Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh. "The Road to 1947". In The Partition of India, by Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, 25-59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh. "The Road to 1947". In The Partition of India, by Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, 25-59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

• Indian Muslims, like Indians of other faiths, were divided by ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian religious identities. The main division was between the descendants of Muslims invaders, the ashraf, and the descendants of native converts, the ajlaf. The ashraf were relatively wealthy and often owned land or held administrative posts; this class divides was largely a continuation of the privileged ashraf status under the Mughals. The ajlaf, like most Indians, were primarily poor farmers. The ashraf usually spoke Urdu, while most ajlaf spoke regional languages (27-28).
• The ashraf were the main Muslim group pushing for separatism. For this reason, Muslim separatism was more intense among the Muslim minorities of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, who were largely ashraf, than the majority Muslim communities in modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh, who were overwhelmingly ajlaf (27).
• The separatism of the ashraf Muslim communities in India came from their relative decline in societal position since the end of Mughal rule. New Hindu elites monopolized educational and professional opportunities under British rule, marginalizing the once privileged position of the ashraf (28).
• The British colonial government believed that religious identities in India were rigid and totally defining, a belief reinforced through religious censuses in the later 19th Century. Based on this belief, the British colonial government introduced special electorates for Muslims in 1909 to make sure that Muslims would not be marginalized in local and provincial governments, based on the assumption that Muslim and Hindu interests would be divergent and incompatible (28-29).
• As religious identities became increasing salient in the late 19th Century, partially as a result of British colonial policy, tensions grew between Muslims and Hindus. In the 1890s, riots had broken out over alleged cow killing. Demands for more power transformed into Muslim separatism in the 1900s, as the rise of the extremist wing of Indian National Congress articulated an Indian nationalism which threatened Muslim interests (29).
• Hindu nationalism became more prominent in India and Congress campaigns following the 1905 protests over the division of Bengal into multiple provinces. In response to the perceived threat of Hindu nationalism, Muslim leaders organized the All-India Muslim League in 1906, using it to successfully lobby the colonial government for rights securing their community from Hindu domination (29-30).
• The creation of the Muslim League created issues for Congress because it had been established to support a secular Indian nationalism, despite some Congress factions supporting Hindu nationalism. Eventually, in 1916 the League and Congress signed the Lucknow Pact, committing themselves to joining pursue independence, but also cementing the religious divide between the organizations (30).
• The interests of the Muslim League and Congress were clearly divergent by the 1940s, when the, sometimes violent, anti-colonial movement led by Congress conflicted with the Muslim League's support for the war effort and cooperation with the colonial government to protect Muslim interests. Britain saw the League as a strong ally in India, while the League's behavior smeared it in the eyes of Congress (34-35).
• The introduction of an expanded democratic and electoral system in 1935 and the introduction of provincial self-rule in 1937 heightened tensions between Hindus and Muslims in mixed provinces. Congress rule in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere featured the introduction of Hindi script and protections for cows, prompting Muslim politicians to argue that their worst fears of Hindu oppression had come true under Congress rule (32-33).
• The appeal of both Congress and the Muslim League was limited during the 1930s, as demonstrated by the lackluster results of both parties with Muslims outside of Uttar Pradesh. Most Muslims voted for regional political parties led by Muslim leaders associated with, but not part of, the Muslim League (32).
• The Muslim League only came to be recognized the sole representative of the Muslim community during the 1940s, when its strong support for the British war effort endeared the League to the colonial government, which subsequently treated the League on the sole voice on Muslim matters. Other organizations soon began to follow the British example, and communicated primarily or solely with the Muslim League (35).
• Muhammad Jinnah actively attempted to use the privileged position of the League relative to the British colonial government to undermine rival Muslim-interest parties. For example, at the 1945 Simla conference with Congress and Viceroy Wavell, Mr. Jinnah managed to get both sides to agree to the exclusion of the Unionist Party, a major rival in Punjab, from a new national executive council (35).
• The election of 1946 demonstrated the radical change in the support for the Muslim League; whereas it had previously been a minority party in Punjab and Bengal, the Muslim League was now able to claim massive majorities in all Muslim electorates except for the Northwestern Frontier Province (36).
• The idea of a separate Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent -- called the Lahore Resolution -- was adopted by the Muslim League on 23 March 1940, after the speech by Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the annual congress supporting the idea on the basis that Muslims and Hindus were irreconcilable and distinct communities (33).
• Congress was divided on the issue of partition in 1946. Mahatma Gandhi was overwhelmingly opposed to the idea, but he was largely disregarded. Many more mainstream figures in Congress regarded partition as a solution in the brutal communal violence which had rocked north India since the August 1946 riots in Calcutta. By agreeing to, and controlling the process of, partition, Congress believed it could prevent major disorder following independence (37, 39).
• Congress also considered Muhammad Jinnah to be an annoying prick, and thought that if they just paid him some of the country, he would fuck off and they could get down to important matters without having to deal with him or the Muslim League (38-39).
