculty of Osh State University. In April 2010, kidnapped and held captive for a few days (ac-cording to his own account, by gangsters); shortly thereafter he was removed from his post, apparently due to his links with Bakiev. Appointed Rector of the Islamic University, but in July 2010, at the age of 37, died of a heart attack.

• Ednan Karabayev: Born January 1,1953, Talas city. Graduate of the Kyrgyz State University. Member of the Komsomoland active in Communist Party work (1981-90). In 1990-92 served in the Akayev administration. Minister of Foreign Affairs 1992-94; re-appointed under Bakiev in 2007-09.Travelled extensively during his ministerial terms of office. In 2012, he became special advisor to the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan.

• Feliks Kulov: Born October 19,1948, Frunze (Bishkek). Trained at advanced educational institutions of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs; held senior ranks in Soviet, then Kyrgyz security forces. In 1991-92, Minister of Internal Affairs in Kyrgyzstan and in 1992-93, Deputy President of Kyrgyzstan. In December 1993 resigned amid allegations of fraudulent dealings linked to launch of Kyrgyzstan’s national currency, but soon appointed head of the state administration of Chui Province. In 1997-98 served as Minister of National Security in Kyrgyzstan, and in 1998-99, Mayor of Bishkek. In 1999, founded Ar-Namys “Dignity”) party. In 2000, arrested on charges of abuse of office and incitement to violence; given custodial sentences by civil and military courts (7 and 10 years respectively); stripped of rank of Lieu-tenant General, property confiscated. Freed after 2005 “Tulip Revolution”and subsequently cleared of all criminal charges. September 2005 to January 2007 served as Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan under Bakiev. In February 2007 became leader of the opposition bloc “United Front for the Worthy Future of Kyrgyzstan.” Later that year charged with inciting anti-Bakiev protests. Post-2010, remained active in party politics, but mainly involved in raising finance for developmental projects.

• Melisbek Myrzakmatov: Born April 18,1969, Osh Province. In 2007, joined Bakiev’s Ak Jolparty, held parliamentary seat until 2009. From January 2009 to December 2013, Mayor of Osh; unsuccessfully contested mayoral election in January 2014. Known as an out-spoken Kyrgyz nationalist.

• Roza Otunbayeva: Born August 23, 1950, Frunze (now Bishkek).224Studied atMoscow State University; after graduation (1972), taught in the Kyrgyz State University. Political career began in 1981, when she became an official in the Communist Party; in 1986-89, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz SSR; in 1989-91, served in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and headed the Soviet delegation to UNESCO. In 1992 she became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan; in 1992-2004, held prestigious diplomatic posts abroad. In December 2004, was one of the founders of the Ata-Jurt (“Fatherland”) party; in 2006, co-chair of Asabaparty (with Beknazarov).In 2008, she held a parliamentary seat on the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) ticket, later became leader of the SDPK parliamentary group.On April7,2010, following demonstrations against Kurmanbek Bakiev, she was chosen by the opposition group to head the Interim Government. A week after the nationwide referendum on constitutional amend-ments on 27 June 2010, she was sworn in as President. When her term expired on December 31, 2011, she stood down, in accordance with constitutional procedure. Since then she has been engaged in inter-governmental humanitarian initiatives.

• Temir Sariev: Born June 17, 1963, in the Chui province, he graduated from the economics facultyof the Kyrgyz State University in 1989. From 1991 to 2000, worked in the financial sector. In October 2006, he became one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Movement.In2007, the Kyrgyz authorities detained him on charges of smug-gling, but the case was soon dropped. After the ousting of Bakiev in April 2010, Sariev was appointed Minister of Finance Minister in the Interim Government. In December 2011, under the Atambayev administration, awarded the economics and anti-monopoly ministerial portfolio.He was elected PrimeMinster in April 2015; a year later, forced to resign because of alleged corruption.

• Maksat Aji Toktomushev: Born August 9, 1973, Osh province. In 1991-95 followed courses in the local Agri-cultural Institute; concurrently, he studied Islamic law privately with local schol-ars. In 1998-2005, he studied Islamic law in Pakistan, at the Deobandi-oriented “Arabiya”Madrassah; on his return to Kyrgyzstan, in 2005-13 he taught at a local madrassah and served as imam and qazyat various mosques; unanimously elected Mufti in 2014.

