Springborg, Robert. "The Deep State Presides: Military, Presidency, and Intelligence Services" In Egypt, by Robert Springborg, 34-66. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.

Springborg, Robert. "The Deep State Presides: Military, Presidency, and Intelligence Services" In Egypt, by Robert Springborg, 34-66. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.

• Gamal Abdel Nasser inherited a set of developed judicial, administrative, and legislative institutions from King Faruq in 1952 after the overthrow of the monarchy. Additionally, the economy was booming, with new industry sprouting up, agriculture benefitting from modernization and mechanization, and local banks providing capital. Egypt had generally good infrastructure, including an extensive rail network, a good irrigation system, and modern city fitted with trams, sewers, and water systems. Egypt also had a large educated population and a number of highly respected universities (34).
• The economy began to decline under the Nasser government, as demonstrated by the flight of capital from Egypt and depreciation of the Egyptian pound. The end of his government was marked by increased protests for economic improvement and greater political freedom (34-35).
• Anwar Sadat promised a reversal of many of President Nasser's least popular political and economic policies, in particular restraining the security forces and empowering the Supreme Constitutional Court to enforce laws and rights. He also oversaw Egyptian integration into the global market economy in 1973, although he still imposed major state control over economic activity (35).
• Hosni Mubarak also started his administration by presiding over a partial liberalization and allowed a number of opposition figures into parliament. The system was liberalized and then tightened several times during his government, being its freest in the 1980s and early 2000s. President Mubarak also oversaw economic liberalization after accepting an IMF package and forgiveness of half its foreign debt in the 1980s. Hosni Mubarak's son, Gamal, and other regime cronies dominated the new private sector, however, and used their political influence to deny newcomers access to economic opportunity (35).
• Abdel el Sisi rose to power promising to crush the Muslim Brotherhood. He turned Egypt back into an authoritarian dictatorship shortly after taking power in July 2013. He has used his influence to put military officials in control of many economic sectors, edging out civilians from profitable areas (35-36).
• As the most publically devout of the 18 members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Abdel el Sisi used his position to act as a liason between the Supreme Council and the Brotherhood. So when the Brotherhood struck against the military by removing Muhammad Tantawi as Minister of Defense in August, they entrusted Abdel el Sisi with the position as well as an order to restructure and purge the upper echelons of the military (53).
• Abdel el Sisi used this opportunity to place men loyal to himself in positions of power, including over the Republican Guard, created by Gamal Nasser to defend the presidency against the military, and Central Command, which is responsible for Cairo (53).
• Abdel el Sisi then distanced himself from the Brotherhood over time, while instructing military intelligence to foment and organize protests against the Morsi government. Then, on 3 July 2013, he overthrew the Morsi government. In subsequent months, he cracked down on the Brotherhood, killing many supporters and imprisoning around 40,000 others (53).
• Once in power, President el Sisi has presided over an expanded system of secret police and covert prisons, where political prisoners are tortured. These secret police have an especially large presence on universities and school campuses. In 2014 alone, the el Sisi government is thought to have arrested or disappeared some 500 political prisoners. (53-54).
• President el Sisi has specifically targetted Islamists during his repressive activities, seeking to eradicate not only Al-Qaeda and ISIS, but also the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, from Egypt. He has been able to secure support from the West for this anti-Islamist agenda, in a similar way that President Nasser was able to obtain US support for his brutal crackdown on Communists in the 1950s (55).
• 'Limited access orders' are political and economic systems in which elites establish control over the best and most profitable areas of the economy for themselves and restrict access to these sectors. 'Open access orders' are those in which free competition exists for political and economic positions (36).
• Limited access orders are greater for insider businesses, but create huge inequalities in the profits enjoyed by companies with political connections and those without. They also tend to insulate connected businesses from competitive forces, resulting in lower overall productivity and slower economic growth (36).
• Under the monarchy, Egypt had been a partially-open access order, but was transformed into a limited access system by Gamal Nasser and his successors. Originally, under Muhammed Naguib, the original head of the Free Officers Coup, Egypt intended to preserve the parliamentary system and free market inherited from the monarchy, but Colonel Nasser overthrew him in June 1953 and transformed Egypt into a military dictatorship with a command economy (37).
• Colonel Nasser decided to adopt a more authoritarian political system because he did not trust his fellow military officers, in particular, Abd al Hakim Amer. As a result, he opted for a closed political system and invested heavily in an intelligence network based around the military intelligence division (37).
• Colonel Nasser also sought to attack rival political movements outside of the army, identifying the Muslim Brotherhood and the leftist trade unions as the most dangerous. He ordered the arrest of hundreds of leftists in the 1950s and hung the leaders of a strike at the Kafr al Dawar textile plant in August 1952 to deter further labor action. In 1954, he outlawed the Brotherhood, killed six of its leaders, imprisoned over 20,000 members, and forced thousands of others into exile (37).
• Fearing foreign intervention against his government, President Nasser aligned himself with the USA, securing President Truman's support for his coup and an American guarantee to protect against interference by Britain (37). 
