Summary
Between the 14th and 17th of October 2021, the Russian Navy and the People’s Liberal Army Navy (PLA-N) participated in the ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ military exercise in the Peter the Great Gulf and nearby parts of the Sea of Japan. This is the ninth installment of an annual exercise between Russia and China that has been ongoing since 2012.
This year’s exercise focused on mine countermeasures, nighttime operations, firing on moving surface targets, and tracking submarines. This exercise was meant to replicate real world conditions to a greater degree than previous exercises, with ships conducting exercises without prior rehearsal and operating at night time. China also used these exercises to practice deploying its most recent naval hardware, particularly the Type 055 destroyer Nanchang 南昌, and using new communications technology to enable for centralized command of military operations.
The exercises themselves, like those in previous years, are unlikely to significantly improve the interoperational capabilities of the Russian and Chinese navies or improve the fighting capacity of either navy. The exercises have, however, given China an opportunity to test new systems and doctrines in a setting approximating the real world, giving feedback that could be used to improve equipment and refine doctrine. The exercises also send a political message to the world that Russia and China advocate for each other’s security interests and that China has not been politically or militarily isolated by the formation of the Quad or the recent signing of AUKUS.
Background
The most recent naval exercise between China and Russia is part of a larger trend of growing Chinese-Russian military cooperation, originally under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and now continuing on a bilateral basis. The first joint naval exercises between the Russian Navy and the People’s Liberal Army Navy (PLA-N) were held in 2005 as part of larger joint military exercises conducted through the SCO. Since 2012, Russia and China have held annual naval exercises, named ‘Maritime Interaction’ (Морское взаимодействие in Russian and 海上联合 in Chinese).
In the past, ‘Maritime Interaction’ exercises were used mainly for political effect as a means of asserting Russian or Chinese operational capabilities in contested areas: the Mediterranean in 2015, the South China Sea in 2016, the Baltic Sea in 2017. These deployments are meant to signal Russian and Chinese resolve in the face of pressure from the USA and its allies. Previous exercises have also been criticized by observers for a lack of substance compared to equivalent US-led exercises and limited contributions to the capacity of either navy or their interoperability in a real world combat situation.
Forces
Russian forces participating in the exercise consisted of ships and naval aviation from the Pacific Fleet and aircraft from the Eastern Military District of the Russian Army. Russia sent the Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Panteleyev; two Steregushchiy-class corvettes, Hero of the Russian Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov and Gromky; two unidentified coastal minesweepers; the Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine Ust-Bolsheretsk; an unidentified missile boat; and an unidentified tugboat. Helicopters attached to naval aviation of the Pacific Fleet also participated in the exercise. Several Su-30SM fighter aircraft of the Russian Army participated in an antiaircraft component of the exercises. The Russian delegation was commanded by Rear Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov.
Chinese forces participating in the exercise consisted of ships from the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Theater Commands, as well as fixed wing aircraft attached to PLA-N naval aviation. China sent the Type 055 destroyer Nanchang 南昌, the Type 052D destroyer Kunming 昆明, the Type 054A frigates Binzhou 滨州 and Liuzhou 柳州, the Type 903A comprehensive supply ship Dongpinghu 东平湖, an unidentified diesel submarine, and an unidentified rescue vessel. Helicopters attached to naval aviation of the PLA-N were also used in the exercise, as were Shaanxi Y8 aircraft modified with SONAR apparatuses. The Chinese delegation was commanded by Yao Pinghe 耀平和, PLA-N Deputy Commander of the Northern District.
Activities
During the course of the four-day exercise, the Russian and Chinese navies practices mine countermeasures, air defense, live fire at moving surface targets, nighttime deployment and maneuvering, antisubmarine measures, joint maneuvering, and joint communication. The Chinese delegation also practiced using a new aerial reconnaissance system to enhance detection of threats and enhance command and control.
The Chinese fleet arrived in the Peter the Great Gulf and met with the Russian fleet on 13 October, beginning exercises the next day. Unlike other Chinese and Russian military exercises, there was no rehearsal prior to the start of the exercises; this was a deliberate decision to train under more realistic conditions.
On the 14th of October, the Russian and Chinese fleets held an opening ceremony and practiced joint maneuvering. On the 15th of October, the fleets practiced destroying naval mines using artillery fire from ships, aiming and using live fire to destroy decoys being pulled by a Russian tugboat, and defending against simulated air attack by Russian Su-30SM fighters. In the night of the 15th and morning of the 16th, the fleets practiced nighttime deployment and maneuvering. During the night of the 16th, the fleets began an antisubmarine exercise, using ships and Shaanxi Y8 aircraft and helicopters equipped with SONAR to locate a submarine in the Peter the Great Gulf. This antisubmarine exercise concluded during the day of the 17th with the successful location of the submarine after a 20 hour search.