• The British supported the idea of a united India and were doubtful of the viability of Pakistan, despite their constant support for the Muslim League in previous decades. Britain tried, in 1946 and 1947, to pressure both Congress and the League to abandon plans for partition, but they were not willing to force the issue and risk ruining their relationship with Congress (40-41).
• Politics in Punjab prior to partition did not feature strong religious divisions, as the dominant Unionist Party largely functioned as a cross-faith party promoting the interests of landowners and merchants in the province. The exception to the Unionist coalition were Hindu urban elites, who resented the growing power of Muslims  in the provincial government (42).
• The first group to support the partition of Punjab were disaffected Hindus, who believed that they would lose their privileges if Punjab remained united. Sikhs did not support the partition of the province until it was clear that they would be politically excluded in a Pakistani state including all of Punjab (43).
• Sikhs politicians did not support provincial partition until the final hours, trying and failing to convince the British, Congress, and the Muslim League to support an independent Sikh state in Sikh-majority areas. These ambitions were dismissed, and Sikhs eventually accepted the partition as the best way to secure their rights (43-44).
• After failing to secure an independent Sikh state during negotiations with the British, the embittered Sikh nationalists used the opportunity of general chaos in the partition of Punjab to engage in massive ethnic cleansing, creating a Sikh-majority area by force (59).
• Partition in Punjab was messy, poorly organized, and politically charged. Many of the claims made in the boundary commission were politically, rather than fact-based. Judges on the commission also openly fraternized with their political parties. Local elites played a major role in arguing for their inclusion in India or Pakistan, often without regard for physical infrastructure or shared resources (45).
• Both sides were dissatisfied with the boundary ruling, including the correct assessment of the partition line as politically influence and illogical. A number of communities fell on the wrong side of the dividing line (46-47).
• The new border between India and Pakistan was to be enforced by the Punjab Boundary Force, created on 22 July 1947, with its 55,000 men. The force was far too small to police the border, with the ratio being 264 Punjabis per a boundary officer. Moreover, many soldiers on the Force were drawn from local Sikh and Muslim communities, heavily politicizing the army and making peacekeeping even more selective (47, 49).
• Both local Bengali elites and the Indian National Congress supported the partition of Bengal province; Congress because it did not want Muslim-majority east Bengal causing problems in the future, and Bengali Hindu elites because they believed partition would allow them to govern unopposed by rival Muslim elites (49). Neither dream came true, partition created a new set of issues, and the rump province of West Bengal lost much of its influence in national politics (51).
• The support for partition among Hindu Bengali elites was not caused by a fear of further violence -- which was the main factor prompting Sikh acceptance of partition -- but an anxiety than the successful populist rhetoric of the Muslim League against, primarily Hindu, exploitative landlords and moneylenders would undermine the position of Hindu elites and result in the exclusion of these groups from politics (51).
• Divisions between East and West Pakistan existed since before partition, as many prominent Bengali politicians within the Muslim  League advocated in 1946 for the creation of two separate Muslim-majority states, one Urdu-speaking and one Bengali-speaking. It was overruled by other members of the League who feared two states would be too weak (52).
• "Unlike the figure in Auden's famous poem, 'Partition', Radcliffe did not singly settle the fate of millions by the stroke of his pen. In short, he provided a useful 'screen' for the Indian politicians to hide behind when the new boundary lines evoked their inevitable hostility" (53).
• The Indian Princes became increasingly concerned over their future from the 1930s onward, as Congress began encouraging liberal and reformist movements in the Princely States. Tensions were particularly great in Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh, and Hyderabad, both of which had royal houses of a different religion than the majority of the population (54).
• The Princely States were pressured by the British government to accept domination by either India or Pakistan. Viceroy Mountbatten believed that an Indian subcontinent with Princely States would be too fragmented to function. Although some members of the British colonial government objected to abandoning the Princes, these opinions were silenced by rabid backlash by Congress and the Muslim League (54-55). 
• The decision by the British colonial government to support the Muslim League and Congress in pressuring Princes into accepting dominion under one of the two states meant that the only violence was over which state was selected. States with contested results experienced massive violence, in the case of Hyderabad and Junagadh followed by forcible Indian conquest, and in the case of Jammu and Kashmir by armed conflict between India and Pakistan (55).
• The only major state to refuse to obey British, Indian, and Pakistani demands was Kalat, where Khan-i-Azam declared independence. Threats of invasion eventually brought Kalat into Pakistan in March 1948, although he declared independence again in October 1958 in response to centralization by the Pakistani government (57).
• The Princes who had been reluctant to join India or Pakistan were coaxed into acceptance with generous pension plans or positions as the governors of the newly created provinces (55-56).
• Partition was not an inevitability, it was a distinct political choice. The idea of separate religiously-defined states only came from a politicization of religious identity, heightened by increased competition following democratization in the 1930s. Moreover, it was not imposed by the colonial government, but developed based primarily on the demands of Indian politicians in Congress, the Muslim League, and the provinces (57-59).