Wilson, Robin. "The Politics of Contemporary Ethno-nationalist Conflicts". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.7, No.3 (2001): 365-384.

Wilson, Robin. "The Politics of Contemporary Ethno-nationalist Conflicts". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.7, No.3 (2001): 365-384.

• "Ethno-nationalism is profoundly different. The fault lines it draws are principally vertical, not horizontal. Its counterpart is not the state [...] not other citizens but an enemy-image of the latter, collectively conceived. The intensity of ethno-nationalist antagonism is proportionate not to any social inequality the client constituency suffers relative to a comparator/competitor group but rather to the sense of difference erected between them" (367).
• Ethno-nationalist conflicts are zero-sum games based on domination, meaning that democratization and moderation do not come easily or naturally to the conflicts. These conflict tend to ignore dialogue and civil society, and are generally geared towards violence (367).
• Currently the only solutions to ethno-nationalist violence are political institutionalization that lower, but does not decimate, violence -- as in Ireland -- international mandates over territories -- like Bosnia and Herzegovina -- or military occupation by overwhelming force -- as in Kosovo (367). 
• "In many parts of the world people are being successfully mobilised to defend themselves against real or perceived threats from other groups, whose culture they are encouraged to view as irredeemably alien to their own -- The emphasis is seldom on the importance of converting `them' to `our' point of view. What is stressed is the urgency of defending and strengthening `our' community or way of life against `their' aggression or interference or excessive influence" (368).
• Many observers, from both Marxist and Liberal traditions, explain ethno-nationalism as a 'old' ideology that will die out under new forces of global Communism, class conflict, multiculturalism, or other modernities. This is blatantly false (368).
• Intra-state conflicts are not based on 'ancient hatreds' between ethnicities, but between groups galvanized by modern ideologies. This ethnic conflict is primarily triggered by weakened states, whose lack of protection drives people into the arms of other ethno-nationalist security guarantors (369).
• In this situation, the 'ancient tensions' become a self-referential myth than ethno-nationalist groups use to mobilize support for their movement, by expressing current securities onto a mythic past. This in turn makes the conflict seem organic, natural, or unstoppable (369).
• "Scientists of the mind agree in Us and Them: the Psychology of Ethnonationalism, the Committee of International Relations of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry concluded that `Ethnicity has no existence apart from interethnic relations" (370).
• The emergence of semi-autonomous regions within Europe, which seem to contain cultural and linguistic rights without undermining state sovereignty, challenges the dominant narrative of violent separatist ethno-nationalism (371-373).
• Organizations such as the UN, NATO, and ICC are taking larger roles in providing services in weak states and resolving conflicts in areas where states do not clearly have a right of sovereignty. The author expects that the role of these organizations will expand in the future (374).
• The rights of ethnic minority within states were first institutionalized in the UN through the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National, Religious and Ethnic Minorities. This was also reflected in a similar 1995 resolution by the Council of Europe (375).
• In Europe, the main actor enforcing these ideals has been the OSCE, which delegates a chief on issues of national minorities as of 1992, following a failure to prevent the Yugoslav and Chechen wars. This framework stresses dialogue and individual complaints, not allowing collectives to control the voice of an entire community (375-376).
• Dr. Arend Lijphart has suggested that ethnic or political conflict between two polarized communities forced to reside within the same geographic area can be resolved through 'consocialization', wherein political settlements are created to force cooperation through institutions like mutual vetos, grand coalitions, and mutual autonomy (378-379).
• This concept has come under attack since the 1980s, as the 'success stories' of consocialization in Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland have all come apart at the seams: separatism has overtaken Netherlandish politics, while Austrian political compromise has broken down in the face of resurgent Austro-fascism (379).
• Further criticism has been pilled on Dr. Lijphart for using entirely primordialist concepts of ethnicity, and ignoring the role that politics plays in creating ethnic groups. While consocialization might make sense between defined and unchangeable groups, in real life these divisions encourage corruption and sharpen and institutionalize ethnic divides, thereby making conflicts more difficult to solve (379-380).
• "I have sought to outline what could be described as a broadly `progressive' strategy for addressing today's ethno-nationalist conflicts. [...] the reconceptualisation of sovereignty away from winner-takes-all assumptions, the entrenchment of minority (but not 'group') rights, and the freeing up of identity choices" (380).
• "Elements of the international community [...] have begun to evolve a new paradigm, in which the international scene is occupied by a differentiated range of sub- and supra- as well as state actors, in which the latter no longer have hard and opaque boundaries. It is best conceived as a web of interrelationships between overlapping nodal points, the constraints being international human-rights conventions, international legal jurisdiction (including ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court), and, ultimately, the threat of collective military action for humanitarian purposes" (381).