Sobhy, Hania. "Secular Façade, Neoliberal Islamisation: Textbook Nationalism from Mubarak to Sisi". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.21, No.4 (2015): 805-824.

Sobhy, Hania. "Secular Façade, Neoliberal Islamisation: Textbook Nationalism from Mubarak to Sisi". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.21, No.4 (2015): 805-824.

• In the aftermath of the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Egypt experienced a surge of nationalism as the new military government attempt to convince people that Egypt faced grave internal and external threats to its existence. All opposition was portrayed as 'terrorists' and 'traitors' in league with either the Muslim Brotherhood or a shadowy league of the US, Turkey, and Qatar set on dividing Egypt. This nationalism manifested itself in the form of new nationalist songs, which were occasionally led by military officers in schools (805-806).
• Despite basing much of his regime's support on opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is personally devout and has incorporated conservative Salafist messages into his government -- in particular attempting to use al-Azhar to promote a 'moderate' alternative form of Islam to challenge the Brotherhood (806).
• Rather than moving away from Islamism, the el-Sisi government is actively promoting a more conservative Islamist stance. This has included anti-atheism and anti-homosexuality campaigns, arrests of those not observing Ramadan in 2015, promotion of some Islamic charities, and closer ties with Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states (806).
• The Mubarak government also publicly proclaimed itself the protector of a secular nationalist state against religious extremists, while simultaneously presiding over a massive expansion in the role of religious institutions and organizations in education and social service provision (806).
• The author looks at how the government expects the ideal Egyptian citizen to practice nationalism and Islam by studying the textbooks used in Egyptian secondary schools (807). The examined textbooks are those for the course on national education and Arabic language (808-809).
• Source mine for the development of Egyptian nationalism under the Nasser and Sadat governments on page 809.
• Arab nationalism was actively promoted by the British as a means of challenging Ottoman power, while British colonialism in Egypt helped created a specifically Egyptian strain of nationalism. This specific Egyptian national identity developed concurrently with broader Arab and Islamic identities during the crisis in Mandatory Palestine (809).
• The Free Officers were primarily influenced by Arab nationalism, but also by Islamist, Egyptian nationalist, and communist political currents. Under the Nasser government, Egyptian identity became defined by pan-Arab nationalism and state socialism (810).
• Textbooks under the Nasser government emphasized prior class struggles and foreign imperialism and colonialism, with many examples of similar exploitation elsewhere. They also projected these trends into the past, attempting to portray Egyptian history as a struggle by the people against foreign imperialism and class domination (810).
• Anwar Sadat, being less socialist, shifted discussions of Egyptian identity away from class struggle and towards Islamic identity. He was publicly very religious and religion was portrayed as a source of all government legitimacy. This shift from socialism to Islamism helped facilitate a transition from Soviet alliance to alliance with the USA and the Gulf monarchies (810-811).
• Under Hosni Mubarak, almost all references to socialism and Islamism were purged from official state documents, and, following liberalization in the 1990s, they were sometimes replaced by commitments to free enterprise and competition (811).
• The tremendous retreat of the welfare state under the Mubarak government allowed Islamic charities and Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to dominate social service provision in many areas. This was been particularly extreme in education, where cuts have seen many more students go to private schools, often run by Islamic organizations (811-812).
• After a spate of terrorist attacks in the 1990s, the Mubarak government did intervene in the educational sector to limit Islamic extremism there. Thousands of extremist teachers were removed from their positions by state order and security agents monitor and report on all faculty. The domination of Islamic organizations in private education was meant that the number of conservative Salafi and neoliberal Muslim schools increased, as did their influence in society (812).
• The 2009 textbooks under the Mubarak government declares that a good citizen should, first, have faith in God, and also be nationalist, selfless, rational, and proud of Egypt and its history (812-813).
• Examples of good nationalism provided included pride in Arabic, rejection of foreign media and languages, scientific progress, and Mustafa Kemal's foundation of a legal newspaper to spread his beliefs (813).
• The textbook emphasizes the importance of Egyptian nationalism, democracy, piety, charity, and entrepreneurship, as well as the compatibility of all of these ideals with Islam. No mention is made of protest or extra-legal opposition to government (813-814).
