March, Luke. "Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’". Europe-Asia Studies, vol.64, no.3 (2012): 401-425.

March, Luke. "Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’". Europe-Asia Studies, vol.64, no.3 (2012): 401-425.

• There is a wide-ranging discussion of the extent to which nationalism influences policy-construction in Russia, including concerns of a 'Weimar Russia' of authoritarian nationalism. Many scholars disagree with these interpretations. A source mine of the various arguments in available from page 401 to 403.
• The author hopes that his analysis will be more holistic than other works about how official statements and rhetoric actually affect Russian foreign and domestic policy. From this Dr. March concludes that nationalism is a tool of the regime to mobilize support towards regime goals, but that it is losing the ability to suppress this nationalism when it wants to, increasing becoming prison to its own rhetoric (402).
• The author divides Russian nationalism into three 'faces': official, cultural, and political. Official nationalism refers to Kremlin rhetoric and policies. Cultural nationalism refers to preserving the 'Russian lifestyle' and civilizational values. Political nationalism focuses on the ways nationalism and national symbols are used during electoral periods. The state manages, supports, or represses all these forms of nationalism (403).
• Since the Russian state is mainly interested in controlling and repressing forms of nationalism which challenge it, the regime often puts radical and xenophobic nationalism at an advantage compared to liberal nationalism, since only the liberals are actually critical of the authoritarian nature of the current Russian regime (404).
• To some degree Russia abandoned ideology during the 1990s, as the collapse of the Russian state under Yeltsin discredited liberalism to a similar degree as communism and fascism. Instead state ideology has been largely supplanted by pragmatism and fragmented elite interests (404).
• Since 1996, however, groups within the Kremlin have been searching for a new identity which could restore social cohesion in the way that Communism had done during the Soviet Union. The current national idea is distributed through the variety of media controlled by the Kremlin (405).
• Many of the current ideas and ideologies which influence the current Russian 'national idea' come from traditional conservatism, including anti-Bolshevik Tsarist figures. This idea emphasizes Russia's unique history and culture, and how its culture will reflect a unique Russian state (405).
• Russian democracy and constitutionalism may be weak, but its existence still is vital to the structure of the modern Russian state (407).
• The concept of the modern Russian state is still very much based on traditional Tsarist notions of divine or ordained autocracy, with a focus on a single strong leader. The state is above any law or constitution in the Russian conscious, taking-up a place as the collective will of the nation above any singular institution (407).
• This is an important distinction of Putin's rule, as the focus is placed on 'statism', rather than traditional 'nationalism'. It is the state that is glorified, not the people. This also tends towards a more civic, less ethnic, basis for rule; Russiiskaya, not Russkaya (408).
• Another lynchpin of the modern Russian 'national idea' is the concept of 'sovereign democracy' stressed in Kremlin speeches. This concept, which stressed the importance of sovereignty and domestic non-interference, is a 'native' version of democracy, created as an alternative to the pure Western import of the 1990s (408).
• Despite being 'democracy', this concept is really just a cover for the autocratic measures taken by Russia as a response to colored revolutions in surrounding countries. It stands for sovereignty, and sovereignty alone (409).
• Any 'democracy' within the Russian concept of sovereign democracy is based on popular rule rather than democratic process. The Russian state is conceived as democratic b/c it supposedly expresses the national will, not b/c it has democratic institutions (409).
• Official Russian nationalism, as proscribed by Putin as an element of the 'national idea', is clear, moderate, and pro-European in that it does not stress Russian differences with the rest of Europe. There is even indication that Russia considers itself in official statements to be majorly a European, not Eurasian, state (410).
• The rhetoric of media produced by the Kremlin and pro-government news sources, however, is striking for its cultural and civilizational nationalism, which is abundantly anti-West in that it places specific stress on the differences between Russia and the USA/EU (410).
• The most significant break between contemporary Russian nationalism and traditional nationalism under the Tsar is the absence of Orthodox or Christian identity from official discourse. Although the Russian Orthodox Church undoubtedly has a privileged position within the Russian state, it is used by both parties to gain support, rather than create an actual union (410).
• Moreover, contemporary Russian nationalism also includes strong support among Russian Muslims. Putin has made statement that Russia is a 'Muslim Power' and taken steps to ally himself w/ moderate figures in the Muslim world. Putin has worked especially hard at fostering an inclusive Russian identity after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (411).
• The possible ethnic and Russo-centric nature of Russian nationalism is the cause of enormous intra-elite competition in Russia. There are some who want to see Russian ethnics restore to a position as 'elder brother', but such proposals face backlash from powerful Tatar elites, among others (411).
