Ro'i, Yaacov & Alon Wainer. "Muslim identity and Islamic practice in post-Soviet Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.3 (2009): 303-322.

Ro'i, Yaacov & Alon Wainer. "Muslim identity and Islamic practice in post-Soviet Central Asia". Central Asian Survey, vol.28, no.3 (2009): 303-322.

• The 'Islamic Revival' in Central Asia during the 1980s and 1990s, which struck fear about radicalism into so many has largely abated, as the vast majority of Central Asians have managed to become ordinary, moderate Muslims. This paper seeks to describe how Central Asians practice and view Islam within their very controlled political environments (303).
• This study attempts to take various elements studied individually in different Central Asian republics and create a single comprehensive study of attitudes towards Islam and Islamic practice for the entire region sans Turkmenistan (303).
• In all four republics in which survey were conducted citizens refused to answer many questions, seeing them as provocative and potentially compromising to safety. The authors tried to get a varied sample, but it does still display a biased towards those of a higher education and excludes Northern Kazakhstanis and Southern Kyrgyz. All interviews were anonymous. Roughly equal numbers of each ethnic group were recorded, albeit from different countries (304).
• The surveys consisted of 17 to 15 questions depending on language and had different degrees of openness. Most people filled out the survey fully or mostly completed. Often people's preferences differed from their practices, as wearing hijabs or growing beards in looked-down upon in many places (305).
• The vast, vast majority of respondents across all countries self-identified as Muslim, but this did not correspond to a special interest or community within the broader Muslim world. Only 33% of respondents paid attention to events elsewhere in the Muslim world, and these were primarily people already interested in politics w/ higher education (305).
• Among professed Muslims adherence to Islamic practices is lower than expected. Previous studies in Kazakhstan (Privratsky 2001) have indicated perceptions that only the elderly and certain other groups are expected to adhere to full Islamic practice, while basic morality is more important for the general population. This study, however, shows the highest rates of Islamic practice among the young, with 66.2% of those praying 5 times a day being under thirty (306).
• Still the majority of Muslims do not follow required Islamic practice, despite increasing practice since the collapse of the USSR. Most people still consider Islam to be more a belief and a set of cultural practices, often linked with nationality, than an active set of religious obligations (306).
• Full lists of rates of Islamic observance are available on pages 307 and 308, with the major conclusions being that the vast majority of Central Asians follow at least one pillar of Islam, with the fast during Ramadan and almsgiving being the most common activities (308). Uzbeks and Tajiks are much more likely than any other group to pray five times a day, with ~40% rather than the ~7% of other groups (307).
• Only 12.5% of respondents participated in the Hajj, but this figure is likely skewed b/c countries like Uzbekistan have restrictions of travel to Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially for those making religious pilgrimages (308). 
• Those with only an elementary-school education were more likely to be devoutly religious and pray five times a day, however they were surpassed by the those w/ a higher education, who followed almost all Islamic custom except observance of daily prayer (309).
• Even among Central Asians who are not Muslim, most follow Islamic practice or Sufi practice during life events -- circumcision, marriage, death -- with circumcision being the most common. Again Uzbeks and Tajiks are much more observant of these rites than other ethnic groups (309).
• Among those who follow rituals, the associated social practices of feasts and parties are become far less common since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as they become unaffordable to many Central Asians, this has been mostly seen through increased use of free state-sponsored cremation services and performance of circumcision in hospitals rather than mosques (310).
• In Central Asia shrine visitation in considered a part of Islamic practice, and around 40% of the interviewed population visit at least one shrine a year. Shrine visitation is most common among the less educated, with a marked decrease after achieving higher education (310).
• Many of the key religious sites, especially in Uzbekistan, have been appropriated by the government as symbols of national culture and tourism. Despite this, many still travel to these areas and take part in the strictly supervised services and religious activities (311).
• Sufi practice remains strong in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. As a result consulting with ishans is considered an alternative practice to mosque worship which will attract less official attention. Men are much more likely than women to consult ishans and the practice is limited to certain areas of Sufism and shrine worship (311).
• Islamic education is a primary method of regaining knowledge about faith were traditional and informal knowledge transmission has died out, like in the Soviet Union. Despite this, few Central Asians have bothered to seek religious education, with 44% never doing so and 21% having possibly read one book (312).
• Of the 32% who engaged in a religious education several times or on a regular basis, 62% were under 30 years-old and 40.6% had a higher education, showing that the groups most interested in expanding Islamic knowledge are young and highly educated (312). 
• Islamic practice is largely informed by traditional cultural beliefs in addition to actual Islam. This is represented by the belief among 81.8% of respondents that respect for parents and elders in fundamentally Muslim, whereas only 27.5% and 20.7% believed similar things about prohibitions on dating and the sequestration of genders within the home (313).
• Most Central Asians do not regularly attend mosque, with 23.1% attending Friday prayers and only 5.2% going to mosque during the week. This is partially b/c of regime repression especially in Uzbekistan, where it is publicly acknowledged that being too devout is a red flag for security services. Most Central Asians across all groups do not attend mosque at all or only at important festivals, this is especially true for women (314).
• Most Central Asians believe that society is more religious after independence -- although an equally large 40% refused to answer the question believing it might result in political punishment (314). Despite this, only 23.7% of respondents said that they were more devout Muslims since independence (315).
• More complete data sets not included elsewhere or fully discussed are available from page 315 to page 317.
• The residents of the Farg'ona Valley are much more religious than Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz from elsewhere. The pray more regularly, and are much more likely to observe the cultural aspects of Islamic practice such as life cycle rituals and the pillars of Islam. Despite this, public signs of devotion such as mosque attendance or the hijab -- possibly b/c of discriminatory action by the government (317).
• Uzbeks living in Tajikistan are also much more likely than their Uzbekistani brothers to observe Islamic practice or receive an Islamic education. They are nearly twice as likely to attend mosque, receive instruction, or pray five times a day. This may be b/c the Dushanbe regime is less intrusive (317).
• The practice and belief in Islam between cities and rural areas is less marked that the authors originally expected. Religious belief in rural areas is slightly higher, but city-dwellers are more likely to engage in cultural practices of Islam and to believe in a greater Islamic community. Some other pillars are followed more in cities for a variety of reasons, including economic necessity in the countryside (317).
• "Our interviews show that Islam – or being and feeling Muslim – is manifestly a significant element in the identity of Central Asians who belong to culturally Muslim ethnic groups. For many – among them many young people and academics – Islam is a way of life. Indeed, our tables show unequivocally that young people and academics are at the forefront of Islamic affiliation and observance" (318).
• Muslim identity in Central Asia is not easily defined by a set of fixed criteria as it could be elsewhere, instead being based on ethnic culture and traditions. Islam is often viewed as public and cultural morality, which has not been weakened by incorporation into government nation-building projects. Some non-Islamic practices are considered 'Muslim', whereas actually religious obligations -- such as not eating pork -- are ignored and suffer universal erosion (318).
• "In an in-depth interview in October 2006, a 45-year-old bartender in a Bukharan hotel stated that the accelerated Islamization of Uzbek society was thwarted in the late 1990s after the terror attacks in Uzbekistan. He added that people were not forced or threatened to refrain from religious activity, but they were led to understand that conducting a religious life openly could induce a confrontation with the authorities" (318).