Rahmani-Ocora, Laden. "Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human Rights Council". Global Governance, Vol.12, No.1 (2006): 15-20.

Rahmani-Ocora, Laden. "Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human Rights Council". Global Governance, Vol.12, No.1 (2006): 15-20.

• In April 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered a final blow to the UN Commission on Human Rights [UNCHR] in his report, In Larger Freedom, where he sharply criticized the Commission for being politicized and selective in its persecution of human rights offenders and degrading the reputation of the UN. The UNGA is currently in the process of replacing the institution (15).
• The purpose of the reform of the Commission into the UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC] was that the new Council would be a standing body, allowing it to respond to crises and give permanent assistance to member states. Secretary-General Annan also proposed that the body conduct universal reviews and elect members by 2/3 majority to prevent the same favoritism that hindered the Commission (16).
• The early work of the UNCHR was setting human rights standards, as embodied by its role in drafting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several other major human rights treaties. It was then intended to oversee the implementation of this rights, but it was not very effective (15).
• The Commission faced a number of challenges, including frequent recourse to the 'no-action' motion to prevent discussion of certain countries. The country also only had one annual meeting of 6 weeks, preventing it from dealing with crisis situations or emergencies (16).
• "It came to resemble a club where friendships easily overlooked wrongdoing. A record of selectivity and double standards tarnished its reputation, and its membership has often included notorious political regimes that were themselves major perpetrators of human rights abuses" (16).
• The author suggests that core problems of selectivity and entry of severe human rights abusers onto the Council will not stop. The universal period review will end blatant immunity for favored human rights offenders, but states will still protect their own interests and use human rights for political gain (17).
• Dr. Rahmani-Ocora argues that this could potentially be solved with a ban on certain states holding positions on the Council, suggesting those 15 states which contemporarily had a specific resolution condemning human rights in their country (17).
• The author further suggests that the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights [OHCHR] prepare a summary report of the human rights situation in all countries before the elections for the UNHRC as to establish a 'voting guide' to make sure that major human rights offenders are not unknowingly elected (17-18).
• The current UNCHR is also a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC, meaning that it could be -- although never has been -- vetoed by ECOSOC. The author suggests making it a principle organ of the UN (18).
• The Commission originally produced periodic reviews of UN member states, but this practice was discontinued due to political pressure. Reintroducing the peer review process, as suggested by Secretary-General Annan, would solve many of the problems with the Commission (18).
• The Commission allowed NGOs to play a substantial role in the process of promoting human rights, something that the author hopes will be continued in the Council. A resolution from 1996 promotes this, as it aids human rights bodies in maintaining transparency (19).
• A strong UNHRC will require a strong secretariat to promote and implement its measures, however the OHCHR is severely unfunded for its current responsibilities, much less those undertaken under an empowered Council. For the Council to be effective, the OHCHR needs to be adequately funded (19-20).