• The wealthy upper and middle classes posed a threat to the Nasser government as they agitated for foreign intervention to protect their land and capital holdings from expropriation (37-38).
• President Nasser sought to deal with this group by exploiting the divisions between the foreign non-citizens; those of foreign origin with Egyptian citizenship; Egyptian Muslims; and Egyptian Copts, who often owned large estates in southern Egypt. The government used xenophobic and anti-Christian discrimination to force most foreigners and non-Arab Egyptians into fleeing and leaving their wealth behind (38).
• The Nasser government also argued that this section of the population were essentially feudal and reactionary and had impeded Egypt's development by not investing in things that would benefit the whole of society. The government thus had a right to seize their assets to invest in building an economy that would benefit all Egyptians (38).
• The replacement of the foreigner, non-Arab, and Coptic elite with Egyptian military officers at the head of major bureaucracies, factories, farms, and economic enterprises fully closed the economic system in Egypt. Access to the economy now depended on politics and has restricted to anyone of certain religious or ethnic backgrounds (39).
• The configuration of the Egyptian 'deep state' around the army and other security forces has produced a core obsession with security issues, a willingness to use violence to preserve the limited access order, and a subordination of all parts of the economy to the interests of the security forces, the military, and the presidency. This system also prevents talented individuals of a civilian background from accessing positions of opportunity and power (39).
• Michael Mann, a historical sociologist, categorizes the power exercised by states as either 'despotic', whereby the rulers have unlimited authority to do as they please, or 'infrastructural', in which rulers exercise political power through domination and penetration of civil society. In a despotic system, the elite have the coercive ability to control society, whereas in an infrastructural system, the state is able to act because it is enmeshed in civil society. The exercise of power in an infrastructural state cements legitimacy, whereas it erodes it in a despotic state (39-40).
• The difference is demonstrated through tax collection. A despotic states has the power to threat people and demand taxes, but not the knowledge required to track finances or do so on an orderly basis. Whereas an infrastructural state has the knowledge necessary to implement a rule-based system of tax collection. (40).
• Egyptian tax records clearly demonstrate a despotic state, as only civil servants are reliably subject to income tax and the majority of citizens never submit tax records. Collection of personal and corporate taxes are done face-to-face and fraught with corruption. Most tax revenue comes from sale tax and import-export duties (40).
• The difference between state types is also apparent in policing. In despotic states, confessions are secured through beatings and torture, whereas infrastructural states carry out investigations based on evidence (40).
• Egypt is firmly a despotic state, as conditions of high illiteracy, the ubiquity of unregistered housing and informal employment, reliance upon untraceable cash transactions, and a bloated but undertrained civil service all prevent the establishment of an effective infrastructural state. This is further conditions by the unwillingness of military governments to be held accountable in a way that would inculcate a trust of government (40-41).
• Egyptian finances are dismal, with government revenues minimal and non-diversified, and expenditure targeted mostly towards paying off the political support base and interest on public debt rather than investing in education or infrastructure (41-42).
• Egyptian finances were already hamstrung under the Nasser administration, but the partial command economy dampened many of these issues. With economic liberalization under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, however, more of the economy fell into private hands. This forced the government to depend upon tax revenue, which it was bad at collecting, rather than profits from direct ownership (41-42).
• Privatization also exposed extremely uncompetitive Egyptian industries to global competition, resulting in even fewer well-paid jobs. Egyptian business maintains a low level of productivity and effectiveness, meaning that privatization has benefitted only a small number of regime-connected businessmen and did not produce an entrepreneurial class that could have supported the Mubarak government (42-43).
• Private investment in Egypt has been minimal and has not taken the place of reduced state investment, leading to a situation of steadily declining rates of investment. Moreover, most state investment goes into high-yield sectors like petrochemicals, real estate, and telecommunications, leaving only around 25% of the total for investment in productive sectors like infrastructure, health care, education, and agriculture (42).
• The Egyptian 'deep state' created by Gamal Nasser rested on the support of the military, the strongest of these branches; the presidency; and the security forces, including the police and intelligence services. No Egyptian president ever had full control over the military, and, as a result, often depended heavily on the intelligence services to counter-act the military's influence (44).
• The power of the military within the Egyptian system was present even under the Nasser government, as seen in power struggles between President Nasser and the close friend he appointed to run the military, Abd al Hakim Amer. Once in command, General Amer refused to listen to Gamal Nasser and was killed, along with officers loyal to him, by pro-Nasser soldiers in 1967. After this point, President Nasser kept the military out of power by giving important positions to Soviet advisors (44).
• Anwar Sadat dealt with the threat posed by the military by constantly rotating the high echelons of the military and civilian Ministry of Defense. He had especially dangerous military officers demoted, purged, or even killed (45).
• Hosni Mubarak originally entrusted control of the military to Abd al Hamil Abu Ghazala, but later purged him and had him placed under house arrest in 1989 when he was seen as a threat to President Mubarak's power. President Mubarak then chose deliberately incompetent and weak men to run the military, settling on Muhammad Husayn Tantawi. He then ordered Field Marshall Tantawi to concentrate on building up the sectors of the economy controlled by the military, distracting him, but irritating and alienating the more professional elements of the officer corps (45).
