Wollheim, Richard. "John Stuart Mill and the Limits of State Action". Social Research, Vol.40, No.1 (1973): 1-30.

Wollheim, Richard. "John Stuart Mill and the Limits of State Action". Social Research, Vol.40, No.1 (1973): 1-30.

• Mill originally wrote his seminal text, On Liberty, to engage with and counter a common belief during his time period that once the arbitrary and hereditary power of monarchs was abolished, there was no need to further restrict the exercise of state power -- which was now democratic. Mill obviously disagreed and in his response developed a framework for issues of state action in all systems of democratic government (1-2).
• A common criticism towards Mill's harm principle is the difficulty of finding or defining a self-regarding action, for any matter of importance does have an affect on others. If confirmed, such a critique would mandate that only the most trivial actions, like how to brush one's teeth, would performed freely. All other actions could be restricted, in an obvious subversion of Mill's attempt to promote liberty (3-4).
• The author references a paper by Dr. J. Rees in answer of this issue, arguing that since Mill obvious did not mean for his theory to be interpreted that way, he must instead by making a distinction between actions which primarily affect other's interests and those actions which primarily affect our own interests (4-5). This distinction is elaborated as the infringement of 'interests', where an action is only other-regarding if it affects the core interests of others (5).
• Although the author congratulates Dr. Rees on the work done, Dr. Wollheim disagrees with the proposed solution on two counts: the vague definition of 'interests' leaves that category as societally defined, meaning that it will vary between societies and could exclude rights which Mill considers core (7); the theory here is inconsistent with the Utilitarian principles upon which Mill claims to have based his work, because it leaves the definition of 'interests' up to culture rather than calculations of utility (8). 
• The author proposes that the category of 'self-regarding actions' ought to include both actions which by their triviality have literally not effect on others, and those actions which only have an effect on others because others judge them to be right or wrong (8).
• The example demonstrating this second category, which appears in Mill, is that having a party on a Sunday is a self-regarding action. Although it does affect people who believe the Sabbath to be holy, it only affects them because of their moral beliefs, making it self-regarding (9).
• This definition of the term solves one of the objections raised to Dr. Rees's work, because it allows for a consistent definition of the actions across societies and does not depend on cultural definition of terms (10).
• Dr. Wollheim recognizes that his theory is not necessarily or clearly in conformity with Utilitarianism, because it proclaims a broad rule for all cases on what activities can be regulated, not paying heed to pain or pleasure calculations. The author then goes on to explain several possible lines of defense for his theory (10).
• The author suggests that it could be argued, from a Millian perspective, that Utilitarianism only regards physical pain as appropriate restriction on actions, therefore disregarding any offense or emotion pain caused. However, this interpretation does not mesh with Mill status as a philosopher, and the author rejects it (11).
• A stronger path of argumentation is that if the belief that an act is sinful is wrong -- the belief that action X is sinful is a false belief -- then the person being harmed is harmed only by their false beliefs, not the action. Since we cannot determine the true morality of most actions, this has to be the working assumption; meaning that no self-regarding action can be denied on Utilitarian principles (13, 20).
• A possible exception to this rule are actions which produce instant and natural revulsion and disgust -- such as the public consumption of spoiled food -- which are not based on the beliefs of other and therefore might merit a different balance of harm to pleasure (13).
• Another possible objection to this view is that just because beliefs are false does not make the pain from their violation any less real. The author suggests that Mill would have responded that since it benefits society overall to progress towards true beliefs through experimentation, this is a price that false believers must pay (14).
• Within Mill's theory, the author draws a distinction between 'moral beliefs' and 'preferences'. Dr. Wollheim defines the former as beliefs regarding one's own action, whereas preferences are opinions about the morality of other's action. Whereas the former are important, the later need to be controlled by the methods which Mill suggests (16).
• Within the framework of Utilitarianism, the only moral actions directed at others must be based on the concept of improving overall happiness, meaning that 'preferences' made without reference to happiness cannot be accepted as moral or acceptable reasons for state intervention (17).
• Using this criteria for determining the merits of beliefs, most of the cases for moralist intervention are countered. There are however, some cases where the person believes they are doing the right thing without firm evidence. The author claims that Mill would value freedom as a default, allowing something to remain unrestricted until it is proved harmful with solid evidence (18).
• A full explanation of the argument had in this article in defense of Mill can be found on page 19.
• Mill further takes down the idea from the essay by Dr. Rees, that there is any distinction between 'interest' in Mill's usage and the common term. A large amount of textual evidence is provided to demonstrate that 'interest' does not connote any special meaning distinct from other effects (23-24).
• In another text, Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being, Mill makes claims which far extent the range of action that humans should be allowed beyond the restrictions of Utilitarianism advanced in On Liberty (28). However, this text deals with a separate case from Utilitarianism. Whereas Mill believes that Utilitarianism can only be useful in a developed society under certain conditions, his text on individualism provides a guide for a pre-Utilitarian morality (29).