Quinlan, Michael. "The Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons: Shaping the Debate". International Affairs, Vol.82, No.4 (2006): 627-637.

Quinlan, Michael. "The Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons: Shaping the Debate". International Affairs, Vol.82, No.4 (2006): 627-637.

• After the end of the Second World War, the USA swiftly terminated its nuclear weapons cooperation with the UK. Over the next decade, the UK received almost no assistance it developing its own nuclear capabilities, which were made operation in 1956 with the completion of a bomber fleet and nuclear weapons (627).
• Nuclear cooperation with the USA was restarted in 1958 after Britain had demonstrated its independent nuclear capacity and the two countries continue to maintain close technical cooperation on nuclear weapons. This includes facilities sharing, as all British nuclear tests after 1958 were conducted in Nevada (627).
• The UK had developed a ballistic missile capability in the Blue Streak program, but cancel this in 1960 when it was determined that ground placement were vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The UK then switched to American nuclear systems: first the Skybolt aerial missile from 1958 to 1962, and then the Polaris submarine missile after that (627).
• Four British submarines were equipped with the Polaris ballistic missile system and nuclear warheads formed the basis of the British nuclear arsenal, with the Royal Navy taken over strategic nuclear responsibilities from the airforce in 1969. The warheads have since been upgraded to thwart Soviet missile defense systems (627).
• In 1980, the British government decided to replace the Polaris missile system with US-made Trident missiles in the D5 variation. The submarines are built and designed in Britain with technical cooperation and assistance from the USA. The Trident missiles are stored together with American Trident missiles in Kings Bay naval base, in Georgia (628).
• The UK has steadily reduced its nuclear armament since 1980, with the government capping the total number of warheads at 200 in 1998, with a maximum of 48 on each submarine (628).
• The Trident fleet is based at Clyde submarine base, including the submarine port at Faslane and an armament and warhead depot at Coulport. The submarines are occasionally repaired by the naval base in Devonport. One of the submarines is always on patrol. Readiness is below the Cold War levels of 15 minutes, with submarines given days of notice time and missiles not programmed for preplanned trajectories (629).
• The current Trident system was procured at a cost of around 15 billion pounds, adjusted for inflation to 2006 levels, and maintains an annual operating cost of 700 million pounds. If nuclear research labs are added, the total annual cost of the British nuclear program is around 1.46 billion, or approximately 4% of the British military budget (628).
• In July 2005, the British government decided to expand the staff and facilities of its Atomic Weapons Establishment at the cost of 350 million per year over three years. This will secure the continued reliability of warheads without the need for additional testing, as the UK respects the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty despite it not be in force (629).
• There is no reason to suspect that the UK's current nuclear capabilities will become insufficient in the post-Cold War security environment (629).
• The Trident program undergoes regular maintenance as specific components become necessary to replace, although the overall warhead design is likely to be maintained until at least the 2020s (629). The US government intends to continue using the Trident D5 missile until at least the 2040s, with a possible upgrade in design, and the UK will likely follow suit (630).
• When introduced in 1980, submarines equipped with the Trident system took 14 years to deploy. As a result, although the current fleet will remain operational into the 2020s, the decision about replacing or renewing the fleet will need to take place in the 2010s (630).
• Since the 1950s, the USA has had the capacity to deploy nuclear force towards an objective deemed important, including the protection of allied nations. The maintenance of a separate British nuclear force has rested on the possibility of a scenario where the USA is no longer committed or is not perceived as being committed to British security (630).
• This hypothetical scenario might occur because the UK engages in risky international that the USA does not approve of or as the result of a more significant distancing of the USA from its international security commitments (631).
• These two scenarios require different levels of independence to address. The first scenario requires operational independence, meaning that the UK retains the ability to order nuclear strikes without approval from the USA, whereas the second requires both operational and material independence, meaning that the UK can procure all components necessary to maintain an operational nuclear force without American assistance (631).
• From the 1960s onward, the UK choose to maintain operational independence while sacrificing material independence for budgetary reasons. France is an example of an alternative path, as it maintains both operational and material independence (631).
• There a number of rumors that the UK lacks true operational independence: although the UK does depend on the US for intelligence for the direction of missiles and tracking of targets, it does have the capacity to do this alone; and, although Britain has traditionally deferred to the USA, but this will not necessarily be the case and the US cannot stop the UK from launching a nuclear strike (631-632).
• Even in the advent of either of these scenarios, it is unclear that the UK would require a nuclear deterrent to meet current threats. The UK does not envision substantial independent involvement in East Asian or Middle Eastern security and it is unlike that Russia will reemerge as an existential threat. The British nuclear force can only be maintained by arguing that some future and unknown threat could arise, since it is not justifiable on the basis of current known threats (633-634).
• The maintenance of British nuclear force may also serve to bolster British strategic confidence to undertake a number of military missions internationally, and allows European nations to general to act more independently of the United States without being totally dependent on France (634).
• As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the UK is bound by a commitment to work towards nuclear disarmament, a sentiment confirmed by subsequent review conferences and a 1996 ruling by the International Court of Justice (632).
• Some groups have claimed that the NPT prevents the UK from renewing its nuclear capacity as part of its commitment to disarmament. However, there is no timeline included in the NPT and thus the UK is not legally bound to do this. Britain has declared support for universal disarmament, but the UK is not under a legal requirement to disarm before any other member of the Nuclear Club (632-633).
• It is likely that some range of foreign nuclear arsenals will continue to exist into the 2040s and 2050s, meaning that British nuclear rearmament programs must be considered with this scenario in mind (633).
• One for the main arguments for British nuclear abolition is that the UK taken this step would be a powerful push for other countries to move towards nuclear abolition and strengthen the NPT regime. This is unlikely to be the effect of British nuclear abolition, however, as none of the other four recognized nuclear states would change their stance in response to British disarmament, and neither would the rogue nuclear states of India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, or North Korea (633).
• It is unlikely that the UK will end up replacing the Trident system with another nuclear platform, as land-based systems remain vulnerable to attack and the UK likely lacks key equipment for the implementation of an aerial system. In the naval field, submarines are less vulnerable to attack than surface ships and are thus preferable for nuclear armament (635).
• It is also unlikely that the UK will abandon ballistic missiles as the preferred vehicle for nuclear strikes, as cruise missiles would likely require new equipment and modifications and be more vulnerable to interception. Such modification could be made alongside existing ballistic missiles, however, were the submarines to be redesigned (635-636).
• The current size of the submarine fleet was designed with Cold War strategic imperatives in mind, particularly keeping one ship at high readiness at all times. These factors no longer apply, and thus the UK could reduce the number of submarines and/or the number of missile tubes in each submarine without making its deterrence less credible (636).
• Any new missiles and warheads are almost certain to come from the United States, as the UK has not developed independent procurement capacity in that area. The submarines are likely to be domestically procured, as the UK has that capacity, as does France (636).