Stacher, Joshua. "Debating Authoritarianism" In Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria, by Joshua Stacher, 28-46. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Stacher, Joshua. "Debating Authoritarianism" In Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria, by Joshua Stacher, 28-46. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012.

• The Arab world has defied the trend of democratization since the 1990s, with Freedom House listing all Arab governments excepting Lebanon, Morocco, and Iraq as 'not free'. Scholars have tried to find explanations for the region's 'exceptional' lack of democracy. Many posit theories that Arab culture or Islam are responsible for continued authoritarianism (28).
• Studying authoritarianism is difficult because autocratic regimes vary so widely as to defy categorization. Political scientists have responded to this by creating a diverse array of extremely specific categories of authoritarianism (31-32).
• One of the new categories invented by political scientists has been 'neopatrimonialism', which describes a system based partially on traditional authority and partially on modern bureaucratic power. It is often applied to the Arab world because of its mix of formal and informal types of authority (32-33).
• The author argues that many scholars do not properly understand how neopatrimonialism functions, as they assume that formal state institutions are too weak. Instead, the author contends that state institutions both serve elite interests and shape the behavior and powers of those elites (33-35). Institutions, even weak ones, still structure and restrict the behavior of ruling elites (36).
• Whereas modern states are governed by organized bureaucracies with little personal connection to citizens, traditional states are governed by organizations that represent specific ethnic, religious, racial, tribal, or occupational groups that have resonance in that society (35-36).
• Since the 1990s, comparative politics has become focused on democratization. As a result, almost all discussions of authoritarian governments are about democratization and transition, even in areas where no such transitions are forthcoming (28).
• The USA has demanded, and under President Bush Jr. used force to compel, Arab states to democratize. These initiatives have failed because Arab governments simply make minor changes to appease international pressure without gaining any substantive democracy (29).
• Arab leaders and elites respond to this pressure by warning that rapid reforms could breed instability, claim that other states are meddling in their affairs, and finally make minor concessions that are erased when tensions decrease (29-30).
• Authoritarianism is not the stagnant alternative to vibrant democracy, but instead an energetic governance style requiring constant work to resist internal and external pressure and replicate the authoritarian status quo (31).
• Institutions are either centralized or decentralized. When decentralized, distinct elites have control over relatively autonomous branches of the state, such as the military or secret police, and compete for resources and power with other government institutions, often impeding overall state function and frustrating the ruler. In centralized systems, the elite are ordered hierarchically and dissent is difficult (37-38).
• In Egypt in 2010, the government was centralized, with the presidency dominating the security forces and the structure of the National Democratic Party. No institutions exist independent of the presidency and no one can challenge President Hosni Mubarak. This accelerates decision making and allows the regime to adapt more quickly (38-39).
• In Egypt, the concentration of power in the presidency -- and, after 2011, in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces -- has depoliticized not only the bureaucracy and security forces, but also the parliament and other supposedly partisan institutions (45).
• In Syria in 2011, institutions are decentralized, with multiple branches of government having the power to take independent action. President Bashar al Assad, the Baath Party, and the multiple branches of security forces all act as independent centers of power. The government is slow to respond and cannot achieve consensus unless its existence is threatened, as it was by protests in 2011 (39).
• In Syria, all institutions within the state are politicized the site of power struggles between elites for control over those branches of government and in competition with other parts of the Syrian state (45).
• Co-optation is when a political regime incorporates individuals or groups previously outside of the government. It allows governments to better rule society and from a larger base of support. People are willing to be co-opted because it brings benefits in social status, increases personal or collective security, and can have financial or material benefits (40-42).
• Co-optation into the regime is not automatic and requires, in return for the social and financial benefits of such a position, that co-opted groups or individuals contribute something to the regime. As a result, competent, powerful, influential, or potentially dangerous figures and groups will be co-opted, while others will not (42-43).
• Coercion and violence are the tools least used by authoritarian governments, as they will only be deployed when the system is in crisis. In a very powerful authoritarian system, actual violence is not needed to maintain power. Autocrats are unlikely to use force, but likely to threaten the use of force (44).
• Authoritarian states tend to have weaker, more personalized, and more politicized institutions, bureaucratic institutions tend to be stronger than formal political institutions, like parties, and the configuration of institutions varies in different authoritatrian states (45).