Tunçer-Kılavuz , İdil. "Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: ‘clan’, region and beyond". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.3 (2009): 323-334.

Tunçer-Kılavuz , İdil. "Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: ‘clan’, region and beyond". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.3 (2009): 323-334.

• The author uses the term 'clan', but in a very specific context. Unlike the constructed 'clans' of the Qozoq, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, neither Uzbekistan nor Tajikistan have any linkage between administrative structuring and imagined kinship. The closest concept used is avlod or urug' both of which related to extended families rather than kinship societies (324).
• The research of the author indicates that the term 'clan' in literature is typically used in a pejorative and otherizing manner. Rather than looking at kinship 'clans', most other authors seem all types of regionalist relations as 'clan'-based or kinship-based, things the author disagrees with (324).
• "Alliances among political actors from different regions may be formed for professional relations, on the basis of common economic and political interests, or in order to win access to political and economic resources. These power networks are neither ‘clans’ based on kinship, nor purely regional allegiances" (325).
• Regional identities in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are strong and linked to ancestry. People generally identify with the region of their paternal grandfather, rather than the region they were born in. People generally are not considered locals, mahallachi, until they have lived in an area for three generations (325).
• This form of determining identity can often override individual identity formation. A case study shows that a man born in G'arm to a G'armi mother and an absentee Xujandi father is still considered Xujandi by his friends (325).
• Asking which region someone is from is a common question in both republics, although it has become a much more sensitive topic following the Civil War in Tajikistan. With certain individuals the topic is now avoided or can led to awkward pauses (325).
• The different regions differ by dialect, and often further differences exist between cities and rural areas within the same region. Most Uzbekistanis and Tajikistanis are able to mimic at least a few accents of different regions (325).
• People generally interact with those from the same region. People with common regional identities in university will eat together and share dormitories. Most marriages also occur between people of the same region, although this is a universally common trait everywhere (326).
• This regional identities persist with migration. Groups of Uzbekistani and Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia or Kazakhstan will still refer to their regional identities and seek support groups from their region more often than from their countrymen in general (326).
• Regional identities are important in many aspects of life in both countries, especially when finding employment or navigating government bureaucracy. These regional identities are not clans! (326).
• Regionalism is strong in Uzbekistan, especially among the government in determining political positions. There are usually informal quotas in government for each region. During the Soviet Union, there was competition between cliques from Samarqand, Toshkent, and Farg'ona, although the cadres in Farg'ona have lost most of their power (327).
• In Tajikistan there are differing perceptions about the extent of regionalism during the Soviet Union. Many believe that the USSR employed the same balancing act between regions as in Uzbekistan, but many believe that Xujand became entirely dominant, at the exclusion of other regions (327).
• An important note over the entire project is that although regional identities are obviously important, they are not determining factors. There is a significant amount of cooperation within regions and connections -- especially political connections -- are made by a combination of regional identity with self-interest, career, work, and education experiences in common (328).
• An example of this comes from Sharof Rashidov's administration of the UzSSR, when, despite being part of the Samarqand clique, he promoted powerful Toshkentlik and Farg'onalik politicians who displayed loyalty towards him to the point of not interacting with the Toshkent and Farg'ona cliques (328).
• Examples of this behavior even exist during the Tajik Civil War, when, despite the division between cliques, many people from G'arm were loyalists and many Xujandis and Kulobis joined the opposition (329).
• "Scholars who adopt a ‘clan’ approach also use the term ‘clan’ for these political elite networks. It is common to speak of a ‘Samarkand clan’, ‘Khojandi clan’, and so on. Using the term ‘clan’ for these structures in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is misleading. They are more akin to patron-client networks, which may or may not involve kinship ties among members of the network. These groups are primarily instruments for their members to increase their power and wealth. These networks also entail cross-regional alliances. They are political factions composed of cadres from a particular region, who may have been born, or worked or received an education there, and it may include people from other regions who are linked to this group. It is a political network created among cadres, not the categorical or demographic group which is implied by the word ‘clan’. [...] They are power networks organized for the control of administrative and economic assets. These political power networks are not coherent units. Membership is not permanent; people from the same region or people who were within the same group do not give their allegiance to a group permanently. The main factor is the utility of the network in providing power and control over resources and assets to the actor. Relations can be established with people from other regional groups, and people can change sides. When common interests change and clash, elite coalitions can be reconfigured" (328).
• The term 'clan' [klan] is used by Uzbekistanis and Tajikistanis, but in a different sense than the term used by academics. Within the republics, klan is a pejorative term used to refer to powerful extended family groups which wield political power within villages or cities. Klanlar are important at both local and national levels, as family connections led to corruption and nepotism (329).
• The term klan also differs between local and national usages. At the local level, klanlar resemble powerful extended families directly linked by kinship, like crime families in Italy. At the national level, the term is more metaphorical to describe the cliques within economic and political interests which dominate politics and resource distribution. There is no implication that the national klanlar are linked by kinship, only greed. These national clans include people between kin groups and regions (330).
• It is also common for people to associated with gap or osh, groups of men linked through work connections, common education, or having children who intermarried. These groups serve clientist purposes, although are prone to disintegration when the purpose of gaining power and resources is not being effectively achieved (331).
• The highly centralized administrative system of the USSR made the development of these kind of patron-client relationships possible, as populations where entirely dependent on heads of collectivized farms or district party commissars for most services. Under these conditions, cliques developed, and have not disappeared. At higher levels, however, people frequently change their patrons, to one who provides better benefits (331).
• The centralization which enabled the creation of strong patron-client relationships still exists in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, leading to the continuation of the system albeit under different and slightly more democratic rules (332).
• In general, regional identity is more important among common people than elites. Elite groups tend to make decisions based on power rather than regionalism or previous clique membership. Among common people, where less is at stake, regional identity, and loyalty to extended families are more important (332).