Struve, Lynn. "The Southern Ming, 1644-1662", In The Cambridge History of China, Vol.7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Struve, Lynn. "The Southern Ming, 1644-1662", In The Cambridge History of China, Vol.7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, edited by Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

• As Shun rebel forces took Beijing in 1644, the country was in chaos, as all communication between North and South China had been effectively severed. Most postal workers had abandoned their routes, and those few major roads were clogged with refugees. It was for these reasons that it took three weeks for the Nanjing court to hear of the Emperor's death and prepare an army (641).
• When news of the Emperor's death and the fall of Beijing did reach the South, it was greeted with panic and disorder. The perceived sense of state collapse contributed to riots, strikes by factory and mine workers, and revolts by debtors and peasants. The various bandit and rebel groups also became much bolder in their attacks (641).
• Lack of information greatly complicated the succession crisis which emerged in the wake of the Emperor's death, as no one had any idea what happened to his sons. Instead, the Nanjing court decided between those royalty who had already fled to the South and coronated the Prince of Fu on 19 June (641–642).
• Immediately after its establishment, the Ming government in Nanjing could not meet its military costs. Banditry and the loss of the North meant that it only received a small portion of tax revenue, leaving them over 1 million taels in debt covering military expenditure alone. This tax shortage was exacerbated by disruptions to international trade and a drought, which meant soldiers could not grow all of their own food and needed more money to purchase grain (645).
• In an attempt to prevent the army from mutinying or deserting in light of financial difficulties, the Ming Empire allowed the army to use any means to feed itself, usually meaning sacking occupied towns, and gave potentially mutinous commanders high honors to flatter them into loyalty (646).
• Distinguishing between rebels, bandits, and the Ming army was very difficult during this period, as the regular army raided and pillaged settlements like the bandits, and many former bandits or rebels were enlisted into the army through bribery (646).
• The cash-strapped government turned to new measures to raise additional revenue, needed to cover military expenditure, civil service payments, and court expenses. In addition to a variety of new taxes, the government began selling minor clerical positions to nobility, allowing large payments to replace punishment for crimes, and demanded bribery at every level of government (650).
• Throughout this whole period, there was an intense court rivalry between a general named Ma Shiying  马士英 and traditionalist, anti-military, factions in court. This lead to a reinstatement of many corrupt officials allied with General Ma, under military pressure, and the forced suicide of leading traditionalist administrators. It also demonstrated the weakness of the Southern Ming, because it hampered administration and left personnel policy regarding former Shun collaborators up to bribery and clique affiliation (648).
• The lack of clarity in the policy of the Nanjing government towards collaborators caused many nobles and Northern administrators, scared of punishment, to continue residing in the North and collaborating with either the Shun rebels or the Manchus (648-649).
• "Chu Yusung had been reluctant to assume the throne. Like all imperial princes, he was reared in luxury and strictly barred from any role in politics. He had never developed the strength of character, decisiveness, or knowledge of public affairs and rulership that the times now required. Nevertheless, he did try hard in the first months of his reign to fulfill the duties of emperor, freely acknowledging his need for guidance and for the assistance of an able chief grand secretary" (649).
• Ming strategy generally depended on the hope that the Qing army was honest about their goals being the restitution of order in Northern China, believing that perhaps the Qing would be satisfied with concessions, tribute payments, and imperial privileges. The Ming arranged their forces accordingly, aiming to strike against the Shun rebels and other bandits (651).
• In July 1644, the Nanjing court sent an ambassadorial mission to the Qing military governor in Beijing. They sought to secure burial of the late Emperor, the return of Wu Sangui  吳三桂 to Ming service, present the Manchus with gifts, and negotiate the return of Northern China in exchange for all territories beyond the Great Wall, a yearly tribute of 100,000 taels, and any title for the Qing ruler except Emperor (651).
• The diplomatic mission was poorly received in Beijing, with the Ming delegation treated like members of a vassal state and kept waiting for weeks. When they did receive an audience in October, they were berated for the incompetence of their government, their gifts were confiscated, and all requests for the imperial corpse were rebuffed. They were returned in November under armed guard (652).
• The Ming became aware of their changed relations with the Qing by October 1644, in the form of a correspondence between the Ming and Qing Emperors. The aggressive and derogatory language of Dorgon, the Manchu regent, towards the Nanjing court caused the Ming to change their military objectives and focus on holding the Yellow River against the Qing (652-653).
• The Qing army concentrated their forces on targeting rebels groups in Northern China rather than going after the Nanjing court immediately. Throughout most of 1644, Qing forces were involved in campaigns against the remains of Li Zicheng's 李自成 Shun forces in southern Shaanxi and other bandits in northern and eastern Shandong (655).