• Russian official nationalism is intensely conservative and statist, primarily focused on inculcating loyalty to the current system through references to historical traditions and the benefits of authoritarian rule. The lack of definition of what traits exactly make Russia 'russian' helps the state, as its nationalism can include more ethnic and religious groups (412).
• The cultural nationalism as distributed through pro-government media outlets and unofficial discourse is much more civilizationalist in scope, w/ frequent references to an inevitable clash between a unique Russia and a culturally alien West (412).
• Popular media sources in Russia, mainly television, fail to present viewpoints to challenge the dominant narrative of their coverage, which is imperialistic, anti-West, and sometimes xenophobic (412).
• Cultural nationalism is extremely influenced by the personality cult it has created around Putin, essentially elevating him to the position of Father-Tsar (413).
• A conservative Russian Orthodox Church has participated greatly in unofficial Russian nationalism, using the opportunity of media exposure to enforce a Christian national identity in rejection of Western liberalism and individualism (416).
• The narrative of the Soviet past created by the Kremlin is troubling and confusing. They essentially face a contradiction between the desire to hold-up the USSR as the expression of Russian triumph and a necessary stress on the deficiencies of the Soviet and the crimes of Stalin. They have yet to find a happy resting point between these two (415).
• Russian policies opportunistically and inconsistently aim both to repress and stimulate nationalism (often simultaneously). The Kremlin believes it can control its domestic nationalism, but recognizes the potential negative effects of encouraging grass-roots nationalism. Consequently, the government tries to reduce it to symbolic actions and rhetoric, but this often does not have the desired effect. The Kremlin then tried to counter the 'dark side' of nationalism -- xenophobia and hate crimes -- by depriving radical nationalists of political support by including their issues in the official agenda, slowly degrading the government's control over nationalist influences (416).
• The government seems to recognize the danger of extreme nationalism and has taken steps to better prosecute hate crime. It also forced one of the main nationalist parties, Rodina bloc, to join the moderate Just Russia party. It frequently denies registration to extreme nationalist groups (417).
• The hubris of Kremlin policy towards nationalism is best demonstrated through its use of youth groups. 'Anti-orange' groups such as Nashi or the youth-wing of United Russia were created largely to feed moderate nationalism and deny radical groups of members, but the government is often unable to control these organization and prevent them from engaging in similar acts of xenophobia and radicalism (417).
• The Russian government has demonstrated extreme inconsistency in regards to its policies on nationalism, embracing or rejecting different groups as different time seemingly on political whim or to further the agenas of separate power politics (417).
• The dismemberment of the Rodina bloc falls under this category, as the initiative to remove the group from parliament was started by the LDPR, itself a quasi-fascist organization!
• The author includes a number of sometimes shocking examples of Kremlin manipulation of populist and nationalist sympathies, including the destructive results of such short-term attempts to attract voters to a nationalist or nativist electorate (416-419).
• "The Kremlin does not always directly instigate its nationalist excesses, but the authorities’ official nationality and prevalent ‘civilisational nationalism’ repeatedly give a ‘demand from the top’ for nationalist mobilisation in the context of a hierarchical political system with a long historical memory and inadequate safeguards" (619).
• Often these rhetorical demands from the top for nationalist action can create a negative feedback loop through which top-level rhetoric creates demands for action from the bottom, which the government then has to fulfill to prevent losing the legitimacy it gained through appealing to nationalism (619).
• Seeing the Russian elite as inherently nationalistic is a grave mistake, as the official nationalism of the Russian government emphasizes state-centrism, conservatism, European-identity, modernization, and secularism. However, attempts to mobilize a nationalism based on these values have been largely redirected towards more successful civilizationalist and Eurasianist arguments which garner larger electoral response. The Russian government believes that it can successfully control these groups, although it often faces extreme difficulties in doing so (620).
• The dangers of Russian nationalism are greatly compounded by the lack of actual forums for public debate, leading to the continued acceptance among elites and masses of xenophobic, racist, and nativist ideas, which the Kremlin would like to avoid (620).
• As of now, Russian foreign policy is driven by pragmatism rather than ideology of any kind. There does not appear to be active promotion of Eurasianist or neo-imperial dimensions of Russian foreign policy. Despite this, Russia still has separate interests and will act to protect them (621).
• Almost all Russian nationalism is produced for domestic consumption to legitimate local and regional elites. Any spill-over into foreign policy is a result of the inability of the Kremlin to effectively control the nationalism which its rhetoric and policies create (622).
• The imprecise nature of Russian nationalism makes the current Russian government less predictable and more dangerous as an international partner, as it cannot always plan out the foreign policy options available to it at a given time (622).