Watson, Scott. "The 'Human' as a Referent Object?". Security Dialogue, Vol.42, No.1 (2011): 3-20.

Watson, Scott. "The 'Human' as a Referent Object?". Security Dialogue, Vol.42, No.1 (2011): 3-20.

• Securitization theory states that 'security' is not an objective or natural category, but the process of elevating an issue from the realm of normal politics to a state of extraordinary importance requiring extralegal and unconventional solutions. Discussion of 'security' is thus an argument among elites and the public about what issues are pressing enough to violate the 'normal' rules of politics (3-4).
• Since the 1990s, governments have appealed to humanitarianism as justification for military intervention and other extraordinary activities. This means that, like security, humanitarianism can propel certain issues beyond the realm of normal politics (4).
• Recent scholarship arguing against or in favor of humanitarian interventions has underlined the point that, like security, humanitarianism is an essentially contested concept (4-5).
• The author proposes understanding humanitarianism as a sector of security, similar to the way that societal security, environmental security, or military security constitute separate but interrelated areas of security (5).
• Humanitarianism is focused on the core goals of ameliorating human suffering, and preserving human life and basic dignity. (5-6).
• Securitization around humanitarianism follows the same steps as other forms of securitization: it responds to a perceived existential threat to human life, it demands emergency action, and that action is allowed to violate the normal rules that govern politics (6).
• Major actors have identified different types of humanitarian security threats. Some, like the Red Cross and Crescent, focus on threats by armed groups or states against human rights, whereas others, like Oxfam, conceive poverty and other structural factors to constitute the main human security issues (6).
• There is substantial disagreement within the humanitarian community about what constitutes emergency action in response to human security, but there are four general approaches (6):
• 'Bed for the night' advocates for impartial delivery of necessary relief and basic supplies (6-7).
• 'Do no harm' supports providing impartial relief, but also working with receiving societies to mitigating the potential negative fallout of that relief (7).
• 'Comprehensive peacebuilding' calls for an active intervention to address the root causes of human insecurity (7).
• 'Back a decent winner' advising focusing on ending armed conflict by actively backing certain factions and then improving humanitarian conditions during the ceasefire (7).
• Most responses to humanitarian security threats are normal and institutionalized, taking place as charities or recognized bodies. The only exceptional security actions are humanitarian intervention, which is very uncommon, or use of the military for humanitarian relief (8-10).
• The exceptional nature of some responses to humanitarian security, like the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, is demonstrated by the lack of politicization of the response. States send help where it was needed without making the response a subject of political debate, indicating its status apart from 'normal' politics (9).
• The standard approach of the Copenhagen School to the idea of exceptional action in response to security issues does not apply well to discussing international issues since there are no democratic norms or domestic structures to override. The author also objects in general to this view of security responses are being extralegal or exceptional  (7-8).
• The author advocates an understanding of security responses more in line with the Paris School, which understands security responses as policies designed to secure a referent object from a threat -- these responses can be extralegal or they can be heavily institutionalized and normal, like a professional military (8).
• The main debates among advocates of humanitarian security are not about the types of situations that constitute security threats, but the level of response demanded by a security threat and what actors should be responsible for implementing that response (7).
• Contemporary humanitarian systems are set up to support a system of sovereign states who are responsible for the security of their citizens. Even measures dealing with exceptions to that system, like refugees, still have the goal of restoring citizens to the care of their own states in the future (10-11).
• The importance of national sovereignty is also reflected in the norm of aid distribution requiring the consent of the afflicted state. This means that even when states violate the norm by being unable to secure their citizens, their right to do so is acknowledged by their official request for help (11).
• Humanitarian responses need to be securitized because doing so, by stressing the urgent need to protect civilians from a pressing security threat, allows for humanitarian action in contravention of general norms about state responsibility (12).
• As in other areas of security, some actors hold privileged positions in discussions about what issues constitute insecurity and appropriate responses to them. In humanitarian security, these actors are usually NGOs and the media (12).
• On 26 December 2004, an earthquake that registered 9.0 on the Richter scale hit the Indian Ocean, killing over 225,000 people and causing widespread destruction across nine different countries (13).
• The event was securitized by widespread media coverage, with multiple actors stressing the direct threat that the tsunami posed to the lives of millions of people and the urgency of the situation (13).
• The main securitizing actors during the crisis were major humanitarian organizations and a few big NGOs, who were given a privileged position by the media in discussions of the crisis and response. Locals and governments were also given space, but the driving narrative was shaped by NGOs and other humanitarian organizations (13).
• NGOs and other humanitarian organizations were portrayed as active agents by the media. The depiction of all other actors were as passive victims requiring the active intervention of those humanitarian organizations (13-14, 16).
• Media coverage of the tsunami depoliticized the circumstances that led to certain deaths. The arbitrary death from natural disasters was stressed, while the fact that deaths were increased by failure to enforce building codes or institute proper safety systems were not covered (15).
• The media focused on the stories of individuals who had lost family in the disaster, drawing from a range of populations. This served to present the disaster as common and indiscriminate, instead of highlighting that those who died were overwhelmingly poor (14-15).
• Most media depictions of actors in war zones are simplistic and one-dimensional. People are either portrayed as actors or victims, which are viewed as mutually exclusive identities. This perception undermines effective solutions in these areas, as people can be both victims and actors, or even victims and war criminals (14).