• By late Autumn of 1644, Qing forces had established a line of control to the North of the Yellow River and seemed prepared to launch an assault. Local administrations near the front frequently defected to the Qing, bringing the front steadily forward and giving the Qing information about the weakness of the Nanjing court (655).
• In January 1645, Qing forces crossed the Yellow River and captured northwestern Henan after several Ming generals surrendered. By February, Qing forces had moved into Hubei and chased the Shun rebels out of the area. In March, the Qing armies finally prepared to march on the Yangtze River (656).
• Ming defenses were shattered by betrayal during this time, as one general assassinated his rival and then defected to the Qing side, where he received a large command. This betrayal threw two armies into chaos and they fled from the frontline with the Qing back into Ming territory, flooding the areas with deserters and bandits (656).
• Many Ming governors and military leaders defected to the Qing as they marched into Jiangsu, and the Qing forces faced no military opposition until they reached the North bank of the Yangtze River in May 1645 (657).
• "Supply shortages, purges, and the 'false heir' case, combined with the fear that Li Tzu-ch'eng's army, fleeing the Ch'ing, would descend on the Yangtze Valley, eventually brought about the mutiny of which Nanking long had been forewarned: the eastward campaign by Tso Liang-yii's army, ostensibly undertaken to "cleanse the surroundings of the ruler" (655).
• The army of Zuo Liangyi defected at Jiujiang after the general's 'eastward campaign' was halted by an imperial representative. Troops from both the imperial command and General Zuo's army decided to mutiny and loot the city, then continued downstream towards Nanjing, pillaging along the way. This caused such worry that the Ming court diverted large numbers of resources to stopping the mutineers, leaving the Qing unopposed (657).
• The Qing forces crossed the Yangtze River at Jiangsu on 30 May 1645, whereupon the fortress city of Zhenjiang surrendered without a fight as so many troops had deserted. The news that the fortress city of Zhenjiang had fallen caused a panic in Nanjing, as the Emperor and many other high ranking officials secretly fled the city in early June 1645. Commoners sacked the imperial palace and mansions until Nanjing was finally surrendered to the Qing forces on 16 June 1645 (658).
• On 18 June, a Qing force discovered the hiding place of the Ming Emperor and took him captive. He was marched back to Nanjing dressed as a commoner, and forced to attend a humiliating dinner with the Qing general and a false heir to the Ming throne before being placed on house arrest (660).
• Upon conquering southern China, the Qing first hoped that the rice surplus of the Yangtze river could be used to relieve populations affected by drought in northern China, by restoring the Grand Canal to working order. Most of the officials tasked with this responsibility had also served under the Ming (660-661).
• The Qing employed a number of policies to guarantee that they were accepted among the population. They started by canceling all excess taxes and levies imposed by the Ming, amnestying all those who had fought against their invasion, harsher penalties for corruption, and schemes to employ Ming administrators by offering fair treatment for their status and a return to a position of equivalent rank (661).
• Opposition to the Qing really only started with the imposition of the queue and Manchu dress on 21 July 1645, which inflamed traditional Chinese sentiments and caused many nobles to align themselves with bandits and thugs, alongside other anti-Qing factions, against the Qing occupation (662).
• Resistance to Qing rule took the form of purging cities of garrisons, capturing or killing remote Qing outposts, raiding areas controlled by the Qing, and assassinating Qing officials or collaborators (662).
• "Numerous Ming officials submitted without resistance, and the formal, physical trappings of Ming government —official seals, yamen buildings, city walls, guardposts — were easily taken over, if only because the Ming government had already lost its authority in these areas. The Ch'ing invariably found that it was a much more difficult matter to restore social order, especially when all manner of disruptive elements began to cloak themselves in legitimacy by allying with Ming loyalists who opposed the Ch'ing regime" (680).
• A number of Ming nobles and members of the imperial family fled South before the summer of 1645, forming the class of potential replacements for the Ming Emperor. Although he changed courts many times and was generally popular, the Gengyin Emperor 庚寅 was severely constrained to the Zhejiang province and never had a serious chance of retaking more territory; this was even more true for later members of the Ming aristocracy (665-666).
• From the beginning, the Ming court was actually fractured between two different Emperors, both set up around the Zhejiang area. There was a variety of factional infighting between the groups, further weakening the Ming cause (668).
• Neither Ming court had set up a proper logistics network, depending on the assumption that soldiers would be fed and paid from taxes collected in their locality. In the winter of 1645, shortages became common, leading auxiliary units to disband and professional soldiers to start pillaging village granaries (669-670).
