Thompson, Mark. "Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': Authoritarianism, Democracy, and 'Good Governance". Third World Quarterly, Vol.25, No.6 (2004): 1079-1095.

Thompson, Mark. "Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': Authoritarianism, Democracy, and 'Good Governance". Third World Quarterly, Vol.25, No.6 (2004): 1079-1095.

• Economic development was the foundation of politics in the Asia-Pacific for decades. Dictators argued that social and democratic progress were conditional upon economic development, and thus could be delayed as long as autocratic governments delivered rapid economic growth (1083). 
• These developmental dictatorships often invoked 'Asian values' of frugality, work ethic, and teamwork as the key to the economic success of the Asia-Pacific. They argued that these values could only be inculcated under a disciplined authoritarian state (1085).
• Claims about 'Asian values' were also made by Singapore and Malaysia, but for different reasons. Since these countries already enjoyed relative prosperity. Instead, these values are invoked to justify the superiority of the authoritarian system by emphasizing the negative aspects of Western democracies: high levels of crime, social alienation, and disorder (1086, 1091).
• The argument that anti-democratic 'Asian values' were responsible for the Asia-Pacific's economic success was decisively undermined by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Previous advocates of Asian values, like Singapore's Tommy Koh, were now forced to respond to allegations that these values were responsible for the crisis (1079, 1085).
• International organizations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, who had previously supported authoritarian governments in Asia due to their economic success began to criticize these governments after the 1997 crisis. The opinion had shifted from authoritarian values supporting economic growth to creating the corruption and cronyism that imperiled the regional economy (1079).
• Civil society groups across the Asia-Pacific also blamed the economic crisis on the corruption and nepotism of autocratic governments and advocated for democratic reforms in the name of 'good governance' (1080).
• The notion that democracies would benefit economic growth was quickly disabused, as Philippines and Indonesia saw their economic growth become sluggish after decades of rapid growth (1089).
• The economic and financial connections that had allowed the Asia-Pacific as a region to grow so rapidly during the postwar period also meant that the region as a whole was threatened by financial crisis in any individual country, which is how a currency crisis in Thailand escalated into the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Moreover, foreign investors had been accustomed to rhetoric describing the region as a cohesive unit and so abandoned the entire region when one economy started to sink (1083).
• The Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia collapsed as a result of popular protests, called the 'reformasi movement', about its mishandling of the 1997 crisis. Once favored by international financiers for its strong economic growth, Indonesia was forced to accept stringent reforms imposed by the IMF in exchange for loans. Suharto was finally removed from power several months later, in May 1998 (1080).
• Protests in Malaysia over the financial crisis were compounded by a popular uproar over the arrest of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on spurious grounds. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad responded by imposing capital controls, isolating Malaysia from international financial markets (1080).
• Most of the authoritarian or quasi-democratic states of East and Southeast Asia have remained financially successful in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, whereas the region's democracies have struggled. China and Vietnam have both experienced very high growth rates and been extremely successful in reducing poverty rates, for which they have been praised by the IMF and other international financial organizations. Malaysia has returned to high rates of growth and foreign investment following the removal of Prime Minister Mahathir and his capital controls. Singapore remains, thanks partially to its strict laws against labor organization, the wealthiest nondemocratic state without oil reserves (1080).
• The notable exceptions to this trend are Myanmar and North Korea. In Myanmar, the military dictatorship's brutality and massacre of unarmed protesters in 2003 have isolated it internationally and even provoked regional criticism. North Korea is self-explanatory (1080-1081).
• The Asia-Pacific does not make much sense as a region, as it shares no common geographic or cultural traits, although claims about a common culture are sometimes made by Asian leaders to support political projects. The only historical connections the region shares are historical connections to China and occupation by Japan during World War II (1081-1082).
• The Japanese occupation and the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere did connect a number of rightwing collaborators across East and Southeast Asia, often positions these figure to take power following independence. Although the Japanese occupation was too brutal to attract public sympathy, many East and Southeast Asian leaders shared common ideological beliefs due to their shared history as collaborators, so the occupation paved the way for the Asian-Pacific identity (1082).
• The USA provided the other basis for general political unity across the Asian-Pacific states in the postwar period, propping up rightwing and autocratic leaders to defend against Communism. It also promoted economic growth, first in Japan and then elsewhere, which tied the region together in both political and economic interests (1083).
• The Asia-Pacific also lacks an organization to coordinate its interests. ASEAN represents only Southeast Asia and attempts to include East Asia foundered first on Cold War tensions, and then on disputes over the inclusion of Taiwan. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], founded in 1989, failed to foster a regional identity due to its inclusion of Australia and many American countries. An attempt by the Mahathir government in Malaysia to create a purely Asian-Pacific organization, to be called the East Asian Economic Caucus, was stymied by Japanese reluctance to join an organization that did not include the US (1082).
• Asian-Pacific identity has instead been formed around common economic success; the region had the world's highest rate of economic growth between 1965 and 1997. This development has been described as a flight formation, with Japan leading the region in development, followed by the four 'Asian Tigers' of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, then the Southeast Asian states, and finally the former Communist states of China and Vietnam (1082).
• Gradually, the wealthier countries moved labor-intensive industries to other Asian countries from Japan outwards and shared the relevant technology. This process was done mainly with Japanese capital, and later from Taiwan and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, with investment from outside the region only becoming important in the 1990s (1082-1083).
