Sekulic, Dusko. "The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.3, No.2 (1997): 165-179.

Sekulic, Dusko. "The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia". Nations and Nationalism, Vol.3, No.2 (1997): 165-179.

• Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, many scholars and public figures have claimed that it has an artificial state from the beginning, yet that term 'artificial' certainly does not apply to the creation of a Yugoslav nation, which was supported and implemented primarily by local actors, with outside forces only coming into play later (165-166).
• The author uses Dr. Randall Collins's interpretation of Max Weber's theory of politics to explain some of the reasons behind the decline of Yugoslavia. The theory dictates that the internal legitimacy of a regime is dependent on the geo-strategic success of the state (166).
• The legitimacy of the early Yugoslav state derived from the success of South Slavic elites, particularly the Serbs, in creating nation-states out of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The continued success of the Serbian state in seizing territory and completing its political objectives made the Serbs the dominant elite force among the Southern Slavs (167).
• The low levels of ethnic or national consciousness of other South Slavic ethnic groups during this time period, including the Macedonians, Bosniaks, and Montenegrins, allowed Serbia to claim to be the legitimate representative of these groups without institutional challenges (168).
• Nationally conscious elites on the Adriatic, especially the Slovenes and Croats wanted to attach their groups to the legitimate and admired Serbian state, which they hoped would preserve them from losing their identity to Italy, Hungary, or Germany (169).
• During the First World War, Southern Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted some sort of national autonomy, expecting a single region within a federalized Austria-Hungary should the Empire survive the war, and the formation of a Southern Slavic state including Serbia should the Empire fall (170-171).
• Following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the debate between the Southern Slav became about whether the Yugoslav state should be an expansion of Serbian hegemony or an equal state between the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This became a dispute over centralization -- backed by Serbians -- versus federalism -- backed by Croats, a battle which the Serbians won due to the failure of Croatians to protect their territories from Italy (171).
• A spate of uprising, strikes, and revolts in Croatia and Slavonia following the creation of Yugoslavia, combined with the victory of anti-unification parties in that region's parliament indicate that the creation of Yugoslavia was driven by elite calculation more than popular will (171-172).
• Croatian and Serbian communities within Yugoslavia did not have a history of conflict and communal violence, rather anti-Serbian sentiment only began to permeate the non-elite strata of the population when Yugoslavia was created because Yugoslavism and Serbian rule became linked to discrimination and persecution -- often on the basis of faith (173).
• Contrary to some claims that Yugoslavia began to dissolve immediately following the death of Josip Tito, the Yugoslav government remained legitimate for another decade, because the country's geo-strategic position remained unchanged until the end of the Cold War (173-174).
• Much of the positive global position of Yugoslavia was dependent on the Cold War, which allowed the country to remain neutral between the two Blocs because of a power balance. Furthermore, it allowed the Communist Yugoslav regime to continue positive relations with the West, only to counter-balance Soviet influence (176).
• When the bipolarity of the Cold War disappeared in the late 1980s, the unity of Yugoslavia was no longer a strategic issue. This meant that legitimacy and stability had to be internal, which it was not during the chaotic lead up to the Yugoslav Wars (177).
• The legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime was not built on official Communism, but on the memories of the guerrilla war against Nazi occupation. Cultural memories of that conflict, immortalized in the denunciation of 'internal enemies' aligned with fascism who might threaten to return, supplied the regime with legitimacy (174).
• The legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime was also buttressed by a fear of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, who continually posed a security threat. Furthermore, life in Yugoslavia was liberal compared to these countries, and the people despised the thought of Soviet rule (174-175).
• Whereas the Yugoslavs under the Tito administration expressed a legitimate fear of the West, particularly Italy, by the 1980s Europe was non-threatening and held prospects of economic prosperity. Croatia and Slovenia, under Liberal Communist governments, in particular wanted to join in on European integration (175).
• The opposite process occurred in Serbia during the same time period, as Communism became more conservative when power shifted from Ivan Stambolić to Slobodan Milošević. This split was formalized during the next elections when Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia voted for anti-Communist governments whereas Serbia and Montenegro elected pro-Soviet governments (175).
• Yugoslavia could only continue to exist as a nation-state with such radically anti-Communist and Communist factions if either radical federalism was pursued in a manner that allowed anti-Communists to pursue integration with the EU, or military force was used to crush the other side -- in reality only the Communists had control of the military (176).
• Croatia and Slovenia suggested that a new federal system be established, but this was rejected by the Milošević government with Western support. Instead President Milošević demanded further centralization and started a war to forcibly reintegrate the anti-Communist parts of Yugoslavia (176).
• The author argues that the seeds for the Yugoslav Wars were planted in the original creation of Yugoslav following the First World War, because the Serbian elite felt that the state was an extension of Serbia whereas non-Serbian elites rejected this version in favor of a federal system with a multiethnic identity (177).