Lischin, Luke. "The IMU Ascendant: How Uzbek Autocracy Empowers Terrorist Entrepreneurs". Small Wars Journal, 28 Jun. 2014.

Lischin, Luke. "The IMU Ascendant: How Uzbek Autocracy Empowers Terrorist Entrepreneurs". Small Wars Journal, 28 Jun. 2014.

• Although whether the phenomenon is widespread or accurate is not determined, some in Uzbekistan certainly feel that the government is using the threat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [O'zbekistan Islomiy Harakati] (IMU/O'zIH) to pressure NATO and the ISAF mission to support the Uzbekistani Armed Forces. The government has been blunt in its opportunism, asking the coalition to sell old equipment to the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan (1).
• There has been a general perception in both Uzbekistani society and the opinions of Western military leaders that the IMU is a spent force, killed off a decade ago and incapable of mustering any force in the Central Asian republics (2).
• There is mounting evidence from the experience of ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan that the IMU is still operating withe efficiency in some Northern areas of the country. Between 2009 and 2013, ISAF patrols report increased numbers of Uzbek militants in the Kunduz and Taxar provinces. The IMU also have been collecting taxes from the locals and installed a 'shadow governor' named Attallah by capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the post-Taliban leadership (2).
• Very little is known about IMU Amir Usman Ghazi or other members of the leadership, but the organization is estimated as of 2010 to have 1,000 to 5,000 men operating in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan and North Waziristan funded to the tune of $2.4 million to $4.87 million a year by the Afghan Taliban. The group appears to be well trained and possessing a relatively developed public relations platform (2).
• As the contemporary IMU is very closely based in Afghanistan and seems to have little functional activity in Uzbekistan, it's future presence in Central Asia is unknown. However, the group has made several indicates that it intends to one day carry out operations in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics (2).
• The conceptual and theoretical framework in which this paper operates is a social network theory of terrorism developed by thinkers such as Sherzod Abdukadirov. To operate successfully within this theoretical framework, terrorist organizations need to be able to access other actors and resources which allow them to provide public goods, which may be difficult in the face of legal restrictions to their operation. This paper examines the role of these restrictions in prevent the development of terrorist networks in Central Asia and Uzbekistan (3).
• "Social network theories of terrorism often share common assumptions regarding the bounded rationality of terrorists operating within particular social contexts. Under this line of reasoning terrorists are not exceptional actors whose motivations are too particular or idiosyncratic to explain but are, in the words of Sherzod Abdukadirov “social entrepreneurs”. Andukadirov asserts that terrorist actors are much like nonprofit organizations in that they can provide societies with alternative access to public goods that other actors, primarily the state, have failed to adequately provision. Public goods, unlike private goods, are often intangible and conceptual in nature, and carry a normative subtext. “Security”, “defense”, and “justice” are critical examples of public goods that terrorist groups, by virtue of their capacity and willingness to use force, are sometimes able to provide. Because these groups are nominally driven by an innate desire to provide these goods and gain public trust, terrorist organizations are understood to be “altruistic” and therefore willing to incur material costs in order to supply these goods" (3).
• The author explains the continued and unexpected stability of Uzbekistan as the result of a rough balance of power within the country between regional cliques and informal patronage systems (3). Mr. Lischin asserts that the system in Uzbekistan in neopatrimonial, and uses arbitrary arrests and military force to enforce the domination of resources by a limited group of oligarchs (4).
• The author notes that 'clan' divisions no longer explain Uzbekistani politics, as President Karimov seems to created a new system of patronage which transcends these previous regional or familial patron-client divisions. The author claims that President Karimov has centered all systems of patronage around his family and a small number of clients, which increases his personal power at the cost of alienating previous clients, who may search for other partners. The author claims that this system functions by arresting other wealthy elites and redistributing their assets among clients (4).
• Within countries with a developed civil society, elites who had been rejected from patronage networks might turn towards civil society, but Uzbekistani civil society is so controlled, restricted, and regulated by the state that this is not a viable option for organizing oppositional politics. The control achieved through domination of finances and complex administrative procedures for approval means alternative systems of power are underground (5). 
• A number of underground and illegal organizations exist in Uzbekistan, which provide the sorts of social and public goods that the government cannot and civil society is not always allowed to. The most infamous of these groups is Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Salafi group which advocates the creation of a global, fundamentalist caliphate through conversation and non-violent means. The are extremely banned in Central Asia, but still may have 7,000 to the implausible 60,000 members in Uzbekistan and 3,000 to 5,000 in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. In addition to proselytizing, Hizb ut-Tahrir provide charity services to needy families, organizing religious services, and helps organize actions against corruption (6).
• Neither Hizb ut-Tahrir nor other prominent oppositions groups, namely Birlik and Erk, have made lasting impacts in Uzbekistani political life. Their existence is a struggle, with no hope for expansion. Protests have similarly been infrequent, mainly focused on single issues that have failed to coalesce into a national movement (6).
• The Uzbekistani state constructed by Islom Karimov has made itself stable by limiting the capacity of individuals to organize outside of state structures and therefore making the population extremely dependent on the state for all basic material and social goods. Maintaining this domestic stability means prevent alternative patronage systems from developing, largely by limiting international interference in internal affairs (6).
• While acknowledging that neither ethnic Uzbeks in Central Asia nor Uzbekistani citizens display any strong tendencies towards Salafism or versions of Islam not sanctions by the state and promoted by the mahalla, the author contends that by discarding the jihadi elements of its message, the IMU could capitalize on anti-Karimov sentiment and install itself as a success anti-government opposition (7).
• This danger is present because the IMU represents the only capable sub-state force in Uzbekistan, as it is the only opposition group capable of mustering armed force. This may lead some anti-Karimov groups to ally with it, despite not sharing its jihadi ambitions. It would be well suited to the kind of the guerrilla asymmetric warfare it uses against ISAF forces, having developed since its defeat by Uzbekistani forces around the turn of the century (8).
• To counter the seeming implausibility of liberal or secular Uzbekistani oppositions groups working with the IMU, the author has noted that a similar coalition of forces appeared to overthrow the Shah during the Iranian Revolution. Mr. Lischin notes that charismatic leadership and powerful friends in Afghanistan could propel the IMU to play a major role in any process of tumultuous regime change in Uzbekistan (8).