Saideman, Stephen. "At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism and Kashmir". In The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, edited by T. Paul, 202-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Saideman, Stephen. "At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism and Kashmir". In The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, edited by T. Paul, 202-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

• General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan agreed in 2004 that the Kashmir conflict should be settled peacefully, the first move away from Pakistan's traditionally militarist and irredentist position. This move, however, has been accompanied by threats to General Musharraf's life, demonstrating the impact of domestic politics on state responses to the Kashmir conflict (202).
• The author theorizes that 'irredentism', defined as the domestic politicization of border disputes, is the driving factor behind the longevity of conflicts like Kashmir. India has other border disputes in the Himalayas, but these are easier to resolve because they are not as politicized (202-203).
• States will engage in irredentist conflicts regardless of the political, security, or economic risks involved. Although some scholars claim that states are more likely to engage in irredentism when they enjoy a power disparity, states like Serbia also clearly engage in irredentism when they are the weaker party (208).
• The conflict in Kashmir has been immensely costly to both India and Pakistan, consuming large amounts of tax revenue in military budgets and ruining opportunities for expanded economic ties (203).
• Although both India and Pakistan contribute to the perpetuation of the Kashmir conflict, India is generally considered the status quo state, whereas Pakistan is considered irredentist because some Kashmiri groups want to join Pakistan, whereas no one in Gilgit-Baltistan wants to join India (203).
• The author assumes that irredentism is caused by the same factors as secessionism, namely economic or political discrimination combined with repeated failures to achieve more autonomy through other political avenues. The author speculates that other factors must exist, however, since Kashmir experiences both secessionism and irredentism (205).
• Whether organizations tend towards secessionism or irredentism depends on their relationship with the mother country, the potential positions available to movement leaders in both situations, and the material benefits of union. Movements will be more likely to be irredentist if they are funded or linked with the mother country, if leaders can expect prominent positions following union, and if the mother country is not significantly worse off (205-206).
• States are less likely to accept separatist demands if they are experiencing multiple separatist movements, since they fear that submitting in one case will strength the resolve of other separatists and set a bad precedent (206-207, 215).
• The success of irredentist or separatist groups is dependent on the behavior of the ruling government. This treatment in turn is dependent on whether the national political system rewards extremist or moderate views. Contrary to ordinary assumptions, extremist parties are actually more likely to sign peace accords because they are less susceptible to the resultant political backlash due to their extremist credentials (207).
• Irredentism is supported by both ideological and self-interested groups. Organizations which desire a unified ethnic homeland or want to liberate their kin from foreign rule will support irredentism, but so will organizations with an interest in worsening relations between states or creating an environment of insecurity (210).
• The Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir has three primary regions: Jammu, which is primarily Hindu and Sikh; Ladakh, which is split between Buddhists and Shiites; and the Vale of Kashmir, where Muslims are predominant. Separatism is more prevent in the Vale of Kashmir, whose residents feel the most connected to those in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan and more oppressed and marginalized by the Indian government (212).
• The fact that the vast majority of the population of the state lives in the Valley of Kashmir means that people in Ladakh and Jammu fear that they would be politically dominated by the Valley in an independent Kashmir (212).
• Prior to partition, Kashmiris were divided into parties advocating union in Pakistan and those advocating an independent Kashmir, the latter organized in the National Conference Party under Sheikh Abdullah. After partition, those who supported Pakistan fled to Azad Kashmir, leaving Sheikh Abdullah as the dominant political figure in Indian-controlled Kashmir (212-213).
• Following partition, India promised the Kashmir would have significant autonomy, enshrined in Article 370 of the Constitution, and a future plebiscite on its status. In the mid-1960s, however, India attempted to centralize power and restrict this autonomy, leading to a war with Pakistan in 1965. After this conflict, plebiscite was no longer considered a realistic political possibility in India (215).
• Sheikh Abdullah's advocacy for self-rule or independence in Kashmir frequently resulted in trouble with the Indian authorities, and he was imprisoned for long periods throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1977 elections, regarded to be the first free elections in Kashmir, he regained political leadership, retaining it until his death in 1982 (213).
• Upon the death of Sheikh Abdullah, his son, Farooq Abdullah, took over control of the National Conference Party. Farooq Abdullah is regarded as a poor leader, and many Kashmiris became increasingly disaffected over corruption and stagnant economic growth. This dissatisfaction with democracy under Indian rule intensified following the botched 1987 elections, prompting the growth of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which advocated violence as a means to establish an independent Kashmir (213).
