Singh, Nitya. "How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China". India Review, Vol.11, No.3 (2012): 139-160.

Singh, Nitya. "How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China". India Review, Vol.11, No.3 (2012): 139-160.

• After its defeat in the 1962 war, India adopted a defensive and non-confrontational policy towards China. India and China tried to repair relations and resolve disputes from around 1980 to 2007, during which time both countries liberalized and became significantly wealthier. Since 2007, China has become much more aggressive in its stance towards India, a situation to which India has failed to effectively response (139).
• Under the Nehru government, Indian foreign policy rested on economic autarky and the idea of non-alignment centered around a harmonious Asia. These idealistic aims shaped Indian foreign policy under Jawaharlal Nehru during the 1940s and 1950s (142).
• Sino-Indian relations began to sour in 1957, when China built a highway through the disputed Aksai Chin territory, building on aggravation over Chinese military incursions into disputed territory. The settlement of the Dali Lama and many of his supporters in Indian after 1959 angered China, which accused India of fomenting revolt in Tibet (142-143).
• India failed to resolve any of these issues between the countries, assuming that peace would ultimately prevail. Lack of Indian initiative on these disputes allowed war to break out in 1962 (143).
• India's defeat in the 1962 war led to a recalibration of Indian foreign policy, based on a distrust of Chinese intentions. This also led to an overall abandonment of many Nehruvian ideals, including non-alignment, and the strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union (143).
• Sino-Indian relations were restored by Indira Gandhi in 1976, and became much friendlier in 1984, when Rajiv Gandhi recognized Chinese control of Tibet. The new friendship was demonstrated by Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, and his support for the Chinese government during the Democracy Wall protests (143).
• Indian foreign policy shifted in 1991 from non-alignment to trying to develop a web of partnerships with all major powers, including China. Formalized as the 'Gujral Doctrine' under Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral in 1996, this strategy saw India become more involved internationally (143-144).
• In 1997, India tried to promote stronger economic ties to Southeast Asia, partially to displace China there, encourage cooperation among states between Sri Lanka and Thailand. It also established ties with Taiwan in an attempt to play all sides (144).
• The election of the Hindu nationalist BJP government in 1998 was a stumbling block for Sino-Indian relations, as the renewed nuclear tests alienated China, especially after leaked documents indicated that the tests were specifically meant to intimidate China (144).
• Relations were normalized in 2000, when President Narayanan visited China as a gesture of goodwill (144).
• Reconciliation between China and India really took off in 2004 with the election of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as his government actively sought to strengthen economic ties with China. India opened up the Nathulu and Jelepla passes in Sikkim to commerce, gave China observer status on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], and actively sought cooperation in high-tech industries (144).
• Indian foreign policy is largely led by the Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Minister of External Affairs. Foreign policy decisions are highly personalized and strategies are usually not continued between individual ministers. Furthermore, foreign policy strategies normally reflect the opinions of individual politicians and are not generally informed by expert analysis or regional knowledge (140).
• States and state governments also play a large role in determining foreign policy, with regional political parties reach out to foreign countries. The ruling parties in Tamil Nadu, in particular, have played a large role in determining Indian policy towards Sri Lanka (140-141).
• Indians are generally interested in foreign affairs and most educated Indians care about Indian foreign policy, which is hotly debated in the media. Public opinion plays very little role in the actual creation of foreign policy, however (141).
• Indians generally dislike and distrust China, with around half the population believing that both China's economy and its military pose a threat to India (144-145).
• Four general opinions about China exist among Indian intellectuals and policymakers: that China is not immediately threatening, but remains a long-term threat; that China constitutes a security threat; that China believes Indian economic growth is a threat to Chinese ambitions; and that China is not a threat to India (144).
• None of these perceptions have any links to concrete or objective analysis and are instead usually based on personal opinion. The dominant opinion is currently [in 2012] that China poses a threat to India and India should be wary (144). 
