Sadri, Houman. "Integration in Central Asia: From theory to policy". Central Asian Survey, Vol.16, No.4 (1997): 573-586.

Sadri, Houman. "Integration in Central Asia: From theory to policy". Central Asian Survey, Vol.16, No.4 (1997): 573-586.

• The 'neo-functionalist' theoretical lens, commonly applied to the EU to describe the spillover of responsibility under the EU from the coal and steel community to its contemporary form, fails to adequately explain Central Asian integration because the international institutions which drove European integration simply do not exist in Central Asia (573-574).
• Other important distinctions exist between Europe and Central Asia. The new states of Central Asia jealously guard their sovereignty, unwilling to give up power to a supranational organization reminiscent of the Soviet Union (574, 577-578). Additionally, integration of the Central Asian economies would not result in massive growth. These factors have meant that Central Asian politicians and interest groups are generally opposed to integration (574).
• Theorists generally consider that a number of preconditions need to exist for economic or political integration between states to take place. The economies of the states should be similar in size and efficiency, strong trade ties should already exist between the states, common values held by the states, and a common threat. Central Asia would appear to have all of these indicators except strong economic ties, since their economies were generally tied to the western Soviet republics rather than to each other (575).
• While the populations of the Central Asian republics share both history, languages, and values, they are still developing their national identities, meaning that there are not currently set conceptions of nationhood let alone the basis for developing a conception of 'central asian-ness' (578).
• The most successful integration program in Central Asia is run by the Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO], an alliance of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan to promote trade and development. There is little formal research on the ECO and its goals in Central Asia, but they appear to be economic because it is unlikely that the leadership could agree on common political aims (577).
• "These states have joined ECO so that the organization serves their needs, not vice versa. Therefore, the state structure in this region is not looked upon as a menace that people hope will whither away eventually, but a weak political organization that has to be strengthened so it can function as a truly independent unit" (578).
• The increased involvement of the Central Asian republics in the ECO is due to both a desire to develop other diplomatic and economic connections as a way to free themselves from Russian influence, and an economic necessity to obtain access to global markets for commodity exports in light of severe recession in Russia (578).
• Progress through the ECO has been slow, and apparently insufficient for some Central Asian states who have increasingly turned to bilateral agreements on issues of energy and other matters of importance (584).
• Iran is not viewed as threatening by the Central Asian republics -- with some exceptions among the senior Uzbekistani leadership (579). All countries have refused to cooperate with US-led sanctions, however, since access to Iranian ports and capital is simply too valuable (583-584).
• Iranian foreign policy in Central Asia is defined by opposition to the presence of foreign troops being stationed in the region, non-interventionism, the demilitarization of the Caspian Sea, enhanced regional cooperation, peace in the region, better environmental protections, and connecting Central Asian markets to global markets through Iranian ports (580-581).
• Most of these goals are linked to Iran's economic interests in Central Asia. Having a stable and peaceful neighboring region without Russian, American, or Chinese hegemony will free Central Asian materials and petrochemicals for development, allow commodities to be exported through Iranian ports (581).
• Central Asian states are broadly supportive of Iranian goals, particularly its initiatives to develop economic infrastructure to countries besides Russia. Infrastructure to China is already being developed, with competing plans to sell Central Asian oil and gas through either Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey in the future (581-582).
• Iran sees environmental protection as extremely important primarily because it shares the Caspian Sea with other states who intend to use the Sea for petrochemical extraction. Iran wants to ensure that this will not negatively impact its profitable export-oriented fishing industry (582).
• Russia has fully endorsed Iranian policy in Central Asia, encouraging the Central Asian republics to engage in further cooperation and engaging in strategic cooperation with Iran in a number of fields itself. This about-face from the Soviet hostility to Tehran occurred in April 1996 under the Yeltsin administration (583).