• Political economy in the Asia-Pacific has been focused on economic growth controlled by the government through control of labor and business. Under state management, this economic growth largely occurred without an increase in business profits or worker wages. This situation, although strange and manufactured, appears natural to the middle classes of the Asia-Pacific (1084).
• The power of labor movements and unions in the Asia-Pacific was crushed in the postwar period, with Indonesia being an extreme example of that violence. Labor leaders were arrested and independent unions destroyed, instead replaced with state-run unions. This allowed the government to make sure that wages rose at a rate far lower than would be expected considering increases in productivity (1084).
• Capitalists were made dependent upon Asian-Pacific governments and threatened with retaliation if they did not follow state directives. In South Korea, this was through direct intimidation, with a number of economic crimes carrying the death penalty during the Park government. In Southeast Asia, most capital came from the ethnic Chinese minority, which could be threatened with racial violence and pogroms if it did not obey the government (1084).
• The US-led War on Terror provided authoritarian governments in the Asia-Pacific with renewed domestic and international support for heavy-handed security measures and illiberal control over their societies. In wake of the threat of Islamic terrorism, arguments about the benefits of disciplined societies gained new salience (1086).
• Singapore arrested a number of suspected al-Qaeda agents in 2001 and 2002, using their presence as justification for the passage of the Internal Security Act, granted the government broader powers to detain and arrest people. Singapore stoked fears about Malaysia being overthrown by an Islamist regime and the threat that this might pose to both Singapore and American interests there (1086).
• Prime Minister Mahathir in Malaysia used hysteria following the 9/11 attacks to suggestion connections between al-Qaeda and the opposition Islamist party, Parti Islam Semalaysia; this gave him the support of many non-Muslim minority communities (1086-1087).
• The tactic of accusing the Parti Islam Semalaysia of Islamic extremism was electorally effective, both discrediting the opposition and allowing for security forces to harass and arrest opposition politicians under the pretense of countering Islamic extremism (1087).
• Malaysia's willingness to pass strict laws against Islamic extremism and vigorously pursue suspected terrorists made it very popular with the United States and its allies, whereas Prime Minister Mahathir had previously been viewed unfavorably as an antisemitic dictator (1087).
• Indonesian democracy has faced pressure from the US and the military in light of the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings, which seemed to confirm US suspicions of Indonesia's lackluster stance on Islamic extremism. The US has pressured Indonesia to take stronger measures to combat Islamic extremism, but these measures are unpopular domestically. The withdrawal of US aid and military assistance, however, would go against the wishes of the military. Accordingly, Indonesia has endorsed unpopular measures, including a bloody response to an insurgency in Aceh, to placate the US and make sure that the military does not feel its interests are threatened (1087).
• Thailand has used American support for anti-terrorist measures to use more violent measures against Islamist guerrillas in southern Thailand. Thai assistance in the War on Terror has reduced criticism of human rights abuses by the government of Thaksin Shinawatra (1088).
• The Philippines, under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, has used connections between al-Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines to obtain US assistance in repressing the insurgency there. The 9/11 attacks opened up military assistance not previously available and has given the government more leeway for repressive measures in Sulu and Mindanao (1088).
• There were also claims, made by leaders of an attempted coup in July 2003, that Filipino military commanders had been selling weapons supplied by the US to Islamist rebels for profit. Allegations were also made that the government planned to bomb its own people in a false flag operation to obtain additional military aid, that would presumably also be used for personal enrichment (1088).
• Attempts by the IMF, World Bank, and other international organizations to shift discussions about Asian-Pacific economics from 'Asian values' to 'good governance' failed to loosen the grip of authoritarian governments. Instead, middle-class groups in the new democracies of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have employed the rhetoric of 'good governance' to argue for a return to more authoritarian modes of governance (1088-1089, 1091).
• Calls for a return to technocratic and developmentalist government have been sparked in many places by the rise of labor politics and unions. Unionization, having been repressed for decades, scares the middle-class and threatens the interests of Asian-Pacific industry (1089).
• President Joseph Estrada, a former action movie star, was elected in the Philippines on the basis of populist promises to help the nation's poor. He was massively corrupt, embezzling large sums of money to spend on his mistresses, and totally incompetent, spending much of his time gambling. His ineptitude frightened international investors and the economy continued to decline following the 1997 financial crisis (1089).
• The Archbishop of Manila and student activists recreated the popular movements that had ended the Marcos dictatorship in the 1980s and marched across Manila, eventually forcing President Estrada to resign. With the assistance of the Filipino military, Joseph Estrada was placed on trial for corruption in 2001 (1090).
• There were large demonstrations against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo by supporters of Joseph Estrada in Spring 2001, especially among the lower classes. To this protesters, the middle-classes of the Philippines had worked with the military to subvert democracy and unconstitutionally remove a populist leader (1090).
• President Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached on corruption charges, but these were politically motivated by middle-class and elite concern about his erratic behavior and his failure to engineer an economic recovery following the 1997 crash. His failure to secure economic recovery led former supporters to abandon him and work with pro-military parties to remove him from office (1090).
• The success of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand demonstrates the centrality of economics in Asian-Pacific government. Prime Minister Shinawatra has managed to stay in power through populist measures, including low interest rates and cheap loans to farmers, and corruption, despite consistent attempts by middle-class groups in Bangkok to remove him from power by legalistic means. Both sides are willing to bend democracy to further their political aims (1090).