Misra, Amalendu. "Shanghai 5 and The Emerging Alliance in Central Asia: The closed society and its enemies". Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.3 (2001): 305-321.

Misra, Amalendu. "Shanghai 5 and The Emerging Alliance in Central Asia: The closed society and its enemies". Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.3 (2001): 305-321.

• The Shanghai 5, or Shanghai Cooperation Organization, [SCO] was created in 1996 at a conference on border disputes between China, Kazakhstan, Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. The meeting began a process of demilitarizing the Chinese border and establishing confidence-building measures along the borders (305-306).
• Since its inception, the SCO has gradually shifted its focus to regional security and stability. Recently, this has been expressed in a belief that internal factors constitute the greatest threat to regional security, prompting a joint commitment to combat crime, extremism, and separatism (306).
• The SCO is uniquely successful in pursuing regional integration in Central Asia because to adopts a neorealist perspective of regional interstate relations which recognizes the insular nature of these states. In a situation of international anarchy, as exists in Central Asia, the only possible cooperation is based on common threats to state sovereignty, the same issues covered by the SCO (306).
• The central axis of the SCO is the relationship between Russia and China, whose governments recognize the value of pursuing mutual interests and supporting each others international behaviors in an attempt to collectively counter American hegemony (307). Recently, a shared fear of Islamism has prompted deepened cooperation between the countries (308).
• Russian interest in the SCO is a result of domestic politics which have made Eurasianism and its protector status in the 'near abroad' as central elements of foreign policy. Russia seeks to bring all of Eurasia together -- under Russian control -- into a collectivist, traditionalist, and anti-Western bloc (309).
• Russian engagement with Central Asia is mainly mediated through the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], although it views China as a valuable ally in pursuing its goals in Central Asia and supports Chinese activities. The CIS still has a more Russian focus on projecting Russian power over ethnic Russians and the 'near abroad' (310).
• China seeks to use the SCO to pacify its western borders and guarantee security and stability near restive communities in Xinjiang; it also seeks to economically dominate and exploit the natural resources of the region. China views Russia as a major impediment to its own regional goals, but is willing to focus on the many common interests (310).
• According to the 'clash of civilizations' theory posited by Samuel Huntington, Central Asia sits at the convergence of the Orthodox Christian, Islamic, and Chinese civilizations and is therefore subject to conflict over religion and national identity. Some analysts, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, have suggested that Central Asia might collapse into ethnic cleansing like the Balkans did during the 1990s (312).
• The role of Islam in Central Asia politics is muted, however, as the Soviet legacy has left a secular state run by secular elites. Religiosity is also fairly weak to begin with in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, while the Islamist movements in Tajikistan are repressed by the government (312).
• The heavy emphasis on state sovereignty and the dangers of separatism in the SCO are based on the number of ongoing and potential separatist movements in SCO members. China fears separatism among the Uyghurs, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic about their Russian minorities, and Russia about the Caucasus. All SCO members have reason to fear ethnic nationalism and separatism, so it is main part of the organization (313).
• While the origins of the SCO are as a security organization, its has always had deeply economic interests. The impetus for the initial demilitarization of the Chinese border was to remove barriers to trade and Chinese economic interests in Central Asian markets. These two goals are also mutually reinforcing, since more security allows for more trade, while better economic conditions makes extremism less attractive (314).
• Uzbekistan is arguably the lynchpin of Central Asia and its prosperity and stability affect the stability of all surrounding states. It is fiercely and intensely nationalist and has managed to incorporate and contain Islamic identity within this nationalist model. Uzbekistan has been pursuing an independent foreign policy, bolstered by support from the US. It would benefit greatly from joining the SCO, as would Turkmenistan (315-316).
• The American relationship with Islamic extremism has been mixed: a combination of public disavowal after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and clandestine activities supporting the growth of radical Islamism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in an attempt to destabilize the USSR (317).
• The most likely way for the SCO to fail in the future is if Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia grow stronger and further apart. Right now the organization depends on the Russo-Chinese axis and a conflict between these powers would effectively paralyze the group (319).