Riley, Jonathan. "One Very Simple Principle". Utilitas, Vol.3, No.1 (1991): 1-35.

Riley, Jonathan. "One Very Simple Principle". Utilitas, Vol.3, No.1 (1991): 1-35.

• Dr. John Gray, a scholar contemporary with the author, has published three 'fatal' objections to Mill's classic theory of liberty. These three objections are: that because the nature and scope of harm is subjective and dependent on moral outlooks, people with different moral outlooks could not reach agreement on the scope of prohibited activities (1); the purposeful absence of value judgements in Utilitarianism makes it intractable as a way to judge between different utilities, meaning Mill's Utilitarianism cannot make the judgements necessity in his theory; and a critique of Mill's 'individuality' as radical and flawed, because, by basing his concept on experimentation from the norm, voluntary acceptance of conservative life is not considered expressive of individuality (2).
• Dr. Gray expands on his original critique by blaming Mill for a break from earlier Liberal thinkers, who came from the 'classical liberal' tradition, and replacing that field with 'rationalist liberalism', which Dr. Gray believes to be defined by hubris and a belief in the ability of rational man to understand the entire world (4).
• Dr. Gray also submits that both forms of Liberalism contain fundamental contradictions which leave 'liberty' undefined as a term, while also giving it priority in their theories. He posits that this leaves the concept up to variation based on contemporary political cultures and destroys any theoretical unity (4). Dr. Gray instead proposes a 'political Pyrrhonism' [referring to an Ancient Greek thinker who demanded recognition that all knowledge is guesswork], where the focus would be on practical effects rather than ideologies like 'liberalism' (5).
• The 'simple principle' asserted in Mill's On Liberty also had an obverse dealing with the 'right to liberty'. It states that the individual has the moral right to liberty in all cases where his action does not harm others (6-7).
• Mill provides a caveat to this claim, saying that this principle only applies to people capable of self-directed improvements, stating that it should not apply to children, the feeble-minded, or 'barbarian' peoples (7).
• Mill claims the principle is feasible because in reality people make self-regarding choices which do not harm others. These self-regarding actions are designated as such because they do not directly affect others, or such harm is contingent on the actor first harming himself. All of the activities are voluntary personal choices (7).
• Mill further suggests that his liberty principle should be accepted as a fundamental moral tenant everywhere, regardless of culture or faith (8). Mill then continues to suggest that this principle is moral precisely because it allows for disagreement, and differing moral opinions -- which may include the correct divine answer -- can only express themselves with the preconditions of society under the liberty principle (9).
• Furthermore, Mill considers being able to logically weigh between different opinions and moral choices as an essential part of being human. With this in mind, for humans to truly develop and realize their potential, they must be exposed to a plurality of opinions in debate, which the liberty principle allows for (9).
• Mill also believes that his theory will have beneficial and practical effects in his home of England in particular, because he believed that the conservative social attitudes of contemporary Britain may have put down restrictions on behavior in ways which Mill believed might strangle democracy and civilization (10).
• Mill proposed his theory of liberty and Utilitarianism in response to what he viewed as radically different conditions of life in his era, requiring a new interpretation of liberty. The primary change for Mill was that whereas under pre-modern rule the notion of liberty could be defined as a conflict of mass society against the restrictions of a 'state' controlled by privileged elites, in a modern industrialized and democratic society the danger for restrictions on liberty lay into the people themselves, who controlled the state through mass political participation (10-12).
• Mill feared that the ascendent middle class might attempt to use its control over societal opinion and mass participation in democratic processes to restrict behavior into the boundaries considered appropriate by the middle class and conventional societal norms -- something Mill feared would lead to social and cultural stagnation (12).
• Whereas other theories of previous eras are directed towards constraining state power and regulating the nature of appropriate state action, Mill entirely turns towards individuals and individual freedom, which he defines as the area in which: "[the] individual rightfully chooses whatever he likes without any interference from laws, moral rules or other customs" (13). 
• Mill's theory essentially applies to the full enjoyment of private spheres of conduct, are closed to any discussion of intervention, whether state or societally led (15). Conversely, any act which does prejudice the interests of others becomes open to discussion on whether general welfare would improved by intervening (16).
• "In short, the individual has no moral right to choose as he pleases within the public sphere. Thus, given a democratic society, for example, it is perfectly acceptable for the popular majority and its political representatives to restrain, by law or opinion, individuality outside purely private spheres" (16).
• Importantly, these principles only inform us that under these circumstances the state has the option to intervene, but does not have to. Indeed, the issue of intervention should be considered throughly and there are potentials for both legal restriction and societal punishments (16).
• In these cases, the effects of intervention upon broader society must be considered, and in many cases intervention may be rejected as a solution because it would only cause greater harms. A chief example would be many economic processes, which cause definite harm to competitors. Despite this, Mill would argue that the intervention would do much more harm, and thus has to be rejected in this case (17, 21).
