Megoran, Nick "Framing Andijon, narrating the nation: Islam Karimov's account of the events of 13 May 2005". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.1 (2008): 15-31.

Megoran, Nick "Framing Andijon, narrating the nation: Islam Karimov's account of the events of 13 May 2005". Central Asian Survey, vol.27, no.1 (2008): 15-31.

• The author provides a very good summary of the Andijon Incident: "On 13 May 2005, Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley city of Andijon staged the largest and most determined challenge to the government of the independent republic’s hitherto only president, Islam Karimov. Apparently precipitated by the conviction of 23 local businessmen on charges of religious extremism and illegal political activity, violence began with lethal attacks on state security agents in the early hours of 13 May. Government buildings and their environs were subsequently occupied by the gunmen and their supporters. After negotiations proved fruitless, government troops used force to reclaim control of captured state buildings. A large number of people were killed in what has, thus far, proved to be the most deadly day in independent Uzbekistan’s history" (15).
• The Andijon Incident has had tremendous effects on the politics of Uzbekistan. The Western criticism of the crackdown resulted in the near total termination of all American interests in the country, demonstrating the interpretation and conceptualization of the events are important to understand contemporary Uzbekistani politics (16). 
• The author engages with Dr. Andrew March (2003) in his analysis on the rhetorical strategies employed in the creation and mobilization of nationalism in Uzbekistan. Dr. March finds that Uzbekistani nationalism is constructed on an ideology of 'national independence' [milliy mustaqillik] emphasizing the imagined struggle of the Uzbekistani people for independence and the mobilization of their national spirit or intrinsic values as a nation. These values are reductionist towards an authoritarian system and promote the contemporary political order as an extension of nationhood (16).
• Dr. March critiques the texts and ideology for claiming ancient inhabitants of the territory as Uzbeks and generally establishing an anachronistic timeframe of nationhood. He also claims that President Karimov's claims to the 'natural' being of Uzbekistani nationalism limit the area of discourse by making his policies natural and all alternatives forced or constructed (17).
• This paper, by Dr. Megoran, works w/ Dr. March's research but includes several critiques of it. Dr. March ignores the potential for the ideology to actually have believers -- which it does -- and dismisses the ways in which it actually interacts with the population. Specific to the Andijon Incident, Dr. Megoran also looks at how the ideology of mustaqillik is adapted to explain specific policies and actions (17).
• Analysis about governmental framing of the Andijon Incident is provided from "O'zbek Xalq Hech Qachon Hech Kimga Qaram Bo'lmaydi", a text published out of press statements made by President Karimov concerning the Andijon Incident and its coverage (18).
• The author provides a detailed description of President Karimov's narrative for the Andijon Incident:
• "Karimov’s narrative includes nothing about the background to the Andijon incident. Instead, he reports that the ‘criminal deeds’ began at 00.30 am on 13 May, when a police battalion in Andijon was attacked. Four duty officers were killed and their weapons taken. At 1.30 am the ‘gunmen’ attacked a unit of the defence ministry, located on the road in the 34th military district. Four or five people were killed, and more weapons seized. They took a Zil-130 truck, and used it to break into a prison and free almost all the 600 prisoners there. After this, they drove around in cars yelling and screaming, firing into the air, and creating chaos. They took a number of people whom they encountered (apparently by chance) hostage, then attacked the regional Hokimiyat. They were able to occupy it easily as only unarmed night watchmen were inside. They then attacked the headquarters of the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security Services, but were repelled by armed servicemen (pp. 6–7). Their first action after seizing the Hokimiyat, Karimov continues, was to use its telephones to summon people they knew in the city, especially family – the elderly, women and children – to form a ‘living wall’ (p. 8) of some 300 people around the building. They then called Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan’s Jalalabad and Osh regions to tell those who had planned this crime, their sponsors and bosses, what they had done.7 Burnt out cars were used to block streets approaching the Hokimiyat and five or six snipers were positioned around the roof. Karimov reports that he learned of what was taking place at 1.40 am, and arrived in Andijon at 8 am (p. 11). He immediately established a field headquarters and invited local leaders to meet him and discuss the events. After ascertaining the mobile phone numbers of the gunmen, contact was made and a leader identified for negotiations. These were entrusted to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Zokirjon Almatov, and to Saydulla Begaliev, the hokim (governor) of the viloyat (region). Karimov reports that an offer was made to the gunmen, in order to avoid further loss of life. Weapons could be kept or handed in, three or four buses would be provided, and the gunmen could go wherever they wanted to. This came with the President’s personal assurance that ‘not a fibre of a single hair on your head will fall, no one will touch you’ (pp. 17–18), a guarantee repeated numerous times in the book. Almatov said that, naturally, a judicial investigation would follow, where the innocent would be vindicated and the guilty face the law’s demands. The gunmen were warned that they had no other option, for if they chose to fight the state, ‘what will be left of you?’ (p. 18). Karimov reports that the gunmen consented to accept this offer if half a dozen of their (imprisoned) men were handed over. Karimov agreed to give time, as he put it, to find out what sort of people they were. Just as the handover was due to take place, they made more demands, including the release of Akram Yuldashev (jailed leader of the putative ‘Akromiya’ group8 ) and could not assure Almatov that this was their final demand. Some of Karimov’s advisers and colleagues proposed agreement, but the majority were against it, and this view carried. Karimov claims that the adoption of this position was bolstered by intercepted telephone calls made by the gunmen suggesting they had sinister plans afoot to create a Caliphate. The government’s demands and offer were repeated to the gunmen, with further assurances of safety and the warning that if they opened fire, they ‘could be destroyed in an instant’ (p. 28). After negotiations failed, the account continues, between 7.30 and 8.00 pm the gunmen realized that government forces were approaching and tried to act first. They divided into three groups and attempted to escape the town, pursued by government forces, ‘in the direction of Kyrgyzstan’ (p. 29). Strikingly, the fighting between government forces and gunmen as the Hokimiyat was retaken – the main focus of foreign press reporting – is not discussed at all. The narrative leaps over this, the very next sentence beginning a discussion of the death toll, ‘It is still not possible to say precisely how many soldiers and police officers were killed.’ Karimov ends his report by saying that the chase had to be abandoned at 11.30 pm on the night of 13 May, and that some of those fleeing may have escaped into Kyrgyzstan’s Osh and Jalalabad regions (pp. 29–30). With this, Karimov concludes his report, saying ‘This summary of mine is comprised only of facts. I have not said anything apart from the basic facts ... . I have not provided any commentary of my own on the events’ (p. 30). He then goes on to offer such a commentary, drawing five conclusions. First, he claims that the ‘religious extremists and gunmen’ (p. 30) sought primarily to exploit an opportunity to prepare an overthrow of the government, as had recently occurred in Kyrgyzstan. Second, the young had their minds poisoned to believe that this opportunity presented itself in Uzbekistan because the local and national government were similarly weak. Third, ‘Behind the Andijon gunmen were people from other countries’ (p. 38), backing the Akromists and members of Hizb-ut Tahrir. Fourth, they thought that the population of Andijon would support them, and finally their overall aim was to overthrow the constitutional order and create a ‘Caliphate" (18-19).
• Islom Karimov has and remains heavily aware that his version of the Andijon Incident is in contestation and needs to compete with competing domestic and foreign narratives. As a result his conceptualization of the incident is designed to delegitimize other interpretations, esp. those by foreign governments (20).
• In his account, President Karimov identifies the primary antagonists as being 'criminals' [jinoyatchi], terrorists [terrorist], and religious extremists [diniy ektremist]. From this perspective the Andijon Incident is entirely represented by the violent actions at the hokimiyat building and various police stations, with the only civilians involved being supporters of the movement or innocents coerced into becoming human shields. This allows the regime to justify their deaths and its violent response, b/c according to the government account there were no other demonstrations (20).
• This account also dismisses the possible of alternative motivators besides extremism or criminality for the actions in Andijon. The involvement of the trial of 23 businessmen in the preceding months and the increased social and economic tensions in the city are not addressed at all, b/c non-violent groups are not recognized by the narrative (20).
• From the narrative it can be considered that the Karimov administration considers the civilians injured during the Andijon Incident to be collateral damage and thus included in the death tally as among criminals or terrorists as supporters. This means that the government figure of 187 dead could be partially accurate, although still demonstrative of a brutal response to agitation (21).
• The author argues that hegemonic masculinity in Uzbekistan is necessary to understanding the construction and expression of state "Uzbekness" in day-to-day life in Uzbekistan, w/ the ideology of mustaqillik being the defining characteristic of contemporary hegemonic masculinity. A source mine of research contributing to gender conceptualization in Central Asia is also present (21-22).