• While Indian rule had been relatively mild in the 1970s, Indira Gandhi tightened her grip over the province again in the 1980s, increasing Kashmiri dissatisfaction. This was increased the National Conference Party's participation in an electoral alliance with Congress in the rigged 1987 election, tainting the party in the eyes of many Kashmiris (215-216).
• The late 1980s witnessed an intensification of violence within Jammu and Kashmir, firstly because the capitulation of the Indian government to the Liberation Front's demands following the 1989 kidnapping of the Home Minister's daughter convinced more people that violence was the most effective tactic of dealing with India; violence was severe enough that direct rule was declared in January 1990. This coincided with the expansion of Islamic extremist ideologies and the outflow of mujaheddin from Afghanistan, both of which became integrated into Kashmiri groups (213).
• The expansion of Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist groups in Kashmir has greatly increased the Pakistani influence on armed opposition within Kashmir. These groups often receive arms or money from Pakistan and have some sort of connection to the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. As a result, these groups almost all support union with Pakistan and Pakistan has used selective funding to diminish the role of the separatist Liberation Front in the insurgency (213-214, 218).
• Increased Pakistan influence has also resulted in militant groups being pulled from different countries and regions, meaning fewer militants are native Kashmiris. Local communities now support the insurgency less since they are seen as foreigners oblivious to the cost of war borne by the locals, and because these foreign groups often involve themselves in organized crime and other criminal activities to secure funding (214).
• Separatist aspirations in Kashmir seem to have risen dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s in response to changes in India, the death of Sheikh Abdullah, and the collapse of the Indian National Congress. It has since decreased, however, as Kashmiris become less tolerant of violence and the insurgencies become increasingly dominated by foreigner jihadis and dependent on Pakistani support (214-215).
• Muslims in Kashmir were scared when Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh entered a coalition with the BJP in the 1980s, a mutual distrust which caused his government to take a harder stance on Kashmir. He adopted a mainly military response, increasing public resentment of India in the region (216).
• The BJP successfully politicized the issue of Kashmir during the 1990s, calling for the government to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution, drafting Hindu militias to fight Kashmiri insurgents, and appealing to the Hindu minority in the state (216).
• The period of intense violence, during which the country was under direct President's Rule for years, ended in 1996, when the Congress government organized largely fair elections resulting in a victory for Farooq Abdullah. The 1998 elections were even more robust (217).
• Pakistan has consistently sought to integrate Kashmir into its territory, under both democratic and military governments. Democratic governments have supported these policies because they are popular and taking a weak position on the issue leaves politicians exposed to criticism (218-219).
• Military governments have supported the annexation of Kashmir because it would give them an additional demographic, strategic, and resource advantage in their rivalry with India. There is also a theory that the military prolongs the crisis in Kashmir because this security issues allows it to dominate national politics and receive large amounts of funding (219).
• As a population, the Pakistanis support union with Kashmir because they share religious ties with the Muslims of Kashmir. This is politically salient in Pakistan, which often defines itself as a religious state. Support for Kashmir is often used as a barometer for 'muslimness' in Pakistani politics, encouraging politicians to support union (220).
• Pashtuns and Punjabis are the groups most supportive of union with Kashmir. For Punjabis, this is likely because they share ethnic ties with the Kashmiris and many have family on both sides of the border. Pashtuns are over-represented in the military, leading many to support union as a source of religious and civic pride (221-222).
• This support is not, however, universal. The Baloch and Sindhi populations of Pakistan generally do not support union with Kashmir, which they view as heightening tensions with India without any possible benefits, since they do not feel commonalities with the Kashmiris (221).
• Current Pakistani policy on Kashmir likely also has a strong religious component, as the ISI and upper echelons of the military have been increasingly involved with fundamentalist Islamist groups since the Afghan War. President Musharraf has strong ties to the ISI, and his policy may be influenced by their fundamentalist sympathies (222).
• In the 2000s, Pakistani policy on Kashmir has been influenced by two new pressures: increased dependence on the USA, and stronger domestic support for better relations with India. In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan has faced increased pressure from the USA to curtail support for jihadist organizations, including those in Kashmir. A growing lobby of businessmen in Pakistan has also been lobbying the government for better ties with India, marking a possible turn in public opinion away from irredentism over Kashmir (222-223).
• President Musharraf may pursue a more conciliatory policy towards Kashmir in the future as American pressure has forced him to abandon platforms dependent on the support of religious hardliners, prompting a possible turn towards wooing the votes of non-irredentist voters (223).