Karasar, Hasan Ali. "Chicherin on the delimitation of Turkestan: Native Bolsheviks versus Soviet foreign policy. Seven letters from the Russian archives on razmezhevanie". Central Asian Survey, Vol.21, No.2 (2002): 199-209.

Karasar, Hasan Ali. "Chicherin on the delimitation of Turkestan: Native Bolsheviks versus Soviet foreign policy. Seven letters from the Russian archives on razmezhevanie". Central Asian Survey, Vol.21, No.2 (2002): 199-209.

• This article is a collection of seven letter written to various Soviet officials in the 1920s by Georgiy Chicherin, the Soviet Comissar for Foreign Affairs between 1923 and 1930. The letters were written about Turkestan during the time of basmatchi resistance and when the Turkestani elite were undecided about whether to support or oppose national delimination (199).
• The letters are as follows:
• 1) To Joseph Stalin, dated 5 April 1924. In this letter, Chicherin warned against the redistribution of territories belonging to Xiva and Buxoro and said that such a plan would likely result in protests from the Muslims and the Western states (200).
• 2) To the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party, dated 16 May 1924. Chicherin again warned about the negative impacts that dissolving Buxoro would have on the USSR's relations with Muslim states, particularly Turkey and Afghanistan. He cautioned that British influence in Afghanistan was liable to increase if the Soviets dissolved Buxoro (200).
• 3) To Stalin, dated 22 May 1924. Chicherin warned that the national delimination of Soviet Turkestan had been done hastily and that the project contained errors. He said that even one of its major supporters, Fayzulla Xo‘jayev, believed the project had been rushed (200).
• 4) To the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party, dated 28 May 1924. Chicherin warned that the Uzbek commercial bourgeois were behind some of the plans for delimination and planed to make themselves rich by including all of the cotton producing areas of Turkestan in a new Uzbekistan and put all the poor areas into other SSRs. He noted that this plan was opposed by the Kyrgyz and by the Xorezm Communists because they would be left with only the poorest areas and that the Turkmens supported the plan because they would get some rich areas (200-201).
• 5) To Grigoriy Zinovev, dated 28 May 1924. He reiterated previous points about the delimination project being supported by the Buxoro commercial bourgeois and warned against about the destruction of an independent Buxoro and Xiva being bad for Soviet relations with the Muslim world (201).
• 6) To Stalin, dated 6 July 1924. Again, repeates that the delimination of Soviet Central Asia would have a negative impact on relations with the Muslim world, including Turkey, and claims that even Fayzulla Xo'jayev had doubts about the stability of the new SSRs (201).
• 7) To Stalin and other senior Communist leaders, dated 30 October 1924. This letter was written after the delimination of Soviet Central Asia had been carried out. Chicherin complained about the attemps by Turkmen Communists to incorporate Turkmen areas of Iran into the USSR and asked Stalin to use his influence among the Turkmen leadership to get them to stop (201).
• In this series of letters, Chicherin makes five arguments in opposition to national delimination in Soviet Turkestan:
• The delimination, by ending the indpenedence of Buxoro and Xiva, would have a negative impact on the USSR's relations with the Muslim world, in particular Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran. The creation of Turkmenistan would cause apprehension in Iran and Afghanistan would be offended that the Soviets violated an earlier treaty guaranteeing Buxoro's independence. All countries would be drawn more into the British sphere (201).
• The changes in possession of land and wealth among different national elites would upset the balance in the region and cause ethnic strife that would have the largest impact on the masses (201-202)
• Bolshevik leaders were being manipulated in the delimination by Uzbek commercial bourgeois who wanted to create a signal zone of cotton wealth that they would control (202).
• Even the local Communists, like Fayzulla Xo'jayev, who supported national delimination, believed that there was a potential for revolt among some Uzbek classes because of the end to Buxoro's sovereignty (202).
• The project was poorly planned, lacked detail, had an unrealistic timeline, and needed more thought and research before being carried out (202).
• These letter may unset the conventional view that national delimination in Soviet Central Asia was a project from the Center and imposed on the region. According to Chicherin's account, the main supporters of delimination were local Central Asian Communists who believed that delimination would grant them more power and influence (202).