• No mention is made in the textbook of economic or social rights, and even major moves like President Nasser's expansion of social services are not mentioned. Provision of social services is described as a charitable activity sanctioned by Islam, and specifically not a right or responsibility of the state (814).
• Religious diversity in Egypt, in particular the Copts, is not mentioned. Their calls for textbooks to stop using Quranic verses have been repeatedly rejected (814, 821).
• Required syllabi under the Mubarak government in Arabic language and literature focus on the novel 'Wa-Islamah', a story about the Crusades. It portrays Egypt as a docile country willing to rally behind a just leader to defend the country and the faith from foreign invasion. It also states that foreign invasion is the result of atheism, and that faith is crucial to national strength (815).
• Other Arabic literature focuses on other early Islamic figures and scrupulously avoids discussion of modern Egyptian history. Major nationalist figures are only discussed in short heavily-edited texts, and other selected readings make sure to not bring up any themes beyond personal faith or banal national identity (816).
• Set history textbooks focus on the positive achievements of Ancient Egypt and the Islamic Caliphates. Do mention is made of violence or the internal political struggles of these polities. No distinction is made between these different polities (816).
• The Mubarak government's strategy of depoliticizing religion and channeling religious feelings into charities that provided social services no longer offered by the state worked to limit Islamist criticism during the 2011 revolution. Almost no protesters criticized Hosni Mubarak as a bad Muslim and only 9% of Egyptians thought that the goal of the revolution was to establish an Islamic state (817).
• This approach did not, however, curb the appeal of the Islamist opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood remained strong and its promotion of a specifically political Islam did not diminish in popularity. The el-Sisi government has realized this and is trying to destroy the organization with force (817-818).
• The removal of any reference to Egypt's extensive and strong relations with Israel and the West was removed from textbooks. This did not decrease public anger over these alliances, and the anti-Western and anti-foreign values taught in schools were turned on Hosni Mubarak to accuse him of betraying the country. The el-Sisi government has adopted this rhetoric and accused opposition to its rule of being Western agents (818).
• The el-Sisi government clearly recognizes that the failure of neoliberalism to address Egypt's economic and social problems drove the 2011 revolution and has sought to avoid placing the pious and hardworking individual as the driver of societal progress. The government has adopted a vague commitment to quasi-socialist reform and talked about the negative effects of liberalization under the Sadat and Mubarak governments, but no more action has been taken (818).
• After the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and his replacement by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, national textbooks underwent a number of revisions. First any pictures and references to Hosni Mubarak, his family, and his banned political party were removed. Secondly, positive and negative aspects of the 2011 revolution were briefly discussed (819).
• The Morsi government only had the chance to make two revisions to the national textbooks: a picture of an uncovered woman was removed as was images of dead protesters during the 2011 revolution. New essay questions had more emphasis on political rights and Islamic principles. These reflect a possible nationalism focused on expanded political freedoms and Egyptian history as a struggle for Islamic rule (819-820).
• The el-Sisi government announced planned changed in the national textbooks, to edit all set texts and materials to remove any reference to violence. This includes removing sections detailing nationalist violence and historical Islamic violence (820).
• The attempts of the el-Sisi government to portray itself as the protector of a secular state, or a conservative religious orthodoxy, will likely be undermined by a failure to effectively combat Islamic terrorist organizations. Moreover, both liberal groups and the Muslim Brotherhood are deeply and intensely opposed to President el-Sisi, and likely cannot be won over to his side (821-822).
• The economic policies of the el-Sisi government have also failed to move beyond neoliberalism, and still focus on market-driven growth and limited state services. President el-Sisi's first move was to reduce fuel subsidizes, raising inflation and hurting the poor. This, combined with his overall rhetoric, means it is likely that Egypt will remain neoliberal (822).
• "The legitimacy of the regime in Egypt hinges critically in the socioeconomic sphere and the functioning of state institutions, not only in relation to nationalist rhetoric or how Islamist or secular the regime projects itself to be. Morsi’s Islamist credentials did not prevent massive mobilisation against him on the backdrop of a severe energy crisis. Nasser’s lack of such credentials also did not preclude his massive popularity in light of the expansion of social services. In fact, [...] the vast majority of Egyptians believe that the most critical issues facing Egypt are economic" (822).