• Governance remained weak in the areas controlled by the Southern Ming, with banditry still common and the government totally unable to meet expenditure with limited budgets. Distrust of local authorities, especially landlords, triggered peasant revolts and many groups refused to pay taxes. In some areas, villages began hording materials, causing trade and communications networks to breakdown (672).
• One emperor died in battle with the Qing in 1646, whereas the other emperor fled his court in Fujian on 30 September 1646, but was later captured by a Qing expeditionary force and executed on 6 October. Other members of the imperial family were taken to the North and placed under house arrest, whereas their officials were co-opted into Qing administration (676).
• The death of both emperors in Fujian led to the enthronement of two more members of the imperial family based in Guangdong. Like in Fujian, two courts ended up being established: one in Guangzhou, and one in Wuzhou. Both courts were hostile towards one another, despite being composed of rump Ming forces supplemented by bandits and pirates (678).
• The war between these rival imperial factions was ended in January 1647, when Qing cavalry forces swept into Guangzhou. They executed all the members of the imperial family they could find and annexed the territory. The surviving emperor abandoned his court and fled to Guilin, in a display of cowardice that ruined local support for the Ming in Guangdong and the Southwest as a whole (679).
• The remaining Nanning court has still split by rivalries, in this case between loyalists and opportunists serving the court. Both sought the same positions, and fought for them, but some desired influence in the resistance, whereas other just believed that they could be richer as a Ming loyalist than a Qing official (688). The contest between these factions is best represented through the conflict of pragmatism and traditionalism which emerged over the division of royal titles and commissions among the supporters of the Nanning court (689).
• After falling to receive the proper honors and positions that he had expected, General Jin Shenghuan decided that he should reject the Qing and that the Ming might reward him. Accordingly, in February 1648, he had the Qing governor of Jiangxi imprisoned, his military superior executed, and queues removed (684).
• This change attracted the attention of Ming loyalists elsewhere in China, and in May of that year the military commander in Guangdong also defected to support the Ming court, now based in Nanning. The Nanning court now also received the support of the diverse pro-Ming groups across southern China (685).
• The military success of the defected generals was miserable, as after falling to take the city of Ganzhou, they were subjected to a long seige throughout 1648, culminating in their suicide in March 1649 after the garrison in Nanchang surrendered to the Qing army (686). 
• After military setbacks since the death of the mutineers in 1649, the Ming court was finally forced to flee Wuzhou in December 1650, after Qing forces took the vast majority of Jiangxi and Guangdong from the Ming loyalists (692).
• Some key members of the Southern Ming imperial family had converted to Catholicism during this time, and were requesting assistance from the Portuguese and other Catholic countries. By the time a papal ambassador reached Guangdong, however, the court had already fled deep into Yunnan (692).
• Despite ties with a number of rebel groups that had formerly been the pirate-traders that illegally conducted trade between China and Japan since the abolition of trade in 1600, the Japan government was unwilling to assist the Southern Ming governments. The contemporary Japanese government faced domestic issues, was concerned about allowing Japanese to leave the country — and become contaminated — and did not believe that the Ming could fight or govern effectively (700).
• From the 1650s onward, the Ming did not have a viable resistance movement, and really devolved into bandit groups in the Eastern coastal mountains and landlocked Southwest who fought Qing rule. In this way, the term 'Ming' gradually became associated less with the actual dynasty and more with general resistance to foreign rule (701).
• In October 1651, the Ming court was forced to flee Nanning, at which point they fled into Yunnan and came under the protection of a local warlord, Sun Kewang 孫可望 who had seized exclusive military control of the province for himself. From this point until its flight to Burma, the Ming court was little more than a legitimizing puppet of the Yunnanese warlord (705).
• After facing betrayal by his own generals and a series of humiliating defeats by the Qing in eastern Yunnan, Sun Kewang surrendered to Qing forces in 1657, promising to help them purge Yunnan of the Ming as penance. The Qing did not agree to this, putting him under house arrest instead (706).
• The Ming court fled to Burma after the surrender of Sun Kewang, during which they were abandoned by the last of their soldiers. They received a cold welcome from the Burmese court, but were eventually accepted as permanent guests of the Burmese monarch at the royal capital in Ava (707-708).
• The presence of the Ming Emperor caused a number of problems in Burma, starting with the fact that loyalist troops kept pouring over the Northeastern border and demanded to be led by the Ming emperor. This started revolts in the region and a breakdown of public order. In response, in 1660, the Burmese King killed the remainder of the Ming court and confined the Ming Emperor to a squalid prison cell (709).