• China's territorial disputes with India have influenced Chinese policy in South Asia. China's refusal to permanently settle its boundary disputes with India and its support for Pakistan both place heavy pressure on India, pressure which China hopes will eventually force India to resolve the border disputes in favor of China (146). 
• The border disputes between India and China began during the Simla Conference in 1914, during which Britain and Tibet signed a treaty setting their international border -- known as the McMahon line after Sir Arthur McMahon, the British delegate. This treaty was never recognized by the Republic of China, which stated Tibet did not have the right to sign treaties (147).
• India insists that the Simla Conference was legitimate and that the McMahon line is the international border, while China has consistently refused to recognize the Simla Conference as a legitimate (147-148).
• Since the 1980s, there have been active attempts by both countries to demilitarize the border and reduce the potential for conflict. China has not, however, ever agreed to settle the actual boundary disputes, based on respecting the line of actual control and confidence-building measures, including high-level military contacts initiated in 2006 (148-149).
• The last major military incident between India and China occurred in 1986 at the Sumdurong river valley in Arunachal Pradesh, during which over 200,000 troops were mobilized to the area (149).
• The most significant recent change has been Chinese recognition of Indian control of Sikkim as legitimate in 2003, whereas India's 1975 annexation of the territory was previously seen as illegitimate (147).
• The current [2012] Chinese approach to border disputes with India is to maintain military superiority along disputed territories in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh (147), and make consistent border incursions to test Indian resolve and constantly contest the frontier (149-150, 153). China also accepts residents of Arunachal Pradesh without visas, on the basis that they are Chinese citizens living on Chinese territory (150).
• India has usually responded to Chinese incursions into its territory with a show of military force, particularly in Kashmir (153). Indian reactions to Chinese claims and legal-diplomatic methods of securing disputed territories have, however, usually been muted, and India prefers not to discuss the issue (151, 153-154).
• China has resolved 17 of its 23 territorial disputes since independence. China has various conceded some points in order to maintain stability and pressured weaker states into agreeing to Chinese terms on borders (145-146).
• The variable nature of Chinese stances of border disputes depending on the situation is demonstrated by different treatment of the McMahon line. China recognized the McMahon line as its border with Myanmar in 1960, but refused to do to so with India because doing so did not benefit China (146).
• The great power aspirations of India, combined with its growing economic strength and nuclear capabilities, have made China uncomfortable, and China actively seeks to disparage and discredit Indian initiatives and limit Indian power (146).
• Around 50% of Chinese elites interviewed said that they expected the government to adopt a containment policy towards India. India overtures to the USA are seen as the start of an anti-China coalition, and China seeks to outflank India militarily as a result (146-147).
• Indian policy towards China has always been reactive and lackluster, partially because a good portion of Indian politicians do not consider China to be a threat; in 2009, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Indian intelligence service, told senior military officials that China would not be a threat until 2050 and should be largely ignored (154).
• India's lackadaisical approach to security relations with China has been detrimental to Indian security, as China has steadily increased its advantage in the region while the lack of Indian response has given China to reason to concede on any of its claims or seek settlement (155).
• Long-term Chinese intentions in the Himalayas are unclear, as in previous border disputes, like the 2011 settlement with Tajikistan, China claimed huge swathes of territory that it then agreed to rescind claims on, but still seems to have ended up with core regions. What borders China actually seeks with India are thus unknown (154).
• The author recommends India use the disputed Tibetian border to its advantage to scare China about its legitimacy in Tibet, forcing China to come to the table. He then recommends that India seek to establish the Line of Actual Control as the legal boundary, giving Aksai Chin to China, but keeping Arunachal Pradesh (155).
• India should also stop restricting infrastructural development in border regions, as Sikkim, Indian Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh are massively undeveloped and have very few roads or other infrastructure. This will both cement the legitimacy of Indian claims to the area and enable more rapid deployment of Indian forces to the frontlines (155).
• The author also recommends that India attempt to modify its 'Look East' policy to aim at constructing an anti-China military coalition with Southeast Asian countries and Japan. This would substantially increase the risks incurred by China due to boundary disputes (155-156).