March, Luke. "The Russian Duma ‘opposition’: no drama out of crisis?". East European Politics, vol. 28, no.3 (2012): 241-255.

March, Luke. "The Russian Duma ‘opposition’: no drama out of crisis?". East European Politics, vol. 28, no.3 (2012): 241-255.

• The 2008 Economic Crisis has a major event for Russia, precipitating a 7.9% drop in GDP from 2008 to 2009, the most severe contraction of any OECD country. The author notes that despite this decline, there was no large scale mobilization against the government, nor significant decrease in support for President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin.
• Similarly there were no statistically significant changes in party approval ratings between 2007 and 2011, despite massive decreases in traditional party support through the US and Europe (242).
• Some discontent at the economic situation did manifest in the electorate during the 2011 general election -- alongside other factors -- but the question remains: why did this not manifest earlier? (242).
• Despite claims that the Russian opposition, with the possible exception of the Communist Party, is fake and parastatal, the author states that: "Virtual or not, each of these three parties claims to be the genuine opposition; each has real voters and real elected representatives and receives real funding. So their role is hardly negligible: for better or worse, they constitute the only national opposition in Russia" (242).
• Some organic and single-issue protests against Russian economic policy towards the Great Recession did emerge, but these only belatedly received support from political parties, if they did so at all (243).
• All political parties developed significant critiques of the Russian government's policies in response to the Great Recession, mainly focusing solutions on increased subsidies, tariffs, and state control. They also criticized figures within United Russia, although only the Communist Party went so far as to actual criticize either Putin or Medvedev (244).
• The role that political parties could ever play in the current Russian political system is extremely doubtful, as the majority of political action occurs through informal face-to-face interaction between policymakers and high officials (244).
• This is demonstrated through the sycophantic behavior of party elites within the system, such as this speech by the leader of Just Russia: "[We are] very critical of the financial and economic ministries. But we think the president and prime minister will figure things out for themselves...we are calling for change, but the president and the prime minister will decide what kind of change it will be" (244).
• An example of this informal behavior occurred during the opposition boycott of Parliament following the 2009 elections. After irregularities they left, but returned after a week w/o clear political concessions. The next elections, however, in 2011, where on a more level field, indicating that something was done (245). 
• The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) is a right-wing radical populist party, which rhetorically divides the population between the 'morally pure' populace and a venal ruling class who need to be removed. It frequently calls for violent action against elites and foreign interests, despite itself being extraordinarily corrupt even by Russian standards (245). Like many populist movements, LDPR is characterized by inconsistency, and manages to reconcile tirades against United Russia as the hallmark of all corruption w/ a pro-government position and laudatory opinions of Putin (246).
• The reforms that the LDPR did suggest included reshuffling of key economic positions, imposition of monopolies on luxury goods and alcohol, banning foreign investments, and demanding an end to one-party rule by United Russia (246).
• Just Russia emerge in 2006 as a combination of three pre-existing left-wing parties, and exists today as a parastatal social democratic group. Just Russia adopted a strategy of praising the economic reforms of President Medvedev, while attacking corruption within United Russia, all part of a strategy to replace United Russia as the 'party of power'. It focused domestically on traditional social-democratic issues, such as dependence on raw resources and increased wealth inequality in Russia. (247).
• In some areas Just Russia emphasized the role of United Russia's one-party monopoly as a leading cause in Russian crisis. They called for a lower barrier to party registration and direct election of governors. In those areas where regional party groups openly voiced platforms of democracy, Just Russia polled significantly higher; e.g., 16% in Altai Krai.
• The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is by far the most oppositional of the groups, although critiques point to a great degree of control still existing, despite anti-regime and anti-Putin rhetoric. Since the 1990s, they have repeatedly advocated for political reform, and directly accused United Russia and Prime Minister Putin of criminality (248). The critiques of the Communist Party followed an ideological line, blaming the failure on global capitalism and provide classical Marxist critique. They advocated increased public ownership and a return to a command economy as a solution to the crisis (249).
• Interestingly, the party has praised Medvedev while decrying Putin, attempting to drive a wedge between Russian leadership. To what degree this was political theater is difficult to determine, although the Communist Party was the only group to not support Putin's election as Prime Minister (248).
• Despite these critiques from all three opposition groups, very little came of this opposition. Although all parties either opposed or abstained in the vote on Putin's anti-crisis plan, the budget was still approved with a 3:1 majority. Their voting record on other issues is equally messy, w/ only the Communists consistently opposing government laws (250).
• The only real and substantive opposition to the policies of United Russia, Medvedev, and Putin came in the form of radical non-parliamentary organizations or individual Duma members not backed by their political parties (251).
• Based solely on their rhetoric, the three Russian opposition parties make-up a strong and formidable opposition, however the self-limiting nature of the party leadership prevented any party from translating rhetoric into action and stopped short of actual oppositional political action (251).
• No party even challenged the policies of President Medvedev, with almost all anger expressed at United Russia, unnamed foreigners, 'traitors', and members of other opposition parties (251).
• The author says that this conclusion offers hope for democratic reform in the future, as it demonstrates that the main obstacle to pluralism and democratic politics is the self-limiting behavior of party elites. This means that should the elites end this behavior, the current system has no other options currently in place to stop oppositional politics (252).