• The author believes that the restriction of Mill's concepts of fundamental or natural liberty to the expression of individuality in private self-regarding acts provides a good rebuttal to the issues of expansive liberalism raised by Dr. Gray. Since Mill restricts fundamental liberty to a very small range of action, there should be no worries about the dogmatic defense of any liberties in the public other-regarding sphere (17).
• Another substantial critique of Dr. Gray, Dr. John Rees, and others is that the term 'harm' is ill defined in Mill's philosophy, meaning that it must be defined by the 'essential rights' as determined by culture. This leaves the definition up to society, thus leaving open the gates for massive restrictions on action based on what a moralistic society concludes as 'rights' and its decision are what 'rights' are superior (18) -- obviously not what Mill had intended (19).
• Dr. Riley argues that Mill does in fact provide a suitable, if difficult to piece together from his work, concept of 'harm' which works with the rest of Utilitarian theory. The first instance of harm is an action which either damages someone's vital interests as a human being -- such as stabbing someone -- or interferes with the legitimate powers of the government to act in the public sphere -- such as not paying taxes (20).
• Mill also expands this category of harmful acts to include instances where lack of action causes indirect harm. Failing to provide help when you can, such as doing nothing when someone is choking, counts as harm according to Mill (20).
• Harm very explicitly does not include emotional harm or distress caused by an action, because any harm as such caused to the discriminating person is not a necessary consequence but a result of their beliefs. Since they have chosen to hold such beliefs, they are the source of any harm or distress (22-23).
• Contrary to some claims about supposed moral relativism by Dr. Isaiah Berlin, Mill still believes that some actions are positive and others negative. Importantly, Mill's theory demands a level of absolute protection for self-regarding actions, but it does not require society to approve of any self-regarding behavior. It is entirely fair to approve of some actions and dislike others, and choose their company voluntarily based on these traits, so long as criticism does not reach the level of intervention against the performance of that activity (25-26).
• The key distinction between the levels of societal action allowed to be taken against an individual for his self-regarding behavior is whether they are natural or orchestrated. For example, shunning someone for being a fascist is an acceptable and natural reaction to their private views, however the organized shunning of an apostate from the Mormon Church is artificial and therefore not acceptable as a society response according to Mill (27).
• The author intends to consider and address three common critiques of Mill: that one's actions always affect others, because if one harms oneself to the degree of impoverishment, burdens are placed on others (28); poor conduct will set a bad example for others and thus harm children; the cases for interference set aside for children and retards should also apply to those with poor morals, because otherwise the consistency of argument breaks down (29).
• Mill responds to the first critique by saying that in the case that extreme personal actions, such as substance abuse, led to violation of obligations to others, then it becomes an other-regarding issue and intervention can be justified. For example, should substance abuse led to a failure to perform public duties, then intervention is allowed (29).
• This, however, should purely be placed in the context of public responsibilities. The author explains the distinction between this a general ban here: "The extravagant man who nevertheless is able to pay his debts, the public servant who is drunk only while off duty, [...] should remain perfectly free from legal or social penalties" (30).
• Mill dismisses the second critique as misunderstanding the effect which a genuinely harmful behavior, such as alcohol consumption, would have on people who witness it. Presumably, such individuals would also see the overwhelmingly harmful behaviors associated with the activity and be discouraged, not encouraged, to copy it (31).
• Mill responds to the third critique with his clarification about actions answered in the first critique. If the action is not severe enough to affect others and trigger the possibility of intervention, then society still has no right to intervene because doing so would limit the kind of experimental action which furthers civilization -- and which children, and retards cannot possible engage in (31).
• The theory outlined in On Liberty is not intended to tell societies how to behave in general or in the public sphere, that role is reserved for the theory of utility, it is only meant to instruct people how to behave in the private sphere; as according to their own self-regarding desires and opinions without regard to society or the state. Because it is limited in scope, it does not encounter many of the practical issues which Dr. Gray finds with it (31).
• The Liberty Principle is in accordance with Utilitarianism, because of Mill's claim that self-improving adults generally know what is best for them -- more often than the state does in any case. Taking this assumption as true, the liberty principle must allow for better results than any other system, thus increasing total pleasure and fulfilling the requirements of a policy under Utilitarian principles (32).
• For Mill the definition of 'liberty' is based about freedom to pursue one's own desires and act on one's own judgements. Thus a necessary precondition for liberty is being able to logically select one's own desires, requiring the ability of moral self-improvement which Mill stresses in his work (33).
• This definition of 'liberty' is also compared and contrasted with two other definitions of the term commonly, but mistakenly, ascribed to Mill. The first defines liberty in terms of mutual non-interference on 'superior rights', which runs right into the problem of 'rights' being social defined and requires accepting majoritarianism (34).
• The second alternative defines 'liberty' as the unrestricted right to do whatever one wants, a very different concept than Mill's and closer to the natural freedom described by Thomas Hobbes. This definition leaves no place for organized government or society and leaves the way open for anarchy and brutal warlordism (35).