Throughout the exercise, the Russian and Chinese ships practiced joint maneuvering and joint communication to accomplish shared goals. China also used a new form of aerial reconnaissance during the exercise, receiving real time information on the location of ships and using that information to empower the decision-making abilities of Chinese commanders.
On the second day of the exercise, the 15th of October, there was an incident were an American ship, the USS Chafee, was stopped by the Russian Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Tributs and escorted away from an area of the Sea of Japan that had been closed due to the live fire drills conducted that day. Russia complained about the US presence, but the American crew reported that the Russian ship behaved professionally and that there had been no issue.
Following the conclusion of the exercise, most of the Russian ships that had participated in the exercise, plus the Admiral Tributs, accompanied the Chinese ships through the narrow Tsugaru Strait. This is the first time that the fleets have crossed through the Tsugaru Strait together. Although this Strait is international waters and the Russian and Chinese move was fully legal, the Japanese government considered the joint passage to be intentionally provocative.
Analysis
The Maritime Interaction 2021’ exercise affirms a number of existing trends in Russian and Chinese military cooperation. It also is another demonstration of ongoing trends within the Chinese military. There are four main takeaways from the ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ exercise:
Russia and China both continue to see military cooperation with the other as very important.
Naval cooperation with Russia continues to benefit China by providing the PLA-N with training in areas in which the Russian Navy has more experience.
Despite attempts to move closer to ‘real world conditions’ in its training, China still remains very far away from replicating an accurate military environment.
China is moving towards implementing a more centralized command and control doctrine of ‘intelligentization’ by giving high level commanders greater access to battlefield data.
Both Russia and China consider continued military cooperation to be important to their security interests. This has been demonstrated through a number of recent military exercises, high level meetings of defense officials, and the fact that ‘Maritime Interaction’ is still ongoing after 10 years. The ‘Maritime Interaction’ exercises seem particularly important to China, which has deployed one of its newest and most advanced ships, the Nanchang, to the exercises. The presence of this ship in ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ has been the focus of many Chinese media reports and is meant to demonstrate the importance that China places on continued military cooperation with Russia. Chinese media coverage of this event affirms Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s statement that Russia and China are, “better than allies.”
Despite the short time periods of the ‘Maritime Interaction’ joint exercises, naval cooperation with Russia continues to benefit China by allowing the PLA-N to train with the more experienced Russian Navy. Moreover, the 2021 exercises focused on areas in which China is notably inexperienced compared to Russia, including mine countermeasures and antisubmarine operations. These exercises also allow China to practice with new naval equipment, enabling better integration of new ships and hardware into the fleet. The practical benefits for the Russian Navy of naval cooperation with China are less obvious.
Despite new attempts to improve its training practices by making exercises more realistic, ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ shows that the PLA-N is still a long way from accurately simulating a real world combat environment during exercises. A number of steps were taken in ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ to enhance the realism of the training, including eliminating the rehearsals of exercises that are normal in Chinese and Russian military training, having drills at irregular times unknown to most sailors, and practicing at night time. These steps show a commitment within the Russian Navy and PLA-N to improve their training. Other elements of the exercise, however, show that the navies are far from simulating a realistic combat environment. This was clear during the antisubmarine component of the exercise, where Chinese and Russian ships searched for a submarine within a limited sea zone with complete control of the air domain. Assuming that the navies are preparing for a conflict with the USA or its allies, prolonged naval aviation operations of this kind are unrealistic. Similarly, the air defense exercise did not feature any form of electronic warfare or communications jamming, allowing for easy targeting of the aircraft that is unrealistic as a simulation for conflict with the USA or its allies.
China continues to integrate more advanced information technology into its armed forces as a way of enhancing the quality and amount of detailed battlefield information available to Chinese commanders. This was demonstrated in the ‘Maritime Interaction 2021’ exercises by the use of continuous aerial surveillance to give precise ship location to commanders on the Nanchang. Greater access to this information that is meant to allow higher level officers to take more decisions and thus limit the role of lower level officers in decision making. This is part of a wider trend of ‘informationization’ within the Chinese military, with the intent of removing power from a class of lower and middle military officers seen as incapable. The presence of this doctrine in the PLA-N is significant and means that, in a future conflict, the PLA-N could also be exceptionally vulnerable to electronic warfare as a means of disrupting highly concentrated command and control systems.
