Ramsay, Robert. "UNCTAD's Failures: The Rich Get Richer". International Organization, Vol.38, No.2 (1984): 387-397.

Ramsay, Robert. "UNCTAD's Failures: The Rich Get Richer". International Organization, Vol.38, No.2 (1984): 387-397.

• The recent 6th conference of the UN Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] at Belgade was an unmitigated failure, another in a list for the organization which has failed to rectify the wealth gap between rich and poor countries. Many of these failures can be blamed on the regional bloc system by which proposals are brought forward and the inefficiency of the UNCTAD secretariat (387-388).
• The author also blames these failures on a general lack of concern among the governments of either rich or poor nations to correct wealth disparities or solve issues of mass poverty (388).
• The members of UNCTAD are placed into three groups: the Group of 77, the developing countries; Group B, industrialized countries of the OECD; and Group D, the industrialized socialist nations of the Eastern Bloc. There are also a few independent states, like China and Israel. These are broad categories with great internal disparity (388).
• Since the purpose of the UNCTAD is to reduce inequality between rich and poor nations, it might be expected that the Group of 77 would come up with resolution. However, the interests of the group are so diverse that it is unable to agree on specific proposals of any kind (388).
• Group B is generally conservative and limits its role to opposing the few changes that other blocs can agree to, seeing charges as detrimental to its short term economic interests (388-389).
• Group D plays a marginal role in UNCTAD, limiting itself to blaming Western colonialism for issues (389).
• The UNCTAD secretariat is a weak institution that attempts to incorporate the views of all of its members in rhetoric, frequently ignoring its possible role in developing policy proposals. Rather than attracting the opinionated academics needed to spur policy discussions, the secretariat is staffed by near-retirement diplomats who produce vague documents to guarantee that no country will object and cost them their position (389-391).
• The declining relevancy of UNCTAD is reflected in the decreased attendance at its major meetings, to which countries have been sending lower ranking officials in recognition of the declining priority of the organization (391).
• National governments have taken essentially no steps towards improving or reforming the function of UNCTAD, nor have complains been followed up by action. This indicates a lack of political will on all sides to actually solve the problems of income inequality between nations (392).
• "In many UNCTAD debates, one sees the Group B countries defending the status quo, the 77 refraining from attacking it, and Group D sitting and watching" (392).
• The countries of Group B are the most conservative and play an active role in repressing any dissent that does emerge, including buying out troublesome members of the Group of 77 with aid and development packages (392-393).
• The Group of 77 is more interesting, because their rationale for not attacking the prevailing economic order in the UNCTAD is that the forum is more difficult than action elsewhere. Since they lack internal unity, individual members of the Group of 77 often see more benefit in acting unilaterally outside of UNCTAD rather than battling for changes in the conference. Consequently, weak and poor countries are left with no allies inside or outside the blocs (393).
• The governments of poor countries are usually controlled by rich people, who have more in common with the interests of other rich people than they do with their own poor countrymen. They often achieve their position and wealth by selling out their nation to foreign economic interests, leaving the rulers of poor countries with as little incentive to change the global economic order as those in rich countries (393-394).
• Often the only benefit of UNCTAD's existence, and the reason why it continues to exist despite repeated failures, is that it allows the elites of rich countries to look generous and allows the elites of poor countries to look like they are defending national interests, all while doing nothing (394-395).
• "It is in the national interest of a poor country to pay as little as possible for imports and services such as shipping, to obtain as much as possible for exports, and to obtain the greatest possible involvement of its nationals in ventures operated by transnational corporations on its own territory" (394).
• The great problem of wealth disparity inside nations, especially very poor nations, is almost impossible to solve since those in positions of power are loath to abolish their own privileges. Generally, political elites are also economic elites, and will use their political power to defend their economic power (395).
• Ultimately, the issue of world poverty lies with rich people and poor people, not rich nations and poor nations. The confusion in the international community towards this notion is partially to blame for the ineffectiveness of most poverty relief measures (397).
• The author observes that, unfortunately, this is also true in many international organizations, where administrators in certain organizations will often place their personal interests over those of the country. This often occurs through institutional rivalry, where different parts of the UN care more about sidelining each other than helping states (396).
• Wealth disparity in poor nations has often been used as a reason for wealthy countries to curtail aid payments, because the benefits of that aid inevitably go towards the rich and powerful in poor countries rather than those who could really benefit from aid payments (396).