• Abdel el Sisi has not insulated the presidency from the military, as his predecessors did, but has instead extended the military's control over politics and the economy. He depends heavily on friendly military officers to govern the country and has subordinated the powers of the Ministry of Interior, and its intelligence services, to the armed forces. At the same time, however, he constantly rotates military commands to prevent any individual officer from challenging his authority (45-46).
• The Egyptian armed forces are the largest in the Middle East and the 11th largest globally, often matching countries with far larger economies. Active-duty and retired military officers are present at all levels of Egyptian administration, while the armed forces also controls a large share of the Egyptian economy. It is also by far the most popular state institution in Egypt, earning the approval of over 80% of Egyptians (46).
• The Egyptian military has tremendous power under the legal framework, with these powers expanded even more under the 2012 Constitution and the subsequent 2014 Constitution, both of which place the military above the law (46).
• The Egyptian military shares with the president the power to declare war, and that this power supersedes that of parliament. Moreover, the commander-in-chief is the Minister of Defense, who is constitutionally required to be an active-duty officer (47).
• The 2012 Constitution gave military courts the ability to try civilians in cases regarding 'military security', and this right was upheld in the 2014 Constitution. Moreover, the military is given total authority over all aspects of conscription in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions (47).
• Military control over the economy has expanded during all Egyptian presidencies. Although originally assigned by President Nasser to be responsible for the production of military goods, this purview was extended under Anwar Sadat to include construction projects and the production of basic foodstuffs. Under Honsi Mubarak and Abdel el Sisi, military control extends over a range of personal and consumer goods (47).
• The Egyptian military uses its control over large-scale recruitment to maintain a supply of cheap conscript labor, primarily to work in military-owned factories and production sites (47).
• This economic control is used to maintain political control over a large segment of the population. High-ranking officers are promised lucrative positions at the top of military-owned companies after retirement, in return for their loyalty, and some 300,000 conscripts are given a stable job and housing in an economic environment of mass unemployment and homelessness (47-48).
• Military power in Egypt is expressed through ideological and material means over both the elites and the mass of the population. there are songs, festivals, official histories, and museums to commemorate and celebrate the military, and it operates its own TV channel. Its enormous economic power is also used to generate support, as it can supply goods at cheaper-than-market rates for political gain (47-48).
• The Egyptian army has some 450,000 soldiers, as well as 350,000 lower-quality reservists in the Central Security Forces. There are also at least 200,000 intelligence officers and secret police, and 350,000 policemen and 35,000 police officers in the Ministry of Interior. There are likely around another 2 million Egyptians employed in military-owned enterprises. This would mean that the military accounts for around 8% of all jobs in Egypt (48). 
• Egyptian Military Intelligence has, since 1951, been responsible for both the collection of intelligence for the military and supply of intelligence about the military Egyptian society as a whole. Under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, State Security Investigations, under the Ministry of Interior, and the General Intelligence Directorate, under the presidency, were also empowered, as neither president trusted the military or Military Intelligence (50).
• Military Intelligence played a major role under President Nasser, as he entrusted the organization to destroy domestic opposition groups after he banned political parties in 1953, and to organize a group called the 'Liberation Rally' to demonstrate public support for his government. He leaned on Military Intelligence even more during his tensions with General Amer and the military (51). 
• Under Abdel el Sisi, the influence of Military Intelligence has once again been increased, including in the overthrow of the Morsi government. Military Intelligence organized a youth movement, called Tamarrud, which masterminded the petition calling for Mohamed Morsi's resignation, and participated in the mass protests against the Brotherhood (50).
• President el Sisi has sought to personalize control over Military Intelligence, appointing several family members and close friends to high positions in its administration (50).
• Military Intelligence plays an important role in destroying opposition to the el Sisi government, as it has been responsible for organizing fake opposition parties and runs a system of secret prisons across Egypt for enemies of the regime (50-51).
• Military Intelligence has been responsible for orchestrating public organizations supporting the el Sisi government, creating the 'Support Egypt' group and ordering Muhammad Badran, the head of the Egyptian student union, to organize the Nation's Future Party to attract university students supporting the government (51).
• The position and prerogatives of the presidency within the Egyptian system have varied over time, but the president has always exercised power over an autocratic and closed civil service and had power to determine who was given access to political power and economic opportunity (52).
• Whereas Gamal Nasser appealed to the poor and downtrodden of Egypt, under President el Sisi, the presidency has chosen to ally itself to the elites and middle classes scared of popular revolution. This has been seen by his efforts to attract the support of former allies of Hosni Mubarak, investment in mega-projects of dubious economic value, and continued austerity measures that cut social welfare (52-53).
• The Egyptian presidency often operates according to the 'delegative model', whereby the election of a president is not for supporting the implementation of specific policies, but a general belief in the abilities of a specific person, who is given a mandate to govern however they think most appropriate (56-58).