Perdue, Peter. "The Tenacious Tributary System". Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.24, No.96 (2015): 1002-1014

Perdue, Peter. "The Tenacious Tributary System". Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.24, No.96 (2015): 1002-1014

• The term 'tributary system' is commonly used by pundits and IR scholars to describe Chinese IR. This is despite the fact that no Chinese dynasty has ever used this terminology to describe is foreign relations and historians deny such a system existed. The concept has become popular because it captures the idea of an essentialized Chinese IR opposed to an essentialized 'normal' IR practiced by the West (1002, 1004).
• The idea of the 'tributary system' is that Chinese dominance in East Asia prior to the 19th Century was due to cultural hegemony, not purely military force. Journalists and politicians assume that China plans to use its rising global influence to restore this tributary system because it is assumed that the system is an essential aspect of Chinese culture (1003).
• The tributary system functions on Confucian principles and peacefully ties together the Asian nations under Chinese hegemony, in contrast to the exploitative role of Europe in Asia (1004).
• Some of the claims made to support the 'peaceful Chinese hegemony' versus 'violent European domination' dichotomy include faulty history, including David Kang's erroneous claim that East As was peaceful compared to Europe historically (1004-1005). China was, in fact, a fairly violent state (1005, 1008).
• The author claims that Chinese actions over the past 5 years [since 2010] firmly disprove any idea of the tributary system. The Chinese stance in the Sea China Sea, as well as Chinese statement on foreign policy, seems to more closely resemble the IR School of Realism than a tributary system. This suggests that Chinese foreign policy is not so different from that of other countries, including the West (1003).
• The belief that some essential cultural aspect of China prevents them from following liberal democratic norms has existed for a long time, at least since the foundation of the Republic of China, when American journalists celebrated Yuan Shikai's dictatorship as a 'natural' form of government for China (1004).
• The modern incarnation of the 'tributary system' myth originated with John Fairbank's 1968 scholarly anthology 'The Chinese World Order', in which Mark Mancell coins the term in the essay 'The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay'. The concept is on flimsy historical grounds essentially limited to 'the Emperor thought China was better than others and deserved mad respect' (1005).
• The scholars of the 1960s drew on older theories that hoped essentialized Chinese culture would result in the end of Communism there (1011). These, in turn, drew on claims by both foreign observers and Chinese scholars, including Jiang Jieshi, during the 1930s that China would 'naturally' return to a peaceful and dominant position in Asia (1011-1013).
• This idea of China existing as a unified and peaceful state was historically a powerful motivator during the 1930s and 1940s when Japan threatened to conquer the country, as it argued that even border territories were core parts of historical China, formed a single community, and could not be lost (1012-1013). It remains a popular idea and its legacy shapes contemporary Chinese attitudes towards Taiwan and other 'lost territories' (1012).
• During the 1930s and 1940s, the focus of Chinese unity was still strongly military, with Jiang Jieshi and other openly praising the role of historical Chinese conquest and colonization in creating a unified China, and often advocating for similar methods. During the 1960s, Communist victory meant that the focus was shifted away from militarism and towards claims of a 'natural' and essentialized China bound together by culture, not conquest (1013-1014).
• In contrast to Mr. Mancell's claims, the tribute system as existed was always more complex and contested and even when it was assumed by Chinese elites to create a hierarchical relationship of deference, it often served commercial or practical purposes for the other states; not based on cultural hegemony (1006-1007).
• Chinese documents evidencing a tributary system really only exist during from the 1750s to the turn of the 19th Century, when Qing power was at its height. Prior to this point, the Qing and earlier Chinese states appear to have recognized the power of their neighbors, especially in Central Asia, and treated them with due respect. Chinese correspondence with other nations during this period envokes common cultural ideas of kindness, common descent -- in the case of the Manchus -- and Buddhist principles (1007).
• Any tribute paid to the Chinese by other nations was irregular and many nations, especially Japan, refused to participate in the ritual. Nations usually only gave tributes as a way to facilitate trade with China by paying respects to the Emperor and acquiring his permission, not because they ascribed to Confucian teachings or considered China to be the natural hegemon (1008-1009).
• For hundreds of years, Korea had paid regular tribute to the Ming Dynasty, ascribed to the same Neo-Confucian faith, and tied itself to China politically. Korea was, therefore, shocked and horrified by its replacement by the Qing, who they considered Manchu barbarians. The Koreans decided it was better to not provoke Manchu aggression and continued their payments to the new dynasty, although they pointedly kept many Ming traditions in defiance of illegitimate Manchu rule (1009).
• Chinese foreign relations during the Early Modern period, although distinct, are not totally different from the strategies and techniques of other nations at the same time, including the Ottomans, Russia, or France. Chinese interactions with other polities can certainly be understood on the same terms as these other imperial states (1010).
• China can also been seen as having engaged in imperialism and colonialism during that time period in Mongolia, Taiwan, Central Asia, southwest China, and Java. The movement of Han settlers into these areas resembles colonial activities elsewhere and can be discussed and analyzed in the same way (1010-1011).
• Scholars of China need to be more critical of Chinese foreign relations and its internal imperial and colonial projects. Right now, too much scholarship uncritically reinforces stereotypes and official Chinese government lines (1014).