Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.1, No.3 (1972): 229-243.

Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.1, No.3 (1972): 229-243.

• The contemporary public and governmental reaction to human suffering, looking at the specific instance of the 1971 Bengal refugee crisis, is morally unjustified (230).
• Death by starvation, malnutrition, exposure, etc., are bad things. If it is possible for us to prevent these bad things from happening, "without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance," then we should do it (231, 235).
• This means that since the choice exists between spending money on non-essentials and giving money to famine-relief or other charities, it is not only moral to give money to charities, but it is immoral to not give all non-essential money to charity (235).
• There is no difference morally between choosing to help or not when one is the only person who can do so and when one is one of millions who can do so. This is an excuse for inactivity, but being part of an immoral group does not make individual actions more moral (232-233).
• This premise is only true if the membership in the group prevents adequate knowledge about the needs of the situation. However, in the specific case of famine being addressed, almost all members of the population are readily informed of the amounts still needed, meaning that membership in a group of inactive people does not lessen the immorality of individual inaction (234).
• Some philosophers have argued that basic societal moral codes can only be so complex, meaning that asking too much leads to a breakdown of all moral prohibitions. Adding a demand that all non-essential money be given to charity might stress our current moral code to breaking point (237).
• As this actual breakdown in moral standards has not been triggered, it seems worth the risk considering that the benefit of creating this new social norm is destroying all starvation (237-238).
• The author quotes from St. Thomas Aquinas, demonstrating that these notions of giving away to the poor all excess wealth not needed for a simple life have a long tradition in Western, and Christian, philosophy (239).
• Some have argued that increased private contributions to famine relief, like those generated by the author's suggestions, will discourage governments from solving these problems. While it is possible that this is the case, it is also possible that it could encourage government action by demonstrating the zeal of the citizenry. With this factor as an unknown, it remains moral to accomplish the known positive effects of donating (239).
• The author adopts the contemporary idea that population expansion is uncontrolled, leading to unpreventable famines in the future, leading to the possible objection that famine relief does nothing but dely the problem. The moral solution to this is to donate heavily to moral means of population control, meeting the same requirement for famine relief but in a different sector (240).
• Two possibilities exist for establishing the amount of aid it is appropriate to give. Either, adopting the Utilitarian concept of marginal utility, it is moral to give up until the point where further aid would render one as destitute as a Bengali refugee; or it is moral to give until the point where giving more would have a severe negative impact upon one's quality of life (241).