• According to the hegemonic conceptualization of masculinity in contemporary Uzbekistan, the gunmen involved in the Andijon Incident represented a heterodox masculinity in three main ways:
• By attacking their countrymen and defying the paternal state, they defied the responsible of a good Uzbek to care for his father and brothers. This was specifically emphasized through their role in killing policemen, who did idealize the respectful and fatherly Uzbek (22).
• In this telling President Karimov is representative of the idealized Uzbekistani masculinity, coming to Andijon with the goal of helping his brother-citizens and consulting his locals and community elders before any actions. This embodies the positive respect for the elders in Uzbek masculinity, as President Karimov says: "If I did not know the opinions of those who live in the sacred homeland of Andijon, first of all those important mahalla oqsoqollar (respected old men), the elderly, and the honourable, if I did not ask for their help, it is certain that bringing thousands of soldiers to Andijon would achieve absolutely nothing at all" (23).
• The second divergence between proper Uzbek masculinity and the masculinity of the gunmen was in their treatment of women and children during the events. Previous research indicates that masculinity in Central Asia is largely defined by ability to control female bodies in public space, whereas the gunmen misuse this power by placing women and children in harms way as human shields (23).
• The third heterodoxy was the duplicitousness of the gunmen during negotiations. The hegemonic masculinity in Uzbekistan speaks directly and truthful, in erkakcha, whereas the gunmen both changed demands and communicated different goals to the government versus allies in Afghanistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. The speech of Islom Karimov during this period perfectly represents truthful and blunt erkakcha (24).
• By employing strategies and rhetoric which undermine the masculinity, muslim-ness and Uzbek-ness of the individuals opposing the government, President Karimov establishes himself as the idealized centre of the hegemonic masculinity and damages the claims of the anti-government forces to represent Islam or Uzbek identity (24).
• President Karimov's conceptualization of the Andijon Incident further creates a dichotomy between the gunmen and the government by framing the event in terms of constitutional illegitimacy. By using violence, the gunmen are going against the constitutional order and ignoring the constitutional and rational mode of control, namely elections. In this way, the government's actions are a rational response to provocation (25).
• The constitutional legitimacy and lawfulness of President Karimov's regime is implied to such a degree that the possibility that the government fired on unarmed protestors is dismissed as ridiculous as, "I do not think that is possible to find a single person in any government in the world who would give the order to fire on unarmed people. Tell me, where did you discover this rumour, where did it come from, where have you seen such a country? Have you seen one in Latin America, have you seen one in Africa, have you seen one in Asia, where have you seen one?11 Whence did the rumour that demonstrators were shot arise?" (25).
• President Karimov also frames the state and anti-government forces during the Andijon Incident in terms of understanding versus opposing the 'natural laws of states'. In this conceptualization, Uzbekistan needs to follow its own unique path towards democracy and trying to export foreign ideas like jihad or coloured revolutions to Uzbekistan is sheer folly (27).
• This comes from a confusing aspect of the state ideology of President Karimov's regime, the partial adoption of telological history from Marxism which states that all nations progress through stages of development. President Karimov, however, asserts that the stages of development are different for each country and both of these facts cannot be ignored. If stages progress too rapidly, as in the Kyrgyz Republic during the Tulip Revolution, bad things happen, and if foreign ideologies are imported, as in Andijon bad things happen (25-26).  
• "Rather than reworking the ‘ideology of national independence’, President Karimov’s book on the subject frames his government’s response as a legitimate and necessary law and order operation in reaction to a plot perpetrated by criminals and terrorists of deviant masculinity and religiosity and inauthentic nationality, opposed to the constitutional order and at odds with the scientific laws of states" (28).
• Importantly, the rhetoric of the Uzbekistani state in regards to the Andijon Incident does not reference mustaqillik or other high-level ideological concepts. Instead the concepts utilized by the state during this time of crisis are traditional Muslim values, hegemonic masculinity, and the sense of Uzbek-ness (28).
• This may indicate a distinction between the forms of nationalism produced and consumed by elites versus the common people. If true, the current scope of research on ideology and nationalism in Uzbekistan is greatly skewed towards the nationalism of elite groups not deployed in every situation (28).